Security Target class 2 smart card reader SPR532
Contents
1. The user should not leave his or her smart card unsupervised A_USER ISO_EMV For applications requesting a secure PIN input the user has to use only processor smart cards compliant to ISO 7816 or EMV A_USER FWLOAD The user may download firmware versions of the TOE from the Internet site of the manufacturer the supplier or the distributor as well as from intranet sites of a company It is assumed that it is clearly communicated during the download of the firmware from an external source whether or not the firmware is CC certified It is assumed that the user will download CC certified firmware versions only It is assumed that the user knows that he or she will loose the CC certified and SigG SigV confirmed status of the product if he or she downloads any non CC certified firmware version to the TOE A_USER SIG_APP It is assumed that for the use of the TOE in accordance with SigG SigV only applications and smart cards that were evaluated and confirmed in the SigG context are used Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 13 45 3 2 Threats In the following section threats are represented that require special preventive measures within the TOE or in its environment The authors of threats are identified and des2. Section 17 2 of the O INS_ BYTE The TOE guarantees Signatures Act must that the PIN is ensure that transferred to the when producing a smart card only qualified electronic using PIN signature commands with the identification data are specified instruction not disclosed and are bytes stored only on the OE LED The user must relevant secure signature examine the status creation device of the LED during PIN entry on the keypad of the reader to check that the mode of the secure PIN input is active OE KEYPAD The user must enter his or her identification data using the keypad of the TOE Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM page 19 45 MICROSYSTEMS 15 Sicherheitstechnische O SEAL The TOE guarantees paragraph 4 Veranderungen an that the user may SigV technischen recognize security Komponenten nach den critical modifications Abs tzen 1 bis 3 m ssen by the security seal f r den Nutzer erkennbar O DOWNLOAD The TOE guarantees sein that newly downloaded Security relevant firmware will be changes in technical accepted only if components pursuant to integrity and subsections 1 to 3 authenticity are must be apparent for the successfully verified user OE SEAL The user must examine regulary before use that the securi
3. T STORE T DOWNLOAD T SEAL Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 34 45 8 2 Explanation of the security requirements Together with the security requirements of the environment the TOE corresponds to the security relevant requirements The SPR532 smart card readers fulfill the special requirements under 15 paragraph 2 number 1a no disclosure or storage of identification data and paragraph 4 recognizability of security relevant changes to SigV The security functions SF PINCMD and SF CLMEM for secure PIN input including LED control and memory rework are not directly open to attack due to their implementations The secure firmware download corresponds to the requirements according to the minimum strength of the functions high An attacker with high offensive capability cannot go around the security functions since he or she cannot attain an access to the security functionality of the TOE Thus the TOE is consistent with the security objectives The minimum strength of the functions high is appropriate and consistent with the TOE security objectives of non revealing and non storing from identification data and the recognizability of security relevant chang
4. SFR6 SFR FTA_TAB 1 No dependencies SFR7 SFR FPT_PHP 1 FMT_MOF 1 e Management of functions in TSF e No dependence for the TOE since no change of the behavior of the security function is possible whereby a management of the behavior of the security functions can be dropped Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 39 45 8 2 4 Connections security requirements IT environment There are no security requirements for the IT environment Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 40 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS 8 3 Explanation of the TOE summary specification 8 3 1 Security requirements and security functions Those in the following represented security functions complement each other and correspond in their cooperating to the security requirements of the TOE All security requirements are covered by the existing security functions which complement each other mutually to an overall secure system Security function Security requirement Comment SF1 SF PINCMD SFR FDP_ACC 1 The security function guarantees SFR FDP_ACF 1 that
5. TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS page 6 45 2 TOE description ASE DES 1 The SPR532 smart card reader represents universal smart card reader devices which can communicate with processor cards compliant to ISO 7816 and EMV2004 through different application interfaces CT API 1 PC SC 3 The devices work with all smart card transmission protocols compliant to ISO 7816 4 T 0 T 1 Data transmission protocols for memory cards IC 2 wire 3 wire protocol are also supported SPR532 readers have a keypad with silicone keys in order to guarantee a secure PIN entry The keypads include the numeric keys 0 to 9 as well as the keys Clear yellow Confirmation green and Cancel red The reader recognizes the commands sent by the host which is typically a PC and inserts the numbers entered over the keypad as a PIN to the appropriate places of the command to the smart card Only the fact that a numeric key has been pressed is communicated to the host This causes the host application to display to the user that a key is pressed and how many numbers of the PIN have been actually entered The PIN never leaves the reader towards the host The readers can be used at all host systems that possess a serial RS232 and or a USB interface They are used as accessories in
6. TOE guarantees that the PIN is transferred to the smart card only using PIN commands with specified instruction bytes The TOE has to be used in non public but private and office environments only The user must examine regulary before use that the security seal is intact T CHANGE OE USAGE The user should not leave his or her smart card unsupervised T STORE O STORE OE STORE The TOE does not store any identification data The user may not store identification data unsecured T DOWNLOAD O DOWNLOAD OE FWLOAD The secure firmware download guarantees that the TOE cannot be changed without authorization The user should download CC certified firmware versions only T SEAL O SEAL OE SEAL The user can recognize by the condition of the security seal that no manipulations at the hardware were made CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 Certification label SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS page 32 45 e By using a Trojan horse an attacker could try to spy the PIN entered by the user Since the PIN will be transferred only within the TOE directly to the smart card it is not possible to spy the PIN with such Trojan horses e An attacker could try to modify the firmware to read out the PIN Since the TOE accepts only a corre
7. and SigG SigV confirmed status of the product if any non CC certified firmware versions are downloaded to the TOE OE SIG_APP For the use of the TOE in accordance with SigG SigV only applications and smart cards that were evaluated and confirmed in the SigG context may be used Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 18 45 SCM MICROSYSTEMS 4 3 Dependencies requirements SigG SigV security objectives In the following table the required security requirements of SigG SigV are referenced to the security objectives of Common Criteria Law order Text of law Security Description objectives 15 Signaturanwendungs O REVEAL The TOE guarantees paragraph 2 komponenten nach 17 that the PIN does not number 1a Abs 2 des SigG m ssen leave the reader SigV gewahrleisten dass bei toward the host der Erzeugung einer O STORE The TOE does not qualifizierten Signatur die store any Identifikationsdaten nicht identification data preisgegeben und diese O SIGNAL The TOE guarantees nur auf der jeweiligen that the secure PIN sicheren is clearly signaled to Signaturerstellungseinheit the user gespeichert werden O TRANSFER The TOE guarantees that the PIN is only Signature application transferred to the components pursuant to smart card
8. ensured by the security measure SM 8 3 3 Requirements and measures for assurance Those in the following represented measures for the assurance correspond to the requirements of the assurance All requirements to the assurance are covered by the existing measures to the assurance which complement each other mutually to an overall secure system Measure for Requirements Comment assurance of assurance AM1 Configuration ACM_CAP 3 Authorisation control management ACM_SCP 1 TOE CM coverage AM2 Delivery and ADO_DEL 2 Detection of modification operation ADO_IGS 1 Installation generation and start up procedures AM3 Informal ADV_FSP 1 Informal functional specification functional specification AM4 Security ADV_HLD 2 Security enforcing high level design enforcing high level design AM5 Subset of the ADV_IMP 1 Subset of the implementation of the implementation TSF AM6 Descriptive low ADV_LLD 1 Descriptive low level design level design Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM page 42 45 MICROSYSTEMS AM7 Informal ADV_RCR 1 Informal correspondence correspondence demonstration demonstration AM8 Guidance AGD_ADM 1 Guidance AGD_USR 1 AM9 Life cycle support ALC_DVS 1 Identification o
9. the destruction of the generated private keys e No direct dependence for the TOE since this contains only the public key FMT_MSA 2 e Secure security attributes e No dependence for the TOE since only one key for the secure firmware download is present whereby a management of the security attributes can be dropped CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 Certification label SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS page 38 45 SFR2 SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA FDP_ITC 1 e Import of user data without security attributes e No dependence since the hash algorithm does not use keys FCS_CKM 1 e Cryptographic key generation e No dependence since the hash algorithm does not use keys FCS_CKM 4 e Cryptographic key destructions e No dependence since the hash algorithm does not use keys FMT_MSA 2 e Secure security attributes e No dependence since the hash algorithm does not use keys SFR3 SFR FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACF 1 e Security attribute based access control e See SFR FDP_ACF 1 SFR4 SFR FDP_ACF 1 FDP_ACC 1 e Subset access control e See SFR FDP_ACC 1 FMT_MSA 3 e Static attribute initialisation e No dependence for the TOE since only one key for the secure firmware download is present whereby a management of the security attributes can be dropped SFR5 SFR FDP_RIP 2 No dependencies
10. the publisher of the smart card A_USER USAGE OE USAGE The operational area of the TOE is clearly defined with home and office applications A_USER UNOBSERV OE UNOBSERV The user must enter his or her identification data unobserved A_USER KEYPAD OE KEYPAD The user must enter his or her identification data using the keypad of the TOE A_USER ISO_EMV OE ISO_EMV For applications requesting a secure PIN input the user must use only processor smart cards compliant to ISO 7816 or EMV A_USER FWLOAD OE FWLOAD The user will download CC certified firmware versions only A_USER SIG_APP OE SIG_APP For the use of the TOE in accordance with SigG SigV only applications and smart cards that were evaluated and confirmed in the SigG context may be used Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 31 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS Threats Security objectives Comments T REVEAL O REVEAL O SIGNAL O TRANSFER O INS_BYTE OE USAGE OE SEAL The TOE guarantees that the PIN does not leave the reader toward the host The TOE guarantees that the secure PIN is clearly signaled to the user The TOE guarantees that the PIN is only transferred to the smart card The
11. to enter identification data PIN and convey it securely to secure signature production units signature smart cards according to 2 number 10 SigG therefore the readers can also be used for applications in accordance with signature law and signature regulation 6 7 Moreover they can be used for the transmission of the hash value from the application to the signature card and for the provision of a signature from the card for use in signature applications Thus they represent a partial component for signature applications which require a security confirmation to be able to be used for qualified electronic signatures under 2 number 3 SigG For the use of the TOE in accordance with SigG SigV only signature applications and smart cards can be used that were evaluated and confirmed in the SigG context SPR532 smart card readers fulfill the special requirements under 15 paragraph 2 number 1a no disclosure or storage of identification data and paragraph 4 recognizability of security relevant changes to SigV The following list of supported instruction bytes for the secure PIN input must be used by the applications and be supported by smart cards in accordance with the specification Non supported instruction bytes will be rejected with a qualified error message e VERIFY ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x20 e CHANGE REFERENCE DATA ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x24 e ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x28 e DISABLE VERIFICATION REQ
12. B 1 SFR FDP_RIP 2 SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA SFR FPT_PHP 1 Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 37 45 8 2 3 Dependencies of functional security requirements SCM MICROSYSTEMS Security requirements Dependencies Reference SFR1 SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA FDP_ITC 1 or not applicable FCS_CKM 1 not applicable FCS_CKM 4 not applicable FMT_MSA 2 not applicable SFR2 SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA FDP_ITC 1 or not applicable FCS_CKM 1 not applicable FCS_CKM 4 not applicable FMT_MSA 2 not applicable SFR3 SFR FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACF 1 SFR4 SFR4 SFR FDP_ACF 1 FDP_ACC 1 SFR3 FMT_MSA 3 not applicable SFR5 SFR FDP_RIP 2 none SFR6 SFR FTA_TAB 1 none SFR7 SFR FPT_PHP 1 FMT_MOF 1 not applicable SFR1 SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA FDP_ITC 1 e Import of user data without security attributes e No direct dependence for the TOE since the key is brought in with the manufacturer and delivered with the TOE FCS_CKM 1 e Cryptographic key generation e A requirement for the development environment of the manufacturer which is describing the generation of the keys e No direct dependence for the TOE FCS_CKM 4 e Cryptographic key destructions e A requirement for the IT environment describing
13. I 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 28 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS 6 2 TOE security measures The housing is sealed by means of a falsification secure security sticker which will be destroyed during removal and thus can be used only once Thus the user can recognize by the condition of the safety seal that no manipulations at the hardware were made 6 3 Assurance measures The assurance measures are reflected by the following documents of the manufacturer Configuration management Delivery and operation Development o Informal functional specification o Security enforcing high level design o Informal correspondence demonstration o Descriptive low level design o Subset of the implementation of the TSF e User guidance e Life cycle support Identification of security measures e Test documentation e Vulnerability assessment Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS page 29 45 7 PP claims ASE_PPC 1 The present Security Target is not aiming at fulfillment of a PP 8 Explanation 8 1 Explanation of the security target These chapters furnish the proof that the security target is comple
14. Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 14 45 Security type modifications give the opportunity to an attacker to obtain identification data in the TOE and arrive thus in possession of the PIN T DOWNLOAD By manipulations during the download a modified or unauthorized firmware could be loaded into the reader which could contain capabilities for uncovering the PIN T SEAL By manipulation of the seal and following manipulation of the hardware after opening the reader the attacker can intercept the communication between reader and smart card 3 3 Organisational security policies There are no organisational security policies intended for this TOE Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 15 45 4 Security objectives ASE_OBJ 1 4 1 Security objectives for the TOE The SPR532 smart card reader serves to get the identification data PIN from the user The basic security objectives for the TOE are O REVEAL The TOE does not reveal any identification data O TRANSFER The TOE guarantees that the PIN is only transferred to the smart card O INS_BYTE The TOE guarantees that the PIN is transferred to
15. Security Target to reach the evaluation level Common Criteria EAL3 for the class 2 smart card reader SPR532 sa SCM page 2 45 MICROSYSTEMS Table of contents page 1 ST INTRODUCTION ASE_INT 1 4 1 1 ST identification 4 1 2 ST overview 5 1 3 Postulate of CC Conformance 5 2 TOE DESCRIPTION ASE_DES 1 6 3 TOE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ASE_ENV 1 10 3 1 Assumptions 11 3 2 Threats 13 3 3 Organisational security policies 14 4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ASE_OBJ 1 15 41 Security objectives for the TOE 15 4 2 Security objectives for the environment 16 4 3 Dependencies requirements SigG SigV security objectives 18 5 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ASE_REQ 1 20 5 1 Functional security requirements of the TOE 20 5 2 Minimum strength of TOE security objectives 24 5 3 Assurance requirements of the TOE 25 5 4 Security requirements for the IT environment 25 6 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ASE _TSS 1 26 6 1 TOE security functions 26 6 2 TOE security measures 28 6 3 Assurance measures 28 Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 7 8 9 page 3 45 PP CLAIMS ASE_PPC 1 EXPLANATION 8 1 Explanation of the security target 8 1 1 Connections assumptions security objectives threats security objectives 8 1 2 Cross references threa
16. UIREMENT ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x26 e RESET RETRY COUNTER ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x2C e UNBLOCK APPLICATION EMV2004 INS 0x18 Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 8 45 The SPR532 smart card reader family offers secured firmware download in order to be prepared for future requirements The verification of a signature of the firmware with the asymmetrical RSA algorithm and a bit length of 1024 guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the firmware during the loading of the firmware into the smart card reader The manufacturer SCM Microsystems ensures the secure generation and administration for the production of the necessary secure signature key SCM guarantees that each new version of the TOE receives a new version number and thus is clearly identifiable The user may download actual firmware versions of SPR532 from SCMs web site http www scmmicro com security pcs_product_drivers html together with a Windows tool to download the new firmware to the smart card reader SCMs web site clearly states during the download of firmware if the respective firmware is CC certified or not If a non CC certified firmware version is loaded to the TOE the smart card reader loses the CC certified and SigG SigV confirmed status A softwa
17. ar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 22 45 SFR FDP_ACF 1 Security attributes based access control FDP_ACF 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the smart card reader access policies to objects based on the identity of the object The TSF must enforce the subjects e User through the keypad interface e PC through the serial RS232 or the USB interface e Smart card through the card reader interface objects e PIN e Two LEDs e Firmware and operations e PIN entry e Verification of the PIN e Control of the LEDs e Download valid signed firmware The identity of the objects is sufficient as security attribute since the objects are attainable only over defined interfaces of the TOE and for each interface only one subject is defined FDP_ACF 1 2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed The PC S PC sends commands on behalf of the application to the reader which causes the TOE to then only cause the LEDs OB LED to display the secure indicator mode OP L_CONTROL and to pass the entered PIN OB PIN to the smart card if 1 the commands to the smart card reader are recognizable on the basis of their command structure in accordance with CCID 8 as such for verifying or modifying the PIN and in addition 2 a command with one of
18. at only confirmed versions of the TOE are used in order to remove this task from the end user A_USER UNOBSERV The user must enter his or her identification data unobserved A_USER KEYPAD It is assumed that the user enters his or her identification data using the keypad of the TOE A_USER LED While the PIN is being entered on the keypad of the reader the status of the LED verifies that the mode of the secure PIN input is active A_USER SEAL The user routinely has to examine that the security seal is intact A_USER STORE The rules to the secure keeping and non proliferation of the PIN are communicated to the user by the publisher of the smart card Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 12 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS A_USER USAGE The TOE is laid out for use in private and office environments In an office environment the SPR532 smart card reader should be arranged in such a way that the usage is avoided by unauthorized users That means that the smart card reader is set up in such a manner that its usage is possible for authorized persons only and that a working environment protected from manipulation attempts has to be guaranteed An unobserved input of identification data PIN is to be ensured by suitable measures at the place of work
19. ations from 16 Mai 2001 Signaturgesetz SigG 7 Signaturverordnung Verordnung zur elektronischen Signatur signature Regulation to the electronic signature regulation Signaturverordnung SigV vom 16 November 2001 english version at http www iid de iukdg gesetz SigV 161 101 engl pdf CCID Chip Smart Card Interface Devices Revision 1 00 2001 03 20 9 Common Criteria Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1 3 August 1999 10 EMV 2004 Integrated Circuit Card Terminal Specifications for Payment Systems version 4 1 Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006
20. cribed by attacks and attacked values The motivation of the attacker is to spy the PIN of the user It is assumed that an attacker should have very good knowledge in electronics and software The attacker could use the following weak points of the TOE e the interface between readers and smart card e the keypad for the PIN entry e the firmware download Opportunity for attack is offered if the TOE is unobserved by the user or if the user is careless during PIN entry The PIN as identification code of the user represents a personal secret An attacker has three possibilities to uncover this secret T REVEAL The attacker could try to intercept the communication between host and smart card and or smart card reader over a Trojan horse virus if the PIN is entered into the host equipment Or the attacker could try to attain a PIN code outside of the commands planned for it T CHANGE The attacker could try to change the PIN without knowing the PIN itself if the smart card supports the option to separate verification of the actual PIN and modification of the same within two commands T STORE Storage of identification data Storing identification data in the TOE also poses a danger of attack because these data could be obtained from the TOE by an attacker if the attacker came into the possession of the TOE and would have the technical facility Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH
21. ctly signed firmware for the download loading a manipulated firmware is not possible e An attacker could try to open the TOE and manipulate it in such a way that the PIN could be read out Since the TOE is sealed and the user is able to examine the sealing before each use a manipulation of the TOE is already identifiable from the outside by the user The security objectives are suitable to counter the identified threats to security Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 33 45 8 1 2 Cross references threats security objectives of the TOE SCM MICROSYSTEMS T REVEAL T CHANGE T STORE T DOWNLOAD T SEAL O REVEAL O STORE N O SEAL O SIGNAL O TRANSFER O INS_BYTE Lje O DOWNLOAD 8 1 3 Cross references assumptions threats security objectives of the environment OE UN OE KEY PAD OE LED OE LOAD OE SIG_APP OE ISO_ EMV OE OE USAGE i OE STORE SEAL OE VER SION A_USER UNOBSERV OBSERV J A_USER KEYPAD A_USER LED A USER VERSION A_USER SEAL A USER STORE A USER USAGE A USER ISO_EMV A_USER FWLOAD A_USER SIG_APP T REVEAL T CHANGE
22. e done for instance using a PIN of his or her signature card The private PIN code has therefore to be protected The PIN data should be stored in the smart card reader only as long as the corresponding command is sent to the smart card or until the smart card is removed The security specific functions to ward off any threats and reach the security objectives are listed below SF PINCMD The firmware in the reader checks the commands sent to the reader by means of the command structure compliant to the USB smart card reader specification If the commands for Verification or Modification of the PIN are recognized and if the command which has to be forwarded to the smart card contains one of the following instruction bytes e VERIFY ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x20 e CHANGE REFERENCE DATA ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x24 e ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x28 e DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x26 e RESET RETRY COUNTER ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x2C e UNBLOCK APPLICATION EMV2004 INS 0x18 it will be switched into the mode for secure PIN entry over the integrated keypad The RS232 version of the reader emulates the protocol which is specified for the USB smart card reader so for both host interface versions an identical data stream will be processed by the security functions The security function SF PINCMD recognizes the command for PIN entry sent by the host software and inserts the PIN data en
23. e that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from all objects A memory rework of the buffer for the transmission of the PIN from the keypad to the smart card is realized with the power on procedure after transmission of the command to the smart card after pulling the card in the case of abort by the user with a timeout during the PIN input and after defined resetting commands initiated by the host Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 24 45 FTA TOE access SFR FTA_TAB 1 Default TOE access banners Before establishing a user session the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorised use of the TOE During execution of the function Secure PIN entry the orange LED is switched into the flashing mode After transmission of the PIN to the signature component smart card and confirmation by the smart card with the status byte SW1 0x90 the orange LED is turned on A disturbance of the card reader caused intentionally or due to a technical failure is indicated to the user by fast flashing the green LED Invalid data are rejected An error message is transferred to the host FPT TOE material protection SFR FPT_PHP 1 Passive detec
24. echnical capabilities cannot bypass the security functions as based on the implementation there is no possibility to manipulate the rework of the memory area in the TOE An attacker can not influence the program flow of SF CLMEM in the TOE which guarantees the erasing of the PIN data in the internal memory of the TOE as described above An evasion of SF CLMEM would be only possible if a manipulated firmware would be loaded which is however not possible due to SF SECDOWN SF SECDOWN The verification of a signature of the firmware with the asymmetric RSA algorithm and a bit length of 1024 guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the firmware during loading of a new firmware into the smart card reader The hash value over those firmware which will be loaded is determined based on the algorithm SHA 1 with a length by 160 bits The verification of the integrity and authenticity takes place in the TOE via comparison of the determined hash value and the hash value as a component of the decoded signature The public key for this operation is stored in the TOE Even a determined attacker with significant technical capabilities cannot bypass the security functions as based on the implementation there is no possibility to get the private key to manipulate the TOE As the probability of guessing or calculating the key is negligible SF SECDOWN is fulfilling the minimum strength of functions high Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BS
25. es The minimum strength of the functions high is appropriate for the requirements to the assurance which reflects itself in the requirements going beyond EAL3 ADO_DEL 2 detection of modification ADV_IMP 1 subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_LLD 1 descriptive low level design ALC_TAT 1 well defined development tools AVA_MSU 3 analysis and testing for insecure states AVA_VLA 4 highly resistant The quantity of the selected security requirements forms a mutually support and whole consistent in itself since all relevant dependence is considered The formulated requirements of the security policies are a completing part of this security system Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 35 45 8 2 1 Connections security objectives security requirements Security Security requirements Comments objectives O REVEAL SFR FDP_ACC 1 The security function of the O TRANSFER SFR FDP_ACF 1 Secure PIN entry guarantees O INS_ BYTE that only approved commands are passed to the smart card O SIGNAL SFR FTA_TAB 1 The LEDs of the reader display the mode of the Secure PIN entry O STORE SFR FDP_RIP 2 A memory rework of the buffer for the transmission of the PIN from the keypad to the s
26. f the security measures ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools AM10 Test ATE_COV 2 Analysis of coverage documentation ATE_DPT 1 Testing high level design ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample AM11 Vulnerability AVA_MSU 3 Analysis and testing for insecure assessment states AVA_SOF 1 Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_VLA 4 Highly resistant Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter Stra e 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS sa SCM page 43 45 8 4 Explanation of the PP postulates At present there exist no protection profiles for smart card readers to the employment in the framework SigG SigV Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 44 45 9 Abbreviations sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS BSI Bundesamt f r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik CC Common Criteria CCID Integrated Circuit s Cards Interface Devices CT API Card Terminal Application Programming Interface DFU Device Firmware Upgrade EMV Europay MasterCard Visa HBCI Home Banking Computer Interface ID Ide
27. ion Secure PIN entry This security function ensures that the PIN input is passed on surely over the keypad of the smart card reader to the smart card without the possibility to be spied out by the host computer The storage areas of the PIN data are reworked by the firmware so that no attack on stored data is possible The requirements of the environment of the deployment are formulated in a way that the user must be able to enter his or her identification data unobserved The falsification secure security seal guarantees the recognition of security relevant changes Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 11 45 3 1 Assumptions The SPR532 smart card readers are suitable both for the office and for private use Due to multi functionality the readers can support additional uses beyond signature applications such as secure home banking The end user is informed about his or her responsibility during the use of the TOE A_USER VERSION It is assumed that the user verifies routinely with a software tool provided by the manufacturer whether the version number of the TOE agrees with the confirmed version before use of the smart card reader Applications in accordance with 2 number 11 SigG should verify automatically th
28. mart card is realized with the power on procedure after transmission of the command to the smart card after pulling the card in the case of abort by the user with a timeout during the PIN input and after defined resetting commands from the host O DOWNLOAD SFR FDP_ACF 1 The verification of a signature of SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA the firmware with the hash SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA algorithm SHA 1 and the asymmetrical RSA algorithm with a bit length of 1024 guarantee the integrity and authenticity of the firmware while loading of the firmware into the smart card reader O SEAL SFR FPT_PHP 1 The falsification secure security seal which will be destroyed during removal and thus can be used only once guarantees that the user may recognize security critical modifications Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 36 45 SCM MICROSYSTEMS 8 2 2 Cross references security objectives security requirements O STORE O SEAL SFR FDP_ACC 1 O REVEAL af SFR FDP_ACF 1 N SFR FTA_TAB 1 SFR FDP_RIP 2 SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA SFR FPT_PHP 1 N O SIGNAL O INS_BYTE O DOWNLOAD SFR FDP_ACC 1 O TRANSFER a SFR FDP_ACF 1 N N N SFR FTA_TA
29. meets the following Norms FIPS180 1 and ISO IEC 10118 3 The verification of a signature of the firmware based on a 160 bit hash value in accordance with SHA 1 and in connection with SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the firmware while loading of the firmware into the smart card reader Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 21 45 FDP User data protection SFR FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control The TSF shall enforce the smart card reader access policies on the subjects e S USER User through the keypad interface e S PC PC through the RS232 or the USB interface e SICC Smart card through the card reader interface the objects e OB PIN PIN e OB LED Two LEDs e OB FW Firmware and the operations covered by the SFP e OP P_ENTRY PIN entry e OP P_VERIFY Verification of the PIN e OP L_CONTROL Control of the LEDs e OP F_DOWNLD Download valid signed firmware Connections subjects objects operations S USER S PC S ICC OB PIN OP P_ENTRY OP P_VERIFY OB LED OP L_CONTROL OB FW OP F_DOWNLD The subjects S are accessing the objects OB by the operations OP Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Osk
30. ntifier LED Light Emmitting Diode PC Personal Computer PC SC Personal Computer Smart Card Interface PIN Personal Identification Number ROM Read Only Memory RSA Rivest Shamir and Adleman Public Key Cryptography SHA 1 Secure Hash Algorithm Rev 1 One way hash SigG Signaturgesetz Signature law SigV Signaturverordnung Signature regulation SPR Secure pin pad reader USB Universal Serial Bus Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM CROSYSTEMS page 45 45 10 Bibliography Reference _ Description CT API Application Independent CardTerminal Application Programming Interface for ICC Applications Revision 1 1 Deutsche Telekom GMD TUV amp Teletrust 15 04 1999 1 2 5 CT BCS Application Independent CardTerminal Basic Command Set for ICC applications MKT Version 1 0 15 04 1999 Computer Systems Revision 1 0 December 1997 5 Class 2 Definition Requirements at smart card readers for home use from view of SKO V1 0 09 97 Informatikzentrum der Sparkassenorganisation GmbH 6 Signaturgesetz Gesetz Uber Rahmenbedingungen fur elektronische signature law Signaturen und zur Anderung weiterer Vorschriften vom Law about basic conditions for electronic signatures and for the change of further regul
31. only approved commands are passed to the smart card SFR FTA_TAB 1 The LEDs of the reader display the mode of the Secure PIN entry input SF2 SF CLMEM SFR FDP_RIP 2 A memory rework of the buffer for the transmission of the PIN from the keypad to the smart card is realized with the power on procedure after transmission of the command to the smart card after pulling the card in the case of abort by the user with a timeout during the PIN input and after defined resetting commands from the host SF3 SF SECDOWN SFR FDP_ACF 1 The verification of a signature of SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA the firmware with the hash SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA algorithm SHA 1 and the asymmetrical RSA algorithm with a bit length of 1024 guarantee the integrity and authenticity of the firmware while loading of the firmware into the smart card reader Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 41 45 SCM MICROSYSTEMS 8 3 2 Requirements and measures for security Measure for assurance Requirements of assurance Comment SM1 Sealing SFR FPT_PHP 1 The security requirement against material manipulation of the TOE is fulfilled by the sealing and not by a security function SF as a component of the TOE but
32. onment only An unobserved input of identification data PIN is to be ensured by suitable measures at the place of work The user should not leave his or her smart card unsupervised OE STORE The user may not store his or her identification data unsecured outside the secure smart card OE SEAL The user must examine regulary before use that the security seal is intact OE VERSION In regular intervals the user must verify that the version number of the TOE agrees with the confirmed version The user uses a software tool provided by the manufacturer supplier or system integrator Applications in accordance with 2 number 11 SigG should verify automatically that only confirmed versions of the TOE are used in order to remove this task from the end user Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS page 17 45 OE FWLOAD The user may download firmware versions of the TOE from the Internet site of the manufacturer supplier or distributor as well as from intranet sites of a company It must be clearly communicated during the download of the firmware from an external source whether or not the firmware is CC certified The user should download CC certified firmware versions only The user has to be informed that he or she will lose the CC certified
33. re tool is provided with which the user can control the version number of the TOE to correspond with the confirmed firmware version The housing is sealed by means of a falsification secure security sticker which will be destroyed during removal and thus can be used only once The Common Criteria certification report of SPR532 is available at http www bsi de and the SigG SigV compliance confirmation at http www bundesnetzagentur de Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 9 45 SPR532 smart card readers demonstrate different operating conditions by means of two LEDs and a buzzer as follows sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS LED1 LED2 Buzzer green orange Just after power on OFF OFF 740Hz 25ms Just after DFU operation Reader powered 0 5s ON OFF OFF 4 5s OFF Smart card powered ON OFF OFF Smart card 500ms ON OFF OFF communication 500ms OFF Secure PIN entry mode ON 500ms ON Diff sounds for each keys 500ms OFF 0 9 2400Hz 25ms Clear 1100Hz 25ms Cancel 1100Hz 25ms OK 1100Hz 25ms PIN Success 900Hz 100ms 1200Hz 100ms PIN Fail 300Hz 100ms PIN entry successfully ON ON OFF completed Smart card powered PIN entry successfully 500ms ON ON OFF completed 500ms OFF Smart card communication Sma
34. rt card 100ms ON Previous OFF communication Error 100ms OFF state Self test during boot of 100ms ON Previous OFF SPR532 failed 100ms OFF state Firmware upgrade OFF ON OFF running Firmware upgrade failed OFF 32ms ON OFF 32ms OFF BootROM mode ON ON OFF Diagnostic mode 250ms ON 250ms ON depends on test function 250ms OFF 250ms OFF Device Firmware Upgrade CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 Certification label SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter Stra e 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS page 10 45 3 TOE security environment ASE_ENV 1 This chapter describes the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE is used those values that can be protected and the acting subjects like users and attackers Moreover the organizational security precautions and references to the secure use ofthe TOE are represented The values that can be protected are identification data PIN of the user as well as the firmware and hardware of the smart card reader itself The threats of the TOE by an attacker are e Uncovering identification data e Security relevant changes in the equipment An attacker with high offensive capability cannot uncover identification data from the TOE The firmware guarantees that the commands for verifying and modifying the PIN are recognized and worked on by the security funct
35. te and result coherently in a consistent whole which corresponds to the security objectives The SPR532 smart card readers fulfill the requirements under 15 paragraph 2 number ta no disclosure or storage of identification data and paragraph 4 recognizability of security relevant changes to SigV Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 30 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS 8 1 1 Connections assumptions security objectives threats security objectives Assumptions Security objectives Comments A_USER LED OE LED During PIN entry on the keypad of the reader the status of the LED has to be verified that the mode of the secure PIN input is active A_USER VERSION OE VERSION By means of a software tool it is to be checked in regular intervals that the version number of the TOE agrees with the confirmed firmware release Applications in accordance with 2 number 11 SigG should automatically verify that only confirmed versions of the TOE are used in order to remove this task from the end user A_USER SEAL OE SEAL The user regularly has to examine that the security seal is intact A_USER STORE OE STORE The rules to the secure keeping and non proliferation of the PIN are communicated to the user by
36. tered over the keypad to the corresponding place in the command to the smart card As well only the fact that one of the numeric keys is pressed is reported to the host Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS sa SCM page 27 45 This information is used by the host application to show the user with the progress of PIN entry During the PIN entry the corresponding LEDs display the mode of secure PIN entry Even a determined attacker with significant technical capabilities cannot bypass the security functions as based on the implementation there is no possibility to manipulate the processing of the PIN commands in the TOE An attacker can not influence the program flow of SF PINCMD in the TOE which guarantees the protection of the PIN data The exchange of the PIN takes place only between smart card and TOE over the card reader interface This interface is inside the TOE and from manipulation protected by the security seal SF CLMEM The memory area for the PIN data will be reworked after transfer of the command to the smart card after removing the card after cancellation by the user after a timeout during PIN entry during switch on process and after defined reset commands from the host Even a determined attacker with significant t
37. the PC surrounding field The current supply is made in the serial configuration by means of the PS 2 interface mouse keyboard and as USB equipment by the USB bus On the host side the application interfaces are made available as CT API and PC SC which can be used for all types of smart cards All functions at the interfaces are illustrated for CT API in accordance with 1 and for PC SC in accordance with 3 Further interfaces such as OCF are in planning The SPR532 smart card reader does not possess any functionality that works without connection to a host It must generally be operated at a host Details on available host software such as drivers libraries and tools are available in the user manual of the SPR532 The driver software is not included in this evaluation The TOE ends at the serial RS232 or USB interface to the host computer Installation software including drivers manual and tools such as the tool to verify the firmware version can be downloaded from http www scmmicro com security pcs_product_drivers html Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter Stra e 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 7 45 SPR532 smart card readers are usable in many market segments because of their multi functionality As class 2 readers 5 the SPR532 readers are also able
38. the following instruction bytes which can be passed on to the smart card is contained e VERIFY ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x20 e CHANGE REFERENCE DATA ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x24 e ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x28 e DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x26 e RESET RETRY COUNTER ISO IEC 7816 4 INS 0x2C e UNBLOCK APPLICATION EMV2004 INS 0x18 Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 23 45 The PIN OB PIN must be entered by the user S USER at the keypad of the TOE OP P_ENTRY The PIN OB PIN may be sent only over the card reader interface to the smart card S ICC for verification of the PIN OP P_VERIFY The download of a new firmware OP F_DOWNLD initiated by the PC S PC may be only accepted if the integrity and authenticity of the firmware OB FW were successfully verified on the basis of its signature with the asymmetrical RSA algorithm and a bit length of 1024 FDP_ACF 1 3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules None FDP_ACF 1 4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the No further rules SFR FDP_RIP 2 Full residual information protection The TSF shall ensur
39. the smart card only using PIN commands with specified instruction bytes O SIGNAL The TOE guarantees that the secure PIN entry mode is clearly signaled to the user O STORE The TOE does not store any identification data O DOWNLOAD The TOE guarantees that newly downloaded firmware will be accepted only if integrity and authenticity are successfully verified O SEAL The TOE guarantees that the user may be alerted to security critical modifications by changes made to the security seal Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 16 45 4 2 Security objectives for the environment The security objectives for the environment correspond in a general manner to those under 4 1 specified OE UNOBSERV The user must be able to enter his or her identification data unobserved OE KEYPAD The user must enter his or her identification data using the keypad of the TOE OE LED The user must examine the status of the LED during PIN entry on the keypad of the reader to check that the mode of the secure PIN input is active OE ISO_EMV For applications requesting a secure PIN input the user must use only processor smart cards compliant to ISO 7816 or EMV OE USAGE The TOE should to be used in non public private and office envir
40. thor Torsten Maykranz SCM Microsystems GmbH Evaluation level EAL3 with augmentations Strength of security functions high Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 MICROSYSTEMS sa SCM page 5 45 1 2 ST overview The SPR532 smart card readers are universal smart card readers with keypad and offer capability for secure PIN entry and for authentic firmware download This security target describes the functional and organisational security requirements and procedures for the TOE and its operational environment They are compliant to the security targets of SigG SigV e No disclosure or storage of identification data 15 paragraph 2 number 1a SigV e Recognizability of security technical modifications 15 paragraph 4 SigV 1 3 Postulate of CC Conformance The security target with its functional requirements is compliant to the security requirements according to part 2 and in its requirements for assurance compliant to part 3 of Common Criteria Version 2 1 August 1999 EAL3 with augmentation ADO_DEL 2 ADV_IMP 1 ADV_LLD 1 ALC_TAT 1 AVA_MSU 3 AVA_VLA 4 The strength of security mechanism is classified as high Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080
41. tion generation procedures and start up Class ADV Development ADV_FSP 1 Informal functional specification ADV_HLD 2 Security enforcing high level design ADV_RCR 1 Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_IMP 1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_LLD 1 Descriptive low level design Class AGD AGD_ADM 1 Administrator guidance Guidance documents AGD_USR 1 User guidance Class ALC ALC_DVS 1 Identification of security measures Life Cycle Documents ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools Class ATE ATE_COV 2 Analysis of coverage Tests ATE_DPT 1 Testing high level design ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample Class AVA AVA_MSU 3 Analysis and testing for insecure states Vulnerability assessment AVA_SOF 1 evaluation AVA_VLA 4 Highly resistant Strength of TOE security function 5 4 Security requirements for the IT environment There are no security requirements for the IT environment Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 26 45 6 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS 1 6 1 TOE security functions To realize a qualified electronic signature it is necessary that the user identifies himself or herself to the signature application This could b
42. tion of physical attack The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF s devices or TSF s elements has occurred The housing is sealed by means of a falsification secure security sticker which will be destroyed during removal and thus can be used only once Thus the user can recognize by the condition of the safety seal that no manipulations at the hardware were made 5 2 Minimum strength of TOE security objectives By the use of the algorithms RSA and SHA 1 in the security function SF SECDOWN the TOE offers protection against high offensive capability and fulfills the minimum strength of functions high as demanded in SigG Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 page 25 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS 5 3 Assurance requirements of the TOE The requirements for the aimed evaluation assurance level 3 with augmentations are listed in table 6 4 Common Criteria part 3 as follows Assurance class Assurance components Class ACM Configuration management ACM_CAP 3 Authorisation controls ACM_SCP 1 TOE CM coverage Class ADO Delivery and operation ADO_DEL 2 Detection of modification ADO_IGS 1 Installa
43. ts security objectives of the TOE 8 1 3 Cross references assumptions threats security objectives of the environment 8 2 Explanation of the security requirements 8 2 1 Connections security objectives security requirements 8 2 2 Cross references security objectives security requirements 8 2 3 Dependencies of functional security requirements 8 2 4 Connections security requirements IT environment 8 3 Explanation of the TOE summary specification 8 3 1 Security requirements and security functions 8 3 2 Requirements and measures for security 8 3 3 Requirements and measures for assurance 8 4 Explanation of the PP postulates ABBREVIATIONS 10 BIBLIOGRAPHY Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS 44 45 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 4 45 1 ST introduction ASE_INT 1 The target of evaluation is the SPR532 smart card reader with the firmware version 5 10 The smart card reader is available with one delivery version e SPR532 cable option with serial RS232 or USB connector 1 1 ST identification Title of the Security Target Security Target to reach the evaluation level Common Criteria EAL3 for the class 2 smart card reader SPR532 Version 1 23 Issue date 04 07 2006 Document ID CCASESPR Au
44. ty seal is intact OE VERSION In regular intervals the user must verify that the version number of the TOE agrees with the confirmed version OE FWLOAD The user should download CC certified firmware versions only Certification label CC BSI DSZ CC 0394 SigG BSI 02080 TE XX 2006 SCM Microsystems GmbH Oskar Messter StraBe 13 85737 Ismaning Germany Tel 49 89 9595 5000 Version 1 23 Document ID CCASESPR Date 04 07 2006 sa SCM MICROSYSTEMS page 20 45 5 IT security requirements ASE_REQ 1 5 1 Functional security requirements of the TOE FCS Cryptographic support SFR FCS_COP 1_RSA Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform a secure firmware download by means of decoding and verification of signed data in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm by RSA and cryptographic key sizes of 1024 bit length that meet the following Norms ISO IEC 14888 3 The verification of a signature of the firmware with the asymmetrical RSA algorithm and a bit length of 1024 in connection with SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the firmware while loading the firmware into the smart card reader SFR FCS_COP 1_SHA Cryptographic operation The TSF shall perform a secure firmware download by means of decoding and verification of signed data in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm by SHA 1 and cryptographic key sizes which are here not relevant that
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