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        UFC 4-021-02NF Security Engineering Electronic Security Systems
         Contents
1.        Elevator       Monitored  Area       Rollup Door    Display Image    Time Increments    4 3 12 1 Figure 4 4 is a rudimentary example of a switching display  The diagram is  taken from an actual project  where coverage of possible camera    dead zones    from a  single camera was needed  The solution was to add a second camera  More complex  display systems use a display switcher to monitor and scan multiple cameras  The     switcher    determines the duration that the monitor views a specific camera     50    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Table 4 1  CCTV Display Component Application Guidance                Use This Equipment For This Reason   Black and white When color information is not required     monochrome  display Some Video Content Analysis systems only work with  black and white cameras    Color displays When color information such as clothing or vehicle color  specifics are needed    CRT displays When the space configuration lends itself to addition of  console mounted type displays    LCD Displays Lower power consumption    Less space required  Higher resolution        Large format display  23 e When overall dispatch center  console and desk   inches to 80 inches or space is limited   Assumes wall mounted or  larger suspended displays      e When having little glare from the display is a  significant concern     e When power consumption is a significant  consideration     e When a large number of displays  more than nine in  m
2.       cabling  power connections  grounding  and required system interfaces     10 6 1 9 The system designer should have owner feedback on any changes to devices  upon completion of the design development review meeting     10 7 BIDDING  10 7 1 Installers and System Integrators  Installers and integrators must be    experienced in the installation  tuning  and programming of ESS  Require a minimum of  three years of documented experience for the types of systems the project includes     134    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    APPENDIX A    REFERENCES    ASHRAE 62  Ventilation for Acceptance of Indoor Air Quality  American Society of  Heating  Refrigeration  and Air Conditioning Engineers  ASHRAE      Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems  The  2001  Mary Lynn Garcia   Sandia National Laboratories  Butterworth Heinemann  Boston    DoD 5200 8  Physical Security Program  Department of Defense  Washington  Headquarters Service  Executive Services and Communication Directorate   Directives and Records Division  http   www dtic mil whs directives     DoD 8190 3  Smart Card Technology  Department of Defense  Washington  Headquarters Service  Executive Services and Communication Directorate   Directives and Records Division  http   www dtic mil Awhs directives     DOD 0 2000 12 H  DoD Antiterrorism Handbook  Department of Defense  Washington  Headquarters Service  Executive Services and Communication Directorate   Directives and Records D
3.      Wide Area Network  WAN   An internetwork that uses telecommunication links to  connect geographically distant networks     Acknowledgement  A computer dictionary called    Webopedia    was used for some of the definitions used  in this glossary  Webopedia is found at http  Awebopedia com      145    
4.      Wire and Conduit    9 6 16 1 Figure 9 2 illustrates the necessary interface signal between the fire alarm  system and each local door controller panel  The ESS design needs to include the  elements identified in Figure 9 3 for system interface     127    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Figure 9 3  Elements of a Fire Alarm System    Wire and conduit from the fire alarm system to the security system  It is required that the power  and communication lines not be placed in the same conduit     Assignment of fire alarm input output addresses  The fire alarm system sends a signal  fire alarm  system output  to each individual door controller in the event of a fire alarm signal     Assignment of security system input output addresses   Termination of the fire alarm security system interface on the fire alarm system   Termination of the fire alarm security system interface on the security system     Programming of the fire alarm system to achieve door unlock signals in the event of a fire alarm  signal     Programming of the security system to achieve door unlock signals in the event of a fire alarm  signal     Door access control hardware all needs to be    home run    to a local junction box for ease of  troubleshooting and repair        9 6 17 Intercom System  While not a requirement  site specific factors may require  provision of an intercom or similar auxiliary communication system at entry portals  such  as motorized gates  to communicate w
5.      the term is really a misnomer because the failed component is  still a failed component  Alternate communication paths are employed until the fault can  be corrected     6 6 TRANSMISSION MODES PROTOCOLS    6 6 1 Several modes and protocols exist for electronic security data transmission   These include serial communication  RS 485  RS 232   network communication using  Ethernet or TCP IP protocol  dial up modem  T 1 line  and wireless     6 7 TRANSMISSION MEDIA    6 7 1 Hardwired  Hardwired refers to using dedicated proprietary  DoD owned   conductors to transmit data video between DTM nodes  Dedicated conductors can be  copper or fiber optic     6 7 1 1 Copper Conductors  Generally  copper conductors can be run to 750 feet  using standard RG 59 U connectors  Use of RJ 11 U conductors can extend that  distance to 1 500 feet  RJ 6 should be used for longer distances   A robust design  makes use of RG 6 U  100  double shielded cable for outdoor applications   These  distances are general guidelines  Changes in technology permit longer distances using  repeaters  Disadvantages of copper conductors include susceptibility to electromagnetic  interference  radio frequency interference and damage from lightning strikes     6 7 1 2 Fiber Optic  Fiber optic allows transmission over longer distances by using  light  which does not have the higher resistance loss over distance of copper  conductors  Furthermore  fiber optic is not affected by electromagnetic interference or  lightn
6.     59    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 9 2 2 The second technique is the use of cameras with automatic gain control  a  feature that amplifies existing video to help camera create an enhanced video signal at  low light levels     4 9 2 3  Both of these techniques enable cameras to function more effectively in  interior low light conditions  and are also useful for outdoor cameras as well  In some  cases  the integration of CCTV cameras with night lights and intrusion sensors can be  very effective  The sequence of events might be as follows  an intruder activates an  interior presence sensor  which in turn activates instant on lighting or a night light  and  the CCTV camera is triggered and video images are recorded     4 9 3 Light to Dark Ratio  One design parameter of CCTV systems is specification  of a proper light to dark ratio in the space viewed     Light to dark    ratio refers to the light  intensity  as measured in foot candles or LUX  of the lightest  most reflective surface  to  the darkest  least reflective surface   A proper light to dark ratio for good CCTV picture  clarity is 4 1  The maximum ratio is 8 1  When the ratio is too high  the shadows appear  black and the viewer can not distinguish any shapes in the shadows  While not always  achievable  the designer should strive for a light to dark ratio of 4 1  as shown in Table  4 3  For guidance on light sources and lighting levels  refer to UFC 3 530 01     Table 4 3  Light t
7.    8 3 1 Once an intrusion is detected  i e  door forced open or perimeter fence or  microwave intercept   it is generally the practice to make sure the event is being viewed  and recorded  Interface of the IDS to the CCTV system can occur through several  different means  hardwired conductors  serial communications  and networked  connections as discussed below  Activation of an intrusion detection alarm results in an  audible alarm that gets the operators attention     8 3 2 Hardwired Conductors  Older technology  still effective for simple  installations  In this case  copper conductor wiring is taken as digital outputs from the  IDS or combined ACS IDS and connected as inputs to the CCTV system to initiate  camera recording and if required     panning to a pre set location  In the most basic  approach  this design requires a pair of wires for each alarm notification output signal     8 3 3 Serial Communications  RS232  a two wire shielded 16 AWG conductor    In theory  this is the same principle of operation as the hardwired method with an  improvement in that a single RS232 conductor pair can handle several camera signals   It is most easily done when the CCTV and IDS  or combined ACS IDS  are made by the  same vendor  but can be done with different vendors  but requires writing or availability    1 or combined ACS IDS    113    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  of software drivers  While slightly more complicated than the hardwired approach  
8.    9 6 15 Shielding  When required  shielded cable should only be grounded at one  end     typically back at the local security panel     to prevent open loop grounds  A  common question is whether or not cables in metallic conduit are required to use  shielded cable  If there is more than one communications cable in the metallic conduit   the answer is yes     the cables should be shielded  Most manufacturers specify shielded  cable such as the cable running out to card readers  The designer should follow the  manufacturer   s recommendations     9 6 16 Fire Alarm System Interface  In the United States most egress doors are  required to unlock  in the path of emergency egress  in the event of a fire emergency    Note  certain institutional facilities are exempt from this automatic door unlock  requirement  for example  prisons or high security hospitals   Methods vary on how this  may be accomplished  If free egress hardware is supplied  which is possible when  electric locks or electric strikes are used   then that is all that is required  If magnetic  locks are supplied  this life safety function has to be achieved by interfacing the ACS  with the fire alarm system  Where doors are locked  electrically by magnetic locks or  other devices not supplied with free exit hardware   the interface shown in Figure 9 2  should be specified in the design     Figure 9 2  Interface Between Fire alarm and Security Panel    Local Fire Fire Alarm Signal Local Security  Alarm Panel Panel  
9.   In other words  the system can detect intruders before they have  crossed the protected area   s perimeter     5 4 6 False Alarm Causes for Exterior Sensors  Table 5 3 displays typical false  alarm causes for exterior IDS sensors  Snowfall  removal of snow  winds  temperature    90    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  change  and rain drainage are some factors to consider in exterior sensor selection   Refer to the Perimeter Security Sensor Technologies Handbook for more information on  exterior IDS sensors     When fence detection sensors are used  the best application is to use a double fence  concept  In addition to adding an additional delay factor  the outer fence acts as an  animal deterrent  while the detection system is best applied to the inner fence  Typically  the fence should be a climb resistant fence at least eight feet high with a minimum of  eight feet of distance between the inner and outer fence  as shown in Figure 5 12  Use  of concrete footings down to one foot below the surface helps limit mitigation by shallow  tunneling     Figure 5 12  Fence Example    Climb resistant  construction    Public Area Restricted Area    at least 8 feet    91    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Table 5 3  False Alarm Causes   Exterior IDS Sensors    Sensor Type    False Alarm Cause    Notes       Active Infrared    Animals  Wind blown debris    Fencing mitigates animal false  alarms       Passive Infrared  PIR     
10.   The card   s thickness and stock composition make it resistant to  pocket damage  however  it is susceptible to malfunction arising from wear  after many passes through reader slots  The card is moderately priced  but  capable of storing a moderate amount of data     3 4 7 4 Smart Cards  Smart cards are credential cards with a microchip embedded in  them  The term    smart card    can define cards that simply carry data  but more  commonly is used describe cards with integral microprocessing and read write data  storage capability  Smart cards are available as a    Contact    type or more commonly as  a    Contactless     and wireless  type  An example of a    Contact    smart card is one which  can interface to a computer through the embedded contact  The contactless  wireless    37    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  smart card operates at 13 56 MHz  which is more than a hundred times faster than the  data exchange rate of 125kHz proximity cards  There are also hybrid cards available   which have either both types of smart card chips in one plastic body or have both  contact and contactless interfaces to one microprocessor in the plastic body  Smart  cards can store enormous amounts of data such as access transactions  licenses held  by individuals  qualifications  safety training  security access levels  and biometric  templates  One principal security advantage of smart cards is that cryptographic  capabilities can be used to send card infor
11.  18 1 3 Use proven technology  Dealers will try to sell the latest and greatest  which  may or may not be proven technology     4 18 1 4 Look for ease of use     4 18 1 5 Cameras to be used in conjunction with infrared lighting  black and white  cameras or dual mode cameras  should not have an infrared filter on the camera     4 18 1 6 Specify whether or not auto white balance or manual white balance shall be  used  Normally auto white balance will be recommended  The exception would be an  environment where there is a stable black white image     4 18 1 7 Coordinate with the lighting designer to provide appropriate light for both  interior and exterior  site  cameras     4 18 1 8 For interior cameras  ensure sufficient lighting is available to assess alarms at  all hours of the day  Use strategically placed night lights to ensure internal visibility at  night     4 18 1 9 For outside locations  specify tamper resistant housings or other vandal proof  features for remote areas     4 18 1 10 Investigate the scalability of the system  If more cameras are needed locally  or remotely  can new systems be added with as little effort as possible     69    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 18 1 11 Understand the service plan  Manufacturers provide service and maintenance  programs  Some have premier service plans that provide feature upgrades and  enhancements on computer based video recorders     4 18 1 12 Consider how the images will be viewed  the num
12.  2 5 6 Summary  Table 2 3 provides a summary of the pros and cons of each type  of monitoring station method     Table 2 3 Pros and Cons of Monitoring Methods          Pros Cons  Local Alarm Easy to implement No guaranteed response  relies on  Station Cost effective support forces being in audible visual  range  Simple  Centralized Does not require any Requires an existing Central Station  Station additional space or building   Some complexity in establishing  Probably does not require   connection  any additional staffing May rely on non DoD forces  CCTV capability may be limited or non   existent          22    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006       Police  Connection    Direct communication with  law enforcement response  forces without delay     Requires a cooperating law  enforcement station with space and  equipment    Must consider separate archiving  resource   Probably does not have CCTV  assessment capability    Ongoing fee may be required for  monitoring    Interface connection is required     Systems often operate with reduced  sensitivity to minimize the number of  nuisance alarms        Proprietary  Station       Not reliant on outside  sources     Should have CCTV  assessment capability     May have Motion Path  Analysis  IDS  capability        Requires 24 7 trained personnel   possibly increased staffing     Requires real estate space and fit out  hardware     Increased recurring labor cost of  Dispatch Center operators        23   
13.  2 min  Door contacts or glass  window or wall breakage sensor  4 Breach interior hardened 2 4 min  Door contacts  door  5 Work time in breached space   3 min  Motion sensor  TOTAL DELAY TIME 8 min 39 sec nominal for this example       Table 2 2  Sample Detect  Delay  and Respond Measures                      Detect Measures Delay Measures Respond Measures  Intrusion detection devices Fences Response force alerted  Alarm notification Walls Response force travel  Visual displays Doors Neutralization          14    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  2 2 5 Figure 2 3 shows two cases of alerting a response force  In the first case   initial detection is not made until the interior wall of the critical asset has been breached   With initial detection at six minutes  response forces do not arrive on the scene until  after some compromise of the critical asset has been achieved  In the second case   initial detection is made at the fence line and allows response forces to arrive and  intervene before asset compromise     Figure 2 3  Timeline Showing Two Cases of Breach and Detection    I  Climb Fence  9 sec   li       Cross Ground  1 min           DETECTION AT  BUILDING  PERIMETER    DETECTION AT  PERIMETER       l  l     I  l   j  l  l  l   l  l  U  l  0 min 1 min 2 min 3 min 4 min Smin 6 min 7 min 8 min 9 min 10min 11min    15    UFC 4 021 02NF   27 September 2006   change 1  23 October 2006   In the above timeline  there will be a difference in time req
14.  2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 6 11 1 To illustrate voltage drop calculations  consider the example of a 2 amp  24  volt camera located 300 feet from the power supply  Figure 9 1 shows two attempts     Figure 9 1  Attempts 1 and 2       Attempt 1   Try 14 AWG Cable  From chart  1 01 voltage drop x 3  for 300 feet     3 03 volts   12 6  drop  No good     Attempt 2   Try 12 AWG Cable  0 64 voltage drop x 3   1 92 volts   12 6   8   drop  Good              9 6 11 2 For exterior cameras such as parking lot surveillance cameras  higher wire  gauges may be required  In one example of a long distance run  6 AWG was used to  reach the first camera  After that distance  12 AWG was found to be adequate to power  the subsequent near by cameras     9 6 12   Harmonics  Harmonics in a power system are typically the odd multiples of  60 Hz such as 180 Hz and 300 Hz and are generated by switching power supplies such  as in a computer  by adjustable frequency motor drives  by lighting ballasts  by UPS  systems  by electric welders  and by other rectifier type equipment  Harmonics in a  system are measured in total harmonic distortion  THD      9 6 12 1 Harmonics in a power system can cause overheating of cables and  equipment along with false operations  NFPA 70 requires designs to consider  harmonics and IEEE 519 is a reference standard  When a neutral of a multiphase feed  has significant harmonics  itis to be oversized  UL and the IEEE both have methods for  de rating standard transfo
15.  3 Motion Activated Cameras  A fixed camera with a video motion feature can  be used as an interior intrusion point sensor  In this application  the camera can be  directed at an entry portal  door  and send an alarm signal when an intruder enters the  field of view  This device has the added advantage of providing a video image of the  event  The key to good video motion detection is contrast  Activation of a door will  provide sufficient contrast  An intruder in a white lab coat walking down a corridor with  white walls might not generate sufficient contrast  Application of video motion cameras  as an interior intrusion device requires coordination with the building architect and or  interior designer  Interior video motion cameras can also be alarmed by someone  cutting off the lights  As with any camera  the better the lighting  the better the detection  capability  Use of cameras  requires careful consideration of the background image and  normal or abnormal changes to that background image     Internal motion activated cameras act as a detection means for stay behind covert  intruders     5 3 4 Other CCTV Detection Methodologies   Refer to Chapter 4 for subsections   on video content analysis and motion path analysis in the section Employment of CCTV  Cameras for Intrusion Detection   When these other methodologies are used  consider   the following guidance     5 3 4 1 Require good lighting     5 3 4 2  Best done where there is a stable background image and intrusion w
16.  Accordingly  the ESS designer should plan for a nominal 20   expansion capacity when designing a new system     9 2 GENERAL COORDINATION    9 2 1 Throughout the planning and design process the designer should coordinate  closely with security  Physical Security Officer  and anti terrorism personnel   Antiterrorism Officer   end users  base communications officer  information  technology   and fire and safety personnel     9 3 CIVIL COORDINATION    9 3 1 Gate Control  Vehicle Gates and Sally Ports   A sally port is a holding port  where vehicles are located  Sally ports may require control hardware for interlocking  gates  Refer to UFC 4 012 1  Security Engineering  Entry Control Facilities Access  Control Points  for more information on sally ports and entry control points     9 3 2 Underground Site Work  Inter building DTM communications are often  made by buried direct conductors  Underground site work needs to coordinated with  existing civil drawings and buried utilities     9 4 ARCHITECTURAL COORDINATION    9 4 1 Importance of Coordination  Past experience shows that the biggest  disconnect in project design and construction costs is due to lack of coordination  between commands  security  engineers  and ESS installation personnel  It is  imperative that planned ESS component locations be identified early in initial design  and planning stages in order to coordinate conduit installation and electronic module  interface requirements for security locks and equipment  Addi
17.  Combined credentials may result in a decrease in the  false acceptance rate but will increase verification time and decrease the throughput  rate     3 5 2 17 Decide early if there are special exit technology or egress monitoring needs   Special exit technologies  request to exit buttons or cardreaders  require life safety code  consideration and additional door hardware coordination     3 5 2 18 Additional design guidance for ACS is provided in Figure 3 8     42    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 3 8  ACS Design Process    Retrofit Project New ols aan      roject    Y Determine Requirements for ACS  Y    How many credential holders     How many vistors contractors     Throughput requirements     How many levels of credential token are required     How many and type of portals     How many hierarchial levels are required     Is anti passback required     is two man rule required     is anti tailgating required     What is locking method for securing portals     What will be the method of maintaining the  access holder database     Existing Project  without CAC  Justification to CAC Cac    Upgrade to CAC        No  Cn   S A    Y e  Add Credentials Upgrade to       O D d Oh H sh Wn      _ we  wg oOo            to Existing System CAC Credential       43    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 4    CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION SYSTEMS  4 1 OVERVIEW    4 1 1 The CCTV system is another core subsystem of an overal
18.  Figure 4 8     4 6 5 1 There are three modes in which PTZ cameras can be employed   4 6 5 1 1 Default at home and zoom to alarm   4 6 5 1 2 Continually sweep    4 6 5 1 3 Manual control    55    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 8  PTZ Sweep Range    cWEEP_ RANGE  f    x     Home Position    Table 4 2  Fixed versus PTZ Cameras                            Video Intruder  Pre alarm Motion Tracking  Applications Cost Review Detection Capability  Fixed   Fixed assets Lower Recommended   Recommended   None  such as doors   entry gates  and  loading docks  PTZ   Open areas  Three times Poor Poor Good  fencelines more application application  expensive than  a fixed camera  4 6 6 Dome Cameras  Dome cameras are actually a cheaper version of the PTZ    camera when the total cost is considered  installation  parts  and maintenance   Dome  cameras are mounted in a hardened plastic lower dome  which is commonly smoked   colored to conceal the camera  The use of smoke colored domes provides covert lens  positioning  while the use of clear domes provides for better low light performance   Dome cameras are a good design solution for applications where the camera needs to  be protected from the environment  such as dust  or it is desired to conceal the axis and  field of view for a scanning camera  A common application of dome cameras is in office  buildings with suspended ceilings  The dome camera is more aesthetic and less    harsh     looking than a ca
19.  SENSORS viaa aaa aaite eet eal ak al alice Med 82  5 5 SYSTEM lee El eege eege eet eeben 93  5 6 IDS  DESIGN GUIDANCE rerien aa aaka aa 93  5 7 SUMMAR E 96   CHAPTER 6 DATA TRANSMISSION MEDIA  DIMI   ANEN 97  6 1 INTRODUCTION jitsccisscteiertintenanivasinttanaandaatsnaciatenedaggeta Wa  oeiee BM Guts 97  6 2 BANDWIDTH ANALYSIS    eeeeeeeeeseeeeeree erence A  ee ree 97  6 3 SECURE CGOMMUNIGATIONS nenn      t    wf    98  6 4 NETWORK TOPOGRAPHY aen eene  RENE 98  6 5 COMMUNICATION REDUNDANCY  ANERE 103  6 6 TRANSMISSION MODES PROTOCOLS 00    eeeccccceeeneetteeeeneeeeeeeeneeeeeeee 103  6 7 TRANSMISSION MEDIA    0 0   cece ee eeee E  eee ecppeennenseeeeeseessneeeeenes 103  6 8 TECHNOLOGY COMPARISION NEEN 105  6 9 ENCRYPTION BE  EN  TE 105   CHAPTER 7 DISPATCH CENTER   n areara 107  7 1 INTRODUCTION REN  WT EEN 107  7 2 SPACE ehhh nell oy ch MS aa IANA DUNE Saito sei eads 108  7 3 Ee Ra sesh tad EE  VI EE 109  7 4 CONSOLES irre a VE  TEE 109  7 5 MONITORS isin SE  WEE MIMD cccasuistsintesnidinicneadguacaandinasieadansanndaananeacianes 111  7 6 GROUNDING POWER CONDITIONING AA 111  7 7 KEREN  WE 111  7 8 SUPPOR TRQOU 1 EE 112   CHAPTER 8 ESS SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION         ANEN 113  8 1 OVERA uf  EE 113  8 2 COMMUNICATION FROM THE IDS TO THE AC  113  8 3 COMMUNICATION FROM THE IDS TO THE CCTV SYSTEM    113  8 4 COMMUNICATION FROM THE CCTV SYSTEM TO THE ACS                114  8 5 COMMUNICATION FROM THE ACS TO THE DISPATCH CENTER       115  8 6 COMMUNICATION FROM THE DISPATCH CENTER T
20.  UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 3  ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS  3 1 OVERVIEW  3 1 1 The function of an ACS is to ensure that only authorized personnel are    permitted ingress and egress from a controlled area  The ACS should be able to log and  archive all transactions and alert authorities of unauthorized entry attempts  ACS can be  interfaced with the CCTV system to assist security personnel in the assessment of  unauthorized entry attempts     3 1 2 As illustrated in Figure 3 1  an ACS has many elements  including electric  locks  card readers  biometric readers  when required  but not always part of every  system   alarms  and computer systems to monitor and control the ACS  An ACS  generally includes some form of enrollment station used to assign and activate an  access control device  Detailed descriptions of the various elements of an ACS are  described later in this chapter     3 1 3 In general  an ACS compares an individual   s credential against a verified  database  If authenticated  the ACS sends output signals which allow authorized  personnel to pass through controlled portals such as gates or doors  The system has  the capability of logging entry attempts  authorized and unauthorized  that are archived    Event and tracking logs are discussed in more detail in a subsequent subsection    Typically the ACS interfaces with the IDS for input of digital alarm signals at access  portals controlled by the ACS  An example of this wo
21.  as a  central monitoring and assessment space for the ACS  CCTV  and IDS systems  In this  space  operators assess alarm conditions and determine the appropriate response   which may entail dispatching of security forces  Normally  the Dispatch Center is staffed  by trained personnel 24 hours a day  seven days a week  The Dispatch Center may be  co located with other installation functions  Refer to Figure 7 1     Figure 7 1  Dispatch Center Centrally Located    eee                     Dispatch Security  Center   Administration    Airfield  Enclave    Ss POORE LE Sy eR Ns E ET AL ON Le ef e SS  RE iy E Sas kl         7 1 2 When several regional installations or sites interface and report to a  centralized dispatch center  that space or building may be known as a Regional  Dispatch Center  RDC   Refer to Figure 7 2     107    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 7 2  Example RDC    Major Site  1         Major Site  2    Regional  Dispatch    Center   aaa      15 Miles    Dispatch Security  bi Administration              20 Miles    Major Site  3    Small Site Remote  2    Small Site Remote  1    7 1 3 Small facilities not located on a DoD installation such as Reserve Centers   medical clinics  or pharmacies may be connected to a Central Station or Police Station     7 2 SPACE  7 2 1 Space programming fora Dispatch Center should consider the following   7 2 1 1 Equipment wall space    7 2 1 2 A minimum of three foot clearance in front  and rear 
22.  background sounds  Often a booth has to  be installed to house the sensor in order to provide the system an acceptable quiet  background  Voice recognition systems are not widely used     3 4 9 3 6 Iris Patterns  Iris recognition technology scans the surface of the eye and  compares the iris pattern with stored iris templates  Iris scanning is the most accurate  and secure biometric  After DNA  irises are the most individualized feature of the human  body  Even identical twins have different irises  and each person   s two irises differ from  each other  The unique pattern of the human iris is fully formed by ten months of age  and remains unchanged through a person   s lifetime  A benefit of iris recognition is that it  is not susceptible to theft  loss  or compromise  and irises are less susceptible to wear  and injury than many other parts of the body  Newer iris scanners allow scanning to  occur from up to ten inches away  A disadvantage of iris scanning is that some people  are timid about having their eye scanned  Throughput time for this technology should  also be considered  Typical throughput time is two seconds  If a number of people need  to be processed through an entrance in a short period of time  this can be problematic     3 4 9 3 7 Retinal Scanning  Retinal scanning is an older  comparable technology that  reads the blood vessel pattern on the retina in the back of the eye  but it is not readily  available in the marketplace  Whereas iris scanners can work u
23.  cable with a video  transceiver unit to optically isolate the video system  head end from the field device to avoid damaging the  primary CCTV controls equipment        72    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006       Perimeter CCTV  Recommendations    Provide color PTZ cameras capable of viewing and  recording the entire parking lot  entry and exit points   and normal walk paths    Provide color PTZ cameras capable of viewing and  recording all perimeter doors    Provide color PTZ cameras capable of viewing exterior  chemical storage  electrical substations  generators or  other critical areas    Provide fixed color cameras viewing and recording  vehicle license plates as vehicles are driven onto  property        Security Guard Monitor  Considerations    Security CCTV monitors should be evaluated based on  the level of security personnel that will be viewing the  images    The minimum number of displays should be one     A better configuration is two displays with one  dedicated for alarm call up and the scanning different  cameras     For complex systems  require custom configurations  and evaluations   The final configuration must take into account   a  the    number and frequency of simultaneous alarms  and  b   the number of facilities being monitored        Camera Frame Rate    Non alarm mode   Poor  1 fps  Recommended  3 fos  Very Good  5 fps   Alarm mode   Acceptable  10 fos  Recommended  15 fps  Very Good  20 fps        Long Range Thermal  Im
24.  card  readers  Insertion readers require that you insert the card into a slot that is just large  enough to accommodate the card and then remove it  Swipe readers require that you  swipe the card through a long narrow slot that is open at each end  Proximity and  contactless readers require that you hold the card in front of the blank face of the  reader     3 4 6 2 Insertion and swipe readers  while functional  are older technologies   however  at this writing the use of the CAC requires use of the insertion type magnetic  stripe reader or a bar code reader  Insertion or swipe readers require the credential to  be inserted into the reader and the card can wear out over time  Once the CAC is  converted to a contactless read capability  use of insertion or swipe readers should be  an unusual design for new projects because of the dated technology  Until the CAC is  converted to contactless read capability  the insertion magnetic stripe reader is  preferred over the bar code reader  which is more easily compromised  Proximity  readers are popular and require the user to pass the card within an adjustable distance   one to two inches from the reader   While commonly used in commercial non DoD  applications  testing has demonstrated that it is possible to intercept the unencrypted   125kHz proximity card  signals  Smart cards are also wireless  contactless credentials  that can be read in close proximity to a smart card reader     3 4 6 3 Figure 3 7 displays a typical configurat
25.  detection sensors and access control readers must have  tamper resistant enclosures  and integral tamper protection switches  All enclosures   cabinets  housings  and boxes  having hinged doors or removable covers that contain  processors or connections must have tamper protection switches  All tamper alarm  signals must be monitored continuously whether the system is in the access or secure  mode of operation     9 6 8 1 Signal and DTM Supervision  Line supervision is a term used to describe  the various techniques that are designed to detect or inhibit manipulation of  communication networks  All signal and DTM lines must incorporate some level of line  supervision  Line supervision for ESS must detect and annunciate communication  interruptions or compromised communications between field devices and the associated  CPU  or PCU   Field device signals must be supervised by monitoring the circuit and  initiate an alarm in response to opening  closing  shorting  or grounding of the signal  All  DTM must be supervised by the appropriate level of encryption and must initiate an  alarm upon any manipulation or disruption of the signal     9 6 8 2 Encryption  Encryption is where the transmission of the signal is supervised  by employing a data encryption standard that applies a specific algorithm to alter the  appearance of the data  For high security areas  Level Two and Three Restricted  Areas   AA amp E and controlled access areas that process Secret or above classified  mater
26.  distance  Security lighting increases the effectiveness of guard forces and closed circuit  television by increasing the visual range of the guards or CCTV during periods of  darkness  It also provides increased illumination of an area where natural light does not  reach or is insufficient  Lighting also has value as a deterrent to individuals looking for  an opportunity to commit crime  Normally  security lighting requires less intensity than  lighting in working areas  An exception is at normal doorways     4 9 1 1 Refer to UFC 3 530 01  Interior  Exterior Lighting and Controls for general  lighting guidelines  Refer to MIL HDBK 1013 1A Design Guidelines for Physical Security  of Facilities for security lighting requirements     4 9 2 Interior Lighting  Interior lighting for CCTV presents special issues that need  to be considered by the designer  For example  after hours lighting may be significantly  lower than normal operation lighting  Two solutions help minimize this impact     4 9 2 1 The first technique is the use of cameras with automatic backlight  compensation  Backlight compensation is a camera feature that enables the camera to  automatically adjust picture brightness depending on lighting conditions  which  compensates for bright backgrounds so foreground objects are not silhouetted   Frequently  CCTV cameras near windows are affected by backlighting  causing  shadows and silhouettes  so the use of appropriate cameras with backlight  compensation is effective 
27.  equipment such as digital  recording equipment  DVRs   local security panels  and termination cabinets  Additional  HVAC capability may be required in dedicated equipment spaces due to the heat  generated by equipment     112    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 8    ESS SUBSYSTEM INTEGRATION  8 1 OVERVIEW    8 1 1 Since the different subsystems of a facility   s total ESS are drawn on a number  of different technologies  i e  camera technology  biometric technology  microwave  intrusion technology  and information transfer technology   the manufacturers of  subsystems tend to be uniquely different  As a result  system integration or making the  subsystems and components    talk to each other    reliably and consistently is a major  portion of an ESS design  The purpose of this chapter is to briefly consider some of the  system integration issues associated with an ESS     8 2 COMMUNICATION FROM THE IDS TO THE ACS    8 2 1 As covered in Chapter Two     Electronic Security System   ESS  Overview     for  a simple system  the IDS may already be an integral part of the ACS  In these  intermediate systems  depicted in Figure 2 7   basic intrusion detection devices are  brought into a combined ACS IDS system as digital inputs on local security panels  All  that is required is to allocate digital input points in the closest security panels and  program the ACS to provide an alarm on event     8 3 COMMUNICATION FROM THE IDS  TO THE CCTV SYSTEM 
28.  interface and initialization  International Organization for  Standardization  ISO   http  Awww iso org    ISO IEC 15693 3 2000  Identificgation cards   Contactless integrated cicuit s  cards    Vicinity cards   Part 3  Anticollision and transmission protocol  International  Organization for Standardization  ISO   http   www iso org   available in English  only      J STD 607 A  Commercial Building Grounding  Earthing  and Bonding Requirements  for Telecommunications  ANSI J STD 607 A 2002   2002  Telecommunication  Industry Association  TIA   2500 Wilson Blvd   Suite 300  Arlington  VA  22201   http   www tiaonline org    MIL HDBK 1013 1A  Design Guidance for Physical Security Facilities  Document  Automation and Production Service  Building 4 D  700 Robbins Ave  Philadelphia     PA  19111 5094  http   assist daps dla mil     NFPA 70  National Electrical Code  National Fire Protection Association  NFPA   1  Batterymarch Park  Quincy  MA  02169 7471  www nfpa org    NFPA 101  Life Safety Code  National Fire Protection Association  NFPA   1  Batterymarch Park  Quincy  MA  02169 7471  www nfpa org    NFPA 101B  Means of Egress for Buildings and Structures  National Fire Protection  Association  NFPA   1 Batterymarch Park  Quincy  MA  02169 7471  www nfpa org    NFPA 780  Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems  National Fire  Protection Association  NFPA   1 Batterymarch Park  Quincy  MA  02169 7471   www nfpa org    NISTIR 6887  Government Smart Card Int
29.  not be  locked in such that they are restricted from free exit  When an opening is locked from  the public side and free exit is required from the secure side  there are several methods  that can be employed as discussed below  Refer to Chapter 9 for more information     3 3 6 1 The simplest door hardware is a    crash bar     This strictly mechanical device  merely requires exiting personnel to hit the    push to unlock    bar  If an electric strike is  used as a door lock  generally the door has a twist door knob handle that allows free  exit     3 3 6 2 If magnetic locks are used to secure the door than both an automatic and  manual method of existing the door must be provided  Generally  the manual method is  a Request to Exit button  sometimes abbreviated as a REX  When this device is  pressed  power to the door locks is shunting allowing exit  The most common form of  an automatic sensing device that will release the door lock when a person approaches a  door in the exiting direction is a Passive Infrared Sensor  PIR   This device senses the  infrared heat signature of a person and automatically shunts door lock power allowing  free exit  PIRs have a significant security shortfall in that any person passing by or  loitering in the sensing area of a the opening can activate the PIR and shunt door lock  power  For this reason  magnetic locks should be the designer   s last choice for door  locking mechanisms     3 3 6 3 Card readers or keypads can be used for anti passba
30.  path to  communicate directly between nodes  This is the preferred ESS network topography     99    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Figure 6 1 Star Topographies    DISPATCH  CENTER    Panel B    Panel C    Panel D       100    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 6 2  Ring Topographies    DISPATCH  CENTER       101    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 6 3  Fully Meshed Topographies    DISPATCH  CENTER       102    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  6 5 COMMUNICATION REDUNDANCY    6 5 1 Typically the only communication redundancy made is between subsystem  field panels and the system head end  Redundancy between field panels and devices is  cost prohibitive  Acommon method of achieving communication redundancy is  achieved by running primary as well as backup RS 485 lines  If this is done  it is best to  use different raceway routing schemes     6 5 2 New product developments and improved design configurations increasingly  harden communication system redundancy  This concept is currently more applicable  to DTM IT  servers and telecommunication links  systems as opposed to vendor   specific ESS subsystems  such as ACS  CCTV  and IDS  Redundant communication  paths are established such that if a component or link goes down  communication is  maintained through an alternate communication path  While some people refer to these  designs as    self healing
31.  ratio of black to white on a CCTV camera image  Most  cameras  80   are supplied with automatic white balance  Auto white balance ought to  be used when the camera background image is changing  While it is possible to procure  cameras with manual black white balance  this should only be done in a very stable  black white image environment     4 17 CCTV CAMERA EMPLOYMENT FOR INTRUSION DETECTION    4 17 1 Background  Originally  cameras were employed for intrusion detection by  allowing an operator to continually view images on display screens  Intrusion detection  occurred by human recognition of an intrusion event  Issues of operator fatigue   distractions and number of monitors that can be effectively observed left a lot of room  for missing an intrusion event  While camera technology has not changed significantly in  the last decade  the introduction of digital images and software programming capability  has improved significantly  So while the camera housing  the lens  focal length and  associated image are basically the same  the ability to digitally process the digital image  ina manner that allows automated intrusion detection has seen a tremendous increase  in technology in the last ten years  Programming trip wires can allow automated alarm  notification with no prior human involvement  Methods for detecting intruders by CCTV  systems include video motion detection  video content analysis  and motion path  analysis     67    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 
32.  sensors use a  combination of PIR and microwave technology  Techniques of    ANDing    or    ORing    the  microwave signal and the PIR signal are reviewed in Paragraph 5 5     5 4 3 5   Vibration sensors sense intrusion through vibrations caused by personnel or  vehicular movement  These sensors are not well employed near railroad tracks   roadways  rock quarries  or runways  Many of these systems use wireless battery   powered sensors to send alarm signals to a notification station     5 4 3 6 Video Content Analysis and Motion Path Analysis  The newest intrusion  detection technology for intrusion detection is sophisticated software analysis of the  camera images such as video content analysis and motion path analysis  As previously  discussed in Chapter Four  CCTV camera systems are increasingly being used as  intrusion detection systems  Application of complex algorithms to digital CCTV camera  images allow CCTV systems to detect intruders  The software programming   algorithms  start by detecting pixel changes and evolve to include filtering to  differentiate and filter out normal video events  leaves blowing  snow falling  from alarm  events  intrusion   The application of software rules can further evolve to differentiate    86    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  between a cat walking across a parking lot  irrelevant  to a person trespassing through  the parking lot  relevant to an alarm event   The application of complex software  algorit
33.  stub 12  above grade   route conduit on secured side of fence   for heavy traffic  use non sensitive cable under the gate     Affix sensing conduit to  fence mesh min  18  centers    5 4 5 Other Exterior Sensors    5 4 5 1 Buried Cable There are two common types  buried ported cable and buried  fiber optic cable  The two principle advantages of buried cable are that  a  it is covert   and  b  it follows the terrain  A limitation is buried cable systems do not work well with  shrubbery or trees on it and require landscaping and maintenance  It is important that  the cable be buried to a uniform depth  Changes in soil conductivity can effect the  sensor readings     5 4 5 2 Ported Cable  Ported cable comes in two principal configurations  Single  cable and paired cable  A single cable system uses one cable to create a sensing field  approximately 6 feet in diameter around the cable  Paired cable systems use two cables  routed in parallel one to two feet apart  One cable transmits and the other receives a  signal to create the sensing field     5 4 5 3 Fiber Optic  Fiber optic lines can be used to monitor pipelines or manholes     5 4 5 4 Wide Area Sensors  Wide area sensors such as radar can be employed on  logical approach paths for large terrain or water territories oboundaries  Wide area  sensors can assist response forces with early alerting or tracking of intruders  This  technology approach has the advantage of being able to detect intruders beyond the  defined perimeter
34. 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Table 5 7 Exterior IDS Applications Table             Application Sensor Type Notes  Fence line Taut wire Very sensitive  high maintenance   Coaxial strain sensitive Works  susceptible to EMI   TDR When fence is not in good condition    Fiber Optic More expensive  but better filtering   CCTV  Video Content Best current technology  can account for trees blowing  Analysis Motion Path or normal motion  but is the most expensive   Analysis   Gates BMS Simplest device  provide lightning protection   Fence detection systems    Will detect a fence intruder that climbs the gate   Magnetic loop sensor Will detect vehicles only   CCTV  Video Content Best current technology  can account for trees blowing  Analysis Motion Path or normal motion  but is the most expensive   Analysis   Open areas Microwave Works well in desert environments  does not work well  around trees and un cleared line of sight areas   Ported Coaxial Does not work well near electrical substations  certain  geographic areas with unusual magnetic influences   Can be effective  when used as part of a double fence  system   CCTV  Video Content Best current technology  can account for trees blowing  Analysis Motion Path or normal motion  but is the most expensive   Analysis              Note  Table 5 7 is not all inclusive of all exterior sensor options  Refer to text above for  more detail     5 7 SUMMARY    5 7 1 In general  intrusion detection is challenging  Th
35. 1  23 October 2006  4 17 2 Video Motion Detection   VMD  makes use of software usually provided in  the camera  or in the DVR  to analyze differences in contrast between the image pixels  over time  If the contrast changes from one moment to the next  the associated software  is capable of detecting the difference  Video Motion Detection was the industry   s first  attempt to provide automated alarm notification on detecting motion  It was also initiated  to reduce the tremendous storage requirements of CCTV information when closed  circuit television systems converted to digital images  Reduced memory requirements  were achieved because if there were no pixel changes  the system was programmed  not to store video  This technique saved some hard disk drive space  The downside of  Video Motion Detection is that it alerts on everything in a scene that moves  or causes  pixel changes   This could be an object blowing across the field of view  snow falling   rain  waves on water  tree leaves moving or simple lighting changes as a cloud moves  overhead  Initial Video Motion Detection systems experienced many false alarms or  alarms of pixel changes that were not actual intrusion events     4 17 3 Video Content Analysis   VCA  or Artificial Intelligence  Al  was the next  evolutionary step for CCTV system improvement for intrusion detection  Video Content  Analysis  synonymous with Artificial Intelligence is sometimes referred to as    Smart  Video  or    Intelligent Video     Vide
36. 18 2 6 Sensor size  The lens must make an image large enough for the sensor  The  larger the sensor  the more expensive the lens  A lens made for one half inch will work  for one half inch  one third inch  and one quarter inch sensors  but not for a two thirds  inch sensor  If a lens made for a smaller sensor is used on a bigger sensor the image  will get black corners     4 18 2 7 Focal length  Wide angle lenses have a better depth of field than telephoto  lenses  This means that you can focus both close to the camera as well as ata  distance  Telephoto lenses require a more precise focus adjustment     4 18 2 8 Iris  Always use auto iris lenses for outdoor applications  as discussed in the  Outdoor Cameras subsection and indoor applications as discussed in the  ndoor  Cameras subsection     4 18 2 9 Ensure that the monitor viewing area in the Dispatch Center is free from glare  and is ergonomically adjusted for viewing by response personnel     4 18 2 10 Consider using video quad processors versus video multiplexers to put  multiple cameras on the same screen  This configuration eliminates choppy  movements     4 19 CCTV SYSTEMS DESIGN GUIDANCE    4 19 1 Table 4 5 provides additional design guidance and recommendations for  designing CCTV systems     71    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Table 4 5  CCTV Design Guidance and Recommendations    Issue    Recommendations       Camera Angle of View and  Placement    If video motion detection will b
37. 2   Considerations when implementing a CCTV system include     4 18 2 1 The main concern with remote video monitoring is data security  Unless  adequately protected  it may be possible for a hacker to gain access to remote video  sites  To reduce the possibility of unauthorized access  user name and password  protection is an important feature that must be implemented  A firewall and video  encryption should also be employed to dramatically reduce the chance of unauthorized  entry into the system     4 18 2 2 Use ample light  The most common reason for poor quality images is that the  light level is too low  Generally  the more light the better the images  With lighting levels  too low  images become noisy and blurry with dull colors     4 18 2 3 Scene illumination should be even across the field of view of the camera  with    a target light to dark ratio of 4 1 and maximum light to dark ratio of 8 to 1  marginally  acceptable      70    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 18 2 4 Avoid backlight  Try to avoid bright areas in the images  Bright images might  become over exposed  bright white  and objects might appear too dark  This problem  typically occurs when one tries to capture an object in front of a window     4 18 2 5 Reduce the contrast  A camera adjusts the exposure to obtain good average  light level in the image  A person in front of a white wall tends to appear too dark  If a  gray wall is used instead this problem does not exist     4 
38. 2NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 7 3  Sample Simple Dispatch Center Console Layout    Security    Figure 7 4  Sample Small Medium Dispatch Center Space Layout    Large format display panels    3 Operators Q    Administrative  Supervisor Workstation  g   Door protected by Bees    card reader    Fax    1    H  1  H       Equipment Room  if required     Equipment Racks    110    3 feet    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  7 5 MONITORS    7 5 1 Monitors should be ergonomically mounted  New products allow wall   mounted flat screen plasma displays and smaller  hinged  flat monitors that can be  swiveled out and adjusted for individual operators     7 5 2 Monitors should meet the following minimum specifications     7 5 3 Horizontal resolution  450 lines of horizontal resolution at center  700 800  TV lines offer super high resolution     7 5 4 Brightness  More than 250 lux in 100  white signal at center   7 5 5 Total geometric distortion  less than 3    7 6 GROUNDING POWER CONDITIONING    7 6 1 It is a good practice to provide a dedicated ground bus bar in the Dispatch  Center for grounding the ESS panels  Refer to NFPA 70 and TIA J STD 607 for  additional guidance on grounding and power conditioning     7 7 HVAC  7 7 1 Typical environmental conditions for a Dispatch Center are as follows   7 7 2 72 degrees Fahrenheit plus minus five degrees     7 7 3 50  Relative Humidity  RH  plus minus 10   If the relative humidity drops  bel
39. 3 2 4 2 Advantages and disadvantages of using biometric devices to grant or deny  access are shown in Figure 3 4  For information about the different types of biometric  technologies  see the subsection Biometric Readers in the section ACS Equipment in  this chapter     Figure 3 4  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Biometric Devices       Advantages      They provide automated verification that the person attempting to gain access is  authentic       Biometric credentials are extremely difficult to duplicate   Disadvantages     The cost is slightly higher      Longer verification time      Require special housings    m Do not work well in exterior environments             3 2 5 Combining credentials  A site   s security can be significantly enhanced by  combining two or more types of automated access control credentials   such as a  biometric characteristic with a smart card or a proximity card with a PIN code  However   combining credentials results in increased verification time and will decrease throughput  rate  Throughput time should be considered when making decisions about whether or  not to use redundant verification  Another consideration in combining two types of  credentials is that a system can be required to use one device during lower risk times   such as during normally staffed times  and two devices can be required for entry after  hours  The same philosophy can be applied for access control enhancement during  times of heightened force protection threat l
40. Breach and Detection un 15  Figure 2 4  Project ProCess               cccccessessseceecceeeeeeeneeeseceen scenes    A  eee 17  Figure 2 5  A Simple ESS System                  ccccceceeeeeeeeeeecee Ne   n 18  Figure 2 6  Intermediate System with Separate ACS and IDS ae 18  Figure 2 7  Complex System With Separate ACS  IDS  and CCTV Subsystems          19  Figure 2 8  Networked System nee ee ENEE 20  Figure 2 9  Local Alarm Monitoring        4g  e    n   REENEN 21  Figure 2 10  Central Station Monttorimg  Au 21  Figure 2 11  Police Connection Monitoring ee 22  Figure 2 12  Proprietary Station Monitorin                    cccecsseecccceeeeeeeeeesseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 22  Table 2 3 Pros and Cons of Monitoring Methode           ssssssessessssssennnnnreesserrrrnnnnnnsserrrnne 22  Figure 3 1  Example Access Control System  AC   25  Figure 3 2  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Credential Devices              0000    26  Figure 3 3  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Coded Devices             seseeessese1ee 27  Figure 3 4  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Biometric Devices 28  Table 3 1 Exit Technologies  Pros and Cons    30  Figure 3 5  Basic Access Control Geouence EE 33  Figure 3 6  PCU In A SCF siies tvaicrccaes excaucestatiinciiedsaneniccetosinciuesitecinen rat mentacmesiinciede 34  Figure 3 7  Sample Card Reader Door Confguraion 36  Figure 3 8  ACS Design Process eege edd eg 43    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Figure 4 1  Example 
41. C uses five different    141    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  media to store information and enable its different functions  print  digital photograph   hologram  service  grade rank  expiration date  blood type  donor information  date of  birth  and social security number   magnetic stripe and two barcodes  for backward  compatibility   and an integrated circuit  IC  chip  The IC chip is the secure portion of the  card  It contains all the information stored in the other media on the card  along with  certificate  key identifications  and additional pay and medical information  The IC chip  can also store additional information and facility specific needs  The eventual plan is to  provide the CAC with wireless  contactless  13 56MHz  compatible with ISO 14443   card reader capability     Central Processing Unit  CPU   In a computer based system  the component such as  a microprocessor  programmable logic controller  PLC   or similar device that functions  as the overall system coordinator  performing automated alarm functions  control of  peripheral devices  operator interface  alarm reporting  and event logging  CPU is  synonymous with the    head end    of a system and is conceptually the    brains    of the  associated system  Contemporary systems use distributed intelligence such that PC  functions are downloaded to each local panel  which improves system reliability in the  event a communications line is severed     Data Transmission Med
42. CCTV  component system suppliers  These software companies supply unique digital  processing hardware and write software to process the digital image information  At the  writing of this guide  the cost of video content analysis varies from  2500 to  5000 per  camera on top of the installed cost of the camera     Figure 5 10 Video Intrusion Detection System          Camera Sensors Digital Processor           Dispatch Center  i  Mithila         gm    Graphical User i  f Interface    b e   wm i ed       Digital Video Recorder  or Tape Backup       87    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    5 4 3 6 2 Table 5 2 provides additional design guidance and recommendations of use  of video content analysis and motion path analysis systems for wide area intrusion  detection     Table 5 2  Video IDS Design Guidance and Recommendations    Issue Recommendations       Camera Type Use fixed cameras for video content analysis     Consider use of pan tilt zoom cameras for  assessment  once intrusion detection occurs              Image Resolution 320 by 240 minimum   Frame Rate 15 frames per second minimum   Camera Mounting 35 40 feet  higher is better     Cameras mounted at 8 10 feet offer the ground end up  with too much occlusion     Camera must be stable with good physical support        Distance Between 200 300 feet   Cameras       Orientation to Fenceline   Parallel to the fence line or down to 45 degrees to the   or Perimeter fenceline   It is easier to detect a
43. CCTV System                c ccccceeeeeeeeeeeenneeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenaaees 45  Figure 4 2  Dimensions of a    9 inch    ESS Display         ssnnneseeeseeennnnnneneeeeerrrrnnnneneserrrnne 47  Figure 4 3  Example of a    Quad Screen    Display    49  Figure 4 4     Switching    Two Camera Images on a Single Display                  eceeeeeeees 50  Table 4 1  CCTV Display Component Application Guidance    51  Figure 4 5  Simple Two Display Monitor Configuration ANEN 52  Figure 4 6  Multiple Images on A Single Display    52  Figure 4 7  Pre alarm  Current  and Post Alarm Image Compartson 52  Figure 4 8  PTZ Sweep Range                 secseeeeeceeeeeeeeeegpecceeeeeeeee tees MM   n 56  Table 4 2  Fixed versus PI CGameras ENEE 56  Figure 4 9  Calculation for Storage of Frame Size of 25 kbytes            sssssssseeeeseerrrreen 58  Table 4 3  Light to Dark Ratios e M   EEN 60  Table 4 4  Characteristics of Thermal Imagers     siis    s ssssssessseerrneessererrrrrnnnnsseerrrrrnnn 62  Figure 4 10  Relative Magnification Of an Obiect 63  Figure 4 11  Field of view and Focal Length    64  Figure 4 12  Calculation For a Camera in Nonalarm Mode at 2 EP    65  Figure 4 13  Calculation For a Camera in Alarm Mode at 10 fe  66  Table 4 5  CCTV Design Guidance and Recommendations          snsssssosoeeeoeoennnneneeeena 72  Figure 5 1  Example Intrusion Detection System  D     76  Figure 5 2  Separate ACS and IDS Ce EE 77  Figure 5 3  Sample Door CGontguraton  EE 78  Figure 5 4  Sa
44. E  WEE 18  2 5 MONITORING METHODS       00    eegeeeceeeecee ee NDE EEN 20  CHAPTER 3 ACCESS CONTROL SYS TMS 2 Ql seecccccecceereesessceneeeeenseeneees 24  3 1 ON ER VIEW EEN A o TE 24  3 2 ACS ENTRY AUTHORIZATION IDENTIFIERS           0  eeeeseeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeaes 26  3 3 OTHER ACS IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS oaaae 28  3 4 ACS EQUIPMENT cb EEN  MMM EE 31  3 5 ACS DESIGN BIR Ve  VE 41  CHAPTER A CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION GNVSTEMES AA 44  4 1 OV ERY   eae MO WE 44  4 2 DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDER  DVR               cceeesceceeseeseeneeenesseesenenenseneenee 46  4 3 SYAM DISA YS ins ccleaner dst tbe a cna 46  4 4 VIDEO MATRIX SWITCHERS E 53  4 5 Kada VT e 53  4 6 e VE 53  4 7 INTERNET PROTOCOL  IP  ADDRESSABLE CAMERAS eee 57  4 8 ie  rel EE 58  4 9  ES Jr PAT el 59  4 10 VIEWING IN LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS          ccc ceeseeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeneeeeeeenaes 61  4 11 POWER EE 62  4 12 CAMERA FIELDS OEE eebe erer  62  4 13 RESOLUTION aiaeei ed eia een eene 64  4 14 FRAMES PER RTE EE 65  4 15 BANDWIDTH MEET 65  4 16 WAITE BALANCE Vecai arian a tele a a a a ii aE 67  4 17 CCTV CAMERA EMPLOYMENT FOR INTRUSION DETECTION               67  4 18 CCTV EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS A 69  4 19 CCTV SYSTEMS DESIGN GUIDANCE A 71    1    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 5 INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM   cccccstctcccsscncerssersnerensestiactencstetens 75  5 1 OVERVIEW  een iere 75  5 2 CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT  CRU    75  5 3 INTERIOR  SENSORS iieiea ieia iiiv 75  5 4 EXTERIOR
45. Facial Recognition  Cameras can be used for biometric facial recognition as  discussed in Chapter Three     4 1 7 Intrusion Detection  CCTV cameras when employed with video content  analysis or motion path analysis software and equipment are increasingly being used as  a means for intrusion detection as discussed in this Chapter under CCTV Camera  Employment for Intrusion Detection     4 1 7 1    As shown in Figure 4 1  a CCTV system includes cameras  fixed and    pan tilt zoom cameras for the interior and exterior of a facility  a digital video recorder   operator workstation  matrix switchers  and displays     44    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 1  Example CCTV System    POWER FIXED INTERIOR  Ci  F i            CB     DATA esch  Aes POWER  HEATING FIXED EXTERIOR  A E an     BS VIDEO i    IA a MATRIX VIDEO  ROUTER SWITCHER VIDEO  VIDEO PAN  TILT  ZOOM  POWER  CONTROLS Gear  d  ALARM  MONITOR  BATTERIES  ole POWER  CONTROLS  PAN  TILT  ZOOM  FIXED D HEATING EXTERIOR  IMAGE wn a KS  MONITOR  m  120 VAC ELECTRICAL LOADS Segen      OPTIONAL  S Dono  CK    D    MONITOR get     WIRELESS  VIDEO     CAMERA  RECORDER     f  if applicable   I      4H  D    S FFE  Gees A mm  s CPU  limited application     VIDEO CONTENT ANALYSIS STATION   Is  D      45    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 2 DIGITAL VIDEO RECORDER  DVR     4 2 1 In current CCTV systems  the digital video recorder  DVR  has become the     heart    of t
46. For example  infrared illuminators require black white cameras and do not work  on color cameras  The range that the camera will see in the dark depends on sensitivity  and spectral response of the camera and lens combination  Color cameras will not  accurately reproduce color images when used under infrared illumination  Many black  and white cameras use infrared filters to intentionally filter out non visible light   Therefore  black and white cameras which are designed to be used in conjunction with  infrared lighting should be specified such that there is not infrared filter  Dual mode  cameras that can switch from color to monochrome operation in low light conditions  should also have any infrared filter removed for the reason cited above     61    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 10 3 6 A number of illuminator manufacturers each produce a variety of beam  patterns  For example 10   and 30   spot  precise  illuminators and 60   flood illuminators     4 10 4 Thermal Imagers  Thermal imagers use a special technology that senses  heat signatures rather than visual information  These cameras operate under complete  darkness  Thermal imagers are best used in long range detection and surveillance  applications  Thermal imagers detect and display images based on infrared light  emitted from objects rather than visible light reflected off objects  The most common  technology is Forward Looking Infrared  FLIR   Thermal cameras work ona  temperature 
47. Intranet  NMCI  Standard Construction  Practices  Unified Facilities Criteria Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel   available from http  dod wbdg org    UFC 4 010 01  Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings  Unified Facilities Criteria  Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available from http  dod wbdg org    UFC 4 010 02  Minimum Standoff Distances for Buildings  FOUO   Unified Facilities  Criteria Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available from  http  dod wbdg org    UFC 4 012 01  Security Engineering  Entry Control Facilities Access Control Points   Unified Facilities Criteria Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available  from http  dod wbdg org    UFC 4 011 01  DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual  Unified Facilities  Criteria Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available from  http  dod wbdg org    UFC 4 011 02  DoD Security Engineering Design Manual  Unified Facilities Criteria  Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available from http  dod wbdg org    137    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  APPENDIX B  GLOSSARY  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS  ACS   Access control system   AA amp E   Arms  ammunition  and explosives   BMS   Balanced magnetic switch   BOC   Base operations center   CCD   Charge coupled device   CAC   Common access card   CCTV   Closed circuit television system   COTS   Commercial off the shelf equipment   CPU   Central processing unit   CRT   Cathode ray 
48. Mops  MPEG 1 encoding can introduce blockiness  color bleed   and shimmering effects on video and lack of detail on audio  Typical MPEG 1  resolution sizes are 352 x 240 pixels and 320 x 240 pixels     4 15 3 3  MPEG2 is a variant of MPEG1 that is optimized for broadcast quality video  and high definition TV  Typical MPEG 2 resolution sizes are 720 x 240 pixels and 640  x 480 pixels     4 15 3 4 MPEG4 is based on MPEG 1 and MPEG 2  MPEG 4 files are smaller than M   JPEG files  so they can be transmitted over a narrower bandwidth  In CCTV  applications  MPEG 4 allows a style of transmission where an    anchor    image is  transmitted  and then another image is not transmitted until something in the image  changes  This minimizes the number of images transmitted when there is no movement  in a location  For this reason  MPEG 1  and other frame based codecs  can  conceivably be perceived as a better source of forensic evidence since each frame or  image is being sent as opposed to the updates  MPEG 4 offers a wide range of  resolution sizes from 64 x 48 pixels to 4096 x 4096 pixels     4 15 3 5 Following MJPEG  Wavelet is another frame based compression codec that  is commonly used  Wavelet operated in the 30Kbps to 7 5Mbps range and 8 30 frame  rate speeds  Typical Wavelet resolution sizes are 160 x 120 pixels and 320 by 240  pixels     4 15 4 With regard to bandwidth  there are two general system architecture factors     66    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 Oc
49. O THE AGS       115  8 7 BANDWIDTEEANAI EE 115    CHAPTER 9 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND CROSS DISCIPLINE    COORDINATION EE 117  9 1 GENERAL e RE 117  9 2 GENERAL COORDINATION    unn 118  9 3 CIVIE GOORDINATION oriori ionini ienien iore aiaeei ann aeiae ar basanar iaaiiai 118  9 4 ARCHITECTURAL COORDINATION    118  9 5 LIFE SAFETY CODE CONSIDERATIONS AA 121    2    UFC 4 021 02NF    27 September 2006   change 1  23 October 2006   9 6 ELECTRICAL COORDINATION    121  9 7 MATERIAL ENTRY CONTROL     sssssssnnseesnnneseernnnserrrnreerirnnnnrrrnnnnerrnnnneree 129  CHAPTER 10 MODEL DESIGN APDPPROACH  130  10 1 INTRODUCTION E 130  10 2 PROJECT EN NEE 130  10 3 INITIAL DRAWING PREDARATION  131  10 4 BASIS OF DESIGN E 131  10 5 SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE    EE  sees 134  10 6 DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE    keen         MB 134  10 7 BIDDING EEN  EES  134  APPENDIX A REFERENCES EE ET E  E 135  APPENDIX B GLOSSARY              cccseeccceeessereeeeeesseeeegpecsececeesessee  MQM   n 138  ACRONYMS AND ADDREVIATIONS EE 138  DEFINITION OF KEEN  ET E 141    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Table of Figures and Tables    Figure 2 1  ESS as a Part of a Physical Security System                 ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 13  Figure 2 2  Example Detect and Delay Options EEN 14  Table 2 1  Example Breach Events and Delay Time           sssosssssnnnneeseessrrrrrrnnesserrrrrenn 14  Table 2 2  Sample Detect  Delay  and Respond Measures 14  Figure 2 3  Timeline Showing Two Cases of 
50. Post Alarm        Programmable   3 Images on a Large Format Display    52    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 4 VIDEO MATRIX SWITCHERS    4 4 1 Video matrix switchers are components that provide switching capability  between cameras and viewing monitor displays  They typically offer functionality that  allows programmable settings such as loss of video alarms  camera naming  guard tour  camera sequences  and salvo switching  which activates several cameras  simultaneously to pre set views  Video matrix switchers can simultaneously switch  pan tilt zoom  PTZ  control signals with the video  so that control follows the active  camera     4 5 KEYBOARDS    4 5 1 Keyboards allow an operator to control pan tilt zoom cameras  They are also  used to identify which camera to call up and display on the screen  Some CCTV system  keyboards come with    track balls    or joy sticks that facilitate camera control     4 6 CAMERAS    4 6 1 Color versus Black and White  Color cameras offer more information such  as color of a vehicle or subject   s clothing  Some ultra low light color cameras are able to  automatically sense the ambient light conditions and switch from color to black and  white in low light conditions  Cameras must have auto white balance to adjust for the  changing color temperature of daylight and artificial lighting needed for night time  viewing  Black and white cameras are more sensitive under low light or darkness  conditions and are best 
51. Recording of CCTV images is almost always done for retrieval of surveillance  information  Consideration must be given to the location and capacity of the recorders   The bandwidth requirements for streaming video can be high  i e  3 07 Mbps for one  camera in alarm   To reduce recurring cost of transmitting high bandwidth demands  it is  a good design practice to install recording equipment locally and transmit lower quality  images back to the Dispatch Center  For example  it is less costly to download camera  images at 15 frames per second  fps  at the local site and transmit a 2 fps image back  to the Dispatch Center  While the 2 fps image will be choppier  it can give sufficient  information to view what is going on at a remote site  i e  there is an intruder   If  evidentiary information  i e  identity of the intruder  is required that information can be  retrieved from the local site  Alternatively  more time can be used to download a higher  quality image if so needed     4 8 2 Storage Requirements  This example demonstrates how to calculate  storage requirements  Assuming a typical camera image of 25 kbytes  the required  memory storage capability for 30 days of images at 6 frames per second is 389 Gb   That storage requirement is calculated in Figure 4 9     Figure 4 9  Calculation for Storage of Frame Size of 25 kbytes       Capacity    Frame file size in bytes  x  frames per second  x  duration in  seconds    Capacity   25 kbytes x  6 frames per second  x  3600 se
52. Reflected light  Radiated heat    Not recommended       Microwave    Nearby movement outside IDS  area    Use of dual technology PIR  minimizes false alarms       Dual Technology    Same as PIR and microwave    Good choice  Uses both  microwave and PIR       Vibration    Railroads   trains  Roadways   vehicles  Runways   airplanes   Rock quarries   explosions    Seismic event    Only works well in low  background vibration areas       Coaxial Strain Sensitive    Wind flexing fence  EMI    Temperamental          Fiber Optic Improper noise level adjustment   Recommended technology   Anim  l Activit provided suitable fence mount is  y provided and animals are  excluded from the area  Buried Cable Ground shifting due to standing Varying terrain or material    or puddling water  or erosion     composition  asphalt pavement  to grass to gravel  requires  adjusting sensitivity to match  each material       Ported Cable    EMI    Movement of nearby vehicles or  medium to large animals    Congregation of small animals     Very susceptible to EMI from  large electrical equipment or  substations and should not be  used near these installations       Video Content Analysis  Motion Path Analysis       Camera vibration     Normal operational  personnel vehicular movement     Lightning flashes        Good camera mounting mitigates  camera vibration issues     Advanced programming can filter  out false alarms from animals   rain  snow  birds  waves and so  forth     Video content analysis wo
53. The camera field of view affects the lens  zoom level   and number of cameras needed     4 12 2   For cameras used to detect an intruder  with the capability to determine the  presence of an intruder but not necessarily classify the intruder as a human  animal or  object   the area of interest should occupy a minimum of 10 percent of the field of view   with a maximum field of view of 300 feet in length or less     62    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 12 3 For cameras used for classification of an intruder  the capability to classify an  intruder as human   the area of interest should occupy a minimum of 15 to 20 percent of  the field of view  with a maximum field of view of 200 feet in length or less  The lens  selection and alignment should be established so that the field of view should be no  more than 150 feet wide at the far end of the alarm sector to allow at least 4 5 pixels to  cover a 1 foot square target  That minimum resolution is needed to classify the intrusion  source as being a person versus an animal or debris  This likely requires that the  camera be mounted outside the zone being assessed     4 12 4   For cameras used for identification of an intruder  the capability to determine  the identity of a human intruder   the area of interest should occupy a minimum of 25  percent of the field of view  with a maximum field of view of 75 feet in length or less     4 12 5 Figure 4 10 compares the field of view of a telephoto lens wit
54. UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA  UFC     SECURITY ENGINEERING  ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS       APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE  DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  UNIFIED FACILITIES CRITERIA  UFC   ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS  Any copyrighted material included in this UFC is identified at its point of use  Use of the    copyrighted material apart from this UFC must have the permission of the copyright  holder     U S  ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS  NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND  Preparing Activity   AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGINEER SUPPORT AGENCY    Record of Changes  changes are indicated by  1      1         Change No    Date Location          1 23 Oct 06    Title adjusted                UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  FOREWORD    The Unified Facilities Criteria  UFC  system is prescribed by MIL STD 3007 and provides  planning  design  construction  sustainment  restoration  and modernization criteria  and applies  to the Military Departments  the Defense Agencies  and the DoD Field Activities in accordance  with USD AT amp L  Memorandum dated 29 May 2002  UFC will be used for all DoD projects and  work for other customers where appropriate  All construction outside of the United States is  also governed by Status of forces Agreements  SOFA   Host Nation Funded Construction  Agreements  HNFA   and in some instances  Bilateral Infrastructure A
55. UFC assumes the pre design  phases  including the risk analysis  are completed prior to beginning ESS design  For  information on design requirements  refer to UFC 4 020 01 and UFC 4 020 02   described in the section    Security Engineering UFC Series    in this chapter      1 3 REFERENCES    1 3 1 Appendix A contains a list of references used in this UFC  The publication  date of the code or standard is not included in this UFC  In general  the latest available  issuance of the reference was used     UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  1 4 GLOSSARY    Acronyms  abbreviations  and terms are defined in Appendix B   1 5 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES    1 5 1 This UFC is one of a series of security engineering UFC manuals that cover  minimum standards  planning  preliminary design  and detailed design for security and  antiterrorism  The documents in Series 4 0xx are designed to be used sequentially by a  diverse audience to facilitate development of projects throughout the planning  design  and acquisition cycle  The manuals in this series are identified in the following  subsections     1 5 2 DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings  UFC 4 010 01 and  UFC 4 010 02  For Official Use Only   FOUO  establish standards that provide  minimum levels of protection against terrorist attacks for the occupants of all DoD  inhabited buildings  These UFCs are intended to be used by security and antiterrorism  personnel and design teams to identify the m
56. a communication signals are sensitive to changes in capacitance and resistance  associated with different cable types  Digital    1s    and    Os    trigger on sharp LRC   inductance  resistance  capacitance  time constants  The ESS designer should specify  low capacitance cable and sufficient twists per foot that meet manufacturers     specifications  Dry contact signals can be provided in unshielded cable to lower the  cost of installation     9 6 6 Surge Protection  Refer to UFC 3 520 01     122    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 6 7 Electromagnetic Interference  EMI   Interference can be introduced to  unprotected communication lines that are in close proximity to electrical power wiring   radio frequency sources  large electric motors  generators  induction heaters  power  transformers  welding equipment  and electronic ballasts  Protection from EMI includes  avoiding the sources of the interference by physical separation or shielding wire lines by  means of specialty wiring  coaxial  twisted shielded  foil  pairs  and metal sheathed  cables   and metallic conduit systems     9 6 8 Tamper Protection  Tamper protection for ESS can be physical protection   line supervision  encryption  and or tamper alarming of enclosures and components  All  intrusion detection  access control  assessment systems  and their associated data  transmission media must be protected commensurate with the classification of the asset  being protected  All intrusion
57. active portions of the screen  By drawing many such lines from the top  to the bottom of the screen  it creates an entire screen full of images  Since individual  phosphors are illuminated  the CRT technology offers a high resolution image  There  was a historic problem of a static image being    burned in    permanently on the CRT  screen  Most current CRT manufacturers provide a    screen saver    image or feature to  avoid this problem and extend the life of the monitor  The ESS designer should specify  or verify that a screen saver feature is available for CRT displays  With a long term  pedigree of security applications  security CCTV vendors offer a variety of standard  CCTV monitor display sizes to include  9  10  12  14 15  17  19  20  and 21 inch  displays  Note that displays are described in terms of their diagonal dimension as  shown in Figure 4 2  Since there has been a strong history of using CRT displays in  security projects  manufacturing economies of scale have resulted in commensurate  favorable COTS prices and inventory availability  While initially more cost effective as a  display component  CRTs take up desk space  could require a custom built console   consume more power  and generate more heat     46    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 2  Dimensions of a    9 inch    ESS Display          4 3 3 Computer Monitors  Normally supplied as CRTs  computer monitors are  increasingly being used as CCTV display components  Ty
58. agers       Consider for critical perimeter and cases where  detection in fog  rain  snow are important  Criticality of  installation must justify premium price of the camera        73    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006       CCTV Employed as IDS    Video motion detection  motion activated cameras   may work as fixed detectors in narrow spaces such as  doors and hallways     For exterior  wide area surveillance  video content  analyis motion path analysis is recommended over  video motion detection to cut down on the number of  nuisance alarms        CCTV Encoding Decoding   Codec  Schemes       Only use standard codec schemes     do not use  proprietary schemes     Use frame based codec schemes when forensic  evidence may be required        74    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 5  INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM  5 1 OVERVIEW    5 1 1 The function of an IDS is to detect intruders  The detection of an intruder  starts the    clock    on the Detect  Delay  Respond timeline addressed in Chapter Two   Electronic Security Systems Overview  The principal elements of an IDS include interior  sensors  exterior sensors  IDS CPU or local controllers  communications and interfaces  with ACS  CCTV and the Dispatch Center  These elements  and others that comprise  an IDS  are shown in Figure 5 1  shown on next page   An IDS requires integration with  a process and mechanisms and for assessing and responding to intrusion alar
59. are easily defeated   when significant  anti tailgating measures are required  high security vestibules or  guard controlled entrances can be a solution  Such application may slow down access     3 3 5 Two man Rule  The two man rule is a strategy where two people must be in  an area together  making it impossible for a person to be in the area alone  Two man  rule programming is optional with many identification systems  It prevents an individual  cardholder from entering a selected empty security area unless accompanied by at least  one other person  Once two token holders are logged into the area  other token holders  can come and go individually as long as at least two people are in the area  Conversely   when exiting  the last two occupants of the security area must leave together using their  tokens  Use of the two man rule can help eliminate insider threats to critical areas by  requiring at least two individuals to be present at any time  Most ACS software will  enable the assignment of a specific second person that can be established  such as  clearance escort requirement      3 3 6 Exit Technologies  While access control is principally concerned with entry    requirements  some consideration must be given to exit technologies and methods   Door hardware or locking mechanisms specified to enter access portals influence exit    29    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  hardware  Life safety codes in the United States dictate that personnel can
60. ations     6 3 SECURE COMMUNICATIONS    6 3 1 No matter what transmission mode or media is selected  it is important that a  method for securing communications be included  This includes physical protection   such as providing rigid metallic conduit for all conductors  as well as electronic  protection  such as encrypting communication transmissions  Refer to the Chapter Nine  for the subsection on Tamper Protection  which includes a discussion on physical  protection of conductors as well as more general information on encryption  requirements     6 4 NETWORK TOPOGRAPHY    6 4 1 One of the initial steps in designing and evaluating a security DTM is to  identify the topology to be used  Additionally  the designer should coordinate network  requirements with installation security and the communications office  Typically   networked security systems are typically a Proprietary Security Network  Refer to  Chapter 8     ESS Subsystem Integration    for more information     6 4 2 Three general network topographies are possible  star  ring  and fully  meshed  The concepts apply to intra site system architectures as well as inter site  regional configurations  A brief description of each topography follows     6 4 2 1 Star  The star  or    hub and spoke    network involves a central Dispatch Station   or head end  and single communication lines out to individual sites  or field panels    98    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  The disadvantage to a star t
61. atrix fashion  are required     e When flexibility of programming images is required           4 3 13_ Banks of CCTV monitors increase cost  Designs should consider having one  monitor for    alarm call up    and additional monitors for a fixed view or switching images   The tenant command or ESS Project Manager should be wary of the vendor advocating  a monitor for every camera  Individual project display configurations will vary based on  the nature of the project specifics such as number of critical assets  criticality of the  asset  number of CCTV cameras  and space allocation  Figures 4 5 through 4 7  illustrate three different possible configurations  Figure 4 5 is a basic simple project  configuration  Figure 4 6 displays static images for a twenty five camera project  Figure  4 7 illustrates a robust display configuration that allows viewing of pre alarm  current  situation  and post alarm images for a single event  In Figure 4 7  pre alarm shows the  events shortly before the ESS alarm  Conversely  the post alarm displays the events  shortly after the ESS alarm     51    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 5  Simple Two Display Monitor Configuration       Standby       Alarm Callup Monitor Four Camera Images    Figure 4 6  Multiple Images on A Single Display       16 Cameras on a Large Format Display    Figure 4 7  Pre alarm  Current  and Post Alarm Image Comparison    Switchable  or  Secondary Alarms    Current Image    Pre Alarm  
62. ber of monitors needed to  support the system  and how multiple camera scenes will be multiplexed onto a  common monitor  not every camera requires an individual monitor      4 18 1 13 Determine if the system operators need zoom and focus capability from their  workstations     4 18 1 14 Some camera installations may have difficult viewing conditions in terms of  exposure to a variety of lighting conditions from morning fog  to afternoon direct glare  to  evening shade or nighttime darkness  For these locations  ensure the camera has  backlight compensation features  typically a gain or sensitivity setting on the camera   In  rare cases  control of the backlight compensation setting may need to be made  available back at the Dispatch Center  This is an additional control signal that is not  often required  but could be a design requirement for specific cameras     4 18 1 15 Specify auto iris for outdoor applications and determine if interior lighting  conditions change such that it should be specified for interior applications     4 18 1 16 CCTV cameras should not be installed in areas that may compromise  classified material  such as SCIFs  or where individuals expect a certain level of  privacy  restrooms  locker rooms  and private offices      4 18 1 17 Ensure secure mounting for exterior cameras  Mount them on buildings or  other rigid structures whenever possible  Although rarely needed  gyro stabilized lenses  are available for high vibration  high wind  areas     4 18 
63. c hr    540 Mb x  24  hr day  x 30 days   389 Gb   Thus  one camera transmitting camera images of 25 kbytes in size will require  389 Gb for 30 days of storage              4 8 2 1 Quickly  it can be seen the memory requirements for a complex camera  system can be extensive  The ESS designer needs to specify sufficient recording  media methods to archive the project s camera images using a methodology similar to  the one displayed in Figure 4 9     4 8 3 Principle Technologies  There are four principal technologies for recording  CCTV video information  old fashioned VHS  contemporary digital video recorders   DVRs   network video storage  and data servers     4 8 3 1 VHS Recording is an older technology  Banks of VHS recorders were  designed to download CCTV camera images  Tapes were frequently swapped out and  storage space had to be planned for record retention  Since VHS technology has been  made obsolete by current technology  i e  DVRs   VHS units are not recommended for  new security projects     4 8 3 2 Digital Video Recorders  Digital video recording provides a great  improvement in camera image storage  Benefits include eliminating consumable media    58    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006   tapes   reducing physical storage space  ease of search and playback functions  and  the capability to add watermarks for documenting evidentiary recordings     4 8 3 3  Network Video Storage  An emerging trend in modern CCTV systems is the  capabilit
64. c strikes can be configured for fail safe or fail   secure operation  The logic is the same  In fail safe configuration the strike retracts  when de energized on loss of power  This allows the door to be opened from the public  side  In fail secure configuration the strike remains in place causing the door to be  locked from the public side and requires manual key entry to unlock the door from the  public side  Again  as with electric locks  unimpeded access is allowed for in the  direction of egress by manual activation of the door handle lever when exiting from the  secure side  For retrofit situations electric strikes rarely require door replacement and  can often be done without replacing the doorframe     120    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 4 7 2 1 Electric strikes should be protected with a cover guard  Exposed electric  strikes can be over ridden  pried open  by an intruder with a pocket knife screwdriver     9 4 7 3 Magnetic locks  The magnetic lock is popular because it can be easily  retrofitted to existing doors  The magnetic lock is surface mounted to the door and  doorframe  Power is applied to magnets continuously to hold the door closed  Magnetic  locks are normally fail safe  they can be fail secure through the use of a solenoid   This  may be a problem for unstaffed facilities in the event of a power disruption that will leave  the site unsecured until security personnel arrive or power is restored     9 4 7 3 1 Magnetic loc
65. ce reference for the design and construction of electronic  security systems    Q Implementation of automated  hardware electronic security systems will reduce  costly labor intensive security personnel forces    Q Provision of automated intrusion detection systems and methodologies enhance  force protection vigilance by not relying on human operators  who are subject to  monitoring fatigue    a Cost savings through implementation guidance on how to consolidate diverse  dispatch centers  Security command centers  into regional dispatch centers           UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Reduced facility project costs and efficiencies achieved by a better educated  command  designer  and project management staff for the specialized technical area    of electronic security systems   The modernized facilities will perform better in terms of force protection than they did    originally     UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CONTENTS  CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ssscissisiissirtstieieeiaertneirainauea deme arene ete 8  1 1 GE 8  1 2 SCOPRE anA in nica iet i ANA N tbc wget  8  1 3 Ier 8  1 4 GLOSSARY ET  EE 9  1 5 SECURITY ENGINEERING UFC SERIES ANEN 9  1 6 ORGANIZATION OF THIS UFC         eet eeeeceeceeeeeteeee un A NA 10  CHAPTER 2 ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEM OVERVIEW    eee eee 12  2 1 ENEE  WT eaaa 12  2 2 DETECT  DELAY  AND RESPOND  suen    12  2 3 ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS bh M   cee cee eeesseeee reese 16  2 4 SYSTEM COMPLE AE 
66. ck     badge out     procedures but require building code variance or approved special circumstances for  locking an exit portal for a normal existing individual  Badge out card readers over more  specific identification of existing personnel over keypads  where a number of individuals  could have knowledge of the exit numerical code     Table 3 1 Exit Technologies  Pros and Cons           Pros Cons  Door Easy to implement Does not    track    who left the facility or  Hardware Cost effective Space   Simple No additional security   Request to  Slightly simpler to Generally requires complementary  Exit Button implement than keypads or   automatic exiting devices such as a  cardreaders  PIR     No additional Pros  typically   No additional security     mandated in U S  by use of   PIRs can release the door lock if  mag locks    as door locking   someone lingers in detection cone        device    Keypads Some additional security Requires variance or alternate method  afforded in that exiting to U S  life safety code for exit doors   person needs to know the   Exit code can be shared   exit code           Additional construction cost     30    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006                Cardreaders   Can be used to achieve Requires variance or alternate method  anti passback function  to U S  life safety code for exit doors   Allows tracking of exiting Extra construction cost and  personnel by individual programming   identification    3 3 7 Event 
67. ctors  point for supplier  equipment   H Low  which is One T 1 line at Relatively low  Low if DoD  Recurring good  Minimal 1 544 Mbps can which is good if equipment   Cost maintenance be estimated at DoD owned  Leased equipment  cost of installed    500 month  Otherwise obtain   requires vendor  conductors  Obtain vendor vendor quote  quote   quote       Best As good as Generally Requires line of  Consideration technology  Not      hardwired     Not requires line of  sight or mirrors   S affected by line   affected by line sight  Approved  of sight  of sight  frequencies must  be used   f Very good  Second or third Not Signals can be  Security especially if best choice  recommended by   blocked  Hard to  totally contained   Usually CIA studies  but transmit forged  on DoD dedicated may make sense   signals   property  conductors are on DoD property  used from one if there is little  provider  chance of  interception   Weather A affected  Not affected  As Not as bad as Rain  dust  snow   est technology   good as free space fog  or smog can  Effects from weather    hardwired     optics  but can block  consideration  be affected by transmission   heavy rain and shutdown  snow  network                    106    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  CHAPTER 7  DISPATCH CENTER  7 1 INTRODUCTION    7 1 1 The Dispatch Center  also known as the Security Operations Center  SOC    Security Control Center  SCC   or Central Monitoring Station is an area that serves
68. d loop   such that if the cable is cut  a detection can be detected by the other return path     5 4 4 5 Fiber optic strain sensitive cable systems are similar to the coaxial strain   sensitive cable systems  The fiber optic system uses a fiber optic cable  rather than a  coaxial cable  woven through the fence fabric  Strain on the fence fabric causes micro   bending of the fiber cable  which is monitored by the control panel and generates an  alarm condition  Figure 5 11 shows a typical fiber optic fence detection illustration   Fiber optic strain sensing systems are relatively newer detection systems but have a  strong following  The systems are readily available and are highly tunable to adjust for  field conditions due to weather and climate characteristics  The systems are impervious  to lightning  electromagnetic interference  radio frequency interference  or other  electronic signals and can be used over long distances     5 4 4 6 Defeat Measures and False Positives  Possible defeat measures include  tunneling  jumping  or bridging across the fence system  Careful climbing at corner  posts may not generate sufficient vibration to generate an alarm condition     Possible false positives can occur from debris  animals  and plants     89    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 5 11  Typical Fiber Optic Fence Detection System    FIBER OPTIC CABLE  y IN PVC CONDUIT Color  black to match fence mesh       1  RMC under walkway  24    min cover  
69. differential between the object and the background  In desert  environments  the background is white and people are black  In cooler environments   the background is black and people are shown as white images  A key advantage of  long range thermal imagers is that they are less susceptible to environmental influences  from rain and fog  The disadvantage of thermal imagers is the high cost  Typically  thermal imagers are classified as medium or long wavelength as illustrated in Table 4 4     Table 4 4  Characteristics of Thermal Imagers          Classification   Wavelength   Cooling Cost Recommended  Service Period  Medium 3  5 micron Cryogenically  100K 7500 hours  meters cooled   Long 7 14 micron Uncooled  70K 30 000 hours  meters                   4 11 POWER    4 11 1 Options for CCTV power include 12 Vdc  24 Vdc  24 VAC  and 120 VAC  As  with any power system  itis important to understand voltage drop limitations  current  draw issues  grounding  and battery or uninterruptable power supply  UPS  backup   Exterior camera are typically powered by 120 VAC because additional power is needed  for heating and controls  pan  tilt  Zoom   12 Vdc and 24 Vdc cameras are easier to  provide backup power with through batteries  Power systems are further described in  Chapter 9     General Requirements and Cross Discipline Coordination        4 12 CAMERA FIELDS OF VIEW    4 12 1 An important consideration when designing a camera system is determining  the field of view for each camera  
70. displayed at 30 fps  For most security applications  30 fps is higher  than needed for evidentiary and investigative purposes  Additionally  CCTV cameras  have the option to transmit video at two image rates  alarm condition and non alarm  condition  Making use of a lower non alarm fps can reduce project cost by allowing a  lower bandwidth transmission and storage requirement  recording  of the CCTV system     4 14 2   Non alarm frame speeds can fall in the 1 fps to 5 fps range  3 fps average    4 14 38 Alarm condition frame speeds can fall in the 10 fps to 20 fps  15 fps average    4 15 BANDWIDTH    4 15 1 In general  the bandwidth required increases with the frame rate used  Use  this formula to calculate bandwidth     Bandwidth    pixels horizontal by vertical     frame rate in images sec   4 15 2   Sample calculations for a camera in nonalarm mode at 2 fps  Figure 4 12   and in alarm mode at 10 fps  Figure 4 13  are provided to demonstrate the impact on  CCTV communication bandwidth requirements  The following assumptions apply for the  calculations   4 15 2 1 Assumption  1  Resolution is 640 pixels by 480 pixels  4 15 2 2 Assumption  2  Compression ratio is 20 1    Figure 4 12  Calculation For a Camera in Nonalarm Mode at 2 FPS       e At2bytes pixel   614 400 bytes  or 614 4 kb  per image    e Compression  614 4kb per second  kpbs 20    30 7 kbps per image frame   e Camera rate is 2 frames sec   2 x 30 7 kbps   61 4 kbps    e Convert bytes to bits  8bits bytes   2 contr
71. e Size   f   Focal Length    Le ae oy  Siee         H H 7       4 12 7 For example  a 2 meter high person would generate a 0 32 millimeter image  size when 100 meters away from a camera with a 16 milimeter focal length     2 meter person  H    H image size x 100 meters  1  16 milimeters  f    H      2 meter person x 16 milimeters 100 meters   H     0 32 milimeter image person on the camera    The image size in the monitor depends on the display size    4 13 RESOLUTION    4 13 1 Resolution refers to the    graininess    of an image  A sharp picture has more  pixels of information and is viewed as a    sharp    picture  Less pixels  digital cameras  or  TV lines  analog cameras  will result in a    grainier    image  640 pixels by 480 pixels is an  industry standard resolution for digital cameras  320 by 240 will generate a satisfactory  image that can help with transmission costs because it is a quarter of the data  associated with a 640 by 480 image  The system designer is recommended to use 640  by 480 as a standard CCTV resolution design criterion for digital cameras  As a  minimum  use 320 by 240 if there are bandwidth issues  For analog cameras  use 480  TV lines  high  to 330 TV lines  low      64    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 14 FRAMES PER SECOND  FPS     4 14 1 CCTV cameras transmit video in image frames  The measure of the     smoothness    of the playback of the video is quantified in frames per second  fps    Television video is 
72. e typically used for facilities  which are not located ona  DoD base or installation  Examples of facilities  which might be protected by a police    21    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  connection configuration  include medical clinics  base exchanges  commissaries  and  Reserve Centers  Refer to Figure 2 11 for a diagram of a police station connection     Figure 2 11  Police Connection Monitoring    Police Station  DoD Facility or Asset Center    2 5 5 Proprietary Station  This system is similar to a central station operation   except that ESS monitoring or recording equipment for all ESS at the installation is  located within a constantly staffed Dispatch Center on an owner s property  Proprietary  stations are prominent throughout DoD installations where Dispatch Centers are owned   maintained  and staffed by DoD personnel  who comprise the response force  The  installation security force responds to all ESS alarms  As a basic configuration  the  Dispatch Center may be centrally located at an installation  Two possible configurations  of a Proprietary Station Dispatch Center are shown in Figure 2 12  a Dispatch Center  centrally located at a base and an alternative configuration is a detached Regional  Dispatch Center  RDC          Alarm Signal       Figure 2 12  Proprietary Station Monitoring    May or may not be present  DoD Property line Pool a ETN       Regional    Center          Dispatch rn poe  Center             Operations           
73. e used  the camera  should aim perpendicular to the path of the adversary   This creates the greatest contrast and best sensitivity  to video motion     If video motion detection will not be used  and image  recognition is desired  facial or license plate viewing    then aim camera directly at adversary path        Camera Type  Recommendations    Fixed Cameras    Fixed camera use is recommended for collecting data  at specific risk areas  Risk area video shall capture the  following       Record 100  of persons entering and leaving the  risk area       Record 100  of activity within the risk area entry  location        Camera Type  Recommendations    PTZ Cameras    PTZ camera use is recommended for allowing  integrated camera call up with alarms and permit  security to view activity in key areas of facility     Camera call up integrates PTZ cameras to  automatically be programmed to point to designated  perimeter gates  building perimeter doors  loading dock  doors and other critical areas if they are opened  and  the video image s  shall appear on designated security  monitors        Environmental  Considerations for  Exterior Cameras       All exterior cameras must have outdoor housing with  integral heater and blower units  This shall include both  pole mounted cameras and exterior units mounted to  buildings    Weather tight conduit shall be used in exterior  applications     Any exterior camera that has a potential to receive a  lightning strike shall utilize fiber optic
74. ed Access  Control Systems  ACS   Data Transmission Media  DTM   and alarm reporting systems  for monitoring  control  and display     Electronic Security System Console  ESSC   While not always specifically referred to    as the ESSC  most security systems end up with a console that houses monitoring and  server interface equipment  Generally  this console is located in the Dispatch Center     142    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  ElectroMagnetic Interference  EMI   A naturally occurring phenomena when the  electromagnetic field of one device disrupts  impedes  or degrades the electromagnetic  field of another device by coming into proximity with it  With ESS  devices are  susceptible to EMI because electromagnetic fields are a byproduct of the passing  electricity through a wire  Data lines that have not been properly shielded are  susceptible to EMI  A good example of an ESS application is using shielded wiring from  a field card reader back to the local ACS panel     False Acceptance Rate      FAR   The rate or percentage at which a false credential is  inaccurately accepted as being valid by an ACS  A sample FAR for a product could be  0 1      False Alarm  An alarm when there is no alarm stimulus     False Rejection Rate  FRR   The rate or percentage at which an ACS product or  system rejects an authorized credential holder     Frame Rate Per Second  FPS   When referring to CCTV video image  this term refers  to how often the visual still 
75. efinitions used are an  academic basis for presenting different system configurations and integration needs  rather than standardized industry terminology  which does not exist for defining system  complexity     2 4 2 Simple System  The simplest ESS consists of a single ESS subsystem  For  example  a simple IDS at a low value asset is a simple system as shown in Figure 2 5   Other examples are an IDS with door contact  motion sensors  break glass sensors and  other digital input type sensors that do not require integration with another ESS  subsystem  Another example of a simple system would be a basic CCTV system of two  cameras going to a Digital Video Recorder  DVR   Figure 2 5 shows a block diagram of  a simple system     Figure 2 5  A Simple ESS System    IDS    2 4 3 Intermediate System  An intermediate system contains elements of at least  two ESS subsystems requiring integration  One example would be an ESS system  requiring both an ACS and an IDS  A basic block diagram for this type of system  reporting to a common Dispatch Center is shown in Figure 2 6     Figure 2 6  Intermediate System with Separate ACS and IDS    DISPATCH CENTER       IDS ACS    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  2 4 3 1 Combining ACS and IDS  Virtually all ACS can accommodate digital input  signals  Quite often it is possible to combine ACS and IDS when the IDS inputs are  limited to simple digital input devices that do not require separate IDS controllers   Examples 
76. eptance Forms  Normally the ESS designer s  technical specifications or Scope of Work will include requirements for test  documentation as prescribed by other DoD mandates  Currently a UFC on testing  procedures is under development     9 1 3 3 Pre Test walkthrough  A pre test walkthrough should be performed by the  contractor before the final acceptance testing  This allows the final acceptance test to  go smoothly and prevents mishaps and additional testing     9 1 3 4 Training  Consideration should be given to administrator and operator   training  The ESS designer should consider adding the number of hours required to the   appropriate portion of system specifications  Typically  several training sessions with a  117    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  minimum of one per work shift should be considered  It is a good practice to define  some performance criteria such as    upon training completion  the tenant command  should be able to unilaterally make additions or deletions to the ACS database        9 1 4 Operation and Maintenance    9 1 4 1 Overview  In specifying ESS  the designer needs to consider maintenance   service  repair  and sustainability of systems and the associated components  Systems  with arduous requirements should be reconsidered     9 1 4 2 Spare Capacity  An ESS should have the capability to be easily expanded or  modified for simple changes  such as adding a card reader or camera  over the near   term life of the system 
77. er located within the confines of a  Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility  SCIF   Per the Physical Security for  SCIFs     A PCU is a device that receives changes of alarm status from IDS sensors   and transmits an alarm condition to the monitoring station     The PCU resides in an  internal location  safe from external tampering and controls and monitors ESS  equipment for the protected area as shown in Figure 3 6     32    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 3 5  Basic Access Control Sequence    Individual Presents  Credentials to Reader     2  Local Security Panel    Card Reader       CPU Compares Credential J  Data to ACS Database      f              Authorized Credential Holders  Name Level    Jane Doe Hierarchy 1  John Smith Hierarchy 2          33    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 3 6  PCU In A SCIF    SCIF Perimeter    Emergency  Exit       Protected Premises          A Biometric Reader Electric Lock RX  Request to exit    D Junction Box BMS Balanced Magnetic Switch    3 4 4 System Display  The system display is the screen or monitor that allows  personnel to view and interact with the ACS hardware and software  Typically  it is a  computer screen  The location of the system display should be identified early in the  design process  The system display and control can be anywhere a computing device is  connected to the network  The software can reside on any computing device  preferably  a s
78. ere is no one single sensor  system that works in all applications  Realistically  the best Pd that can be achieved by  a single system is 95   Given enough time and resources  all intrusion detection  systems can be defeated  For simple installations with lower security needs  a fiber   optic fence perimeter detection system works well  For higher security applications   double fences intermediate  gravel bed and microwave sensors offer improved security   Video content analysis is an up and coming technology that will only improve with time  as software algorithms more closely simulate alert human operators     96    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 6    DATA TRANSMISSION MEDIA  DTM   6 1 INTRODUCTION    A critical element in an integrated ESS is the data transmission media  DTM  that  transmits information from sensors  access control devices  and video components to  display and assessment equipment  A DTM link is a path for transmission of data  between two or more components  and back to the Dispatch Center  An effective DTM  link ensures rapid and reliable transmission of data  is resistant to compromise  has  redundancy  and is conducive to rapid fault detection and repair  A number of  technology issues are relevant to implementing the DTM  such as bandwidth analysis   secure communications  network topology  communication redundancy  transmission  modes or protocols  and transmission media  These issues are discussed in the  fo
79. erior point sensors and interior volumetric  sensors  For additional information on interior IDS sensors to include types  purposes   principles of operation  common causes of false alarms  and appropriate applications  refer to DoD 0 2000 12 H     75    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 5 1  Example Intrusion Detection System  IDS     EXTERIOR INTRUSION SENSORS    Ee     ea i ie i Ss i   zz    Dee INTERIOR INTRUSION SENSORS    EA  E ie    ellen  va        0    KC        O en      76    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 5 2  Separate ACS and IDS CPUs    Glass Break                _ gt       d Readers  Motion Sensor        IDS   ACS Card Readers  d INTERFACES Door Unlock Signals  Door Contacts    _   _   _   _        BURIED  CABLE  CONTROLLER           TT TT TTT  BURIED CABLE    INTRUSION DETECTION   ACCESS CONTROL    5 3 2 Interior Point Sensors    5 3 2 1 Balanced Magnetic Switch s   BMS   BMS use a magnetic field or  mechanical contact to determine if an alarm signal is initiated  for example  if an access  portal such as a door  window  or roof hatch is been opened   BMS differ from standard  magnetic status switches in that BMS incorporate two aligned magnets with an  associated reed switch  If an external magnet is applied to the switch area  it upsets the  balanced magnetic field such that an alarm signal is received  Standard magnetic  switches can be defeated by holding a magnet near the switch  Mec
80. eroperability Specification  National Institute  of Standards and Technology  NIST   100 Bureau Drive  Stop 1070  Gaithersburg   MD  20899 1070  http   smartcard nist gov    Perimeter Security Sensor Technologies Handbook  1997  Space and Warfare Systems  Center  for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Joint Program  Steering Group  available at http   www nlectc org perimetr full2 htm    TIA EIA 568  Commercial Building Telecommunications Cabling Standard   Telecommunication Industry Association  TIA   2500 Wilson Blvd   Suite 300   Arlington  VA  22201  http   www tiaonline org    136    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  TIA EIA 569  Commercial Building Standard for Telecommunications Infrastructure of  Commercial Buildings  Telecommunication Industry Association  TIA   2500 Wilson  Blvd   Suite 300  Arlington  VA  22201  http   www tiaonline org    TIA EIA 606  Administrative Standard for the Telecommunications Infrastructure of  Commercial Buildings  Telecommunication Industry Association  TIA   2500 Wilson  Blvd   Suite 300  Arlington  VA  22201  http   www tiaonline org    UFC 3 500 10N  General Electrical Requirements  Unified Facilities Criteria Program   Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available from http  dod wbdg org    UFC 3 530 01   nterior and Exterior Lighting and Controls  Unified Facilities Criteria  Program  Engineering Senior Executive Panel  available from http  dod wbdg org    UFC 3 580 10N  Navy and Marine Corps 
81. erver  and be accessed by anyone connected to the network provided they have  access rights to the software  Furthermore  it can be made accessible to the Dispatch  Center  This means that existing computer systems can be used when integrating the  system  Contact the base security and communication office  information technology   for system capacity issues and coordination     3 4 5 Security Alarm Panels  Security alarm panels collect inputs from card  readers  biometric devices  door sensors  and so on  and provide output signals to  electronic door locks  electric strikes  or gate operators  Security alarm panels are  connected to the CPU that provides the database intelligence for determining whether  to grant or deny access  Newer security alarm panels incorporate the following features     34    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 4 5 1   Multiple connection methods such as dial up modem  serial  RS 232   multi   drop  RS 485   and network TCP IP     3 4 5 2 Integrated CCTV camera connectivity  allowing CCTV camera information to  be shared with the ACS     3 4 5 3 Capability for asset tracking within a facility  such as with radio frequency  identification  RFID  tags connected to critical assets     3 4 5 4 Capability for incorporating duress or panic alarm capability     3 4 6 Card Readers  The most common form of credential verification is a security  card reader     3 4 6 1 Types of Card Readers  There are a number of different types of
82. ess hierarchy level     129    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 10    MODEL DESIGN APPROACH  10 1 INTRODUCTION    10 1 1 Other documents provide guidance or directives on design and construction  of DoD facilities  This chapter presents a model approach on how to design an ESS   The intent of this chapter is not to set new directives  but rather to communicate a  process that works well     10 1 2 Two principal project approaches are design bid build and design build  The  model design process outlined in this chapter is applicable to both approaches     10 2 PROJECT PLANNING    10 2 1 As discussed in Chapter 2  ESS is a portion of the portion of the overall  physical security scheme for a facility and should be integrated into the overall physical  protection plan     10 2 2 Balance project funding and project scope  Heightened levels of a security  system provide increased resistance to intrusion and attack  Increased security brings  increased construction costs and complexity  The more complex the system  the more  the cost of operation and maintenance will increase  The level of security elements and  security requirements need to be identified and reconciled with project funds early ina  project  The design team   s challenge is to balance security requirements with life safety   convenience  maintenance  and operational costs     10 2 3 Locating and obtaining CAD backgrounds for site plans and affected buildings  should be an earl
83. ess specific tactics such as direct fire weapons   forced entry  or airborne contamination  Others address limited aspects of design such  as resistance to progressive collapse or design of portions of buildings such as  mailrooms  Still others address details of designs for specific protective measures such  as vehicle barriers or fences  The Security Engineering Support Manuals are intended  to be used by the design team during the development of final design packages  This  UFC is one of the supporting manuals     1 6 ORGANIZATION OF THIS UFC    1 6 1 Following this introductory chapter  the remaining chapters present  information on how to design ESS subsystems as described in the next subsections     1 6 2 Chapter 2  Electronic Security Systems Overview provides an overview of  how ESS make up part of an overall physical security system solution  Information on  the Detect  Delay  Respond principle is presented as well as a brief background on the  vulnerability assessment process that precedes ESS design  Overview information is  presented on system architectures  from simple to complex  and system monitoring  methods  Additional specific information is provided for each subsystem in the  subsequent chapters     1 6 3 Chapter 3  Access Control Systems  An access control system  ACS  is a  system that ensures only authorized personnel are permitted ingress into or egress from  a controlled area   Other DoD documents may refer to the ACS as an Automated  Access Control Sy
84. evels  A risk assessment needs to be  performed to help determine the degree or level of credentially     3 2 6 Identification Method Selection  The type of identification method  card   PIN  biometric attribute or a combination thereof  that will be used needs to be  determined early in the project  Identification of the existing ACS token media and  system capacity should be assessed during project kickoff or the early programming  phase  Per DoD Directive 8190 3  the CAC is the preferred card     3 3 OTHER ACS IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS  3 3 1 Other things to consider implementing as part of an ACS include anti     passback  anti tailgating  the two man rule  and performing event tracking  These are  described in the following sections     28    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 3 2 Life Safety Code Compliance  Anti tailgating and anti passback features  must be consistent with the philosophy of the Life Safety Code and the Means of Egress  for Buildings and Structures  unless specifically over ruled by Government Authority     3 3 3 Anti passback  Anti passback is a strategy where a person must present a  credential to enter an area or facility  and then again use the credential to    badge out      This makes it possible to know how long a person is in an area  and to know who is in  the area at any given time  This requirement also has the advantage of instant  personnel accountability during an emergency or hazardous event  Anti passbac
85. f ESS CPU   s include  microprocessors  servers   programmable logic controllers  PLCs   or even personal computers  PCs    Conceptually  the CPU can be thought of as the    brain    of the ACS system  Formerly   the CPU was a discrete component located at the    head end    of the system  typically  the Dispatch Center  Current state of the art ACS use distributed intelligence that allows  each local security panel to hold  in microprocessor memory  the system logic for its  associated devices  The CPU retains the system specific programming for     action reaction    logic steps necessary for an ACS to allow entry  access  for authorized  personnel and deny access to unauthorized personnel  A sample sequence is shown in  Figure 3 5     3 4 3 1 Communications failure between the CPU and the local access control  processor equipment could result in new users not being permitted entry  Additionally   during any communication failure  users who are no longer authorized will still be able to  enter the area  It is important to provide sufficient backup power capability for the CPU   local processors  and other critical infrastructure to prevent the loss of control of  authorized access  Redundant  fault tolerant communication systems are required in  high security areas where loss of communications  including partial links  cannot be  tolerated     3 4 3 2 A specialized case of a CPU is a Premises Control Unit  PCU   A PCU is a  DCID 6 9 term used to describe a specific controll
86. fiber can be used for the video signal and another wavelength  on the same fiber can be used for the PTZ control signals  Refer to Figure 8 1 fora  sample illustration     Figure 8 1  Sample DTM System Detail    AACS Transmit  AACS Receive  IDS Transmit    IDS Receive  CCTV Camera 1  CCTV Camera 2  CCTV Camera 3  CCTV Camera 4  CCTV Camera 5  CCTV Camera 6  Spare  1    12 strand cable    QOQO CQMOOOOUH    Spare  2    8 7 2 Coordinate with the base communications officer  information technology  or  for Base Level Information Infrastructure and Defense Information Infrastructure     8 7 3 Design Guidance on IT System Coordination  Fiber optic cables typically  come in multiples of twelve strands  with 12 strand and 24 strand fiber optic cable being  very common  While there are no technical limitations on combining ESS with other    115    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  base systems  such as IT or Instrumentation and Control  it is preferable to keep ESS  fibers dedicated for security purposes only from a security standpoint  If other unrelated  systems are on a common fiber  other vendors or organizations will have closer access  to the security communications  Plan for future expansion  provide a minimum of 20    spare capacity  fibers      116    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 9    GENERAL REQUIREMENTS AND CROSS DISCIPLINE COORDINATION  9 1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS    9 1 1 General  The highest security sho
87. frequencies  host nation approval can be slow and or difficult with nuances of licensed  and unlicensed equipment  Long lead times may be required for equipment that met  Host nation requirements or alternative solutions to radio frequency emitting devices  may have to be considered  Approval of radio frequency emitters should be an early  project design consideration     6 7 4 Free Space Optics  FSO   FSO  also called free space photonics  FSPO    refers to the transmission of modulated visible or infrared  IR  beams through the  atmosphere to obtain broadband communications  Most frequently  laser beams are  used  FSO operates similar to fiber optic transmission  except that information is  transmitted through space rather than a fiber optic  FSO systems can function over  distances of several kilometers  but does require a clear line of sight unless mirrors are  used to reflect the light energy  FSO systems offer advantages of reduced construction  cost in that fiber optic lines do not have to be installed  but there are limitations  Rain   dust  snow  fog  or smog can block the transmission path and shutdown the network     6 8 TECHNOLOGY COMPARISION  6 8 1 Table 6 2 provides a comparison matrix of different DTM technologies for  ESS     6 8 2 Explanation of Table 6 2  Dedicated conductors are high lighted for on base  applications and T 1 lines are highlighted for interbase applications as a general guide   Whichever method is used  initial calculations have to be made o
88. greements  BIA    Therefore  the acquisition team must ensure compliance with the more stringent of the UFC  the  SOFA  the HNFA  and the BIA  as applicable     UFC are living documents and will be periodically reviewed  updated  and made available to  users as part of the Services    responsibility for providing technical criteria for military  construction  Headquarters  U S  Army Corps of Engineers  HQUSACE   Naval Facilities  Engineering Command  NAVFAC   and Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency  AFCESA  are  responsible for administration of the UFC system  Defense agencies should contact the  preparing service for document interpretation and improvements  Technical content of UFC is  the responsibility of the cognizant DoD working group  Recommended changes with supporting  rationale should be sent to the respective service proponent office by the following electronic  form  Criteria Change Request  CCR   The form is also accessible from the Internet sites listed  below     UFC are effective upon issuance and are distributed only in electronic media from the following  source     e Whole Building Design Guide web site http   dod wbdg org      Hard copies of UFC printed from electronic media should be checked against the current  electronic version prior to use to ensure that they are current     AUTHORIZED BY       AK             DONALD L  BASHAM  P E  DR  JANES W WRIGHT  P E  Chief  Engineering and Construction Chief Engineer  U S  Army Corps of Engineers Naval Faci
89. h support from  planning team members     1 5 4 Security Engineering Facilities Design Manual  UFC 4 020 02  not  published at the time of this printing  provides interdisciplinary design guidance for  developing preliminary protective measures systems to implement the design criteria    9    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  established using UFC 4 020 01  Those protective measures include building and site  elements  equipment  and the supporting manpower and procedures necessary to make  them all work as a system  The information in UFC 4 020 02 is in sufficient detail to  support concept level project development and provides a sound basis for a more  detailed design  This UFC also provides a process for assessing the impact of  protective measures on risk  The primary audience for the    Security Engineering  Facilities Design Manual    is the design team  which should include security  Physical  Security Officer  and antiterrorism personnel  Security is an essential part of the design  team and they should bring in antiterrorism personnel  Antiterrorism Officer ATO   when  appropriate     1 5 5 Security Engineering Support Manuals  In addition to the standards   planning  and design UFCs described above  there are additional UFCs that provide  detailed guidance for developing final designs based on the preliminary designs  developed using UFC 4 020 02  These support manuals provide specialized  discipline   specific design guidance  Some addr
90. h that of a  normal human eye and a wide angle lens  For short focal lengths  a wide angle lens is  appropriate  It will  however  provide lower magnification  For long focal lengths  a  telephoto lens is appropriate  It will  however  provide a narrow field of view  Note that a  normal human eye sees at a 30 5   angle  In Figure 4 11     CCD    refers to    charge   coupled device     which is the main microelectronic chip that makes up the camera unit   The charge coupled device  CCD  is a sensor that collects light and turns it into an  electronic signal  Typical CCD sizes include 1 3 inch and   inch devices  The larger the  device  the more the area the sensor occupies and  typically  the greater the image  resolution     Figure 4 10  Relative Magnification of an Object    PS         SS   f 75mm Angle 6 8  Telephoto     _   _   _   _  gt   Focal Length  Optical Centre    5     SC  Angle 57 4  Wide angle     63    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 12 6 Figure 4 11 shows the relationship between field of view and the focal length  of a lens  Select an appropriate focal length and use this formula to calculate image  field of view     4 12 6 1 Select the focal length  f     4 12 6 2 Estimate the image size desired  H       4 12 6 3 Estimate the maximum object distance  1    4 12 6 4 Calculate the field of view  H   H  H   x 1 f      Figure 4 11  Field of view and Focal Length    Field of View    H  Field of View         Object Distance  H   Imag
91. hanical contacts  can be defeated by holding the contact in the closed closed position with a piece of  metal or taping them closed  Balanced magnetic switches are not susceptible to  external magnetic fields and will generate an alarm if tampering occurs  Therefore  only  specify balanced magnetic switches for access portal sensors  Figures 5 3  5 4  and 5 5  show some typical applications of BMS     77    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 5 3  Sample Door Configuration    To IDS        Ke Secure side of  door is shown     WINDOW FRAME WINDOW HOUSING    sk Secure side of  window is shown     To IDS       78    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 5 5  Sample Roof Hatch Configuration    ROOFTOP        k Mount device on  secure side of hatch    HATCH HOUSING    5 3 2 2 Glass Break  Glass break sensors are a good intrusion detection device for  buildings with a lot of glass  windows  doors with glass panes   Glass as an exterior  protection barrier is easily defeated  Windows can be quickly and easily broken   Consider the case of installing a card reader on an administrative exterior door  The  determined intruder will not let the door lock deter the intrusion effort  but can take the  option of breaking nearby accessible windows     5 3 2 2 1 There are three basic types of glass break sensors  acoustic sensors  listens  for an acoustic sound wave that matches the frequency of broken glass   shock sensors   fee
92. he CCTV system  The DVR is used principally for the download of camera  images onto a hard drive for recording and storage of historical information  Older  systems used VHS tapes  but are largely phased out  DVRs currently have memory  storage capability of 80 gigabytes to 240 gigabytes with options to expand using  additional hardware to increase storage  Most DVRs are provided with self contained  CD burners for archiving or removal of stored data  Most specifications call out for a  CCTV system to be able to retain 30 days of camera images  The amount of storage  required for 30 days is dependent on a number of factors to include  number of  cameras  compression ratio  resolution  and frame rate  This subject of storage space  as it relates to the above factors is developed in additional detail later in this chapter     4 3 SYSTEM DISPLAYS    4 3 1 Display Technologies  ESS displays for CCTV images make use of three  general technologies  cathode ray tube  CRT   liquid crystal display  LCD   and plasma  display units  LCD and plasma display can be grouped as large format display units  A  general overview on each technology follows     4 3 2 CRT  CRT displays are an older technology and have been used in the  security industry for a long time  A CRT works by moving an electron beam back and  forth across the back of the display screen  Each time the beam makes a pass across  the screen  it lights up phosphor dots on the inside of the glass tube  thereby  illuminating the 
93. hms to CCTV digital images takes on the aspect of artificial camera  whereby the  camera and processors become    smart video    and start to emulate a human operator   The differences between a smart camera and a human operator are principally twofold   It takes a lot of complex software programming  and associated rules  to get the camera  systems ability to differentiate and assess video events as well as the human mind   With more and more project applications  the gap is closing as the camera systems  come closer to emulating the capabilities of fully alert  very motivated  intelligent security  guard fresh into a watch shift  The advantage of Video Content Analysis and Motion  Path Analysis is that the camera systems do not get tired  Studies have demonstrated  that after twenty minutes  the ability of a guard to discern an abnormal event are  severely degraded  Video content analysis systems do not suffer fatigue and remain     alert    after monitoring hundreds of video events in a watch shift  Video content analysis  systems can monitor more cameras  more effectively  with less operators at a reduced  total cost  less dispatch center command center staff      hence  the increase in  popularity of their application  Figure 5 10 displays a typical system architecture for a  video content analysis system     5 4 3 6 1 In the current marketplace  video content analysis and motion path analysis  are supported by software companies which are different from the traditional 
94. ia  DTM   The system that allows for Electronic Security  Systems  ESS  data transmission and communication between system nodes and also  back to the Dispatch Center  In other words  the DTM is the security communications  system and can consist of dedicated conductors  wireless networks  leased T 1 lines  or  virtual private networks  DTM includes both Base Level Information Infrastructure  BLII   on base  as well as Defense Information Infrastructure  DII  inter base      Defense Information Infrastructure   That Information Technology  IT  infrastructure  that is not on DoD proprietary or leased property and requires transmission of  information across property boundary lines  for example  inter base communications     Dispatch Center  The space that serves as a central monitoring and assessment  facility for the ACS  CCTV  and IDS systems  The key components of a Dispatch Center  include consoles  monitors  and printers  Normally  the Dispatch Center is staffed 24  hours a day  seven days a week by trained personnel  Other names for the Dispatch  Center include Security Operations Center  SOC   Security Command Center and  Security Control Center  SCC   Central Monitoring Station  Data Transmission Center   DTC   and Alarm Control Center  ATC      Electronic Security System  ESS   The integrated electronic system that  encompasses interior and exterior Intrusion Detection Systems  IDS   Closed Circuit  Television  CCTV  systems for assessment of alarm conditions  Automat
95. ial  the encryption must be a 128 bit format  which complies with the National  Institute for Standards and Technology  NIST   Federal Information Processing  Standards  FIPS  Publication 140 2  Systems protecting all other assets must meet UL  1076 Class AA line security standards     9 6 8 3 Physical Protection of ESS Raceway and Enclosures  Interior and exterior  ESS should be physically protected as described below     9 6 8 4 Physical Protection of Exterior ESS  Physically protect exterior ESS  All  exterior intrusion detection sensors and access control readers must have tamper  resistant enclosures and integral tamper protection switches  All enclosures  cabinets   housings  boxes  and fittings having hinged doors or removable covers that are  protected by employed sensors must be locked  welded  brazed  or secured with tamper  resistant security fasteners and be tamper alarmed  Route exterior ESS sensor    123    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  communication and power cables that are not directly protected by sensors by one of  the following methods     9 6 8 5 In rigid metal conduit   9 6 8 6 In concrete encased duct     9 6 8 7 In direct buried conduit to a minimum of twenty four inches  0 6 meters  below  finished grade     9 6 8 8 Suspended at a minimum of 15 5 feet  4 5 meters  above the finished grade     9 6 9 Physical Protection of Interior ESS  All interior intrusion detection sensors  and access control readers must have integra
96. ies  RF systems must employ some form of tamper  protection such as     9 6 10 1 The security system must use dedicated frequencies to transmit ESS alarm  data     9 6 10 2 The system must detect and report intentional and unintentional jamming  attempts     9 6 10 3 The system must transmit ESS alarms sent by non hardware links even when  they occur during    off air    periods caused by maintenance or failure   124    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 6 11 Voltage Drop Considerations  Standard voltage drop calculations need to  be made by the designer for calculating ESS conductor size  This is especially  important for CCTV cameras  which may be located some distance from interior  termination cabinets and will probably be outside  The system designer should strive for  a voltage drop of 10  or less  To calculate voltage drop  use this formula     VD   2x IL x1 26  WO    Where   IL   Load Current  VD   Voltage Drop in volts per 100 foot circuit length  see Table 9 1   AWG   American Wire Gauge    Table 9 1  Voltage Drop        Guage   AWG     10   oio   020      CT   o  oso J 1 00   252    i   016  pose RRC  i   o    om   oso   1 40   40  a   o   oso  1o   20   506  e   032 NA oom  127   254   eo  e  om  os   1 60   s20   s00  ae os  127   254   s0   27   19   os   160   3 20   6 40   160  E   g 1o   202   408   807   2012  Pat ra   esa   soo   10 17   2542         ro   s2   640   1201   3207                 125    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September
97. if used for service  of all  electrical cabinets and enclosures  NFPA 70 requirement      7 2 1 3 Counter space for consoles   7 2 1 4 Personnel space for each operator   7 2 1 5 Space for UPS equipment   7 2 1 6 Access requirements for maintenance or repair    7 2 1 7 Conduit space requirements for future system wiring or enhancements     7 2 1 8 Future growth or expansion space    108    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  7 3 LIGHTING    7 3 1 The Dispatch Center space should be designed for normal interior lighting  levels according to the classification of the space  equipment room or Dispatch Center   Consideration should be given to selectable lighting or dimmers that allow reducing the  lighting behind or near system displays  Use of dimmers or task lighting should be  considered at operator   s areas  Indirect lighting should also be a consideration  The  design should strive for no glare of monitor screens     7 4 CONSOLES    7 4 1 A determination should be made early as to how many stations are required   The layout for a simple Dispatch Center console is displayed in Figure 7 3  Although  security system monitors may be co located with other functions such as a 911 call  center and fire alarm monitoring personnel  most commands find a separate  administrative personal computer and printer is required in the Dispatch Center  A  conceptual layout for a small to medium sized Dispatch Center is displayed in Figure 7   4     109    UFC 4 021 0
98. ilable  for the reading and copying of cards so that unauthorized duplication and copying can  never be entirely negated     3 4 7 2 Proximity Cards  Proximity cards  prox cards  use embedded antenna wires  connected to a chip within the card  The chip is encoded with the unique card  identification  Currently  the standard proximity card operates at a frequency of 125kHz   Distances at which proximity cards can be read vary by manufacturer and installation   Readers can require the card to be placed within a fraction of an inch from the reader to  six inches away  Having the card out and at the same height of the reader  background  electrical interference levels  and sensitivity of the reader affect the distance at which a  card can be read  Proximity card technology  125kHz  should not be confused with  wireless  contactless  13 56MHz  technology     3 4 7 3 Wiegand Cards  The following information is cited from Effective Physical  Security  page 196      The Wiegand card is also called an embedded wire card  The technology is  based on the Wiegand Effect  a phenomenon observed when specifically  prepared ferromagnetic wires suddenly reveres themselves on exposure to an  external magnetic field  Wires inside the Wiegand card are formed in a  permanently tensioned helical twist  The order and spacing of the wires  establish a unique code for each card  The magnetic reversals in the wires are  converted into distinct  consistent electrical pulses that are read and  processed
99. image is being updated  Most movies at the cinema operate  at thirty fos  Recommended values for alarm and non alarm CCTV video fps are  provided in the CCTV technical section of the document     Intrusion Detection System  IDS   A system consisting of interior and exterior  sensors  surveillance devices  and associated communication subsystems that  collectively detect an intrusion of a specified site  facility  or perimeter and annunciate  an alarm     Local Area Network  LAN   A geographically limited data communication system for a  specific user group consisting of a group of interconnected computers sharing  applications  data and peripherals     Liquid Crystal Display  LCD   A type of display used for ESS monitors and other  applications  LCDs utilize two sheets of polarizing material with a liquid crystal solution  between them  An electric current passes through the crystals to align so that light  cannot pass through them  Each crystal  therefore  is like a shutter  either allowing light  to pass through or blocking the light  LCD displays can be monochrome or color   Monochrome displays are typically blue or dark gray images on top of a grayish white  background     Multiplexing  MUXing   Combining two or more information channels into a common  transmission storage medium  With old VHS tape systems  the term referred to the  storage of four different CCTV camera recordings onto a single VHS tape  With current  technology  it is sometimes used to refer to transmiss
100. ing  The incremental cost of installing a higher quality fiber optic line is not  significantly more for a 100 Base T line than a 10 Base T line  When in doubt  the  designer should err on the side of the higher quality line  Fiber optic cable comes in two  varieties  single mode and multi mode     103    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  6 7 1 2 1  Single Mode  Light travels through the inner core of the fiber only  Single   mode allows long distance information transfer up to 100 miles  Single mode requires  use of laser transmitter source that adds to the cost  Refer to Figure 6 4     6 7 1 2 2 Multi Mode  In multi mode configuration  light travels through the inner and  outer core paths  Multi mode is recommended for most applications less than three to  four miles  Refer to Figure 6 5     Figure 6 4  Single Mode Fiber Optic      addi A    Cor             Figure 6 5  Multi Mode Fiber Optic       Cladding TL  In  Core  6 7 2 Direct Subscriber Lines  T 1 Lines   Direct subscriber lines  also called T 1    lines  are commonly used in data transmission media systems for connecting remote  sites  T 1 DS1 lines are permanent point to point links through public networks  The  bandwidth capacity of a T 1 line is 1 544 Mbps  The cost of the leased line is dependent  on distance and existing capacity or infrastructure  T 1 lines are uniquely assigned to a  customer  such that only the DoD information would be transmitted over the assigned  conductors  ty
101. inimum requirements that must be  incorporated into the design of all new construction and major renovations of inhabited  DoD buildings  They also include recommendations that should be  but are not required  to be incorporated into all such buildings     1 5 3 Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual  UFC 4 020 01  not  published at the time of this printing  presents processes for developing the design  criteria necessary to incorporate physical security and antiterrorism into DoD facilities  and for identifying the cost implications of applying the design criteria  The design  criteria may be limited to the requirements of the minimum standards  or they may  include       Protection of assets  people  other than those addressed in the minimum  standards      Aggressor tactics that are not addressed in the minimum standards    Levels of protection beyond those required by the minimum standards    The cost implications for physical security and antiterrorism are addressed as cost  increases over conventional construction for common construction types  The changes  in construction represented by the cost increases are tabulated for reference  but they  cover only representative construction that meets the requirements of the design  criteria  The manual also includes a means to assess the tradeoffs between cost and  risk  The Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual is intended to be used by  planners as well as physical security and antiterrorism personnel wit
102. ion     Reasons for Development     Naval Facilities Engineering Command accepted responsibility of the Navy   s Physical Security  Equipment Program  including ESS in Oct 2004  The Navy s criteria for ESS is outdated  1986   and currently there is no Tri Service Criteria for Electronic Security Systems  The Army is in  the process of updating Army TM 5 853 04  1994  for the Tri Service  but finalization is not  anticipated for another year  There have been significant technology advancements in field of  Electronic Security Systems  especially in the areas of CCTV and access control  Therefore   the Navy has an emergent need for updated criteria  Since the schedule for the Tri    Service manual would not meet the immediate need  it was decided to publish a Navy only  UFC  Once this UFC is published  the intent is to combine with the Army   s update to create a  Tri Service UFC for ESS     a This UFC is one of a series of new security engineering UFC documents covering   physical countermeasures for the current threat environment    a The design of electronic security systems is a specialized technical area that does  not fall in the normal skill record and resume of commanders  architects  engineers  and project managers  This UFC provides guidance to those parties tasked with  implementing existing and emerging physical protection system requirements    Impact  The following direct benefits will result from the publication of UFC 4 021 02N        a Creation of a single sour
103. ion ACS Equipment in this  chapter for more on the advantages and disadvantages of each              26    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 2 3 Coded devices  Coded devices such as a keypad or microprocessors  operate on the principle that a person has been issued a code or PIN to enter into the  device that will verify the authenticity of the code entered  Any person entering a correct  code is authorized to enter the controlled area     3 2 3 1 Advantages and disadvantages of using coded devices are shown in Figure  3 3  For information about the different types of coded devices see the section Keypads  and PIN Codes  later in this chapter     Figure 3 3  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Coded Devices       Advantages  e Keypads are compact and easily understood     e Different codes may be used to give access to different points and  doors     e Maintenance is easy     e Keypads are not expensive  They are reliable and easily replaced or  repaired  Little complex hardware is needed     e No cards or tokens need be carried so there is nothing to lose     e Aduress code  known only to the user  can be input covertly if a  legitimate person is forced to enter under duress     Disadvantages    e Codes are easily passed on to other unintended or unwelcome  visitors     e The code can possibly be viewed by others and thus used for  unapproved entry     e Hands free operation is not an option     e The number of allowable unique codes can be li
104. ion for a single door equipped with a  card reader and electric lock  Refer to the subsections on Doors and Door Locks in  Chapter Nine  General Requirements and Cross Discipline Requirements for additional  information on door hardware types and interface considerations     35    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 3 7  Sample Card Reader Door Configuration    PublicSkKdeofDoor  JI Ze             Card Reader       36    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 4 7 Card Types  Card readers use a number of different card types  the most  common in use are described in the following subsections     3 4 7 1 Magnetic Stripe Cards  Magnetic stripe  mag stripe  cards consist of a  magnetically sensitive oxide strip fused onto the surface of a PVC material  They are  inexpensive  easily manufactured  and can carry alphanumeric data   Magnetic cards  used within the DoD should comply with SEIWG 012  which specifies numeric data  only   A magnetic stripe card is read by swiping it through a reader or by inserting it into  a position in a slot  A magnetic stripe card can be individualized by color coding the  cards and printing photo information onto them  The magnetic stripe card is  disadvantaged in that it may be physically damaged by misuse and its data can be  affected by magnetic fields  even when they are of only low potential  Other problems  associated with this type of card are related to the high volume of equipment ava
105. ion media  For example  a bigger  transmission line can be used to bring back six door contact signals from a remote site  to a centralized facility on one line as opposed to six different lines  The end result of  multiplexing on transmission media is construction cost savings of installing less  conductors     143    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Nuisance Alarm  An alarm resulting from the detection of an appropriate alarm  stimulus  or failure to use established entry control procedures  but which does not  represent an attempt to intrude into the protected area  Examples of nuisance alarms  would be an improper opening of a monitored exit door or activation of an exterior  intrusion detection system by a DoD maintenance crew  Animal activation of detection  systems is a potential cause of nuisance alarms  Another example would be a wind   generated alarm of a fence monitoring system caused by flexing of the fence  which can  be compensated for by a wind anemometer   Numerous nuisance alarms can cause  complacency     Personal Identification Number  PIN   An identification string used as a password to  authenticate identity and gain access to a location or computer resource  Although  there are alphanumeric product options  most hardware entry devices make use of a  numeric keypad  Many computer resource programs require an alphanumeric string     Physical Protection System  Physical Security System  Means of preventing  unauthorized physica
106. is requires close coordination and at times creative architectural and  security design solutions to implement the requirements of both safety and security   Physical security system designs need to be coordinated with and comply with NFPA  101 and the Americans with Disabilities Act  ADA      9 6 ELECTRICAL COORDINATION    9 6 1 Electrical issues that need to be considered include power  backup power   grounding  bonding  lightning protection  cable type  electromagnetic interference   tamper protection  voltage drop considerations  power reliability  harmonics  raceway   labeling  shielding  fire alarm system interface  and lighting  These are discussed in the  following sections     121    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 6 2 Power  ESS loads should be fed from distribution panels within the protected  area  A good practice is to use distribution panels with dedicated security system  breakers that can be locked  No other load should be fed from breakers feeding ESS  loads  In addition to the panel nameplate  provide a label with the following inscription      Security System Breaker Within     Label shall be constructed and fastened identical to  the panel nameplate  except the label shall be red laminated plastic with white center  core     9 6 3 Backup Power    9 6 3 1 Battery Backup  The minimum requirement for battery backup for an IDS  and its monitoring station is eight hours  If primary power is subject to being out for  longer period
107. ith entering personnel from the Dispatch Center  or other location     9 6 18 Lighting  While not an official part of ESS  lighting is an effective part of the  overall physical protection design  Lighting should be considered as a countermeasure  for protection of each critical asset  Coordination with the electrical lighting engineer  needs to occur for placement of lighting to enhance viewing of CCTV systems  as  discussed in Chapter Four     9 6 18 1 Lighting at guard check points must be sufficient to clearly allow a guard to  verify the picture ID on access badges  Some installations may provide a fixed camera  at an automatically operated gate for both surveillance and verification of a visual  credential for access  In these cases  lighting must similarly be sufficient to allow  accurate verification of the picture ID     128    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 7 MATERIAL ENTRY CONTROL    9 7 1 Other mandates will dictate specific requirements  but the following are typical  considerations for material entry control as it relates to ESS and physical security     9 7 1 1 Material entry control circulation should be separated from general facility  traffic     9 7 1 2 Loading docks are typically monitored by fixed cameras     9 7 1 3 Rollup doors are normally monitored by an interior point sensor such as a  BMS     9 7 1 4 Shipping and receiving areas are normally caged or secured with a restricted  access scheme  such as a higher card acc
108. ith too much light coming to the camera lens  causing a  backlight situation     4 6 3 Outdoor Cameras  Outdoor camera installations cost more than indoor  cameras due to the need to environmentally house  heat  and ventilate the outside  camera  When mounting a camera outdoors  the lighting requirement changes  depending on the time of day and the weather  Because of this  consider the following  for outdoor cameras     4 6 3 1 Shrubs  trees  and other vegetation in a camera   s line of sight may cause  obstructed views  Designers need to be aware of this when determining where to place  cameras  Also  motion detector systems can register a false positive when plants in the  field of view move in windy conditions     4 6 3 2 Provide heaters in cold weather applications     4 6 3 3 Always use auto iris lenses with outdoor cameras  The iris automatically  adjusts the amount of light reaching the camera and thereby optimizes its performance   The iris also protects the image sensor from getting damaged by strong sunlight   Always set the focus in low light with an auto iris lens  If the adjustment is made in  sunlight  it is very easy to focus  but at night the iris diameter increases and the image is  not in focus anymore  Special dark focus filters called    neutral density    filters or ND  filters help reduce lighting by one or more stops of exposure  These filters do not affect  the color of the image     4 6 3 4 Use caution when mounting a camera behind glass  If you moun
109. ive of systems  requirements  some base drawings such as the functional matrix  and documentation of  factors effecting the ultimate design and functionality of a system     131    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Figure 10 1 Cable Counts on Riser Diagrams    AD  in V4  conduit    AC  in MA conduit    L  in 1  conduit    in 2   conduit       Next  Security  Panel                               Figure 10 2  Sample Cable Schedule  Cable Legend   Style Type Use  A  16 1 TSP Communication Cable RS 485  Plenum Rated  CMP   C  20 AWG 3 TSP Communications Cable Card reader cable  Riser Rated  CMR   D  20 Coaxial RG 59U CCTV Video  E  18 Solid  shield RG 6U CCTV Video  F 2  12 w 1  12 ground THHN 120 VAC Wiring  G  18 1 TP Communications Cable CCTV Video  General Purpose  CMG   L 8 C CAT6 Ethernet cable  U 24 strand 50 micron Fiber optic cable  UU 50 FT VGA Workstation to display                132    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 10 3  Functional Matrix              ACTION    A  1  Valid card reader attempt e   Lost card  attempt e  Ee  Local security panel power  loss    J           N    v  D  2  3      Ge a SE eleisl feet    Door forced entry alarm a  Tamper switch activated on  local security panel   Fixed camera video motion  detection activated   Interior motion sensor alarm Mat          Tamper notification activated   on security device       N    Geh eiert  i pel    Fire panel alarm el         del  emote doo
110. ivision  http   www dtic mil whs directives     DCID 6 9  Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information  Facilities  Director of Central Intelligence Directives   http   www fas org irp offdocs dcid htm    Effective Physical Security  3rd Edition  2004  Lawrence J  Fennelly  Elsevier   Butterworth Heinemann    FIPS 201  Standard for Personal Identity Verification of Federal Employees and  Contractors  March 14  2006  Revision 1  National Institute of Standards and  Technology  NIST   100 Bureau Drive  Stop 1070  Gaithersburg  MD  20899 1070   http   csrc nist gov piv program     GSC IS V2 1  Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification  Version 2 1  16  July 2003  National Institute of Standards and Technology  NIST   100 Bureau Drive   Stop 1070  Gaithersburg  MD  20899 1070  http   smartcard nist gov    IES RP 20 98  Lighting for Parking Facilities   llumination Engineering Society of North  America  IESNA      ISO 14443  Part 1    International Organization for Standardization  ISO    http   www iso org    ISO 14443  Part 2    ISO 14443  Part 3     135    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  ISO IEC 15693 1 2000  Identification cards   Contactless integrated circuit s  cards    Vicinity cards   Part 1  Physical characteristics  International Organization for  Standardization  ISO   http   www iso org    ISO IEC 15693 2 2000  Identifications cards   Contactless integrated circuit s  cards    Vicinity cards   Part 2  Air
111. k  programming prevents users from giving their cards or PINs to someone else to gain  access to the restricted area  In a rigid anti passback configuration  a credential is used  to enter an area and that same credential must be used to exit  If a credential holder  fails to properly    badge out     entrance into the secured area can be denied  Anti   passback is a standard feature for Commercial Off The Shelf  COTS  access control  systems and is typically disabled but can be enabled through software programming     3 3 3 1 An alternative approach to    badging out     which is not as rigid as the process  described above  is use of a time delay on entrance readers  In this design  the  credential  Card or PIN  can not be reused within a prescribed minimum time period   This time delay feature can be programmed and set for a time period such as a half   hour  During the half hour time period  the same card or PIN can not be used for a  second entry  While affording some increased security  this process is not as rigid or  secure as a    badge out    process     3 3 4 Anti tailgating  While not commonly required  a project security requirement  may be to deter tailgating  Tailgating is the act of a person following another authorized  person closely in order to gain ingress through the same portal when the authorized  person   s credential grants access  An example of a simple anti tailgating requirement  would be a pedestrian turnstile for access control  Since turnstiles 
112. ks do have a security disadvantage  In the United States   continuous locking of exit doors is not permitted   For more information refer to NPFA  101  Life Safety Code   Doors equipped with magnetic locks are required to have one  manual device  such as a Request to Exit  or REX button  and an automatic sensor   typically a passive infrared sensor  PIR  to override the door lock signal when someone  approaches the door in the exit direction  While enhancing overall building safety  the  addition of these extra devices allows possible compromise of the door lock in the  following scenario     1  Person A in on the secure side of the door and walks into the field of view  2  The door lock signal is shunted by the activated automatic sensor     3  Person B  located on the public side of the door  can open the door and  breach the security of the locked opening     Magnetic locks should be the designer   s last choice for door locking mechanisms and  should probably only be used on a retrofit project     9 5 LIFE SAFETY CODE CONSIDERATIONS    9 5 1 Applicable life safety and existing codes standards must be met  In the event  of an emergency  building occupants must be able to follow emergency procedures  quickly and safely  The ESS designer must coordinate with the building architect  for  items such as exit plan considerations  and the building fire protection engineer  for fire  alarm system integration  to implement security without comprising life safety code  standards  Th
113. l Alarm Monitoring    Local Security    Alarm Panel Zeg    Visual Alarm       2 5 3 Central Station  Devices and circuits are automatically signaled to   recorded  maintained  and supervised from a central station owned and managed by a  commercial firm with operators in attendance at all times  The Central Station personnel  monitor the signals and provide the response force to any unauthorized entry into the  protected area  Connection of alarm equipment to the central station is usually over  leased telephone company lines for systems of significance  Dial up modems maybe  used for simpler systems  Refer to Figure 2 10     Figure 2 10  Central Station Monitoring    DoD Property Line               DoD Facility    or Assett    Leased   Response Forces   Pod  a nd Telephone    7 7  77    Lines  2 5 4 Police Connection  Police connection systems are transmitted to and    annunciated at a local police agency dispatch center that records alarm annunciation   Connection to the police is primarily over leased telephone lines  Police personnel  respond to alarms  A formal agreement with the police department is required to ensure  monitoring and response requirements  Often police departments impose a penalty after  some quota of false alarms  thus the sensitivity is often turned down to minimize  nuisance alarms and may result in missed indications  Police responders may be  attending to other emergencies and unavailable to respond when needed  Police  connection configurations ar
114. l ESS  It is the  collection of cameras  recorders  switches  keyboards  and monitors that allow viewing  and recording of security events  The CCTV system is normally integrated into the  overall ESS and centrally monitored at the Dispatch Center  Uses of CCTV systems for  security services include several different functions as described below     4 1 2 Surveillance  CCTV cameras can be used to give a viewer the capability to  be made aware of or view visual events at multiple locations from a centralized remote  viewing area  CCTV camera technology makes visual information available that would  normally only be available through multiple  possibly roving  human resources     4 1 3 Assessment  When alerted by an alarm notification  CCTV cameras allow  Dispatch Center operators or other viewers to assess the situation and make a  determination as to what type of response may or may not be required  An example  would be an intrusion alarm at a remote facility  Visual assessment and other  confirmation may indicate an unannounced maintenance crew at work  Symptoms of  intrusion would lead to a response     4 1 4 Deterrence  While more effective against unsophisticated burglars as  opposed to trained covert insurgents  CCTV cameras may deter burglary  vandalism  or  intrusion due to fear of discovery and prosecution     4 1 5 Evidentiary Archives  Retrieval of archived images may be helpful in  identification or prosecution of trespassers  vandals  or other intruders     4 1 6 
115. l access to a system  such as fences  walls  locks  sensors   surveillance  and so on     Premise Control Unit  PCU   A PCU is a specific term defined by DCID 6 9  used to  describe the CPU or local security panel for a SCIF  Per the DCID 6 9 definition  the  PCU receives signals from all associated sensors in the SCIF   s alarmed zone and  establishes the alarm status  The alarm status is immediately transmitted to the  monitoring station  Within the monitoring station  a dedicated alarm monitoring panel   or central processor  monitors incoming PCU signals  On receiving an alarm signal  a  monitoring station   s enunciator generates an audible or visual alarm for the monitoring  personnel     Probability of Detection  Pd   A measure of an intrusion detection sensor   s  performance in detecting an intruder within its detection zone     Proprietary Security Network  A completely self contained dedicated local area  network  LAN  with security system software installed and run on a host server   computer   Proprietary Security Networks are dedicated to the ESS with no outside   Internet  LAN  or WAN  connections     Regional Dispatch Center  RDC   A centralized security command center for multiple  bases and facilities within a geographic region  This location is typically staffed twenty   four hours a day by staff trained to assess and initiate response for ESS alarms  The  RDC requires interface and communication systems to different bases and facilities   The RDC concept i
116. l systems established by the Director of Central  Intelligence     Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility  SCIF   A facility capable of storing  Sensitive Compartmented Information  SCI  material  Requirements for these facilities  are defined in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6 9  Physical Security Standards  for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities     Time Domain Reflectometry  TDR   Use of sending an electronic signal down a  conductor  wiring or cabling  and measuring the time it takes for the signal or part of the  signal to return to determine the location of a conductor flaw or disturbance  The  signal   s reflection begins at the flaw or disturbance point  Once the signal returns  time  is converted to distance  then divided by the speed of light  multiplied by the proper  velocity of propagation  and the result in divided by two  As used in Intrusion Detection  Systems  it is a technology for a fence mounted system that detects intruders climbing  or flexing the fence fabric  and thereby inducing a conductor flaw      Uninterruptible Power Supply  UPS   A power supply system that includes a rectifier   battery  and inverter to maintain power in the event of a power outage  UPS systems  are specified by hours of operation to sustain power during an outage  six hours  ten  hours  or twenty four hours   UPS systems can be standby power systems or on line  systems  Typically  a centralized UPS is not a mandated requirement for an ESS  project
117. l tamper protection switches  All intrusion  detection sensors  access control readers  and assessment equipment located outside  controlled areas must have tamper resistant enclosures  All intrusion detection sensors  and access control system cabling should be routed within the controlled area  If the  cables transverse an uncontrolled area  the cables must be locked  welded  brazed  or  secured with tamper resistant security fastners  Additionally  the following design criteria  needs to be applied     9 6 9 1 All ESS control and DTM associated with the protection of high security areas   Level Two and Three Restricted Areas   AA amp E and controlled areas that process  Secret or higher classified information  must be enclosed in rigid metal conduit     9 6 9 2 All enclosures  cabinets  housings  boxes  and fittings having hinged doors or  removable covers must be locked  welded  brazed  or secured with tamper resistant  security fastners and be tamper alarmed     9 6 9 3 Any metallic conduit that leaves an area that processes classified information  such as a SCIF must be decoupled  insert of nonmetallic conduit  when existing the  area     9 6 9 4 For areas used for handling  storing  production  renovation  and shipping of  ammunition and explosives  metallic conduit must be run underground for at least fifty   feet from the structure  The shielded cable or conduit must also be bonded to primary   and secondary ground girdles where they cross     9 6 10   Radio Frequenc
118. lities Engineering Command  Kes lun T  Ferguson  KATHLEEN I  FERGUSON  P E  Dr  GET W  MOY  P E   The Deputy Civil Engineer Director  Installations Requirements and  DCS Installations  amp  Logistics Management  Department of the Air Force Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense     Installations and Environment     UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Unified Facilities Criteria  UFC     New Document Summary Sheet    Subject  UFC 4 021 02NF  Electronic Security Systems  ESS      Cancels  This document replaces Navy Design Manual 13 02  Commercial Intrusion Detection  Systems  IDS   September 1986     Description  This UFC  Unified Facilities Criteria  document provides guidance on how to  design electronic security systems required by the current antiterrorism force protection  environment  Electronic security systems consist of access control systems  card reader  systems   closed circuit television  CCTV  system  intrusion detection systems  data  transmission media systems  a means to communicate information internally and externally to  DoD sites   and provision of local or regional dispatch centers  also known as security command  centers   Electronic security systems are one part of an overall physical security plan  This  document provides guidance to commanders  architects and engineers on how to design  electronic security systems for projects to include new construction  additions  renovations   expeditionary  or temporary construct
119. llowing sections     6 2 BANDWIDTH ANALYSIS    6 2 1 With any data intensive transmission network  such as an electronic security  system network  it is important to determine the amount of bandwidth consumed by the  system under normal and alarm conditions  This can affect network cost  reliability  and  transmission speed  An example bandwidth analysis is shown below in Table 6 1  For  the DTM  design a system capable of handling the total bandwidth  plus contingency   for each link required in the system     97    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Table 6 1  Example Bandwidth Calculations          Alarm Normal  Bandwidth Bandwidth  Cameras  3 07 Mbps Cameras  0 61 Mbps Total  in per in per Bandwidth  Link Facilities Alarm Camera  Normal Camera   Mbps    B A Building B to Command Center 1 3 07 4 2 68 5 75  C A Building C to Command Center 1 3 1 9 5 5 8 6  D A Building D to Command Center 0 0 0 0 0  E A Building E to Command Center 2 6 1 10 6 1 12 2  F A Building F to Command Center 0 0 0 0 0  G A Building G to Command Center 2 6 1 10 6 1 12 2  H A Building H to Command Center 0 0 0 0 0  I A Building   to Command Center 1 3 1 1 0 6 3 7  J A Building J to Command Center 2 6 1 22 13 4 19 6       Note  The assumptions in the table above are based on 640 by 480 pixels resolution  a  20 1 compression ratio  and 10 frames rate per second  frame rate speed  in alarm and  2 frames per second in the non alarm mode  Refer for Chapter 4 for bandwidth  calcul
120. ls the shock wave when glass is broken   and dual technology sensors  senses  acoustic and shock vibrations   Glass break sensors should be used in conjunction with  other methods  such as volumetric sensors  because they do not sense motion or  intrusion from entering a door or hatch     5 3 2 2 2 Glass break sensors can be used to cover several windows    5 3 2 3 Glass Types  There are a variety of glass types  plate  tempered  laminated   and wired  For inhabited facilities  UFC 4 010 01 requires laminated glass for windows   Most glass break sensors work with all glass types to include laminated glass    5 3 2 4 Glass Break Sensor Guidance     5 3 2 4 1 Do not use window mounted glass break sensors     5 3 2 4 2 Glass break sensors should only be used in protected areas with windows on  the ground floor or that are easily accessible     79    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  5 3 2 5 Use volumetric sensors in conjunction with glass break sensors in protected  areas     5 3 2 6 Use dual technology glass break sensors  acoustic and shock wave   There  is not a significant price difference between a simple acoustic sensor and a combination  sensors  acoustic and shock   For the nominal component price increase  which is a  fraction of the total installed cost  the increased capability justifies the higher cost     5 3 2 7 Check glass break sensor specifications to ensure they are rated for the type  of glass used  typically laminated glass     5 3
121. m is being used as an  intrusion detection methodology  primarily interior camera locations   the CCTV system  can be configured to provide an alarm input to the ACS system     114    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    8 5 COMMUNICATION FROM THE ACS TO THE DISPATCH CENTER   8 5 1 Most alarm signals are usually transmitted from the ACS to the Dispatch  Center    8 6 COMMUNICATION FROM THE DISPATCH CENTER TO THE ACS   8 6 1 Some projects require or are designed such that door unlock signals can be    manually generated from the Dispatch Center  In those cases a door open signal is an  output from a device in the Dispatch Center to the ACS     8 7 BANDWIDTH ANALYSIS    8 7 1 A study should be made of the bandwidth communication requirements for  each subsystem through the DTM to the Dispatch Center  Typically  the CCTV system  will have the highest requirement  but there will be data communications     normally in  the range of kilo bytes per second  kbps      for the ACS system and IDS systems  The  DTM may make use of the base Information Technology systems  If base fiber optic is  used  a good design detail is a fiber schedule showing which fibers on which cables are  dedicated to the DTM or other systems  Plan on one fiber pair for ACS communication      one fiber transmit and one receive  Similarly  plan on one fiber pair for required IDS  communications  CCTV typically only requires one fiber per camera  For PTZ cameras   one wavelength on the 
122. mation to legitimate readers and encrypts that  transmission such that the system remains immune from replay attacks  It is difficult to  copy security credential information onto a forged card  For more information on the  federal standard for electronic smart cards  refer to NIST FIPS 201     3 4 7 5 Common Access Card  CAC   The CAC is a credential used by the DoD to  allow access to DoD computers and physical locations worldwide  For each individual   one card works for all access to computers and physical locations  The CAC is a JAVA   based smart card  It can store a number of personal demographic data elements  It  supports multiple bar codes and a magnetic stripe for legacy applications  making the  card extremely versatile  A standard developed by the Security Equipment Integration  Working Group  SEIWG 012  provides details on the formatting of the information to be  encoded on track two  2  of the magnetic stripe of the CAC  SEIWG    s intent is to ensure  that cards can store enough data to determine information such as the individual  cardholder  the branch of the military from which the card was issued  and the base  from which the card was issued     Per DoD Directive 8190 3  the CAC should be    the principal card enabling physical  access to buildings  facilities  installations  and controlled spaces  This policy does not  require DoD components to dismantle immediately current access systems  or preclude  the continued use of supplemental badging systems tha
123. mera unit  Improvements in product design have reduced the packing  to integral units that now fit in the space of a quarter ceiling tile  PTZ features within  dome cameras move substantially quicker than conventional cameras with a separate  PTZ drive unit on them     56    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 6 7 Cost Considerations  The obvious primary cost considerations are the  number of cameras  mounting devices  and the associated wiring  Adding more  cameras will increase the personnel burden required for monitoring those cameras  This  can be alleviated by the proper design of a monitoring system  If cameras are not  monitored  their data should be recorded and stored for use as after the fact evidence   As discussed in the System Displays Section  larger plasma panels or flat screen  displays can be configured to show only cameras that display alarm conditions     4 6 7 1 Effect on maintenance costs  In general  more cameras and more  monitoring systems are going to result in higher maintenance costs     4 6 7 2 Order of magnitude cost estimates  While there will be variations with  actual installed constructed cost across the United States based on labor type  union or  nonunion  and labor supply  the following general rules of thumb can be used for  conceptual cost estimating     4 6 7 3 Interior fixed camera   2 100   4 6 7 4 Interior soeed dome camera   3 800   4 6 7 5 Exterior fixed camera with heating equipment   5 600  4 6 7 6 Exte
124. mission of data between two or  more components  and back to the Dispatch Center     1 6 7 Chapter 7  Dispatch Center  A Dispatch Center is the area containing the  personnel and alarm notification equipment that monitor inputs from the ACS  IDS   CCTV  and communications systems  At the Dispatch Center  alarms are received  are  assessed and response actions are initiated including dispatching as necessary  This  chapter discusses the function and requirements of the Dispatch Center     1 6 8 Chapter 8  ESS Subsystem Integration  Integration of the various  subsystems for the ESS is discussed  Topics covered include communication from the  ACS to door and gate hardware  IDS to ACS  ACS to and from the CCTV subsystem   and ACS to and from the Dispatch Center     1 6 9 Chapter 9  General Requirements and Cross Discipline Coordination   General considerations such as system acceptance testing  operation  and  maintenance  architectural coordination issues and electrical coordination issues are  discussed     1 6 10   Chapter 10  Model Design Approach  To close this UFC  a chapter ona    model ESS design approach is provided  This chapter does not mandate an approach  but describes an effective model approach on how to design an ESS     11    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 2    ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEM OVERVIEW  2 1 OVERVIEW    2 1 1 ESS is the integrated electronic system that encompasses the ACS  interior  and exterior IDS  CCTV syste
125. mited  For example  a  four digit PIN only provides 10 000 different possible codes              3 2 4 Biometric devices  Biometric devices rely on measurements of biological  characteristics of an individual  such as a fingerprint  hand geometry  handwriting  voice   or iris patterns  Selected individual characteristics are stored in a device   s memory or on  a card  from which stored reference data can be analyzed and compared with the  presented template     3 2 4 1 A one to many or a one to one comparison of the presented template with the  stored template can be made  and access granted if a match is found  depending on the  authorized security level   There are two important acceptance results of which to be  aware  They are false reject and false accept  False reject is denying entry to authorized  personnel  This is inconvenient  but does not compromise security  False accept is  granting access to non authorized personnel  This is the most critical result  as highly   secure facilities cannot afford the error of a false accept  All ACS have some  percentage of false positive  accept  alarm signals  ESS system designers should  understand the issues and work to minimize the number of false positive  accept   events  From a logistics perspective  missions cannot be accomplished if false reject    27    UFC 4 021 02NF   27 September 2006   change 1  23 October 2006   rates are high and authorized personnel are regularly unable to enter their workspace or  facility     
126. mple  two solutions of meeting a requirement to meet the Pd  of 99  were analyzed  There are other options than the two discussed  The example  presented is an academic case study to demonstrate different values of Pd for and  methods of layered protection  It is based on convenient Pd factors for two common  intrusion detection technologies based  fiber optic fenceline and buried cable   For each  project  the IDS designer will have to design a solution taking into account project  requirements  available technology  site specific information  and possible causes of  false alarms     5 6 6 Additional IDS design guidance is provided in Tables 5 6 and 5 7   Table 5 6  IDS Design Guidance    Issue Recommendations       Door Status Monitoring Restricted area perimeter monitoring should be  included at all building entrance and exit points  to  include perimeter doors  roof hatch openings  and  doors used for emergency egress     Doors for emergency egress should include an audible  device  door screamer  on the secured side     All door monitoring should be via balance magnetic  switches  The status switch contacts shall be closed  when the door is closed     Redundant Path for In large critical systems  plan an alternate path for  Alarms alarms  One method of achieving this is to route IDS  alarms into the ACS and out to the Dispatch Center as  an alternate path to a normal primary route of having  the IDS inputs report directly to the Dispatch Centers              95    UFC 4 
127. mple Window Confouraton   78  Figure 5 5  Sample Roof Hatch CGontfouraton  EEN 79  Table 5 1  Application Notes     Interior IDS Sensors       sononsooooooooooeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeme 82  Figure 5 6  Active Infrared IDS 22 103  aca Nasal aaa iA anaae Alas allGe 83    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Figure 5 7  Monostatic Microwave Sensor and Associated Footprints                eeesssseee 84  Figure 5 8  Bistatic Microwave Sensor Operation    85  Figure 5 9  Typical Bistatic Microwave Layout and Guidance              ssssssssseeerreeeseereee 86  Figure 5 10 Video Intrusion Detection System           eee ceeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeenneeeeeeeeneeeeeneaaes 87  Table 5 2  Video IDS Design Guidance and Hecommendatons           sssssssseseseeennnnenne 88  Figure 5 11  Typical Fiber Optic Fence Detection System Au 90  Figure 5 12  Fence Example           22    ccccccceseseseceeeceeeeeeeeeeee eee    A  91  Table 5 3  False Alarm Causes   Exterior IDS Sensors AE 92  Table 5 4  Advantages and Disadvantages of    AND    and    OR    Configurations              93  Table 5 5  Sample Probability of Detection Factors            ceccccccccetecceccccccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 93  Figure 5 13  Zoned Detection Gvstem  tbe 94  Table 5 6  IDS Design Guidance              p M   e ee eenentsseeeneeeeeeees 95  Table 5 7 Exterior IDS Applications Table un 96  Table 6 1  Example Bandwidth Calculations           noooooooooooeoooeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeerereeeeeeeeeee 98  Figu
128. ms     5 2 CENTRAL PROCESSING UNIT  CPU     5 2 1 The key for any IDS is that it be accurate  timely  and allow for assessment  and verification of alarm conditions  Therefore  it is important thatthe CPU allow for  integration to the ACS  CCTV system and provide a user interface to allow security  personnel to interact with alarm events     5 2 2 On a comprehensive system  the CPU of the IDS may include a computer  workstation and printer  The CPU analyzes alarm information from the sensors  and  provides output information to the ACS  CCTV system and computer workstation  The  IDS CPU and the ACS CPU may be integrated into a single controller  This typically  occurs when the IDS inputs are principally simple digital inputs  When more complex  sensors  typically exterior sensors  are used  either local controllers or a separate IDS  CPU will be required as shown in Figure 5 2     5 2 3 A specialized case of an IDS CPU occurs in a SCIF  In this situation  the  Premise Control Unit  PCU  receives signals from all associated sensors in the SCIF   s  alarm zone and establishes the alarm status  The alarm status is immediately  transmitted to the Monitoring Station  Within the Monitoring Station  a dedicated alarm   monitoring panel  or central processor  monitors incoming PCU signals  On receiving  an alarm signal  a Monitoring Station   s enunciator generates an audible and visual  alarm for the monitoring personnel     5 3 INTERIOR SENSORS    5 3 1 This section covers both int
129. ms for assessment of alarm conditions  the DTM  alarm  reporting systems for monitor  control  and display  and the policies  procedures  and  response times that ensure that all elements of the ESS work effectively  It is part of an  overall physical protection system  As shown in Figure 2 1  the overall physical  protection system consists of civil engineering features of fences  gates  entry points   clear zones  and standoff distances  architectural issues of construction materials   barriers  doors  windows  and door hardware  structural issues of blast resistant  protection  mechanical issues of HVAC protection  electrical engineering issues of  power redundancy and lighting systems  ESS  and operational considerations such as  policy  procedures  and response times   In summary  the ESS is one component of a  bigger physical protection scheme  This chapter describes the ESS in general as a  lead in to subsequent detailed chapters on each of the ESS subsystems     Service Exception  Marine Corps  Aboard Marine Corps Installations  Mass  Notification Systems  MNS  are considered a component of the ESS  Design of Mass  Notification Systems is not within the scope of this UFC  refer to UFC 4 020 01 for Mass  Notification System design guidance     2 2 DETECT  DELAY  AND RESPOND    2 2 1 For effective intrusion intervention  the ESS should operate on the Detect   Delay  and Respond principle that ensures the time between detection of an intrusion  and response by security f
130. n designing access control  for doors  Refer to the Life Safety Code and Means for Egress for Buildings and  Structures for code guidance on egress and ingress doors     9 4 6 5 Recommendation  Unless there is a compelling convenience reason for  making a door fail safe  most ESS projects are designed such that the door hardware is  Fail Secure     9 4 7 Door Locks    9 4 7 1 Electric locks  The electric lock is a very secure method to control a door  An  electric lock actuates the door bolt  For very secure applications dual locks can be used   for example  a retractable bolt on and at the top of the door frame and an additional  retractable bolt on the side of the door   In some cases  power is applied to engage the  handle  so the user can retract the bolt vice the electric operator actually retracting the  bolt  Most electric locks can have built in position switches and request to exit  hardware  While offering a high security level  electric locks carry a cost premium  A  special door hinge  that can accommodate a wiring harness and internal hardware to  the door  is required  For retrofit applications  electric locks usually require purchase of  a new door     9 4 7 2 Electric strikes  The difference between an electric strike and an electric lock  is the mechanism that is activated at the door  In an electric lock door the bolt is moved   In an electric strike door the bolt remains stationary and the strike  or cover latch  is  retracted  As in electric locks  electri
131. n intruder moving  laterally than pick up a target traveling down the throat  of a sensor camera axis            5 4 4 Property Fence Line Detection  Several types of fence mounted perimeter  IDS exist  With all fence mounted systems it is critical that the fence construction be of  high quality  with no loose fabric  flexing  or sagging material  The fence should also  have solid foundations for posts and gates  Otherwise nuisance alarms may occur  Five  types of exterior fence sensing systems will be discussed   1  electro mechanical  systems   2  taut wire systems   3  coaxial strain sensitive cable   4  Time Domain  Reflectometry  TDR  systems  and  5  fiber optic strain sensitive cable systems     DAAT Electro mechanical systems  According to the Perimeter Security Sensor  Technologies Handbook  electro mechanical fence sensing systems use either  mechanical inertia switches or mercury switches to detect a fence climbing or cutting  incident  An electronic controller looks for momentary contact openings of the inertia or  mercury switches  For more information on electro mechanical fence sensing systems  refer to the Perimeter Security Sensor Technologies Handbook  Due to advances with  other  better  technologies  electro mechanical systems are not recommended for DoD  use     88    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  5 4 4 2 Taut wire systems  Taut wire fence sensing systems use a series of parallel  wires under tension with a numerous micro s
132. n the information  transfer  bandwidth  requirements     6 9 ENCRYPTION    6 9 1 Encryption of ESS DTM is an evolving area with new standards under  development  Some general guidance follows     6 9 1 1 ACS  Anew emerging NFPA guide suggests that ACS inter building  information be encrypted     6 9 1 2 CCTV MPEG and IEEE have encryption guidelines for video transmission   IEEE 802 is in draft version at this time  Federal Information Practices Standard 140 is  an additional reference     Refer to Chapter 9 for additional information on tamper protection and encryption  requirements     105    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006    change 1  23 October 2006  Table 6 2  DTM Technologies for ESS          Hardwired   Leased T 1 Wireless Free Space  Lines Optics  Suitability Recommended Does not make Generally May make sense   application  sense when base   requires line of can be used when  On Base level information   sight  there is line of  infrastructure can sight   be used   Suitability Rarely Recommended A workable May make sense   achievable  application  Can application  Inter Base because of cross property  property line lines   boundaries        Initial Cost    Dependent on  distance   Principle cost is    Low  which is  good  Must  provide interface    Construction  costs of towers  and tie ins has to    Reduced initial  cost because  conductors are not                per linear foot of   to site   s be computed  used  Need  trenching  demarcation transmit receive  condu
133. npower requirements or limitations  and  sustaining costs  That design criteria will be the basis for establishing the requirements  of the ESS and other elements of the overall security solution     2 3 3 For existing facilities  the design criteria is used to perform a vulnerability  assessment  the results of which are used to establish the requirements for the ESS   For new facilities  the design criteria is used to establish the requirements directly  The  levels of protection will be the most important criteria element in establishing the ESS  requirements  The process outlined in UFC 4 020 02 establishes the planning  requirements  It also provides a risk management process that can be used to evaluate  the resulting requirement  Figure 2 4 depicts the life cycle of an ESS     16    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Figure 2 4  Project Process    Assess Identify    Establish Design    Establish Level  Critical Asset Basis Threat of Protection Security    Engineering  Facility Planning  Manual    UFC 4 020 01    Security  Engineering  Facility Design  Manual    UFC 4 020 02    Scope of  this Guide     UFC 4 021 02       17    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  2 4 SYSTEM COMPLEXITY    2 4 1 General  ESS can range from simple to complex systems  While there may  be some different views or definitions of what constitutes a simple or a complex system   this guide will use the criteria described in this section  The d
134. nter space is required   A determination of Dispatch  Center connectivity  DTM  requirements needs to be made  Connectivity requirements  refers to bandwidth and pathway considerations  Additionally  distance issues and  availability of points of connection needs to be reviewed  There will be additional  project cost if new pathways and connections are required     10 23    Multi Organizational Interfaces  Meetings with end users and facility  security specialists need to be held  Additionally  determine facility and security forces  operational requirements     10 2 8 Space Planning  The ESS designer must interact early to reserve space  requirements in a new building  square footage area  fore ESS components such as  equipment racks  consoles  operator stations  and administrative stations     10 3 INITIAL DRAWING PREPARATION    10 3 1 A good start for drawing production is to begin with the drawings identified in  Figure 10 1     10 3 2   Cable Schedule  For identifying different cable types required for a project  a  good approach is to use a cable schedule and show the conductor count and cable  legend on riser diagrams  A sample is shown in Figure 10 2     10 23 Functional Matrix  A document defining the functionality to the system is a  useful tool similar to the one shown in Figure 10 3     10 4 BASIS OF DESIGN    10 4 1 Some projects require a Basis of Design  Typically a Basis of Design is done  as a report and includes  a functional description of systems  a narrat
135. o Content Analysis classifies images within a camera   s  field of view  Programming algorithms differentiate an animal from a person  The  algorithms start by noticing pixel changes  Additional programming takes into account  color changes  speed changes  types of motion  patterns within the motions  and  degrees of freedom within each motion type  Video Content Analysis can filter out  potential causes of nuisance alarms such as animal movement  rain  snow  birds  and  so forth     4 17 3 1 A variant of Video Content Analysis pertains to asset protection as opposed  to intrusion detection  In this method  the camera focuses on a specific asset     such as  a safe  As long as the camera continues to see the safe than no alarm signal is sent   Obscuration or removal of the safe can be programmed to generate an alarm signal     4 17 4 Motion Path Analysis systems use complex computer algorithms to not only  detect motion within a scene  but also to determine the rate and direction of motion   With these systems it is possible to identify things such as vehicles traveling the wrong  direction on a one way street  vehicles moving faster than allowable  and vehicles that  stop moving  Motion path analysis has the ability of installing virtual trip wires with  complex rules and can be programmed to differentiate between nuisances and targets   An example of this is vehicle within a site moving in a normal path of operational traffic   assume left to right  can be programmed as a n
136. o Dark Ratios             Light to Dark Quality of Image  Ratio   4 1 Great   6 1 Good   8 1 Marginally acceptable          4 9 3 1 The CCTV system designer can influence the light to dark ratio by  coordinating with the project   s lighting engineer  landscape engineer and interior  designer  Actions the designer can take to achieve a proper light to dark ratio include     4 9 3 1 1 Positioning of lighting   4 9 3 1 2 Positioning of cameras     4 9 3 2 When cameras and lights are mounted in close proximity  take care that the  light does not interfere with the field of view of the camera  such that glare or  backlighting issues do not occur     4 9 3 3   Adjusting the field of view   4 9 3 4 Selecting building surface interiors to minimize contrasts    4 9 3 5 Engagement of lighting engineers for new construction projects allows  modeling of light to dark ratios for different material selection  such as concrete versus    60    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  drywall  For retrofit projects  the same modeling approach can be applied  but requires  changing existing surfaces or modifying lighting sources and locations     4 10 VIEWING IN LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS    4 10 1 In addition to increasing the illumination level of the surrounding area  several  technology solutions are available to permit viewing under low light conditions  These  include black white switching cameras  infrared illuminators  or thermal imagers  These  technologies are often u
137. obability of  detection  OR Increased Increased  probability of nuisance alarms  detection  5 6 IDS DESIGN GUIDANCE  5 6 1 The IDS Designer must first determine the design objectives for the project     usually expressed as a Probability of Detection  Pd   Some sample requirements are a  Pd of 95  for most assets and a Pd of 99  for critical assets  Understanding the  requirement  the designer can then go about laying out the ESS and strategy  Consider  a case study of having to provide a Pd of 99  for a critical asset  Some sample vendor   specifications for three types of IDS sensors are shown in Table 5 5     Table 5 5  Sample Probability of Detection Factors             Product Probability of Detection  Buried Cable 95   Fence Mounted 95   Fiber Optic  Microwave 99           93    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  5 6 2 For the purpose of demonstrating the application of different approaches  two  alternatives for meeting the project requirement are presented  While an individual  component probability of detection may not meet a more demanding specification   layering or combining components can result in a higher overall system probability of  detection as illustrated below     5 6 2 1 Option A  Use a microwave perimeter system with a Pd of 99   The  equipment and system meets the project objectives and no other IDS methods are  technically required to meet the specified intrusion detection range     5 6 2 2 Option B  If the scenario is such 
138. of these types of digital input IDS devices are door contacts  glass break  sensors  and motion sensors 2 4 4 Complex System  A complex system has a  separate ACS and IDS system as well as a CCTV system communicating to a Dispatch  Center through a DTM as shown in Figure 2 7     Figure 2 7  Complex System With Separate ACS  IDS  and CCTV Subsystems       DISPATCH CENTER       In Figure 2 7  the curved line from the ACS IDS to the CCTV system represents the  interface that occurs between an alarm event  door contact alarm or fence detection  alarm  to the action that causes the output from a CCTV to be displayed on an alarm  indication screen and provide alarm annunciation in the Dispatch Center  The interface  can vary from hardwired contacts to intelligent data communications  System interfaces  and integration are described further in Chapter 8     ESS Subsystem Integration        2 4 5 Networked System  Figures 2 5  2 6  and 2 7 show discrete systems  An  emerging trend in the security industry is an evolution towards networked systems as  shown conceptually in Figure 2 8     UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 2 8  Networked System    NETWORKED SECURITY SYSTEM DATA TRANSMISSSION MEDIA    DISPATCH CENTER    The networked security system operates on a single network with drivers to the different  discrete components of the subsystems  While it is possible to procure networked  systems  security suppliers are at different stages of developmen
139. ol bits   10 bits byte    e Bandwidth   61 4 kbps   0 61 megabytes per second  Mbps      Thus one camera in normal  nonalarm  monitoring transmits video at a bandwidth of  0 61 Mbps              65    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 13  Calculation For a Camera in Alarm Mode at 10 fps       e At2bytes pixel   614 400 bytes  or 614 4 kb  per image    e Compression  614 4kb per second  kpbs 20    30 7 kbps per image frame    e Camera rate is 10 frames sec   10 x 30 7 kbps   307 kbps    e Convert bytes to bits  8bits bytes   2 control bits   10 bits byte    e Bandwidth   307 kbps   3 07 megabytes per second  Mbps     Thus one camera in alarm monitoring transmits video at a bandwidth of 3 07 Mbps              4 15 83  Compression  Digital images and digital video can be compressed in order  to save space on hard drives and make transmission faster  Typically  the compression  ratio is between 10 and 100  Different encoding decoding  codec  schemes are used  such as     4 15 3 1 M JPEG  Joint Photographic Experts Group  Motion Picture  is a compression  technique for color images and photographs that balances compression against loss of  detail in the image  The greater the compression  the more information is lost  MJPEG  can be provided in any resolution size     4 15 3 2 MPEG 1  Motion Picture Experts Group  is the first MPEG format for  compressed video  optimized for CD ROM  MPEG was designed for transmission rates  of approximately 1 5 
140. oor hardware is prohibited on SCIFs  with the exception of  the SCIF entrance      9 4 4 2 Obtain a copy of the facility s code diagram and access control and develop  an emergency action plan for coordination of security at door openings     9 4 5 Space Planning  Early in the project  architectural issues for Dispatch Center  space  wall space for security panels and floor space for ESS equipment racks needs to  be discussed  Normally  security panels will go in telecommunication rooms  The ESS  designer should coordinate with the telecommunications system designer for space  requirements in the telecommunications room     9 4 5 1 DoD criteria requires that telecommunication rooms are separate from  electrical equipment rooms  These spaces will be climate controlled separately from  adjacent spaces     9 4 6 Doors  Entry control is achieved through locking an opening such as a door  or gate  Using the example of card reader controlled doors  the door is controlled  through a door locking mechanism  When deciding which locking mechanism to use a  decision must be made as to whether the door is    fail safe    or    fail secure     While most  facilities will make all egress doors able to be opened from the    secure side    in the  egress path during a fire emergency  there are options as to whether the controlled door  is able to be open from the    public side        9 4 6 1 Fail Safe  Fail safe doors fail open on loss of electrical power  This means  that if power is lost 
141. opography is that if one of the links is disabled or severed  then communication is lost to that node  The unconnected node may still well operate  through distributed intelligence  but will be unable to receive updates from the rest of the  system  For example  if a new credential holder were added to the access list this  information could be downloaded to a remote site or panel from a central location  With  a severed link  these updates are not available unless the information were uploaded at  the local site panel  Conversely  if a credential holder were deleted from the access  database  a    severed    site panel would continue to allow access until communications  were re established or a local upload made  Figure 6 1 shows a star topography for  both an inter site architecture and an intra site architecture     6 4 2 2 Ring  The ring topography communicates through a loop  This topography is  slightly more robust than a star topography that in the event of failed link   communications can sill be maintained through the    backside    direction on the loop   Communications may be a slower in this backup mode of operation  but would be  sustainable  Figure 6 2 shows a ring topography for both the inter site and intra site  scenario     6 4 2 3 Fully Meshed  The most robust topography is a fully meshed topography  depicted in Figure 6 3  This topography has backup means of communication  such that  if any one link is disabled or severed  communications have an alternate
142. orces is less than the time it takes for damage or compromise  of assets to occur  Refer to Figure 2 2   Note  Some documents consider the additional  specific steps of Annunciate  Classify  and Assess as part of the intrusion intervention  process  These additional steps are part of the process  but for this document are  intrinsically included as part of the Detect step      2 2 2 Table 2 1 provides an example of the times related to each detect and delay  option in Figure 2 2  The cumulative delay times shown in this example  illustrated by a  timeline in Figure 2 3 are estimated at slightly over eight and a half minutes  Assuming  a security forces response time of eleven minutes  the sequence of events shown in  Table 2 1 allows sufficient time for an adversary to compromise and or damage the  targeted asset  Depending on the nature of the asset  there are some dictated  response times  Security and planning personnel should refer to DoD  agency  and  service directives to identify response requirements     2 2 3 Conversely  assuming a security forces response time of five minutes  the  sequence of events shown in Table 2 1 allows sufficient time to intervene on the    12    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  intrusion efforts  In designing an ESS  the designer should work with the facility oase  security officer to identify the response forces and reaction times     2 2 4 The above example is provided to illustrate the general principles of De
143. ormal event  Movement of a vehicle in  the opposite direction  right to left in this case  can be programmed to generate an  alarm for subsequent assessment and action  This technology may be suitable for PTZ  or long range thermal imaging systems  When motion is detected  the system zooms to  the target and tracks it     68    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 18 CCTV EQUIPMENT CONSIDERATIONS    4 18 1   Considerations when designing a CCTV system include     4 18 1 1 Weather conditions such as fog  mist  rain  and snow  Obtain the  environmental requirements such as maximum wind speed  high and low temperatures   as well as humidity information to aid in determining which equipment to use     4 18 1 2 For work at an existing installation  determine if a new system or expansion of  the existing system is best  Some of the factors to consider in weighing the cost of a  new system versus modification expansion to an existing system are as follows     1  Determine the capacity of the existing system to accept new cameras     2  Determine if the existing system is adequate in terms of adequate  picture quality and technology     3  Determine the cost savings associated with making use of existing  equipment  especially an existing matrix switcher     4  Determine if the new system or device is compatible with any existing  devices such as cameras and matrix switches  Rewiring for new  cameras and devices is labor intensive and can be expensive     4
144. ould  generate sharp image contrast     5 3 5 Interior Volumetric Sensors  Volumetric sensors monitor an internal area to  detect the presence of an intruder  There are several types of volumetric sensors  including acoustic  infrared linear beam sensors  passive infrared  PIR   ultrasonic and  dual technology  microwave and PIR   The most commonly used are dual technology  sensors     5 3 6 Acoustic Sensors  Acoustic sensors use passive listening devices to monitor  building spaces  An application is an administrative building that is normally only  occupied in daylight working hours  Typically  the acoustic sensing system is tied into a  password protected building entry control system  which is monitored by an off site  Central Station  When someone has logged into the building with a proper password     80    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  the acoustic sensors are disabled  When the building is secured and unoccupied  the  acoustic sensors are activated  After hours intruders make noise which is picked up by  the acoustic array and an alarm signal is generated     5 3 6 1 Acoustic sensors act as a detection means for stay behind covert intruders     5 3 7 Passive Infrared  PIR  Sensors are one of the most common interior  volumetric intrusion detection sensors  PIRs pickup heat signatures  infrared emissions   from intruders by comparing infrared receptions to typical background infrared levels   Typically  activation differentials are 3 deg
145. ow 30   there can be equipment problems due to abnormally high level of static  electricity  Conversely  too high a humidity can result in condensation  which may cause  electrical shorting or corrosion problems     7 7 4 HVAC heat cooling loads can be calculated by considering these heat loads     7 7 5 Personnel and equipment  The average staffing count of personnel in  conjunction with the kilowatt  kw  load of associated electrical equipment such as DVRs  and ESS servers as well as internal lighting loads  For personnel  ASHRAE 62  recommends 20 cfm flowrate per occupant  Refer to NMCI UFC 3 500 10N and utilize  equipment loads based on the room configuration     7 7 6 Shell load  Shell load considers the perimeter walls  ceilings  windows  and  associated solar gains of the external surfaces     7 7 7 Outside air  Heating or cooling as required for the climatic conditions of the  Dispatch Center location     7 7 8 Components to consider are air handlers  ductwork  inlets and outlets   diffusers and grills   as well as heating and cooling sources     111    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  7 7 9 Dispatch Centers lend themselves to    packaged HVAC equipment systems     because of the relatively low heat load  as opposed to centralized systems for bigger   more complex building types     7 8 SUPPORT ROOMS    7 8 1 A good practice is to plan for nearby support equipment room space to the  Dispatch Center  This room can be used to house local ESS
146. p to ten inches from the  reader  retinal scanners require individuals to look into a device that shines a harmless  infrared light into the eye  Hesitance to look directly into such a reader has curtailed the  acceptance of retinal scanners in most applications     40    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 5 ACS DESIGN GUIDANCE    3 5 1 GENERAL  The DoD is currently migrating to the CAC  New access control  system designs should be based on the CAC as the primary access control credential   Designer options for new systems are     3 5 1 1 Current CAC technology  3 5 1 2 Future CAC technology  contactless   3 5 1 3 Bometrics     3 5 2 CONSIDERATIONS  When designing an ACS the following should be  considered     3 5 2 1 Do not design an ACS based around a single access control credential   3 5 2 2 A coded credential alone does not offer sufficient security    3 5 2 3 At a minimum  all card readers must be equipped with a keypad   3 5 2 4 All card readers must be UL 294 listed and CE certified     3 5 2 5 Contactless card readers must conform to ISO 14443 Parts 1 through 4 and  NIST IR 6887  The Government Smart Card Interoperability specification  GS IS      3 5 2 6 For facilities requiring a higher degree of security  provide biometric capability  in addition to the minimum     Per FIPS 201  fingerprint reading is the biometric technology of choice   Facial imaging  is listed as a secondary biometric credential     3 5 2 7 Retina scanners should no
147. pical sizes include 15  17  18   and 21 inches     4 3 4 LCD  LCD displays utilize two sheets of polarizing material with a liquid  crystal solution between them  The solution is liquid materials that have crystal like  properties  These materials exist as solid crystals at low temperature  but when the  temperature rises they become a milky liquid and at higher temperatures  the solution  becomes clear liquid  In the display assembly  an electric current passes through the  crystals to align them so that light cannot pass through     thereby blocking a blacklight  source  Each crystal  therefore  is like a shutter  either allowing light to pass through or  blocking the light  High quality LCD displays  such as those required by ESS  use  segment drivers to orient individual pixels for image generation  LCDs can be provided  in either monochrome or color assembly units  LCDs commonly are provided in the 15  to 40 inch dimension range     4 3 5 Plasma Displays  Plasma displays consist of two glass substrates bonded  with an intermediate cell  Powering of the plasma display unit results in a high quality  image on the display side of a color filter unit  The displays are programmable and can  display multiple images in a matrix format  Common plasma display sizes range from 42  to 84 inches     4 3 6 Summary  Due to a past history of being the workhorse for security display  needs  CRTs are readily available through security vendors as a standard product  offering competitive p
148. pically fiber optic      6 7 3 Wireless  For security reasons  only use wireless if other media cannot be  used  Wireless broadband networks make use of radio frequency transmission between  towers  Wireless systems have high data transmission rates and do not require  installation of cable  nor rely on existing copper infrastructure  Wireless communications  are affected by line of sight topography and extreme weather conditions  such as rain   snow  or fog   Security can be achieved by vendor encryption and decryption at each  node  The design and cost estimate must consider equipment and software for  equipment and software for authentication servers and encryption systems  Some radio  modem units can provide data transmission rates of several megabits per second   at  ranges up to ten or more miles between modems  One disadvantage of wireless  systems is the systems are susceptible to jamming     6 7 3 1 Frequency Allocation  Frequency allocation or radio frequency spectrum  planning is a critical issue and in some areas of the world a show stopper  Because a  frequency is allocated on a near by base does not mean it will be authorized for the  facility in question  Frequency allocation is a long lead time item  Employment of radio    104    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  frequency transmitting equipment outside of the continental United States usually  requires approval by the Host nation  While there are some    worldwide license free     
149. r access activated Pee WT oe    5  Remote gate access activated elei           EE A et    en    Ri  D         16      tet       TT tT     TT A ER      tT tT dE dE rT TT   TT gt Ti    133    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  10 5 SCHEMATIC DESIGN PHASE    10 5 1 During schematic design  system solutions for the project issues  problems   identified during programming will be generated  The key product for this phase will be  outlined technical specifications and one line riser diagrams  The schematic design  documents can be used to provide the first cost estimate not based on concepts   10 5 2 Initial panel board schedules should be started to indicate power sources for  ESS equipment  Any new needs for power panels should be identified by electrical  power one line diagrams    10 6 DESIGN DEVELOPMENT PHASE    10 6 1 During the design development phase  project plans and specifications will be  completed  Drawings should include the following     10 6 1 1 Legends and abbreviations   10 6 1 2 Site plans   10 6 1 3 Floor plans   10 6 1 4 Riser diagrams   10 6 1 5 Mounting details   10 6 1 6 Door hardware schedule  may be on architectural plans    10 6 1 7 Sequence of construction when applicable   10 6 1 8 Site and floor plans will include power panel locations  security panels   consoles  sensors  cameras  card readers  power circuits  and other related equipment   Riser diagrams should include all devices  including location and zoning requirements
150. rasonic  sensors are rarely used     5 3 9 Dual technology sensors use both microwave and PIR sensor circuitry  within one housing  An alarm condition is generated if either the microwave or PIR  sensor detects an intruder  In some dual technology sensors  alarm settings may be  adjusted to require that both the microwave and the PIR unit detect an intruder  presence before an alarm condition is generated  Since two independent means of    81    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  detection are involved  false alarm rates are reduced when configured in the    AND     condition  both microwave and PIR sense an intruder   Dual technology sensors can  only be used in a SCIF  vault  or secure room if the technologies operate in an    OR     configuration  either the microwave or PIR sense an intruder   Therefore dual  technology sensors are not recommended for this application     5 3 9 1 Dual technology sensors act as a detection means for stay behind covert  intruders  Table 5 1 provides application notes for interior IDS sensors     Table 5 1  Application Notes     Interior IDS Sensors       Application Sensor Type Notes   Doors Balance magnetic switch  BMS     Proper alignment and properly  installed doors minimize false  alarms     Used in conjunction with volumetric  sensors        Windows BMS Use combination acoustic shock    wave sensor   Break Glass Sensor    Used in conjunction with volumetric       Acoustic R 9  Shock  Dual Technology  Roof Ha
151. re 6 1 Star TOO OGIO Ti Nec MF E 100  Figure 6 2  Ring TopsdiaphieS a WEEN 101  Figure 6 3  Fully Meshed Topograpbies 102  Figure 6 4  Single Mode Fiber Optic ENEE 104  Figure 6 5  Multi Mode el del 104  Table 6 2  DTM Technologies for EG    106  Figure 7 1  Dispatch Center Centrally Located  00           cccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeneeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 107  Figure 7 2  Example RDO BS ot cael ath aa ude cncncudalncecndechcncndt men cadedeanchdtenanadecuanandionenes 108  Figure 7 3  Sample Simple Dispatch Center Console Layout          ssssesesesessseeneeeeeenne 110  Figure 7 4  Sample Small Medium Dispatch Center Space Layout  110  Figure 8 1  Sample DTM System Detail    115    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    Table 9 1  Voltage Drop    125  Figure grill 126  Figure 9 2  Interface Between Fire alarm and Security Panel  127  Figure 10 1 Cable Counts on Riser Dagrams 132  Figure 10 2  Sample Cable Gchedule AAA 132  Figure 10 3  Functional Matrix             ccccccceseeseseeeeceeeeeeeeeeesseceeeeeeeeeetengheceeeeeeee A 133    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006    CHAPTER 1    INTRODUCTION  1 1 PURPOSE    The purpose of this UFC is to provide guidance for designing Electronic Security  Systems  ESS  in support of the Department of Defense  DoD  physical security  program requirements  An ESS is one of many physical security measures that must be  considered when addressing the physical security posture of a facility  This UFC i
152. receiver  Interruption of the normal IR signal indicates  an intruder or object has blocked the path  The beam can be narrow in focus  but should  be projected over a cleared path  Refer to Figure 5 6 for a conceptual diagram of how  an active infrared IDS works     Figure 5 6  Active Infrared IDS     a  Normal condition    IR Transmitter IR Receiver    S e  f 99999IIIIIIIIIMIG     Intruder blocks IR beam resulting in alarm signal    Thott ry    Infrared Sensor Guidance   5 4 2 3 Check that the terrain is suitable for clear signal transmission     5 4 2 4 Infrared arrays do not work well in areas with heavy snowfall because drifts or  snowmounds cover sensors and or block transmission and reception paths     5 4 3 Microwave sensors come in two configurations  bistatic and monostatic   With both bistatic and monostatic sensors  the sensors operate by radiating a controlled  pattern of microwave energy into the protected area  The transmitted microwave signal  is received  and a base level    no intrusion    signal level is established  Motion by an  intruder causes the received signal to be altered  setting off an alarm  Microwave  signals pass through concrete and steel and must be applied with care if roadways or  adjacent buildings are near the area of coverage  Otherwise nuisance alarms may occur  due to reflected microwave patterns     83    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  5 4 3 1 Monostatic  Monostatic microwave sensors use a single sensing 
153. rees Fahrenheit  These devices work best in  a stable environmentally controlled space     5 3 7 1 Different cones or cowlings can be placed on the PIR to focus or spread out  the coverage of the detection window  In other words  standard supplied covers for lens  can be made to provide a more narrow or wider sensor coverage area     5 3 7 2 While not a security application  PIRs are often used as an automatic request  to exit device for magnetically locked doors  In this application  the PIR acts as the  automatic sensor for detecting an approaching person in the exit direction for  magnetically locked doors     5 3 7 3 PIR Sensor Guidance     5 3 7 4 Do not use near exterior doors where the sensor can be exposed to sudden  changes in background environmental temperature     5 3 7 5 Best use is in interior climate controlled spaces     5 3 7 6 PIRs can receive false alarms from other heat radiating objects such as heat   system registers  rodents  pets  or other warm objects  in one case a mop bucket with  hot water in it      5 3 7 7 PIRs can also be defeated by a trained  slow moving intruder   Very hard to  achieve      5 3 7 8 PIRs are much more sensitive to travel crossing its sensing area as opposed  to travel toward the sensor     5 3 8 Ultrasonic Sensors use active transmission of sound waves to pick up  intruders much like a radar transmitter and receiver  To get an alarm signal  a signal  must be transmitted  bounced off an intruder and receipt signal received  Ult
154. riate for general applications     4 6 4 Fixed Position Cameras  Fixed position cameras are mounted in a fixed  position and cannot rotate or pan  A good application for fixed cameras is detection  surveillance  because video motion detection can be more readily applied to the static  field of view  The installation and cost of fixed cameras is lower because there is no  associated motor control wiring  Fixed cameras are good for review of pre alarm  conditions because there is a static view of the alarm area  Pre alarm allows the review  of video information for the time period  typically ten to fifteen seconds  immediately  before the alarm occurred  Due to the static view  fixed cameras are not as well suited  for tracking a dynamic event     4 6 5 Pan Tilt Zoom  PTZ  Cameras  PTZ camera mounts allow the camera to  rotate  pan  tilt  and zoom  Because of the drive motor  housing  and wiring for controls   PTZ cameras are typically three to four times more expensive than fixed cameras   However  the operator gets a much better view of the overall area than with a fixed  camera  PTZ cameras are often used for assessment surveillance applications to view  and assess alarm conditions  PTZ cameras are not well suited for pre alarm  assessment because they may not be focused on the alarm area at all times  When  designing CCTV surveillance  consideration needs to be given to lost coverage within  the camera sweep field of view when the camera zooms to a fixed location  Refer to 
155. rices  available inventories  and standardized dedicated conductor  connections  As another variant of CRT screens  for small quantities of cameras  use of  PC monitors are being used  With PC based video presentation  it is not important to  constrain the matrix to a square  The display can be dynamically sized based on events   New developments in large format displays offer advantages of consuming less space   consuming less power  and offering greater flexibility in display format  In addition to  requiring less power and space  large format displays offer the advantage of little to no  glare off the display screen  Currently  large format displays are usually made and  offered by flat panel suppliers and need to integrated into a CCTV display system     47    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 3 7 Display Setups  There are a variety of methods to display images as  described below     4 3 8 Single Image Display  A single CCTV camera image is displayed  This is  best used for a single dedicated camera that is critical for monitoring  Nine inches  9  inches  22 86 cm  is the smallest screen recommended for displaying a single camera  image     4 3 9 Split Screen     Split screen    is most commonly used to describe displaying  multiple CCTV camera images on a single display  The display screen is typically split  into a square pattern  Fifteen inches  15 inches  38 1 cm  is the smallest sized  recommended for split screen viewing for up to a ma
156. rint technology scans the loops  whorls  and other  characteristics of a fingerprint and compares it with stored templates  When a match is  found  access is granted  depending on the authorized security level   Advantages of  fingerprint technology are that it is easily understood  Disadvantages are that the  systems can be disrupted if cuts or sores appear on fingers or if grease or other  medium contaminates the fingers and the scanning plates  Some systems create two  templates for two different fingers  in the event that one finger is altered by injury or  other means  Fingerprint technology is not convenient in environments where workers  wear gloves  Early fingerprint readers were compromised by picking up a valid  fingerprint from a reader with a manufactured    finger     To combat this shortcoming of  the technology  sensors were equipped with the ability to sense a pulse and  temperature  Fingerprint technology is the first choice biometric method per the  emerging FIPS201     3 4 9 3 2 Facial Image  This technology measures the geometric properties of the  subject   s face relative to an archived image  Specifically  the center   s of the subject   s  eyes must be located and placed at precise  within several pixels  locations  Facial  imaging is the backup technology for biometric authentication per FIPS 201     3 4 9 3 3 Hand Geometry  This technology assesses the hand   s geometry  height   width  and distance between knuckle joints and finger length  Advantage
157. rior  pan tilt zoom camera   7 600   4 7 INTERNET PROTOCOL  IP  ADDRESSABLE CAMERAS    4 7 1 An IP camera captures a video image digitally  The video encoder protocols  have not been standardized within the security industry and therefore these cameras  require up front care in specifying the correct protocol and viewing software     4 7 2 Typical System Configuration  The IP camera resides on a local area  network  LAN   Video data is transmitted via the LAN to a video server that routes the  video to end users and possible mass storage devices  storage server      4 7 3 Pros and Cons  IP cameras are the least secure CCTV system  but may  have application where remote viewing over a network is desired  or where a high   bandwidth network may exist  For example  with a typical matrix switcher configuration   in order to view camera images at a site distant from the actual matrix switcher location   new cabling must be run between the matrix switcher and the remote site  With an IP  camera system  a network connection between the sites is all that is required to view  any camera image on the system  One drawback to IP cameras is that they cost more  than a standard analog  non IP  camera  Due to the security concerns with the internet   IP cameras will generally not be used on DoD projects  The possible exception would  be CCTV surveillance of low priority assets at remote locations     57    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 8 RECORDING    4 8 1 
158. rks  best in a relatively stable video  environment  For example  video  content analysis works better in a  flat desert environment than a  volatile meteorological such as  windy  rainy or foggy location        92    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  5 5 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION    5 5 1 Subcomponents of an IDS can be configured in an    AND    or    OR     configuration  In the    AND    configuration  two or more sensors must detect intrusion for  an alarm notification to occur  In the    OR    configuration  only a single sensor need go  into alarm for a notification to occur  The    AND    configuration is used when a concern  about nuisance alarms exists  The    OR    configuration is more secure and is used to  increase the probability of detection  An example is pairing two microwave sensor fields   In the    AND    configuration  both Field A and Field B have to be in alarm to cause alarm  notification  In the    OR    configuration  if either Field A or Field B go into alarm  then an  alarm signal is sent to the Dispatch Center  Addressable sensors allow the capability to  switch the    AND OR    configuration from the Dispatch Center  However for some  facilities  such as SCIFs  this feature should be disabled  Table 5 4 displays the  advantages and disadvantages of each configuration     Table 5 4  Advantages and Disadvantages of    AND    and    OR    Configurations                   Pros Cons  AND Decreased Decreased  nuisance alarms   pr
159. rmers for harmonics     9 6 12 2 Mitigation of harmonics involves either isolating the harmonic source from the  rest of the power system or in isolating sensitive equipment from the harmonics   Methods of mitigation involve use of oversized de rated standard transformers or  harmonic K rated transformers  K4 or K13 being common   use of oversized neutrals in  distribution systems  full size is adequate for feeds to individual equipment   use of input  line reactors or output filters  usually on motor drives   and use of surge suppressors at  panelboards  in wall receptacles  in power bars  or built into the input of ends loads   such as a security panel     9 6 12 3 To further reduce electrical noise  a copper equipment ground sized per  NFPA 70  unless the cable is already shielded  and copper grounding electrode  conductors sized per NFPA 70 should be run in raceways in addition to bonding metallic  raceways and enclosures together     9 6 13 Raceway  All conduit  wireway  and raceway shall meet the requirements of  NFPA 70     9 6 13 1 Conduit runs shall have a maximum of three 90 degree bends or any  combination of bends not to exceed 270 degrees     126    UFC 4 021 02NF   27 September 2006   change 1  23 October 2006   9 6 13 2 All conduit and cabling associated with the ESS should not extend beyond the  perimeter of the protected area     9 6 14 Labeling  Cables should be labeled at origination  termination  entry into and  exit from enclosures with permanent labels  
160. ructions     84    UFC 4 021 02NF   27 September 2006   change 1  23 October 2006   5 4 3 3 2 The detection zone should be graded to within three inches to detect crawling  intruders     5 4 3 3 3 Grass should be kept cut to less than three inches  A gravel surface prepared  for water drainage is better than a grass surface  Since a typical microwave pattern is  ten feet by ten feet  a twenty foot wide gravel bed works well     5 4 3 3 4 Avoid water puddles  The wave action of wind on water can cause nuisance  alarms     5 4 3 3 5 For high security applications  consider use of stacked sensors  one sensor  on top of another   with the lower frequency  wider broader pattern  on top and the  higher frequency  more focused pattern  to detect crawling intruders on the bottom     5 4 3 3 6 Do not place sensors too close to perimeter fences  Wind action on the fence  fabric can cause false alarms     Figure 5 8  Bistatic Microwave Sensor Operation     gt    4 i   EA Ah         f         J   TRANSMITTER  Ak RECEIVER  Bistatic Operation    Low Frequency   Broader Pattern     High Frequency   Detects Crawlers        Stacked Sensors    85    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 5 9  Typical Bistatic Microwave Layout and Guidance    Corner Overlap Intermediate Overlap   10    25      30   60        pie          Cee OGRA     z ao TE PTH     lt o     lt E EE    A TM         ko    Ji    4 E gt     5 4 3 4 Combination  As discussed previously  dual technology
161. s  increase backup capacity accordingly  The requirement for battery  backup for a SCIF and its monitoring station is 24 hours  The battery backup  requirement for a SCIF can be reduced if the system is on a generator  Monitoring  stations must have visible and audible indicators to inform system operators of failure of  a power source  a change in power source  and the location of the failure or change     9 6 3 2 Generator and Uninterruptible Power Supply  ESS components are  primarily low voltage equipment devices and are easily supplied by battery backup  This  UFC is not intended to require a central UPS or generator to back up an ESS  When an  emergency power generator exists or is planned for other requirements  batteries may  serve as the backup power means during the diesel generator startup time period     9 6 3 3 Backup Power for CCTV  Depending on criticality of an asset and the  availability of security forces to assess alarms  consideration should be given for  providing backup power for CCTV systems used for assessing alarm conditions     9 6 3 3 1 Provide battery backup for CCTV system platforms that are used as an IDS  sensor     9 6 3 4 Battery calculations should be required to verify the system   s backup batteries  have the proper capacity     9 6 4 Grounding  Bonding  and Lightning Protection  Refer to UFC 3 520 01   TIA J STD 607  NFPA 70 and NFPA 780 as applicable     9 6 5 Cable Type  In general  data signals should be provided in shielded cable   Dat
162. s  intended to provide uniformity and consistency in the design of an ESS     1 2 1 Applicability    This UFC provides planning and design criteria for DoD components and participating  organizations  This UFC applies to all construction  renovation  or repair projects that  include an Electronic Security System     1 2 SCOPE    This UFC provides guidance in designing an ESS  It is not intended to create the  requirement for an ESS  but rather to assist in designing systems that meet an  established requirement and to give guidance to commanders  architects  and  engineers on designing an ESS for new projects  Headquarters  Major Command  and  installation physical security personnel should be consulted for DoD and Service  directives outlining ESS requirements for asset protection  The ESS requirement may  come from DoD standards  installation requirements  or user requirements  Projects  may include new construction  additions  renovations  expeditionary  or temporary  construction     A vulnerability assessment must be conducted prior to beginning a security project  see  the sections    Vulnerability Assessment   ldentify Critical Assets    and    Vulnerability  Assessment   Design Basis Threat  DBT     in Chapter 2     Electronic Security System  Overview     Having identified what facility or elements might be vulnerable to which  threats  physical security measures such as an ESS can be implemented to reduce the  risk of intrusion and subversive acts  In summary  this 
163. s a trend of economically consolidating different base ESS at one  centralized location to save money and infrastructure of having different discrete base  operations center     Security Equipment Integration Working Group  SEIWG   A working group  responsible for a standard  SEIWG 012  pertaining to information encoded on an  access control card  This standard is generally referred to as    SEIWG     although there  are other SEIWG specifications as well  Originally designed by the DoD  the standard   s    144    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  intent was to provide requirements for an access card that could store enough data to  determine information such as the individual cardholder  from which branch of the  military the card was issued  and from which base the card was issued  all within the  available 40 digits of data storage  The DoD   s specification for the CAC is based on the  SEIWG standard  To meet the SEIWG standard  three important issues beyond the  card and reader must also be addressed     e The access control software must address the complete SEIWG specification   e The field panel must handle the 40 digits information resident to the CAC   e The communication between the card reader and the field panel must be secure     Sensitive Compartmented Information  SCI   Classified information concerning or  derived from intelligence sources  methods  or analytical processes that is required to  be handled within formal access contro
164. s are grouped into three categories     Credential devices    Coded devices    Biometric devices  These devices operate on three basic techniques       Something a person has  such as a common access card  CAC   swipe  card  or proximity card      Something a person knows  such as a personal identification number   PIN       Something a person is or does  such as a biometric identifier    3 2 2 Credential devices  Credential devices identify a person as having  legitimate authority to enter a controlled area  A coded credential  such as a plastic card  or key  contains a prerecorded  machine readable code  When the card or key is read   an electric signal unlocks the door if the prerecorded code matches the code stored in  the system  A credential device only authenticates the credential  it assumes a user with  an acceptable credential is authorized to enter  Various technologies are used to store  the code within a card or key  The most common types of cards are described in more  detail in the section Card Types     3 2 2 1 Advantages and disadvantages of using credential devices are shown in  Figure 3 2     Figure 3 2  Advantages and Disadvantages of Using Credential Devices       Advantages     Cards and card readers are reliable   Disadvantages      Cards can be lost or stolen       Some types of cards can easily be duplicated     Each type of card and card reader has its own advantages and disadvantages  Refer to  the subsections Card Readers and Card Types in the sect
165. s of hand    39    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  geometry are that the systems are durable and easily understood  The speed of hand  recognition tends to be more rapid than fingerprint recognition  Hand recognition is  reasonably accurate since the shape of all hands is unique  A disadvantage is that they  tend to give higher false accept rates than fingerprint recognition  As with fingerprint  technology  hand geometry is not convenient in environments where workers wear  gloves     3 4 9 3 4 Handwriting  Handwriting recognition analyzes the pressure and form of a  signature  This technology is only used in an ACS without heavy traffic because the  procedure of verification is slow  A PIN is typically entered into the system first so that  the computer can more quickly find a template against which to identify the person  seeking entry  Handwriting systems are not widely used     3 4 9 3 5 Voice Recognition  Voice recognition identifies the voice characteristics of a  given phrase to that of one held in a template  Voice recognition is generally not  performed as one function  and is typically part of a system where a valid PIN must be  entered before the voice analyzer is activated  An advantage of voice recognition is that  the technology is less expensive than other biometric technologies  Additionally  it can  be operated hands free  A disadvantage is that the voice synthesizer must be placed in  an area where the voice is not disturbed by
166. sed where visible light either brings undesired attention to a  critical facility  or surrounding property owners object to visible light adequate for good  visual camera operation     4 10 2 Black White Switching  Some cameras will automatically switch from color  during daytime to black white at night  which permits viewing under low light conditions   This can be an effective solution in situations where the existing illumination levels are  too low during night conditions to permit color camera use  but color camera use is  desired during daytime conditions  Numerous CCTV camera manufacturers offer auto   switching black white cameras     4 10 3 Infrared Illuminators  The human eye cannot see infrared light  Most  monochrome CCTV  black white  cameras  however  can  Thus  invisible infrared light  can be used to illuminate a scene  which allows night surveillance without the need for  additional artificial lighting  Infrared also provides many other benefits above  conventional lighting  including     4 10 3 1 IR beam shapes can be designed to optimize CCTV camera performance  4 10 3 2 Extended bulb life   4 10 3 3 Covert surveillance  no visible lighting to alert or annoy neighbors  4 10 3 4 Lower running costs  but higher installation costs     4 10 3 5 Ranges at which illuminators are effective vary with manufacturer and model   Typical values are 10 meters to 85 meters     4 10 3 5 1 It is important to design illumination specifically for the CCTV camera being  used  
167. sessing ESS alarms     Cathode Ray Tube  CRT   A technology used in television and computer display  screens  A CRT works by moving an electron beam back and forth across the back of  the screen  Each time the beam makes a pass across the screen  it lights up phosphor  dots on the inside of the glass tube  thereby illuminating the active portions of the  screen  By drawing many such lines from the top to the bottom of the screen  it creates  an entire screenful of images     Charge coupled device  CCD   A semiconductor technology used to build light   sensitive electronic devices such as cameras and image scanners  Such devices may  detect either color or black and white     Closed Circuit Television  CCTV  System  The system that allows video assessment  of alarm conditions via remote monitoring and recording of video events     Common Access Card  CAC   As envisioned  the CAC is the standard ID card for DoD  personnel  The full implementation of the CAC for access control and personnel  information may take three to five years  In addition to providing identification  information  it is planned to be the principal card for physical access to buildings and  other controlled spaces  It contains limited information related to work function  benefits   and privileges  but does not include medical or personnel records  In addition to  allowing building access  it also allows computer logon and enables email encryption  and electronic document signatures  The credit card sized CA
168. stem or an Electronic Entry Control System   This chapter describes  the elements of an ACS including card readers  common access card  CAC   credentials  biometric readers  electronic door locks  and the computer and electronic  systems necessary to integrate these elements     1 6 4 Chapter 4  Closed Circuit Television Systems  A closed circuit television   CCTV  system is the collection of cameras  video recorders  and other equipment that  allows security events to be viewed  monitored  and recorded  This chapter covers the  components of a CCTV system and the interface with the Dispatch Center     10    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  1 6 5 Chapter 5  Intrusion Detection Systems  An intrusion detection system   IDS  is a system that detects the presence of intruders  This chapter discusses the  elements of an IDS including sensors such as motion detectors  active and passive  infrared sensors  cables designed to sense movement or pressure when buried  underground  point alarms such as magnetic door switches  and glass breakage  sensors  An IDS system requires integration with a process and mechanisms for  assessing and responding to intrusion alarms     1 6 6 Chapter 6  Data Transmission Media  The data transmission media  DTM   system transmits information from sensors  ACS devices  and CCTV components to  display and assessment equipment  This chapter explains the significance of the DTM   A DTM is a communication path or network for trans
169. t a camera  behind glass  such as in a housing  make sure that the lens is close to the glass  If the  lens is too far away from the glass  reflections from the camera and the background will  appear in the image     4 6 3 5 Always try to avoid direct sunlight in an image  Direct sunlight blinds the  camera and may permanently bleach the small color filters on the sensor chip  causing  stripes in the image  If possible  position the camera so that it is looking in the same  direction as the sun     4 6 3 6 When using a camera outdoors  avoid viewing too much sky  Due to the large  contrast  the camera will adjust to achieve a good light level for the sky  and the  landscape and objects that must be assessed might appear too dark  One way to avoid  these problems is to mount the camera high above ground  Use a pole if needed  Given  mounting choices  mount cameras facing away from rising or setting sun  realizing that  this varies by season     54    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 6 3 7 Always use sturdy mounting equipment to avoid vibrations caused by strong  wind  This is especially important with a long focal length lens  These lenses amplify  even the smallest movement of the mount  Building mounts are generally more stable  than pole mounts  When in extremely windy conditions for a critical camera  consider  using a gyro stabilized mount lens to avoid vibration caused by wind  The gyro   stabilized lens has a cost premium and is not approp
170. t are considered necessary to  provide an additional level of security not presently afforded by the CAC  e g   such as  entrance into a SCIF or other high security space   The DoD plan is to migrate to the  CAC for general access control using the CAC   s present or future access control  capabilities  In the future  CACs will be contactless  13 56 MHz  compliant with ISO  14443 and NIST 6887  Government Smart Card Interoperability Specification   This  technology is proposed to be included in the next generation of CAC  For more  information on the Government smart card program  refer to Http   smartcard nist gov      Since the CAC is not fully implemented  an additional badge may be required for  dependants  contractors  temporary employees  host nation workers or when an  additional card provides an added capability not currently provided by the CAC     3 4 7 6 Operational Strategies  Operational strategies for badge policy such as  where the badge is worn  the type of photograph  if required   backgrounds for area  authorization  rules of challenge  penalties for not wearing  and losing are important but  are not within the scope of this design guide     3 4 7 7 Card Reader Card Type Recommendation  New projects should consider  new technology smart cards and the CAC  Magnetic stripe readers used with the CAC    38    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  allow the use of the encoding format defined in the SEIWG 012 standard  described in  the pre
171. t be considered as they are being phased out of  the marketplace     3 5 2 8 Outside hand geometry readers require special exterior housings  Check with  manufacturer   s specifications for external applications on other biometric readers     3 5 2 9  A common cable type for card readers is a twisted  shielded cable  typically   six conductor   One pair is used for low voltage dc power  one pair is used for data  transmission  and one pair is normally used for LED or signal illumination  Verify the  cable requirements with the equipment manufacturer     41    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 5 2 10 Coordination with Building or Project Architect     3 5 2 11 In general  the ESS designer must balance security requirements with life  safety  fire alarm interface  and normal operational convenience factors     3 5 2 12 Exits and entrances should be separated   3 5 2 13 Avoid using a life safety emergency exit as a high security entry portal     3 5 2 14 Limit entrances into the controlled area  SCIFs are limited to one primary  entrance     3 5 2 15 Coordinate with the Architect to ensure proper doors  door frames  and door  hardware are provided  For example  when an electric strike is specified  the door and  door frame should be checked or specified such that it supports the electric strike   capable of routing cables and so forth      3 5 2 16 Consider throughput and traffic low of normal operational traffic and  emergency exiting requirements 
172. t of providing  networked systems for all ESS capabilities  At this writing  a lot of effort is being spent  by individual vendors of ACS  CCTV  IDS and DTM to partner with other subsystem  suppliers or write software drivers to achieve a networked ESS  Typically  networked  security systems are typically a Proprietary Security Network  Refer to Chapter 8     ESS  Subsystem Integration    for more information        2 5 MONITORING METHODS    2 5 1 General  Determine the alarm monitoring method early in the project  planning process  There are several different monitoring methods  Monitoring  configurations  as defined in DoD 0 2000 12 H  including local alarm  central station   connection  and proprietary station  It is vital that the ESS designer understand the need  to identify the Dispatch Center and type of communications early in the project design     2 5 2 Local Alarm  Local alarms actuate a visible and or audible signal  usually  located on the exterior of the facility  Refer to Figure 2 9  Alarm transmission lines do  not leave the facility  Response is generated from security forces located in the  immediate area  Without security forces in the area  response may only be generated  upon report from a person s  passing through the area or during security checks  Local  alarms may offer some deterrence value  Local alarm systems do not initiate the Detect   Delay  Respond sequence     20    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 2 9  Loca
173. tches BMS Proper alignment and proper    installation minimize false alarms     Used in conjunction with volumetric                   sensors   Room Hallways Volumetric Sensors  Do not use dual tech devices in  Passive Infrared cli  Microwave  Dual Tech  PIR  amp  MW   Ultrasonice   Walls Vibration Sensors Design to detect a compromise of a  Fiber Optic Sensors  wall to a secure area   5 4 EXTERIOR SENSORS  5 4 1 This section covers exterior sensors for intrusion detection in the following    categories   1  open terrain sensors such as infrared and microwave sensors   2   property fence line sensors such as electro mechanical systems and fiber optic sensing  systems  and finally  3  other sensor technologies such as buried cable and wide area  sensors     5 4 2 Open Terrain  Open terrain sensors include infrared  microwave systems   combination  dual technology   vibration sensors and new emerging video content    82    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  analysis and motion path analysis  CCTV  systems  In general  open terrain sensors  work best on flat  cleared areas  Heavily or irregular contoured areas are not conducive  to open terrain sensing systems     5 4 2 1 Infrared  Passive sensors can work well in exterior environments  but outside  interference issues of reflected light or radiated light have to be considered     5 4 2 2 Active  Active infrared sensors transmit an infrared signal via a transmitter   The location for reception is at a 
174. tect   Delay  and Respond  Table 2 2 provides additional samples of Detect  Delay  and  Respond factors  For additional information on delay times  refer to the book The  Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems     Figure 2 1  ESS as a Part of a Physical Security System               Operational  Command  amp  Control  Policies  Architectural Procedures  Construction Materials  Responses  Door Hardware  Hardened Doors  Windows                    Mechanical  HVAC   Duct Barriers  Utility Routing              Civil  Fence  Gates  Standoff Distances  Clear Zones             Electrical    Power Redundancy f  Lig  ting                       Structural Physical    Security  Equipment           ESS is a part of a bigger   more comprehensive  physical protection  scheme     Access Intrusion Closed Data Dispatch  Control Detection Circuit Transmission Center  System System Television Method   System     CCTV     13    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 2 2  Example Detect and Delay Options       LEGEND    CARD READER    MOTION DETECTOR a    Confidential  CAMERA Information                    i Detect  2  KS  a  D  Delay vans  f TOR  lt       Detect G                                                     lt    Table 2 1  Example Breach Events and Delay Time  Delay Options Delay Time   Detection Options  1 Climb fence 8 10 sec  Perimeter fence detection  system  2 Cross open ground 10 feet sec    Microwave sensors  3 Breach building door or 1
175. tective laminate  which may be considered for higher security applications     3 4 2 6 Computer for retention and programming of the security credential database   This computer may be a stand alone or client workstation that is connected to the ACS  server database in a client server architecture     3 4 2 7 Equipment to encode badges  depending on types of badges   The badge  printer may be equipped with a magnetic stripe encoder or a separate stand alone  magnetic stripe encoder or both may be necessary where required  The new GSC IS  V2 1 contactless technology tokens require a card reader writer to encode  not encrypt   the token  For more information  refer to the Government Smart Card Interoperability  Specification     31    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 4 2 8 If there is no existing badging location and equipment  the design must  include the badging infrastructure described above as well as space allocation for  equipment and storage requirements     3 4 2 9 Badging may require an interface to an existing personnel database where  the necessary information is stored and maintained  If so  requirements for this  database interface and security must be established    3 4 3 ACS Central Processing Unit  CPU   The CPU is the physical intelligent  controller s  where the ACS application software and database reside and where all  ACS system activity is monitored  recorded into history  commanded and controlled by  the operator  Examples o
176. that terrain contour makes microwave  technology unfeasible  the IDS designer could consider a zoned approach of combining  a fence mounted fiber optic detection system with a buried cable detection system as  shown in Figure 5 13     Figure 5 13  Zoned Detection System        Fiber Optic Fenceline Detection Buried Cable Intrusion Detection  ooo 2e  Ch Geer    Pd 95      Pd 95       aS          Sa a          E               d             A       Gansen d UW   Wa EES       Je  Perimetertence          Daan        PITTI TTT TTT          BURIED LINE l    ye    _ gt  Dd _ gei   Sapte RETR e  5 6 3 If the two detection systems shown in Figure 5 13 are integrated in an    electrical    OR    logic  an alarm from either system results in an IDS alarm  The resultant  net Pd can be calculated as follows      Pd A   95   therefore the probability of not being detected is  1 Pd   1 0 95  5     The probability of not being detected in Zone B is similarly calculated as 5  as well     94    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  5 6 4 The net probability of not being detected by either Zone A or Zone B can be  calculated by multiplying the chances of not being detected in either A or B together as  follows        1 Pd  A    1 Pd  B   5    5     0 25     0 0025     Thus the probability of not being detected by either intrusion system A or B is 0 25    which is another way of saying the probability of being detected is 99 75  or nominally  99      5 6 5 In the above exa
177. the door hardware is configured such that the door can be opened  by anyone from the    public side     While affording great convenience  this configuration  is vulnerable to intrusion during a power loss event     9 4 6 2 Fail Secure  Fail secure refers to entry from the public side  Fail secure  doors fail shut on loss of electrical power  This means that if power is lost the door  hardware is configured such that the door cannot be opened from the public side     119    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  These doors need to be keyed such that they can be manually unlocked by appropriate  response personnel until the security alarm panel and electrical power can be reset   Emergency doors are required to be able to be opened for exiting during a fire   emergency except for certain restricted institutional facilities  prisons and high security  hospitals      9 4 6 3 Door Coordination  Door control impacts  door hardware needs or changes   are sometimes overlooked in project construction cost estimates  Inventory of doors  and assessment of door and hardware suitability should be an early design issue for  assessing project door interface requirements  Door coordination is one of the most  frequent  and costly  problem areas on security projects  It is important that the ESS  designer coordinate with the project architect to ensure that the proper door hardware is  specified and installed     9 4 6 4 Life Safety Codes  Great care should be taken i
178. this  method has the advantage of reduced wiring costs     8 3 4 Networked Connections  Current COTS security systems are moving in the  direction of networked inter system design  H this method is selected  a separate  security network should be installed  In this approach  Ethernet cable is routed to the  headend equipment and a static internet protocol  IP  address for the CCTV and IDS or  combined IDS ACS subsystems  The network connection allows communication  between the remote equipment and a server or desktop personal computer  PC    usually located in the Dispatch Center  The desktop PC will have a security program  that accesses remote equipment through IP addresses provided during setup  The  security program allows the user to access CCTV and IDS ACS information  When  using this approach  having adequate bandwidth is important due to the large amount  required for video information  As mentioned  network security is also of paramount  importance and for DoD projects a dedicated security network is recommended  Cost  savings of reduced point to point wiring have to be compared to possible new costs of  installing a dedicated network  A drawback to this approach is that typically the  manufacturer of both the CCTV and IDS ACS have to be the same vendor unless  compatible software drivers for allowing both systems to talk to each other are available  or created     8 3 4 1 Networked security systems are typically a Proprietary Security Network  A  Proprietary Securi
179. tionally  coordination in the  project programming stage will give persons responsible for collateral equipment the  time necessary to plan for the facility   s necessary equipment     Detailed door by door coordination reviews should be conducted during design  development and creation of construction documents     118    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  9 4 2 Other architectural issues that need to be considered include balancing  security with convenience  entries and exits  life safety code considerations  space  planning  doors  and door locks  These are discussed in the following sections     9 4 3 Balance of Security With Convenience  There is a natural conflict between  making a facility as convenient as possible for operation and maintaining a secure  facility  Convenience should be considered during the different phases of the design  review  however  the requirement for security should never be sacrificed for  convenience  Proper security controls will reduce the flow rate and ease of ingress and  egress in and out of a facility  These issues must be addressed in initial planning to  facilitate additional entry points or administrative requirements     9 4 4 Entries and Exits  In general  provide separate entries and exits  Establish  the number of entry exit points consistent with security and safety guidelines  For an  SCIF only one entrance is allowed unless approved by the Cognizant Security Authority     9 4 4 1   Use of external d
180. tober 2006  4 15 4 1 On site and hard wired cameras    4 15 4 2 Off site image transmission cameras     4 15 5   Bandwidth is not as big an issue for on site cameras because generally the  cameras are hardwired  copper or fiber  and the distances are shorter  It is relatively  easy to increase bandwidth by adding conductors  Off site cameras  on the other hand   are more costly to add because the camera images have to be transmitted over  conductors  typically leased  that cross property lines     4 15 5 1 One technique for conserving bandwidth from off site remote cameras to a  Dispatch Center is to locate the DVR s  at the remote facility  Information can be  downloaded to a DVR local to the remote location at a high resolution and frame rate  If  a video motion or other alarm event occurs  such as a door contact alarm   information  can be transmitted to the Dispatch Center for review  This technique of only transmitting  video images back to the Dispatch Center when an alarm occurs conserves bandwidth  and relieves the Dispatch Center personnel of continually watching monitors     4 15 5 2 Another advantage of placing the DVR at the remote site is that if  communications are lost between the remote site and the Dispatch Center  camera  image archives are still available at the DVR at the remote site  The downside to this  configuration is that constant non alarm camera images are not available at the  Dispatch Center     4 16 WHITE BALANCE    4 16 1   White balance is the
181. tracking event logs  Event tracking event logs are lists or logs of    security events recorded by the access control system that indicate the actions  performed and monitored by the system  Each event log entry contains the time  date   and any other information specific to the event     3 4 ACS EQUIPMENT    3 4 1 Once the type of identifier and other implementation strategies are  determined  the type of equipment to use can be determined  Various types of ACS  equipment are available  as described in the following sections     3 4 2 Badging Equipment  When credentials have associated identification  badges  ancillary badging equipment is needed  Note that besides the CAC issued to all  government employees  supplemental badging may be required during CAC card  implementation transition or for certain restricted access facilities  The Activity must  provide justification to support the requirement for any badging equipment  This  equipment should be scrutinized before deciding to purchase  Badging equipment  includes     3 4 2 1 Camera for capturing photographs   3 4 2 2 Software for creating badge images   3 4 2 3 Signature capture tablet   3 4 2 4 Biometric template capture device  where applicable     3 4 2 5 Badge printer capable of printing a color ID template on the front and back of   the badge  and capable of encoding a magnetic stripe or smart card  where applicable    There are new technology printers that are capable of printing pseudo holograms on the  clear pro
182. tube  commonly used to refer to a computer monitor   DBT   Design basis threat   DTM   Data transmission media   DVR   Digital video recorder   EMI   Electro Magnetic Interference   ESS   Electronic security system   ESSC   Electronic security system console   FAR   False acceptance rate   FPR   False rejection rate   FOUO   For Official Use Only   HVAC   Heating  ventilation  and air conditioning   IDE   Intrusion detection equipment     IDS   Intrusion detection system   138    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  IP   Internet protocol   IR   Infrared   LAN   Local Area Network  LCD   Liquid crystal display   MNS   Mass notification system   NAR   Nuisance alarm rate   NMCI   Navy Marine Corps Intranet   PCU   Premise control unit   PIN   Personal identification number   PIR   Passive infrared   Pd   Probability of detection   PVC Poly vinyl chloride   PTZ   Pani tilt zoom   RDTS   Radar detection system   RFID   Radio frequency identification   RDC   Regional Dispatch Center   RMC   Rigid metal conduit   ROC   Regional Operations Center   SCl   Sensitive compartmented information   SCIF   Sensitive compartmented information facility   SEIWG   Security Equipment Integration Working Group   SOC   Security operations center   TDR   Time Domain Reflectometry   UPS   Uninterruptable power supply     VCR   Video cassette recorder     139    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  VMD   Video motion detection     WAN    Wide Area Ne
183. twork    140    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  DEFINITION OF TERMS    Access Control System  ACS   An automated system that interfaces with locking  mechanisms that momentarily permit access  for example  by unlocking doors or gates   after verifying entry credentials  i e  using a card reader   Other DoD documents may  refer to the ACS as an Automated Access Control System or an Electronic Entry Control  system  The ACS may also be referred to as an Automated Access Control System   AACS   Electronic Access Control System  and Electronic Entry Control     Arms  Ammunition  and Explosives  AA amp E      Balanced Magnetic Switch  BMS   A door position switch using a switch held ina  balanced or center position by interacting magnetic fields when not in an alarm  condition     Base Level Information Infrastructure  That information technology  IT  infrastructure  which exists on DoD proprietary or leased property     Base Operations Center  BOC   An operations center for a DoD base  that has  equipment and personnel for operational responses  Typically  the BOC is the receiving  point for emergency alarms from fire alarm  ESS and 911 calls  This location is typically  staffed by trained staff twenty hour hours a day   The BOC may have a law enforcement  desk of handling domestic dispute or interface with local and federal authorities   The  BOC is typically the will house the Dispatch Center  which is the centralized location for  receiving and as
184. ty network is a completely self contained dedicated local area network   LAN  with security system software installed and run on a host server  computer    Proprietary Security Networks are dedicated to the ESS with no outside  Internet  LAN   or WAN  connections  All networks must meet the applicable DoD and service  component certification policies and procedures  A unique user ID and password is  required for each individual granted access to the IDS host computer  Public Key  Infrastructure  PKI  certificates may be used in lieu of User ID and password for positive  authentication  Positive authentication methods must be in accordance with published  DoD policy and procedures  System must monitor and log all network and ESS  component access attempts and all changes to ESS application using auditing and  network intrusion detection software or similar enhancements  If connection to an  outside LAN WAN is a system requirement  the system would not be considered a  Proprietary Security Network and the following additional requirements would apply     e Encrypt all host server communications to the LAN WAN using a NIST approved  algorithm with a minimum of 128 bit encryption    e Protect the system from compromise with firewalls  or similar enhancements that  are configured to only allow data transfers between ESS components and  authorized monitoring components     8 4 COMMUNICATION FROM THE CCTV SYSTEM TO THE ACS    8 4 1 For those limited applications where the CCTV syste
185. uired to provide protection   depending on whether or the desired protection is to prevent compromise or prevent   destruction  If the goal is to prevent compromise of the asset  the response force must   arrive in time to prevent the threat from reaching the asset  The above timelines needs   to be created according to the protection required and may be shorter or longer  depending on differences between compromise and destruction of protected assets     2 3 ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS    2 3 1 Establish the requirement for ESS early in the planning process Establishing  the requirement necessitates an interdisciplinary planning team to ensure all interests  related to a project are considered appropriately and how security fits into the total  project design  The specific membership of the planning team will be based on local  considerations  but in general  the following functions should be represented  facility  user  antiterrorism officer  operations officer  security  logistics  engineering  life safety   and others as required  The interdisciplinary planning team will use the process in UFC  4 020 01 to identify the design criteria  which includes the assets to be protected  the  threats to those assets  the Design Basis Threat   and the levels of protection to be  provided for the assets against the identified threats  In addition to the above listed  criteria elements  the planning team may also identify user constraints such as  appearance  operational considerations  ma
186. uld be    door forced    alarms at a  card reader controlled door  Similarly  the ACS interfaces with the CCTV system in that  cameras could be placed at remote gates to verify identity of entrants before manually  actuating the remote gate  Signals from the ACS are communicated to the Dispatch  Center through the transmission lines of the DTM  Further information on the specifics  of ACS interfaces with the rest of the ESS are developed in Chapter 8     ESS Subsystem  Integration        24    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 3 1  Example Access Control System  ACS         SECURITY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM  ROUTER  MAG LOCK SINGLE DOOR  Seen AA SS WITH BIOMETRIC  PANEL MAG LOCK DOUBLE DOOR AN eddi bk  NETWORK      SERVER  BMS   ELECTRIC  0 IS    ia    sre  Zu DOOR  PR a   LOCAL  CH E   BMS   SECURITY ALARM fa  jae  7 S PANEL LOCK  n as  D00R  CPU    ss ROOF HATCH A BIOMETRIC READER  120 VAC  LOCAL  BALANCED MAGNETIC SWITCH        SECURITY ALARM ROLLUP DOOR    PANEL EMS CARD READER  UNINTERRUPTIBLE   ew  EL  ELECTRIC Lock    POWER SYSTEM AUTOMATED GATE  ES   ELECTRIC STRIKE  GUARD HOUSE LCR  IN  C0  GATE OPERATOR   LOCAL  OUT  IF ANTI PASS BACK  PASSIVE INFRARED SENSOR  ss Suel  M  MAGNETIC Lock  EJ  RX  REQUEST TO EXIT       POWER  DISTRIBUTION  UNIT       rrEn zaaNnmem  Di SOr    LOCAL ALARM    25    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  3 2 ACS ENTRY AUTHORIZATION IDENTIFIERS    3 2 1 ACS entry authorization identifier
187. uld be applied close to the critical asset   Avoid burdening the entire general population with the highest level of security  Other  considerations include     9 1 1 1 All PCUs should be located within the secure area     9 1 1 2 Enunciators  controls and displays subsystems should be located in restricted  areas and closed off from public view     9 1 2 Certifications and Listings  Equipment and systems should be proven with  a demonstrated history of reliability  One mean of achieving this criteria is to specify  listed or certified products systems such as     9 1 2 1 United States  Underwriter   s Laboratory  UL or similar nationally recognized  testing and listing agency  Refer to UL 294 for a standard on ACS     9 1 2 2 European Union CE listing  CE certifications  referred to as    CE Marking    may  be required by the Host Nation for systems provided in Europe  The letters    CE    are an  abbreviation of a French phrase    Conformite Europeene     The marking indicates that  the manufacturer has conformed with all the obligations required by the European Union   EU  marketplace     9 1 3 System Acceptance Testing  This section discusses system testing and  ownership acceptance procedures and provides sample system commissioning  documents     9 1 3 1 Labeling  Major equipment should have labels to identify the system and  device  Cables should be labeled at origination  termination  and within enclosures  using permanent labels     9 1 3 2 Test Documentation and Acc
188. unit that  incorporates both transmitting and receiving functions  Many monostatic microwave  sensors feature a cut off circuit  which allows the sensor to be tuned to only cover within  a selected region  This helps to reduce nuisance alarms  Refer to Figure 5 7 for  illustrations of a monostatic microwave sensor and associated footprints     Figure 5 7  Monostatic Microwave Sensor and Associated Footprints    50 feet nominally    12 feet  nominally    Field of view on ground           dead zone      T    PIR SENSOR PATTERNS    N Signal of intruder generates alarm            Age   gt  Microwave pattern paired with PIR Sensor      y  CRITICAL ASSET    5 4 3 2  Bi static  Bi static microwave sensors are more commonly used than  monostatic sensors for wide area surveillance  Bi static microwave sensors use a  transmitter and receiver pair  Bi static sensors work over longer distances than mono   static sensors  Typical distances for transmitter receiver pairs are ten to six hundred  feet for X band frequencies and one hundred to fifteen hundred feet for Y band  frequencies  The bi static transmitter typically sends out a high frequency open band  radio frequency in a 3 8 degree pattern   Common microwave frequencies are X band  10 GHz or Y band 24 GHz   Refer to Figure 5 8 and Figure 5 9  next page  for  illustrations of bistatic microwave sensor operation     5 4 3 3 Microwave Design Guidance and Recommendations    5 4 3 3 1 The detection zone should be free of bushes and obst
189. used when IR illuminators are required  These cameras are  further described in the Viewing in Low Light Conditions Section of this chapter     4 6 1 1   Color cameras require a higher illumination level than black and white  cameras to be effective  Typically  a high quality color camera will work well down to 1 5  footcandle  fc  illumination  whereas a standard black and white camera might only  require 0 5 fc  These lighting level requirements vary with the camera model and  manufacturer  so be sure to specify the necessary illumination level that is required for  camera observation  and coordinate carefully with the lighting levels for the particular  area to be viewed     4 6 2 Indoor Cameras  Indoor camera installations reduce the complexity of the  system  but care must be taken to correctly specify the lens  field of view and camera  hardware  Indoor cameras need    4 6 2 1 Sturdy  secure mounting    4 6 2 2 Auto iris for lighting control    4 6 2 3 Auto white balance to ensure proper color correction to accommodate    changes in color temperature of lighting if it is dimmed or lighting is changed due to a  light outage     53    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  4 6 2 4 To be mounted in a position to prevent glare to the lens from overhead  lighting     4 6 2 5 Manual adjustment that the operator at the monitor station can use to  accommodate backlighting situations caused in situations such as when a camera  faces a door to the outside w
190. vious section Magnetic Stripe Cards      3 4 8 Keypads and PIN Codes  Coded devices use a series of assigned numbers  commonly referred to as a PIN  This series of numbers is entered into a keypad and is  matched to the numbers stored in the ACS  By itself  this technology does not offer a  high level of security since a PIN can be stolen by even casual observation  However   coded devices can be effective when used in combination with another credential  reading technology  Coded devices include electronic keypads and microprocessor   controlled keypads     3 4 9 Biometric Readers  Biometric readers verify personal biological metrics   biometrics  of an individual  Biometric readers may be used in addition to credential  devices or with a PIN code     3 4 9 1 Biometric devices have uses at access control points  but may not be mature  enough to use in throughput critical applications such as vehicle entry gates  Designers  have to evaluate the tradeoff between added security and decreased throughput     3 4 9 2 Biometric readers are the future trend of security systems  Current gains in  large scale production of some types of biometric readers have brought biometrics  close in cost to conventional card readers  Although biometrics are not as fast as other  readers  these technologies are still evolving     3 4 9 3 There are several types of biometric characteristics that can be used  The  most common are described in the following sections     3 4 9 3 1 Fingerprint  Fingerp
191. witches attached to it  The system is very  sensitive  but requires frequent maintenance  For more information on taut wire systems  refer to The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems     5 4 4 3 Coaxial strain sensitive cable systems use a coaxial cable woven through  the fabric of the fence  The coaxial cable transmits an electric field  As the cable moves  due to strain on the fence fabric caused by climbing or cutting  changes in the electric  field are detected within the cable  and an alarm condition occurs     Coaxial strain sensing systems are readily available and are highly tunable to adjust for  field conditions due to weather and climate characteristics  Some coaxial cable systems  are susceptible to electromagnetic interference and radio frequency interference     5 4 4 4 TDR Systems  Time Domain Reflectometry systems send an induced radio   frequency  RF  signal down a cable attached to the fence fabric  Intruders climbing or  flexing a fence create a signal path flaw that can be converted to an alarm signal  When  the conductor cable is bent of flexed  a part of the signal returns to the origination point   This reflected signal can be converted to an intrusion point by computing the time it  takes for the signal to travel to the intrusion point and return  The cable can be provided  in armored cable  which requires more than a bolt cutter to sever the sensing cable   These systems require their own processor unit and can be configured in a close
192. ximum of four cameras  More than  four camera images on a 15 inch display become too small to see  Figure 4 3 shows  four camera images on a single 15 inch display     4 3 10 Matrix Displaying for Large Format Displays  LCD and flat screen plasma  displays lend themselves to programming to show several camera images  The  configuration is best done in a square matrix  for example 9 images in a 3 by 3 matrix or  25 images in a 5 by 5 matrix   A square matrix avoids distorting or stretching the camera  image in one direction or the other as would occur in a 5 by 7 matrix configuration     48    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 3  Example of a    Quad Screen    Display    CH  A    a  CN    ZS    4 3 11   Switching Display uses time programming to show different camera images  on the same display  An example of    switching    would be a single CRT display to  display alternating images from two different cameras  An application would be using a  single monitor to display alternating images of two cameras at five seconds duration  each  The sequence would be to display the Camera A for five seconds  followed by a  display of the Camera B image for five seconds  followed by Camera A for five second   and so on as shown in Figure 4 4        4 3 12 Table 4 1 provides CCTV display component application guidance     49    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  Figure 4 4     Switching    Two Camera Images on a Single Display
193. y activity  If possible the CAD backgrounds should be provided after  contract award and before the kickoff meeting of a project  This will allow the ESS  designer or design builder to have a more effective kickoff meeting  Early in the design  process  the ESS designer should conduct site surveys to verify the accuracy of the  existing CAD backgrounds and site conditions    10 2 4 Site surveys  Capacity assessment of existing systems    10 2 4 1 ACS  how many spare card reader slots are available at what panels   10 2 4 2 What type of credential is used    10 2 4 3 Is there badging  issuing new badges  capability    10 2 4 4 CCTV  how many spare camera ports back at central server     10 2 4 5 Is archiving capability present     10 2 4 6 IDS  any expansion capability   130    UFC 4 021 02NF  27 September 2006  change 1  23 October 2006  10 2 4 7 Transmission system bandwidth availability     10 2 5 Coordination of DTM transmission lines  For existing and new DTM  transmission lines  coordinate with the base communications officer  information  technology      10 2 5 1 Approval of radio frequency emitters by local jurisdiction or Host nations must  be considered early in the project     10 2 6 Dispatch Center  Identification of the location of the central monitoring facility   space  for the ESS should be made  If sufficient space does not exist for the current  project  the Dispatch Center needs to be identified and a scheme for central monitoring  made  i e  anew command ce
194. y to use network storage for video images  This enables the use of standard  hard disk arrays  such as a redundant array of independent disks  more commonly  known as a RAID array   a system of using multiple hard drives for sharing or replicating  data among the drives  The benefit of RAID over using drives singularly is increased  data integrity  fault tolerance  and or performance  RAID arrays offer the use of any  standard storage hardware instead of using a proprietary digital video recorder unit s      4 8 3 4 Data Servers  With the development of telecommunications equipment and  an oversupply of associated data centers  new companies are seeking novel market  opportunities for data storage  The trend in the industry is that a few specialized data  storage companies  that have the unique telecommunications engineering experience  and capital to build data centers or    server farms     are offering out sourced data storage  services in the Terabit or Petabit range  While not totally mature  it can be expected that  secure methods of CCTV images will be the way of the future for CCTV security  systems     4 9 ILLUMINATION    4 9 1 A significant part of visibility is lighting  Lighting should enable parking lot  personnel and employees to note individuals at night at a distance of 75 feet or more  and to identify a human face at about 33 feet  These are distances that will allow them   if necessary  to avoid the individuals or take defensive action while still at a safe 
    
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