Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0438-2007
Contents
1. Address Contents Data 80000h 80001h Chip status information ir a internal management 80002h 80003h ROM code number ROM code number 80004h 80005h Device Type 100C h 80006h 8000Fh Available for customer All FF h Samsung s internal management 80010h 8001Bh Serial number value beginning with 14 h 8001Ch 8001Dh IC Fabricator 4250 h 8001Eh 8001 Fh IC Fabrication Date YDDD h where Y is the last digit of the year and DDD is the number of the day within the year 80020h 80021h IC Module Fabricator 4252 h 80022h 80023h IC Module date Packaging YDDD h where Y is the last digit of the year and DDD is the number of the day within the year 80024h 80027h IC Serial Number A proprietary binary number 80028h 80029h IC Batch number A proprietary binary number 8002Ah IC Version 11h 8002Bh Test ROM Code Version 10h 8002Ch 8002Dh Crypto Library Version 035C h 8002Eh DRNG Library Version 02h 80030h 8007Fh Available for customer All FF h Table 6 TOE version information 3 Security Policy The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus provi ding an overall smart card system security Therefore the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure2. specific engineering costs Evaluation assurance level 5 EAL5 semiformally designed and tested chapter 11 7 Objectives EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques will not be large EALS is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques Evaluation assurance level 6 EAL6 semiformally verified design and tested chapter 11 8 Objectives EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs C 6 BSI DSZ
3. Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators AIS 32 Version 1 02 July 2001 Ubernahme international abgestimmter CC Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs schema AIS 34 Version 1 00 1 June 2004 Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5 AIS 36 Version 1 29 July 2002 for CC Supporting Document ETR lite for Composition Version 1 1 July 2002 and CC Supporting Document ETR lite for Composition Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation Version 1 2 March 2002 German IT Security Certificates BSI 7148 BSI 7149 periodically updated list published also on the BSI Web site Security Target Security Target of S8CC9GC 16 bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards Project Comanche Version 1 1 9 February 2007 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd Security Target Lite of SSCC9GC 16 bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards Project Comanche Version 1 0 13 February 2007 Evaluation Technical Report ETR Version 1 26 02 2007 for the product S3CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 confidential document Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1 0 July 2001 BSI registration ID BSI PP 0002 2001 developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs Hitachi Ltd Infineon Technologies AG Philips Semiconductors B 23 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 10 ETR lite for composition Version 1 26 02 2007 for the product S3CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Mic
4. b CC Part 3 extended A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3 Additionally the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements in which case it consists of one of the following a Package name Conformant A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre defined named functional and or assurance package e g EAL if the requirements functions or assurance include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result b Package name Augmented A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre defined named functional and or assurance package e g EAL if the requirements functions or assurance are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result Finally the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles in which case it includes the following a PP Conformant A TOE meets specific PP s which are listed as part of the conformance result C 1 Certification Report CC Part 3 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Assurance categorisation chapter 7 5 The assurance classes families and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 1 Assurance Class ACM Configuration management ADO Delivery and operation ADV Development Assurance Family CM automation ACM_AUT CM capabilities ACM_CAP CM scope
5. Block Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory Electro magnetic analysis Evaluation Technical Report Integrated Circuit Information Technology Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility Protection Profile Random Access Memory Random Number Generator Read Only Memory Rivest Shamir Adelmann a public key encryption algorithm Security Function Security Function Policy Security Functional Requirement Strength of Function Security Target Target of Evaluation Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES TSF Scope of Control TOE Security Functions TOE Security Policy TOE Summary Specification 13 2 Glossary Augmentation The addition of one or more assurance component s from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package Extension The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC B 21 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Formal Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well established mathematical concepts Informal Expressed in natural language Object An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations Protection Profile An implementation independent set of security require ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs Security Function A part or parts of the TOE
6. Organisational Security Policies defined for the TOE are specified in the Security Target 7 and can be summarised as follows It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf of him So called standard high level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile 9 were derived from considering the end usage phase Phase 7 of the life cycle as described in the Security Target as follows e manipulation of User Data and of the Smart Card Embedded Software while being executed processed and while being stored in the TOE s memories e disclosure of User Data and of the Smart Card Embedded Software while being processed and while being stored in the TOE s memories and e deficiency of random numbers These high level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile 9 and used by the Security Target 6 by defining threats on a more technical level for B 8 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report e Inherent Information Leakage e Physical Probing e Physical Manipulation e Malfunction due to Environmental Stress e Forced Information Leakage e Abuse of Functionality and e Deficiency of Random Numbers Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by assumptions see below The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE Delivery are covered by an Organisational Security Policy outlining that the IC Developer Man
7. also known as IC firmware is mainly used for testing purpose during production only but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and or additional services including a RSA asymmetric cryptography library and an AIS20 4 compliant random number generation library All other software is called Smart Card Embedded Software which is not part of the TOE Regarding the RSA crypto library the user has the possibility to tailor this IC Dedicated Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the RSA crypto library Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA crypto library what is resulting in two TOE configurations If the user decides not to use the RSA crypto library the library is not delivered to the user In this case Rivest Shamir Adleman RSA is not provided by the TOE Deselecting the RSA crypto library means excluding the code implementing functionality which the user decided not to use Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality The TOE S3CC9GC is manufactured in IC fabrication of Samsung in Giheung Korea indicated by the production line indicator 14 as hex see part D Annex A of this report The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip composed of hardware and software part
8. of all hardware software and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP TOE Security Policy A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed protected and distributed within a TOE TSF Scope of Control The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP B 22 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report 14 1 2 3 4 gt 6 7 8 9 Bibliography Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Version 2 3 August 2005 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM Evaluation Methodology Version 2 3 August 2005 BSI certification Procedural Description BSI 7125 Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme AIS as relevant for the TOE AIS 20 Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme AIS AIS 20 Versioni Date 2 December 1999 Status Mandatory Subject Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators Publisher Certification body of the BSI Section Il 2 as part of the certification scheme AIS 25 Version 2 29 July 2002 for CC Supporting Document The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 1 2 July 2002 AIS 26 Version 2 6 August 2002 for CC Supporting Document Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 1 1 July 2002 AIS 31 Version 1 25 Sept 2001 for
9. the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a deterministic random number generator If the user decides not to use the RSA crypto library the library is not delivered to the user Hence the BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA crypto library what is resulting in two TOE configurations As the TOE is a hardware security platform the security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information e g to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during Triple DES and RSA cryptographic functions performed by the TOE against physical probing against malfunctions against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality Hence the TOE shall e maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE and e maintain the integrity the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions security mechanisms and associated functions provided by the TOE 4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope The TOE the S3CC9GC microcontroller featuring the TORNADO cryptographic coprocessor is a Smart Card integrated circuit which is composed of a processing unit security components contactless and contact based I O ports and volatile and non volatile memories hardware The TOE comprises the hardware of the smart card secu
10. threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources e g data allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users Application notes A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator s independent vulnerability analysis Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low for AVA_VLA 2 Independent vulnerability analysis moderate for AVA_VLA 3 Moderately resistant or high for AVA_VLA 4 Highly resistant attack potential C 8 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 D Annexes List of annexes of this certification report Annex A Evaluation results regarding development and production environment Certification Report D 3 D 1 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 This page is intentionally left blank D 2 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certi
11. 16 bit Timer and 20 bit Watchdog Detectors and Security Control RESET Address and Data Bus DES AES Power Control MPU Memory Protection Unit Testrom_code RSA Crypto Library and DRNG Library are used Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry The Special Function Registers the CPU instructions and the various on chip memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of the TOE The subsystem Testrom_code stored on the chip is used for testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery 6 Documentation The documentations 11 15 are provided with the products by the developer to the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the operating system and or application software which will use the TOE as hard ware computing platform to implement the software operating system application software which will use the TOE 7 IT Product Testing The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories B 14 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report i Simulation tests These tests are performed before starting the production to develop the technology for the production and to define the process parameters ii Qualification tests These
12. 7 Certification Report 1 7 Disclaimers The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied 2 Identification of the TOE The Target of Evaluation TOE is called S3CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 The following tables outline the TOE deliverables No Type Identifier Release Form of delivery 1 HW S3CC9GC Vers 11 Wafer 2 SW DRNG V2 0 Source code in electronic form 3 SW Secure Crypto Library optional V3 5S Source code in electronic form 4 DOC User s manual 11 V3 1 In electronic form 5 DOC Security Application Note 12 V1 5 In electronic form 6 DOC RSA Application Note 13 V1 8 In electronic form 7 DOC DRNG Application Note 14 V2 0 In electronic form 8 DOC S38CC9GC Delivery Specification 15 V1 2 In electronic form Table 5 Delivered documents of the TOE The delivered micro chips contain the actual TOE and the embedded software They are delivered in form of wafer
13. ACM_SCP Delivery ADO_DEL Installation generation and start up ADO_IGS Functional specification ADV_FSP High level design ADV_HLD Implementation representation ADV_IMP TSF internals ADV_INT Low level design ADV_LLD Representation correspondence ADV_RCR Security policy modeling ADV_SPM AGD Guidance documents Administrator guidance AGD_ADM User guidance AGD_USR ALC Life cycle support Development security ALC_DVS Flaw remediation ALC_FLR Life cycle definition ALC_LCD Tools and techniques ALC_TAT ATE Tests Coverage ATE_COV Depth ATE_DPT Functional tests ATE_FUN Independent testing ATE_IND AVA Vulnerability assessment Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA Misuse AVA_MSU Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA Table 1 Assurance family breakdown and mapping BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report Evaluation assurance levels chapter 11 The Evaluation Assurance Levels EALs provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE It is important to note that not all families a
14. BSI Certification Report IR Bundesamt f r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 for S3CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 from Samsung Electronics Co Ltd BSI Bundesamt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Postfach 20 03 63 D 53133 Bonn Phone 49 0 3018 9582 0 Fax 49 0 3018 9582 5477 Infoline 49 0 3018 9582 111 Certification Report V1 0 ZS 01 01 F 326 V3 31 XSI Bundesamt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 S3CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 ur 0H NL from Samsung Electronics Co Ltd Common Criteria Arrangement for components up to EAL4 The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation Version 2 3 ISO IEC 15408 2005 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation Version 2 3 ISO IEC 15408 2005 Evaluation Results PP Conformance Protection Profile BSI PP 0002 2001 Functionality BSI PP 0002 2001 conformant plus product specific extensions Common Criteria Part 2 extended Assurance Package Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL4 augmented by ALC_DVS 2 Life cycle support Sufficiency of security measures AVA_MSU 3 Vulner
15. CC 0438 2007 Certification Report Evaluation assurance level 7 EAL7 formally verified design and tested chapter 11 9 Objectives EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis C 7 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Strength of TOE security functions AVA_SOF chapter 19 3 Objectives Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed deactivated or corrupted it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim Vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA chapter 19 4 Objectives Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods e g by flaw hypotheses could allow users to violate the TSP Vulnerability analysis deals with the
16. Do 336 711 Korea Onyang plant Delivery d PKL Co Ltd Plant 493 3 Sungsung Dong Cheonan City Choongcheongnam Do 330 300 Korea Mask House The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in Giheung Korea is labelled by the production line indicator 14 as hex For the sites listed above the requirements have been specifically applied for each site and in accordance with Security Target Security Target of SSCC9GC 16 bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards Project Comanche Version 1 1 9 February 2007 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd D 3 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 The evaluators verified that the threats and the security objective for the life cycle phases 2 3 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 as stated in the Security Target 6 are fulfiled by the procedures of these sites D 4
17. It is assumed that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation Protection during Packaging Finishing and Personalisation A Process Card is assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 as well as during the delivery to Phase 7 The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target e tis assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end user to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data to prevent any possible copy modification retention theft or unauthorised use e All User Data are owned by Smart Card Embedded Software Therefore it must be assumed that security relevant User Data especially cryptographic keys are treated by the Smart Card Embedded Software as defined for the specific application context e The developer of the Smart Card Embedded Software must ensure the appropriate Usage of Keydependent Functions A Key Function while developing this software in Phase 1 Key dependent functions if any shall be implemented in the Smart Card Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage attacks B 10 BSI DSZ CC 0438 200
18. Report A Certification 1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following BSIG BSI Certification Ordinance BSI Schedule of Costs Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern Federal Ministry of the Interior DIN EN 45011 standard BSI certification Procedural Description BSI 7125 Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation CC version 2 3 Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation CEM version 2 3 BSI certification Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme AIS Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 AIS 34 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security BSI Errichtungsgesetz BSIG of 17 December 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt p 2834 Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security BSI Zertifizierungsverordnung BSIZertV of 7 July 1992 Bundesgesetzblatt p 1230 Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt f r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI Kostenverordnung BSI KostV of 03 March 2005 Bundesgeseizblatt p 519 Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19 May 2006 p 3730 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 2 Recognition Agreements In order to avoid multiple certification of the sam
19. The evaluators performed independent tests to supplement augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer by sampling Besides repeating exactly the developers tests test parameters were varied and additional analysis was done With these kind of tests performed in the developer s testing environment the entire security functionality of the TOE was verified Overall the evaluators have tested the TSF systematically against the functional specification the high level design and the low level design The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE with production line indicator 14 as hex in Giheung provides the Security Functions as specified Intensive penetration testing was performed at that time to consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised know how Specific additional penetration attacks were performed in the course of this evaluation B 15 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 8 Evaluated Configuration The TOE is the S3CC9GGC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 5 In the broader sense the production of the mask sets for the chip production may be looked upon as the procedure for the system generation The TOE can be delivered in two configurations e Smart Card IC S3CC9GC Revision 11 e Smart Card IC S8CC9GC Revision 11 with Secure Crypto Library V3 5S No further generation takes place after delivery to the customer Aft
20. ability assessment Analysis and testing for insecure states ADV_IMP 2 Implementation AVA_VLA 4 Vulnerability assessment Highly resistant This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security BSI and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate Bonn 01 March 2007 The President of the Federal Office IT for Information Security Security Certified Dr Helmbrecht L S SOGIS MRA Bundesamt f r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Godesberger Allee 185 189 D 53175 Bonn Postfach 20 03 63 D 53133 Bonn Phone 49 0 3018 9582 0 Fax 49 0 3018 9582 5477 Infoline 49 0 3018 9582 111 The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption see BSIG Section 4 Para 3 Clause 2 This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisat
21. ally considered to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart card application software i e smart card operating system and application This was necessary as Samsung Electronics is the TOE developer and B 13 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card application software in its development and production environment For those aspects refer to part B chapter 9 2 of this report The full evaluation results are applicable only for TOE chips from the semiconductor factory in Giheung labelled by the production line indicator 14 as hex 5 Architectural Information The TOE S8CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 5 is an integrated circuits IC providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application software A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target 6 The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found in guidance documents delivered to the customer see table 5 The TOE consists of the 19 subsystems 16 hardware 3 software as defined in evaluation documentation For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components processing unit CPU with ROM EEPROM RAM I O Deterministic Random Number Generator DRNG TORNADO Clock Timer
22. ate measures to check if security relevant data are correctly written e Requirement resulting from ADO_DEL e As the TOE is under control of the user software the chip manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure It is in the responsibility of the Smart Card Embedded Software Developer to include mechanisms in the implemented software which allows detection of modifications after the delivery e TOEs which failed the production tests are also delivered as they are inked marked my black dots and remain physically on the wafer The Card Manufacturer has to follow the procedure described in 15 to handle these chips in a secure manner B 19 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external security measures explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports have to be fulfilled e TOEs which failed the production tests are also delivered as they are inked marked my black dots and remain physically on the wafer The Card Manu facturer has to follow the procedure described in 15 to handle these chips in a secure manner e Requirement resulting from AVA_MSU During an evaluation of the Smart Card Embedded Software the following has to be checked e Application of the security advices given in 12 especially the rec ommendations for secure usage in 12 chapter 4 e Requirement resulting from AVA_VLA e The TOE is prot
23. countermeasures for unobservability SF5 Cryptography 3 PP ST component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report SF1 SF2 SF3 SF4 SF5 Table 4 TOE Security Functions Environmental Security violation recording and reaction This function records in registers the events notified by the detectors The integrated detectors are frequency detector voltage detector temperature detector light detector inner insulation removal detector active shield removal detector and power glitch detector The filters integrated are used for preventing noise glitches and extremely high frequency in the external reset or clock pad from causing undefined or unpredictable behavior of the chip Access Control This security function manages access to the security control registers through access control security attributes The user mode NORMAL mode has another function which is write enabled bit for security related registers If the user does not enable this bit in 128 cycles after the reset the user cannot write security control registers any more for more details refer to the Security Target 7 chapter 6 1 Non reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes The NORMAL mode of the TOE consists of privilege mode and user mode This function disables the TEST mode and enables the NORMAL mode of the TOE This function ensures the non reversibility of the Normal mode T
24. d provides a mechanism to generate random numbers It includes two functions A random SEED Generation algorithm that generates a truly random number and a Deterministic Random Number Generator DRNG algorithm compliant with AIS 20 4 class K3 SOF High requirements TORNADO RSA Cryptographic Library optional assists in the acceleration of modulo exponentiations required in the RSA encryption decryption algorithm TORNADO is a high speed modular multiplication coprocessor for RSA public key asymmetric cryptographic support The TORNADO RSA Library is a software built for the TORNADO coprocessor it provides high level interfaces for RSA based algorithms for more details please refer to the Security Target 7 chapter 6 1 As the final transition from test mode to normal mode is performed before TOE delivery all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery at the end of phase 3 except SF3 1 3 Strength of Function The TOE s strength of functions is claimed high SOF high for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target 7 The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption see BSIG Section 4 Para 3 Clause 2 For details see chapter 9 of this report 1 4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies OSPs addressed by the evaluated IT product The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE and the
25. dicts for the CC Part 3 assurance components according to EAL4 augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation are summarised in the following table B 16 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report Assurance classes and components Verdict Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS TOE description ASE_DES 1 PASS Security environment ASE_ENV 1 PASS ST introduction ASE_INT 1 PASS Security objectives ASE_OBJ 1 PASS PP claims ASE_PPC 1 PASS IT security requirements ASE_REQ 1 PASS Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE 1 PASS TOE summary specification ASE_TSS 1 PASS Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS Partial CM automation ACM_AUT 1 PASS Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP 4 PASS Development tools CM coverage ACM_SCP 2 PASS Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS Detection of modification ADO_DEL 2 PASS Installation generation and start up procedures ADO_IGS 1 PASS Development CC Class ADV PASS Semiformal functional specification ADV_FSP 2 PASS Semiformal high level design ADV_HLD 2 PASS Implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP 2 PASS Descriptive low level design ADV_LLD 1 PASS Semiformal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR 1 PASS Formal TOE security policy model ADV_SPM 1 PASS Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS Administrator guidance AGD_ADM 1 PASS User guidance AGD_USR 1 PASS Life cycle support CC Cla
26. e product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC under certain conditions was agreed 2 1 European Recognition of ITSEC CC Certificates The SOGIS Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on ITSEC became effective in March 1998 This agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Finland France Germany Greece Italy The Netherlands Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland and the United Kingdom This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels EAL 1 EAL 7 The German Federal Office for Information Security BSI recognizes certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this Agreement 2 2 International Recognition of CC Certificates An arrangement Common Criteria Arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 CC MRA It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC As of February 2007 the arrangement was signed by the national bodies of Australia Austria Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary India Israel Italy Japan Republic of Korea The Netherlands New Zealand Norway Republic of Si
27. ected by light sensors against light injection attacks e g with laser Nevertheless the performed penetration tests show that it is still possible to manipulate a running program with a focussed laser The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer has to implement sufficient counter measures in his software to counter such attacks too The Card Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation e All security hints described in 15 have to be considered 11 Annexes Annex A Evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see part D of this report 12 Security Target For the purpose of publishing the Security Target 7 of the target of evaluation TOE is provided within a separate document It is a sanitized version of the complete Security Target 6 used for the evaluation performed 13 Definitions 13 1 Acronyms ACE Advanced Crypto Engine API Application Programming Interface BSI Bundesamt f r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik Federal Office for Information Security Bonn Germany CBC Cipher Block Chaining B 20 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report CC DES DPA EAL ECB EEPROM EMA ETR TOE Triple DES TSC TSF TSP TSS Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation Data Encryption Standard symmetric block cipher algorithm Differential Power Analysis Evaluation Assurance Level Electrical Code
28. eport Evaluation assurance level 1 EAL1 functionally tested chapter 11 3 Objectives EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required but the threats to security are not viewed as serious It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer including independent testing against a specification and an examination of the guidance documentation provided It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE and for minimal outlay An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation and that it provides useful protection against identified threats Evaluation assurance level 2 EAL2 structurally tested chapter 11 4 Objectives EAL2 requires the co operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently as
29. er delivery the TOE only features one fixed configuration normal mode which cannot be altered by the user The TOE was tested in this configuration All the evaluation and certification results therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE For all evaluation activities performed in test mode there was a rationale why the results are valid for the normal mode too Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software is provided within the user documentation 9 Results of the Evaluation 9 1 Evaluation of the TOE The Evaluation Technical Report ETR 8 was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria 1 the Methodology 2 the requirements of the Scheme 8 and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme AIS 4 as relevant for the TOE The evaluation methodology CEM 2 was used for those components identical with EAL4 For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in co ordination with the Certification Body 4 AIS 34 For smart card IC specific methodology the CC supporting documents i The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits ii Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards and see 4 AIS 25 and AIS 26 and 4 AIS 31 Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators were used The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE The ver
30. esent a summary of e the Security Target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation e the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility and e complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body B 1 Certification Report Contents of the certification results N O 0 A 10 10 11 12 13 14 B 2 Executive Summary Identification of the TOE Security Policy Assumptions and Clarification of Scope Architectural Information Documentation IT Product Testing Evaluated Configuration Results of the Evaluation Comments Recommendations Annexes Security Target Definitions Bibliography BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 12 13 14 14 14 16 16 19 20 20 20 23 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report 1 Executive Summary The product type of the Target of Evaluation TOE is the S3CC9YGC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI DSZ CC 0400 2007 were re used The TOE the S8CC9GC microcontroller featuring the TORNADO cryptographic co processor is a Smart Card integrated circuit which is composed of a processing unit security components contactless and contact based I O ports and volatile and non volatile memories hardware The TOE comprises the hardware of the smart card security controllers type S3CC9GC and IC Designer Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software required for operation Such software
31. fication Report Annex A of Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Evaluation results regarding development and production Common Criteria environment The IT products S8CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 Target of Evaluation TOE have been evaluated at an accredited and licensed approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation Version 2 3 ISO IEC 15408 2005 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation Version 2 3 ISO IEC15408 2005 As a result of the TOE certification dated 01 March 2007 the following results regarding the development and production environment apply The Common Criteria assurance requirements e ACM Configuration management i e ACM_AUT 1 ACM_CAP 4 ACM_SCP 2 e ADO Delivery and operation i e ADO_DEL 2 ADO_IGS 1 and e ALC Life cycle support i e ALC_DVS 2 ALC_LCD 1 ALC_TAT 1 are fulfiled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below a Samsung Electronics Co Ltd San24 Nongseo dong Giheung gu Yongin City Gyeonggido 449 711 Korea Development Production Mask House b Samsung Electronics Co Ltd San 16 Banwol Ri Hwasung Eup Gyeonggi Do 445 701 Korea Development c Samsung Electronics Co Ltd San 74 Buksoo Ri Baebang Myun Asan City Choongcheongnam
32. his function is used once during the manufacturing process only for more details refer to the Security Target 7 chapter 6 1 Hardware countermeasures for unobservability This function protects the memory and the address data bus from probing attacks This security function protects also the memory contents of the TOE from data analysis on the stored data as well as on internally transmitted data The algorithms used for encryption are proprietary The ROM scrambling is static key while the RAM and the EEPROM scrambling are dynamic key RAM scrambling is performed automatically while EEPROM scrambling is defined and managed by the embedded software The Central Processing Unit CPU of the TOE is synthesizable with glue logic which makes reverse engineering and signal identification more difficult Most sensitive hardware components such as buses are also hidden and implemented in deepest layers The TOE operations can be made asynchronous by using the Internal Variable Clock and the Random Wait Generator security features They make a full range of intrusive e g probing attacks and non intrusive attacks e g side channel attacks more complex and difficult Cryptography This function is used for encrypting and decrypting data using the Triple DES symmetric algorithm A Random Number Generator is used for B 7 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 generating random numbers for security processes in smart card applications an
33. ion see BSIG Section 4 Para 3 Clause 2 This holds for i the TOE Security Function SF5 which is the Triple DES encryption and decryption by the hardware co processor and TORNADO coprocessor for RSA Asymmetric Cryptographic Support including RSA Library ii for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex A in part D of this report The code in the Test ROM of the TOE is used by the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery This was considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and under ATE for testing The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as identified in table 5 produced in the semiconductor factory in Giheung labelled by the production line indicator 14 as hex within the chip identification number in the EEPROM and the firmware and software versions as indicated in table 5 The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to chips from other production and manufacturing sites provided the sponsor applies for re certification or assurance continuity of the modified product in B 18 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report accordance with the procedural requirements and the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies 9 2 Additional Evaluation Result
34. ion that recognises or gives effect to this certificate is either expressed or implied BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report Preliminary Remarks Under the BSIG Act the Federal Office for Information Security BSI has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor hereinafter called the sponsor A part of the procedure is the technical examination evaluation of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report This report contains among others the certificate Summarised assessment and the detailed Certification Results The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product the details of the evaluation strength and weaknesses and instructions for the user Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security BSI Errichtungsgesetz BSIG of 17 December 1990 Bundesgesetzblatt p 2834 Certification Report Contents Part A Certification Part B Certification Results Part C Excerpts from the Criteria Part D Annexes Vi BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification
35. n size from 32 bits to 2048 bits by step of 2 bits However only key sizes from 1024 bits up to 2048 bits are within the scope of this evaluation The Smart Card Embedded Software is not part of the TOE for more details see Security Target 7 The TOE is intended to be used in a range of high security applications like banking and finance applications communication highways Internet access and transaction processing Transport and ticketing applications access control cards and Governmental cards ID cards health cards driving licenses Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and the integrity and confidentiality of stored data This includes measures for memory protection leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions The Security Target is written using the Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1 0 July 2001 BSI registration ID BSI PP 0002 2001 9 With reference to this Protection Profile the smart card product life cycle is described in 7 phases The development production and operational user environment are described and referenced to these phases TOE delivery is defined at the end of phase 3 as wafers The assumptions threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile 9 are used To address additional security features of the TOE e g cryptographic services the securit
36. nal Requirements SFR selected in the Security Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2 Functional from PP or Requirement added in ST B C FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control FMT Security Management FMT_MSA 1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute initialisation FDP_ACF 1 Security attribute based access control Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Security Source Functional from PP or Requirement added in ST FMT_SMF 1 Specification of management functions ST Protection of the TOE Security Functions FPT_FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state Basic internal TSF data transfer protection FPT_PHP 3 Resistance to physical attack Table 2 SFRs taken from CC Part 2 The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined Security Source Functional from PP or Requirement added in ST Security Audit Cryptographic support Table 3 SFRs CC part 2 extended Note Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided For more details please refer to the Security Target 7 chapter 5 1 and 7 2 These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security Functions TOE Security Description Functions SF1 Environmental Security violation recording and reaction SF2 Access Control SF3 Non reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes SF4 Hardware
37. nd components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances Instead it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility Evaluation assurance level EAL overview chapter 11 1 Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs while the rows represent assurance families Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable As outlined in the next section seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE s assurance They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family i e increasing rigour scope and or depth and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families i e adding new requirements These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3 More precisely each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed While the EALs are defined in the CC it is po
38. ngapore Spain Sweden Turkey United Kingdom United States of America The current list of signatory nations resp approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site http www commoncriteriaportal org A 2 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report 3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings The product SSCC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI DSZ CC 0400 2007 were re used The evaluation of the product SSCC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 was conducted by TUV Informationstechnik GmbH The TUV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility ITSEF recognised by BSI The sponsor vendor and distributor is Samsung Electronics Co Ltd San24 Nongseo dong Giheung gu Yongin City Gyeonggido 449 711 Korea The certification is concluded with e the comparability check and e the production of this Certification Report This work was completed by the BSI on 01 March 2007 The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that e all stipulations regarding generation configuration and operation as given in the following report are observed e the product is operated in
39. nipulation of the TOE There are no special security measures for the start up of the TOE besides the requirement that the controller has to be used under the well defined operating conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report B 9 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 1 6 Assumptions about the operating environment Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile 9 the assumptions defined in section 3 2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the Security Target of this TOE With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security Target Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by these assumptions from the PP The developer of the Smart card Embedded Software Phase 1 must ensure e the appropriate Usage of Hardware Platform A Plat Appl while developing this software in Phase 1 Therefore it has to be ensured that the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE In particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils the assumptions e the appropriate Treatment of User Data A Resp Appl while developing this software in Phase 1 The smart card operating system and the smart card application software have to use security relevant user data of the TOE especially keys and plain text data in a secure way
40. rity controllers type SSCC9GC and IC Designer Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software required for operation Such software also known as IC firmware is mainly used for testing purpose during production only but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and or additional services including a RSA asymmetric cryptography library and an AIS20 compliant random number generation library All other software is called Smart Card Embedded Software which is not part ofthe TOE The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing process phase 3 of the life cycle defined At these specific points in time the operating system software is already stored in the non volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is completely disabled The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card operating system based on the security features of the TOE With respect to security tne composition of this TOE the operating system and the smart card application is important Within this composition the security functionality is only partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the smart card application on top These dependencies are expressed by environ mental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specific
41. rocontroller for Smart Card Version 1 confidential document 11 Users manual SSCC9GC GW 16 Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 3 1 03 2006 12 Security Application Note S38CC9GC S83CCIGW Version 1 5 18 12 2006 13 Application Note RSA Crypto Library with TORNADO V3 5S Version 1 8 04 07 2006 14 Application Note DRNG Software Library Version 2 0 13 12 2006 15 S3CC9GC Chip Delivery Specification Version 1 2 February 2007 B 24 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report C Excerpts from the Criteria CC Part1 Conformance results chapter 7 4 Ihe conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 functional requirements CC Part 3 assurance requirements and if applicable to a pre defined set of requirements e g EAL Protection Profile The conformance result consists of one of the following a CC Part 2 conformant A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2 b CC Part 2 extended A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2 plus one of the following a CC Part 3 conformant A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3
42. s e The TOE hardware consists of 72K bytes EEPROM 6K bytes RAM 2K bytes Crypto RAM 256K User ROM 12K Test ROM 16 bit Central Processing Unit CPU Internal Voltage Regulator IVR Detectors amp Security Logic a non deterministic random number generator RNG this non deterministic part is only tested according to seed generation for conformance to AlS20 4 Memory Protection Unit MPU Triple DES cryptographic coprocessor with 112 or 168 bits key size AES cryptographic coprocessor with 128 bits 192 bits and 256 bits key size TORNADO modular multiplier supporting up to 2048 bit RSA Hardware UART for B 3 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 contact and contactless I O modes Radio Frequency power and signal interface RF Interface Address amp data buses Internal Clock and Timers e The TOE firmware and software consist of Test ROM code that is used for testing the chip during production the TORNADO RSA secure cryptographic library v3 5S optional a Deterministic Random Number Generator DRNG that fulfils the requirements of AlS20 The functions of the library included in the TOE are TND_RSA_SigSTD_Secure RSA signature generation with straightforward method TND_RSA_SigCRT_ Secure RSA signature generation with CRT method TND_RSA_SigCRT_Secure3 RSA signature generation with CRT method TND_RSA_Verify RSA signature verification and RSA_Key_Generation RSA key generation The library supports operatio
43. s e The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and production environment This is outlined in part D of this report annex A e To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during the TOE evaluation The results are documented in the ETR lite 10 according to 4 AIS 36 Therefore the interface between the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the TOE was examined in detail 10 Comments Recommendations The TOE is delivered to Card Manufacturer and the Smart Card Embedded Software Developer The actual end user obtains the TOE from the operating system producer together with the application which runs on the TOE The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation e All security hints described in 11 and the delivered documents 12 13 14 have to be considered In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external security measures explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports have to be fulfilled e Requirement resulting from ADV_LLD Since the hardware cannot guarantee the storage of correct data in case of power loss during memory write operations the software has to implement appropri
44. s from the TOE Manufacturer logistics warehouse in Onyang to the Card Manufacturer The TOE s confidentiality and availability should be protected during the delivery The user software operating system will be loaded on the delivered TOE Then the TOE is under the control of the user software and the TOE manufacturer Samsung can guarantee the integrity up to the delivery process A processing step during wafer testing incorporates the chip individual features into the TOE Each individual TOE is uniquely identified by its product code This product code in the EEPROM Security area is TOE specific as among others It includes the core application category serial number version internal development code and customer ROM code It is described how the customer can retrieve this information Each individual TOE can therefore be traced unambiguously and thus assigned to the entire development and production process compare Table 6 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 The TOE is identified by SSCC9GC revision 11 Another characteristic of the TOE is the product code This information is stored in the EEPROM and can be read out by the user of the card via the normal EEPROM read command It contains the following information at which among others the production line indicator is part of the serial number Here the hex value 14 at the beginning of the serial number indicates that the TOE is produced in Giheung wafer line 5
45. ss ALC PASS Sufficiency of security measures ALC_DVS 2 PASS Standardised life cycle model ALC_LCD 1 PASS Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT 1 PASS Tests CC Class ATE PASS Analysis of coverage ATE_COV 2 PASS Testing low level design ATE_DPT 1 PASS Functional testing ATE_FUN 1 PASS Independent testing sample ATE_IND 2 PASS Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Assurance classes and components Verdict Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS Covert channel analysis AVA_CCA 1 PASS Analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_MSU 3 PASS Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF 1 PASS Highly resistant AVA_VLA 4 PASS Table 7 Verdicts for the assurance components The evaluation has shown that e the TOE is conform to the Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile BSI PP 0002 2001 9 e Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common Criteria Part 2 extended e the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL4 augmented by ADV_IMP 2 ALC_DVS 2 AVA_MSU 3 and AVA_VLA 4 e The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function SF3 Non reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes SF5 Deterministic Random Number Generator The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 20 see 4 were used The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decrypt
46. ssible to represent other combinations of assurance Specifically the notion of augmentation allows the addition of assurance components from assurance families not already included in the EAL or the substitution of assurance components with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family to an EAL Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC only EALs may be augmented The notion of an EAL minus a constituent assurance component is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements C 3 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Assurance Class Assurance Assurance Components by Famil j y Evaluation Assurance Level SERERE Meee Ea Configuration ACM_AUT management ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3 Delivery and ADO_DEL operation ADO_IGS Development ADV_FSP ADV_HLD ADV_IMP ADV_INT ADV_LLD ADV_RCR ADV_SPM Guidance AGD_ADM documents AGD_USR Life cycle ALC_DVS support ALC_FLR ALC_LCD ALC_TAT ATE_COV ATE_DPT ATE_FUN ATE_IND Vulnerability AVA_CCA assessment AVA_MSU AVA_SOF AVA_VLA Table 6 Evaluation assurance level summary BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification R
47. sured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems or where access to the developer may be limited Evaluation assurance level 3 EAL3 methodically tested and checked chapter 11 5 Objectives EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re engineering C 5 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Evaluation assurance level 4 EAL4 methodically designed tested and reviewed chapter 11 6 Objectives EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which though rigorous do not require substantial specialist knowledge skills and other resources EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security
48. tests are performed after the first production of chips The tests are performed in test mode With these tests the influence of temperature frequency and voltage on the security functions are tested in detail iii Verification tests These tests are performed in normal mode and check the functionality in the end user environment The results of the qualification and verification tests are the basis on which it is decided whether the TOE is released to production iv Security evaluation tests These tests are performed in normal mode and check the security mechanisms aiming on the security functionality and the effectivness of the mechanisms The random numbers are tested as required by AIS 20 and fulfil the criteria v Production tests These tests are performed at each TOE before delivery The aim of the production tests is to check whether each chip is functioning correctly vi Penetration Tests Penetration Tests are performed to find security flaws in the product The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified in the functional specification the high level design and the low level design Chips from the production site in Giheung See part D annex A of this report were used for tests The evaluators testing effort can be summarised into the following classes of tests Module tests Simulation tests Emulation tests Tests in normal mode Tests in test mode and Hardware tests
49. that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP Security Target A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE Semiformal Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics Strength of Function A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms SOF basic A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential SOF medium A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential SOF high A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential Subject An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed Target of Evaluation An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation TOE Security Functions A set consisting
50. the environment described where specified in the following report This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated here The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product provided the sponsor applies for re certification of the modified product in accordance with the procedural requirements and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility A 3 Certification Report BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 4 Publication The following Certification Results contain pages B 1 to B 24 and D 1 to D 4 The product SSCC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products which is published regularly see also Internet http www bsi bund de Further information can be obtained from BSI Infoline 49 0 3018 9582 111 Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor of the product The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above mentioned website Samsung Electronics Co Ltd San24 Nongseo dong Giheung gu Yongin City Gyeonggido 449 711 Korea A 4 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report B Certification Results The following results repr
51. ufacturer must apply the policy Protection during TOE Development and Production P Process TOE so that no information is unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE The Policy ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design information and data Access to samples tools and material must be restricted A specific additional security functionality Triple DES Advanced Encryption Standard AES and Rivest Shamir Adleman RSA if selected must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy defined in the Security Target 7 Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to the additional policy 1 5 Special configuration requirements The TOE has two different operating modes normal mode and test mode The application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process Phase 3 At this point in time the operating system is already stored in the non volatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled Thus there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are important for a secure use of the TOE The further production and delivery processes like the Smart Card Finishing Process Personalisation and the delivery of the smart card to an end user have to be organised in a way that excludes all possibilities of physical ma
52. y environment as outlined in the PP 9 is augmented by an additional policy an assumption and security objectives accordingly The IT product S3CC9GC 16 Bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Version 11 was evaluated by TUV Informationstechnik GmbH The evaluation was completed on 26 February 2007 The TUV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility ITSEF recognised by BSI Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility B 4 BSI DSZ CC 0438 2007 Certification Report The sponsor vendor and distributor is Samsung Electronics Co Ltd San24 Nongseo dong Giheung gu Yongin City Gyeonggido 449 711 Korea 1 1 Assurance package The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria see Annex C or 1 part 3 for details The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL4 Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented The following table shows the augmented assurance components Requirement Identifier EAL4 TOE evaluation Semiformally designed and tested ALC_DVS 2 Life cycle support Sufficiency of security measures AVA_MSU 3 Vulnerability assessment Analysis and testing for insecure states ADV_IMP 2 Implementation of the TSF TSF TOE Security Functions AVA_VLA 4 Vulnerability assessment Highly resistant Table 1 Assurance components and EAL augmentation Functionality The TOE Security Functio
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