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XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG

1. Protection Profile Security Target Rationale FCS_CKM 2 1 FCS_CKM 2 1 Selected FCS_CKM 4 FCS_CKM 4 Allocated FDP ACC 1 FDP ACC 1 1 Allocated Elaboration FDP ACF 1 FDP ACF 1i 1 Allocated Elaboration FDP RIP 1 FDP RIP 1 Allocated Selected FDP UIT 1 FDP UIT 1 Selected FIA AFL 1 FIA AFL 1 1 Allocated Selected FIA UAU 1 1 FIA UAU 1 1 Allocated FIA UAU 1 2 FIA UAU 1 2 Allocated FIA UAU 4 FIA UAU 4 Allocated FIA UAU 5 FIA UAU 5 Allocated FMT MSA 1 FMT MSA 1 Elaboration FMT MSA 3 FMT MSA 3 Elaboration FMT_MTD 1 1 FMT_MTD 1 1 Allocated FMT_SMF 1 FMT_SMF 1 Allocated FMT_SMR 1 FMT_SMR 1 Allocated FPT_FLS 1 FPT_FLS 1 Allocated FPT_ITI 1 FPT_ITI 1 Allocated FPT_TST 1 FPT_TST 1 Selected Additional rationale for security function requirement re established through elaboration is described e FDP_ACC 1 1 according to Organizational Security Policies P EPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 46 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG subjects of BIS and EIS are combined and elaborated to inspection systems to perform access control based on the security properties of the subject FDP_ACF 1 1 according to Organizational Security Policies P EPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL subjects of BIS and EIS are combined and elaborated to inspection systems to perform access control based on the security properties of the subject
2. The Personalization agent shall approve application program loading after checking that application programs loaded in the MRTD chip does not affect the secure TOE OE Certificate Verification The Inspection System such as the BIS and the EIS verifies the SOD after verifying validity of the certificate chain for the PA CSCA certificate DS certificate in order to verify for forgery and corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE For this the DS certificate and CRL shall be verified periodically The EIS shall securely hold the digital signature generation key that corresponds to the IS certificate and shall provide the TOE with the CVCA link certificate the DV certificate and the IS certificate in the EAC TA OE Personalization Agent The personalization agent shall issue the ePassport in the secure manner so that to confirm that the issuing subject has not been changed and shall deliver the TOE to the Operational Use phase after verifying the normal operation and compatibility of the ePassport The Personalization agent shall deactivate the writing function before the TOE delivery to the Operational Use phase OE Handling Info Leakage The IC chip the underlying platform of the TOE and ECC RSA cryptographic libraries shall implement countermeasures to prevent exploiting of leakage information during cryptographic operation for the TSF Application Notes In case performing TDES operation RSA operation or E
3. FIA_AFL 1 1 elaborate by removing EAC TA which does not terminate user session FMT_MSA 1 elaborate so that the added access control policy of OS access control is enforced FMT_MSA 3 enforce the added access control policy of OS access control policy and as the security properties may not have other initial values due to performing the access control policy with implementation logic of TOE elaborate the role of specifying the selective initial values of security properties as none FPR_UNO 1 As being permitted in PP IC chip is safer than TOE to provide countermeasures against information leakage so it is implemented on the IC Chip As a result FPR UNO 1 is deleted Added Security Function Requirements Table 10 Added Security Function Requirements Security Function Requirements Rationale FCS_CKM 1 2 Defines security function requirement regarding SCPO2 session key generation to perform SCPO2 mutual authentication FCS_CKM 3 Defines security function requirement regarding encryption key access performed by application programs other than ePassport functions FDP ACC 1 2 Defines security function requirement for OS access control FDP ACF 1 2 Defines security function requirement for OS access control rules FDP DAU 1 Defines security function requirement for data authentication to confirm the authenticity of ePassport FIA AFL 1 2 Defines security function requireme
4. 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 76 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 7 Select Caution when Applying Personalization agent basic information includes Issuer Identification Number Card Image Number Card Recognition Data defined in GP Standard and Card Production Life Cycle Key Derivation Data defined in VGP Standard and may additionally include the information defined by the Personalization agent Personalization agent authentication information refers to the Personalization agent authentication key used in the SCP02 mutual authentication and SCPO2 session key generation and includes 3 DES keys of 112 bit used for cryptographic calculation SCP02 session key MAC SCP02 session key and generation of SCP02 session key for cryptographic calculation regarding confidential information FDP_ACF 1 1 Security attribute based access control ePassport access control Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute initialization FDP_ACF 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the ePassport access control policy to objects based on the following Table 16 Table 17 None Table 16 Security Properties per Subject Subject Security Properties Inspection System BAC rights EAC rights Personalization E i i Personalization agent issuance rights agent Table 17 Security Properties per Object Security Properti
5. Ltd All rights reserved Page 44 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG additionally defined security environment is the threat of T Personalization agent authentication reuse Re established Security Environment e A inspection system re established so that BIS and EIS support AA e T RESIDUAL INFO the residual information remaining from the process of recording and using the SCPO2 session key on temporary memory is added as a threat and re established e PPERSONALIZATION AGENT re established so that ePassport Personalization agent establishes the OS access control policy e P EPASSPORT_ACCESS CONTROL the subjects of BIS and EIS cannot be distinguished at the identification Phase and the performance of access control rule is possible with just the rights attributed to inspection systems the subject divided into BIS and EIS is unified to inspection system and re established Added Security Environment T Personalization agent authentication reuse this threat is added where the threat agent reuses the random number delivered to the Personalization agent by TOE in the Personalization agent authentication process and attempts bypassing the Personalization agent authentication 2 4 2 Rationale for Conformance of Security Objectives This security target re established O Session Termination O Access Control OE Handling_Info_Leakage among the security objectives of ePassport Protection Profile conforms to all the othe
6. according to authentication mechanism application rules FIA_UAU 5 If the Personalization agent or inspection system fails SCPO2 mutual authentication or BAC mutual authentication the session is closed FIA_AFL 1 1 and if the inspection system fails EAC TA retry of EAC TA in the same user session is prohibited FIA_AFL 1 2 The random numbers must be used so that to prevent reuse of authentication related data used in authentication FIA_UAU 4 In order to ensure the secure random numbers used and the secure certificates used in the EAC TA the certificates must be verified and updated FMT_MTD 3 Therefore these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent The TSF must initialize SSC to 0 FMT_MTD 1 2 in order to indicate the channel termination when terminating the secure messaging FDP_UCT 1 and FDP_UIT 1 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 124 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG established in order to protect the transmitted user data Therefore these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent After cryptographic calculation the TSF shall destroy the cryptography related data generated in the temporary memory area to prevent reuse FCS_CKM 4 FDP_RIP 1 Therefore these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent In case the modification of the transmitted TSF data is detected the TSF must terminate the
7. l l l l l l l l l l l l Secure management l l l l l l l l l l l l l Figure 6 Logical Scope of TOE Assets TOE provides information protection functions such as confidentiality integrity authentication and access control in order to protect the TOE assists of the following Table 4 Table 4 TOE Assets Storage Category Description Area Personal Data of the Data stored in EF DG1 EF DG2 EF DG5 EF DG13 ePassport ePassport holder and EF DG16 Identity User Biometric Data of the Information Data stored on EF DG3 and EF DG4 EF File Data ePassport holder EFSOD EAC chip authentication public ePassport Authentication Data key EF DG14 AA chip authentication public Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 30 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG key EF DG15 List of CVCA digital signature verification key EF CVCA identification information used by TOE to authenticate IS in EAC TA process EF COM LDS version information list of used DG tags EAC chip authentication private key Chip private key used by TOE to prove that ePassport IC chip is not counterfeited in the EAC CA process CVCA certificate Certificate of highest authentication authority issued by EAC PKI at the time of ePassport issuance CVCA digital signature verification Public key of CVCA certificate newly generated by k
8. ADV IMP 1 Implementation representation of the TSF AGD_OPE 1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE 1 Preparative procedures Developer action elements AVA_VAN 4 1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing Content and presentation elements AVA_VAN 4 1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing Evaluator action elements AVA_VAN 4 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence AVA_VAN 4 2E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence AVA_VAN 4 3E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 109 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG potential vulnerabilities in the TOE AVA_VAN 4 4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified potential vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Moderate attack potential 6 3 Security Requirements Rationale The rationale for security requirements demonstrates that the described IT security requirements are suitable to satisfy security objectives and as a result appropriate to address security problems 6 3 1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale The rationale of TOE security functional requirements demonstrates the followings e Each TOE security objective h
9. ALC CMC 4 Production support acceptance procedures and automation Dependencies ALC CMS 1 TOE CM coverage ALC DVS 1 Identification of security measures ALC LCD 1 Developer defined life cycle model Objectives Developer action elements ALC CMC 4 1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE ALC CMC 4 2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation ALC CMC 4 3D The developer shall use a CM system Content and presentation elements ALC CMC 4 1C The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference ALC CMC 4 2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration items ALC CMC 4 3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items ALC CMC 4 4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorized changes are made to the configuration items ALC CMC 4 5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated means ALC CMC 4 6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 103 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ALC CMC 4 7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE ALC CMC 4 8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration items as part of the TOE ALC CMC 4 9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM system A
10. CSCA 1 CWA Manage life cycles Stage DS Certificate CWA Link ov Certificate SCPOZ Physical Procedural H SCPO2 mutual suthemtication Security Measures T SCPUZ cure communication Access Control TSF Passport access control rule Protection Certificate Issue Distribution OS access control rule Inspection System BAC BAC mutual authentication BIS EIS BAC see communication Usage EAC Stage EAC outhentication Supports secuirity i EAC secure communication mechanism mm Figure 4 TOE Operation Environment 1 2 3 2 Physical Scope of TOE ePassport refers to the ePassport IC chip and antenna embedded in the passport booklet and its cover The TOE defined in this security target is defined as the OS and ePassport application program loaded on the ePassport IC chip and the IC chip composition elements of IC chip Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 26 129 Lacns XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG hardware firmware and ECC RSA cryptographic calculation library are excluded for the scope of TOE Figure 5 illustrates the scope of TOE Issuance renn nesses TE EL os ePassport application 2 A TOE Inspection System os environment o 2 I Figure 5 TOE Scope ePassport Application Program LDS Application ePassport application program is an IC chip application program which implements the function for storing pro
11. International Standard Organization This standard is composed of the physical part dealing with the mechanical recognition through bare eye and OCR Optical Character Recognition for identification information picture passport number and MRZ Machine Readable Zone printed on the passport and the logical part dealing with the electronic management of traveler information using contactless IC chip of ISO 14443 standard The physical part of ePassport is composed of the contactless IC chip and antenna for wireless communication attached to the passport booklet or the cover The contactless IC chip used in the ePassport is called ePassport IC chip MRTD Chip which contains the IC chip OS COS which supports resource management for hardware elements of IC chip IT technology for electronic storage and processing of ePassport identification information and information protection technology and ePassport application The hardware of ePassport IC chip is generally composed of CPU auxiliary arithmetic unit I O port RAM ROM EEPROM and such Figure 1 illustrates the physical composition of ePassport Passport Booklet N ePassport IC Chip Antenna Figure 1 Physical Composition of ePassport The logical part of ePassport includes not only the picture and personal information of the traveler and MRZ Machine Readable Zone information written on the passport but also bio information data such as face fingerprint and iris for bio rec
12. Lacns XSmart e Passport V1 2 security Target Lite V1 1 Document ID XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Modification History Modified Version Modification Detail Date Approval Item 1 0 Initial Draft 2011 05 12 Lee Juhak 1 1 Chip model added 2011 06 04 Lee Juhak Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 2 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Table of Contents REFERENCED DOCUMENTS esse ses esse sessies ese sd Ged se od de seed dese ee ge eed ee geo oe de de ees Re ee ee doe oe gee od EG ged 7 DEFINITION OF TERMS iseer sesse seek esse sine Se dee oek deed ke de Gee eo Sewe ed bk eke ek ee ee EE ee EG osse 8 1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION esse ese ese ss es ee Ge ee Ee ee ee ee ee ee Ge GE Ge Ge Ge Ge ee Ge ee 17 1 1 SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION eee 17 1 2 TOE OUT NE GE GR EG AN GER ED Ge GE TSG 18 1 3 PREPARATION RULES onu nn ann ead ean mee 40 1 4 COMPOSITION OF SECURITY TARGET ui in 41 2 CONFORMANCE CLAIM esse ese ee ee ee Ge Ge EG EG EG ee ee Ge ee ee ee Ge GE Ge Ge Ge Ge EG EG ee ee 43 2 1 COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM ee ee Ge ee une 43 2 2 PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIM iii eue eee 43 2 3 PACKAGE CLAIME sed eee ss ete 44 2 4 CONFORMANCE RATIONALE eee 44 3 SECURITY PROBLE
13. This security objective for environment is required to counter the threats of T ePassport_Reproduction T BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose and T EAC CA_Bypass by implementing procedural security measures in immigration process such as procedures to check the printed identify information page of the ePassport and to determine the forgery status of the ePassport book etc OE Application_Program_Install This security objective for environment is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P Application Program Install by ensuring that only the application programs are loaded to the MRTD chip in a secure manner by the Personalization agent OE Certificate_Verification Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 66 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG This security objective for environment verifies the SOD after verifying regularly the DS certificate and CRL in order for the Inspection System such as the BIS and EIS to verify for forgery and corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE Also this security objective for environment ensures for the EIS to securely maintains digital signature generation key that corresponds to the IS certificate and to provide the TOE with the CVCA link certificate DV certificate and IS certificate in the EAC TA Therefore this security objective for environment is required to counter the threats of T Damage_to_Biometric_Data T EAC CA Bypass and T IS_Ce
14. gt lt gt lt DE X lt x lt x x lt x lt gt lt gt lt gt lt gt lt DC gt lt gt lt DE DE x lt x lt FCS_CKM 1 1 Cryptographic key generation Key Derivation Mechanism This component requires to generate the 112 bit BAC authentication key BAC and EAC session keys according to the cryptographic key generation algorithm specified in the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 111 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG ICAO document Through this the BAC authentication key is generated for use in the BAC mutual authentication and BAC EAC session key is generated for use in the BAC EAC secure messaging Therefore this component satisfies the security objectives of O BAC and O EAC FCS_CKM 1 2 Cryptographic Key Generation SCP02 session key This component demands generation of SCPO2 session key of 112 bit according to the session key generation algorithm specified in GP Standard Through this the SCPO2 session key to be used in SCP02 mutual authentication and SCPO2 secure messaging is generated Therefore this component satisfies security objective O SCP02 FCS_CKM 2 1 Cryptographic key distribution KDF Seed Distribution for BAC session key generation This component defines the method to distribute seed of key derivation mechanism necessary in generating the BAC session
15. the EIS obtains the read rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder Therefore the EIS is provided the biometric data of the ePassport holder from the TOE BIS or EIS could implement AA security mechanism additionally verify the digital signature provided by TOE using the AA digital signature verification key of EF DG15 and verify the probability of TOE A IC chip The IC chip the underlying platform of the TOE provides the random number generation Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 55 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG and cryptographic operation to support security functions of the TOE It also detects the TOE s malfunction outside the normal operating conditions and provides functions of the physical protection to protect the TOE from physical attacks using the probing and reverse engineering analysis Application Notes The IC chip is authorized item S3CT9KW S3CT9KC of CCRA EAL5 to ensure the security of TOE The cryptographic operation supported by the IC chip may be provided in the co processor of the IC chip or cryptographic libraries loaded in the IC chip A MRZ Entropy The BAC authentication key seed takes the MRZ entropy to ensure the secure BAC authentication key Application Notes In order to resistant to the moderate level threat agent the entropy for the passport number date of birth data of expiry or valid until date and check digit used as BAC authentication key seed amo
16. Also The Issuing State of the ePassport shall update certificates according to the policies to manage valid date of certificates therefore securely deliver them to the Verifying State and Inspection System OE Range RF Communication The RF communication distance between the MRTD chip and Inspection System shall be less than 5cm and the RF messaging shall not be established if the page of the ePassport attached with the IC chip is not opened 4 3 Security Objectives Rationale Security objectives Rationale demonstrate that the specified security objectives are appropriate sufficient to trace security problems and are essential rather than excessive The rationale of security objectives demonstrates the following e Each assumption threat or organizational security policy has at least one security objective tracing to it e Each security objective traces to at least one assumption threat or organizational security policy Table 13 shows the mapping between Security Problem Definition and Security Objectives Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 61 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Table 13 The Mapping between Security Environment and Security Objectives Security TOE Security Objective Security Objective for environment Objectives ging Manufactu por gram O Certificate_Verfifi Residu_Info O Secure_State py e_RF_Comm tion Pro E Procedures ePass check OP Apples OE
17. FDP_UIT 1 2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data whether modification deletion insertion and replay has occurred Application Notes The TSF protects integrity of the transmitted data by using the MAC key for BAC session or EAC session This provides the method of protection against modification deletion and insertion of user data Also a method to protect from reuse using SSC is provided 6 1 3 Identification and Authentication FIA_AFL 1 1 Authentication failure handling user session temination Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FIA_UAU 1 Timing of authentication Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 82 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG FIA_AFL 1 1 The TSF shall detect when the number of failed attempts related to a BAC mutual authentication b SCPO2 mutual authentication reaches 7 FIA_AFL 1 2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been selection met or surpassed the TSF shall user session termination FIA_AFL 1 2 Authentication failure handling Retry Prohibited Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FIA_UAU 1 Timing of identification FIA_AFL 1 1 The TSF shall detect when the number of failed attempts related to EAC TA reaches 11 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been selection met or surpassed the TSF shall prohibit retry of EAC TA Appli
18. S3CT9KW IC chip hardware Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 23 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Address and Data Bus Internal Voltage Regulator ka RAM ka 5KB Crypto co processor Timers Detectors amp Power Contact 16 bit Timer Security 20 bit WDT Control ss kunn IVR Ea S Figure 3 IC Chip Hardware Composition Diagram The IC chip hardware among the IC chip composition elements provide DES module used in the symmetric key encryption according to DES and TDES standards Tornado 2MX2 Crypto module used in the asymmetric key encryption physical security measures such as shield temperature sensor voltage sensor and filter and non determinant hardware random number generator The firmware provides IC chip hardware management function such as EEPROM recording and the function for hardware testing and the cryptographic calculation software library provides calculations such as digital signature generation verification for hash value ECDH key exchange ECC RSA key pair generation and ECC RSA public key verification The cryptographic algorithms provided by the IC chip composition elements are used in the following cryptographic calculations DES Module e TDES data encryption and decryption calculation e Retail MAC and Full Triple DES MAC generation and verification calculation TRNG Module Calculation of big number necessary for the ECC RSA cryptographic calculation pr
19. UIT 1 Data exchange integrity This component defines the method to protect from modification deletion insertion replay when transmitting objects such as the personal data and the biometric data of the ePassport holder within the scope of the ePassport access control policies This component establishes the BAC or EAC secure messaging by performing cryptographic operations for the personal data of the ePassport holder etc transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System with the BAC session MAC key or the biometric data of the ePassport holder etc transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System with the EAC session MAC key Therefore this component satisfies the security objective of O Secure_Messaging as the integrity of user data is ensured This component satisfies the security objective of O Replay_Prevention by ensuring that the BAC session MAC key is not used the same as the BAC authentication key when establishing the BAC secure messaging FIA_AFL 1 1 Authentication failure handling User Session Termination This component detects if the number of authentication attempts for SCPO2 mutual authentication and BAC mutual authentication is greater than 1 and requires termination of user session This component satisfies the security objective of O Session_Termination as the session is terminated if the authentication attempt failure number of the SCP02 mutual authentication and BAC mutual authentication is surpassed Also this
20. and verification algorithm and SHA using hash calculation provided in the IC chip composition elements The function for integrity and verification of global PIN and application program PIN is not used in the TOE of ePassport and thus excluded from the TOE scope The RMI Remote Method Invocation function which supports execution of application programs within TOE from outside of TOE is not used in ePassport application program and thus excluded from the TOE scope Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 39 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Among algorithms TDES algorithm provided by DES the hardware of IC chip is not included in TOE Retail MAC and Full Triple DES MAC also use TDES algorithm and thus not included in TOE The big number calculation used in cryptographic algorithm using asymmetric key is provided by the TORNADO 2MX2 module of IC chip and thus not included in TOE ECDH key exchange algorithm and ECDSA digital signature generation verification algorithm and SHA algorithm provided by ECC RSA library are also not included in the scope of TOE and the RSA digital signature generation verification algorithm provided by RSA library are not included in TOE Table 8 shows the algorithms provided by IC chip composition elements Table 8 The encryption algorithm used by the TOE Classification Algorithm TDES calculation in T DES module IC Chip Hardware Big number calculation in TORNA
21. authorized Personalization agent and defines this as the security role Also several security management functions such as CVCA certificate and current date renewal and secure messaging identification information initialization are performed by TSF itself TSF Protection TOE provides functions such as reference monitor domain separation deletion of residual information transaction processing and self test for TSF protection lt Reference Monitor gt TOE guarantees that for all APDU commands which are the external interface of TOE the access control will not be bypassed but invoked every time to protect TSF from interference and invasion by an unauthorized subject Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 37 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG lt Domain Separation gt TOE provides Javacard Firewall within Javacard virtual machine to separate the area use Such as other application programs and the area where ePassport application program executes After LDS application is installed in TOE all functions such as additional installation deletion and retrieval of other applet are prohibited Therefore the area is separated from other unauthorized subjects because only ePassport area exists in TOE lt Deletion of Residual Information gt TOE provides the function to delete residual information when allocating resources to the object or retrieving resources back from the object so that previous informati
22. data is specified by TOE implementation logic and does not allow specifying initial values thus satisfying security objectives of O Management O Access Control FMT_MTD 1 1 Management of TSF data Certificate Verification Info This component restricts that only the Personalization agent in the Personalization phase writes certificate verification information necessary for the EAC TA in secure memory This component satisfies the security objectives of O Management and O Access_Control by enabling only the authorized Personalization agent to have the ability to write TSF data such as the EAC chip authentication private key current data CVCA certificate and CVCA digital signature verification key etc in secure memory in the Personalization phase FMT_MTD 1 2 Management of TSF data SSC Initialization This component requires to terminate BAC secure messaging before the EAC secure messaging is established This component satisfies the security objective of O Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures by initializing SSC send sequence counter to 0 in order to terminate the BAC secure messaging after generating the EAC session key and newly establishing the EAC secure messaging Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 118 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG FMT MTD 1 3 Management of TSF data OS Management This component controls that only the Personalization agent successful with SCP02 authenticat
23. ePasspo Security Environment O Management O Security Mechanism pplication Procedure O Session_Termination O Secure_Messa O Replay_Prevention O Access_Control OE Certificate_Verifi OE Personalization_Age O Handling_info_leakage OE Inspection_system OE IC_Chip OE MRZ_Entro O Deleting OE PKI OE Rang O AA O BAC O EAC O SCP02 T Personalization Agen t Authen Rreplay T TSF DATA MODIFICA TION T Eavesdropping x T FORGERY_CORRUPTI ON PERSONAL_ DATA T BAC_AUTHENTICATIO N_KEY_DISCLOSE T BAC_REPLAYATTACK DAMAGE_TO_BIOMETR x x x IC_DATA T EAC CA_BYPASS x x x T IS_CERTIFICATE_FOR GERY T SESSIONDATA_REUSE x T SKIMMING x x T MALFUNCTION X T LEAKAGE_CRYPTOGR APHICKEY_INFO T EPASSPORT_REPROD UCTION T RESIDUAL_INFO P INTERNATIONAL_CO MPATIBILITY P SECURITY_MECHANIS M_APPLICATION_PROC X EDURES P APPLICATION_PROGR AM_INSTALL P PERSONALIZATION_A GENT P EPASSPORT_ACCESS_ CONTROL P PKI x P Range_RF_Comm x A Certificate_Vefification X X X A Inspection_System X A IC Chip x A MRZ_Entropy x Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 62 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG 4 3 1 Security Objective Rationale for the TOE O Management This security objective ensures that the TOE provides the mean
24. if it succeeds in SCPO2 mutual authentication according to the rules for authentication mechanism application and the inspection system is given the BAC rights if it succeeds in BAC mutual authentication and succeeding in EAC CA EAC TA and certificate verification after BAC mutual authentication it acquires EAC rights thus satisfying security objectives of O Security Mechanism Application Procedure O Access Control O BAC O EAC and O SCP02 FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification This component requires to establish the messaging based on contactless IC card transmission protocol ISO IEC 14443 4 as the functions the user to be performed before the identification and to identify the user This component satisfies the security objectives of O BAC O EAC and O SCP02 as the external entity is identified with the Inspection System if an external entity to establish the messaging request to use the MRTD application FMT_MOF 1 1 Management of security functions behavior ePassport Writing This component defines that the ability to disable writing function is given only to the Personalization agent in the Personalization phase This component satisfies the security objectives of O Management and O Access_Control by deactivating the writing function of the Personalization agent in the Personalization phase so that the TOE in the Operational Use phase cannot record any data FMT MOF 1 2 Management of security functions behavior OS Life Cycle Chang
25. key to the Inspection System ISO IEC 11770 2 Key Establishment Mechanism 6 The distribution method defined in this component satisfies the security objective of O Replay_Prevention as it uses random numbers and O BAC as it enables to generate the BAC session key of FCS_CKM 1 1 by generating KDF seed FCS_CKM 3 Cryptographic key access This component provides the key access method according to GP Standard and Javacard platform standard API thus satisfying security objective O Secure Messaging FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction This component defines the method of securely destroying the key generated by key derivation mechanism of FCS_CKM 1 1 and SCP02 session key generation of FCS_CKM 1 2 This component suggests the method of destroying the key generated by TSF and remaining in temporary memory area by filling with 0 thus satisfying the security objective O Deletion of Residual Information FDP_ACC 1 1 Subset access control ePassport access control This component defines list of subjects objects and operations in order to decide a scope of control for the ePassport access control policies The ePassport access control policies defined in this component satisfies the security objective of O Access_Control as it defines the Personalization agent BIS and EIS as subjects the personal data and biometric data of the ePassport holder and ePassport authentication data etc as objects and their Copyright 2011
26. measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST AGD_OPE 1 7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable Evaluator action elements AGD_OPE 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence AGD_PRE 1 Preparative procedures Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements AGD_PRE 1 1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 102 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Content and presentation elements AGD PRE 1 1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the developer s delivery procedures AGD PRE 1 2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST Evaluator action elements AGD PRE 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence AGD PRE 1 2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared securely for operation 6 2 4 Life cycle support
27. of T BAC_ReplayAttack by ensuring that the TOE generates different values per session that are transmitted to the Inspection System in the BAC mutual authentication Also this security objective is required to counter the threat of T SessionData_Reuse by ensuring that different random numbers are generated and used per each session of security mechanism because the TOE ensures that the BAC authentication key is not used as the BAC session key in the BAC mutual Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 64 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG authentication and the BAC session key is not generated with the same random number used in the BAC mutual authentication and checks the status of replay of random number transmitted by the EIS in the EAC O Access Control This security objective is required to counter the threats of T Forgery Corruption Personal Data T Damage to Biometric Data and T Skimming and enforce the organizational security policies of P ePassport Access Control by implementing the rules of allowing or denying of Inspection System to read user data in accordance with the ePassport access control policies by the Personalization agent Also this security objective shall implement access control function according to application management authority access authority for fundamental information and authorized information of personalization agent and perform Organizational Security Policies P PERSONALIZATION_A
28. standard ePassport producer embeds IC chip to the passport booklet Personalization agent records Personalization agent identification and authentication information on OS Personalization agent generates SOD by digitally i signing the ePassport identity information Issuan N _ Personalization agent records the ePassport identity information authentication information including SOD and TSF data onto ePassport application program Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 25 129 Lacns XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Phase ePassport IC Chip Life Cycle TOE Life Cycle 4 Inspection system communicates with TOE to Usage authenticate ePassport and confirm the identity of the carrier 5 a Termi 41 Personalization agent changes the status of ermi ePassport so that it is no longer usable nation TOE Operation Environment Figure 4 illustrates the TOE operation environment at ePassport issuance and usage Phase with the major security functions of TOE and the external entities interacting with TOE Personalization agent inspection system Issuing Authority ePassport P 35sport Access Control PA PKI IC Chip Policy Establishanent dt Identity info managment os Security Management Issuance authority H i Record Passport application data security role mansgement ol Verify renew certificates 1 Manage application programs Issuance
29. the utilized procedure P PERSONALIZATION AGENT The personalization agent shall issue the ePassport in the secure manner so that to confirm that the issuing subject has not been changed and shall deliver the TOE to the Operational Use phase after verifying that the data inside MRTD chip are operating normally after issuing The Personalization agent shall deactivate the writing function before the TOE delivery to the Operational Use phase Also the personalization agent should establish the access control policy about the operation system management Application Notes SCP02 security mechanism of GP standard as the security mechanism is used for the personalization agent authentication P EPASSPORT_ACCESS_ CONTROL The Personalization agent and TOE shall build the ePassport access control policies in order to protect the MRTD application data Also the TOE shall regulate the roles of user Application Notes The TOE shall build access control policies as of the following according to the ICAO document and EAC specifications Table 12 ePassport Access Control Policies ject List of poles Ape Personal data Biometric data ePassport e J of the ePassport of the ePassport authentication data EF CVCA EF COM holder holder Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd AIl rights reserved Page 53 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Security i i i i 5 Attribute Read Writ
30. trusted IT product and perform a Termination of the BAC secure messaging or EAC secure messaging b Deletion of BAC session key or EAC session key c Management action specified in FMT_MSA 1 d Termination of Personalization agent messaging e Deletion of Personalization agent messaging session key if modifications are detected Application Notes The Strength of Retail MAC is equivalent to the secure Retail MAC Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 90 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Also Personalization agent messaging uses SCP02 secure messaging which detects change through Retail MAC FPT_TST 1 TSF testing Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FPT_TST 1 1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests selection during initial start up periodically during normal operation at the request of the authorized user at the conditions assignment conditions under which self test should occur to demonstrate the correct operation of selection assignment parts of TSF the TSF FPT_TST 1 2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of selection assignment parts of TSF data TSF data FPT_TST 1 3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of selection assignment parts of TSF TSF 6 2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance requirements for thi
31. verify the evidence regarding the validity of designated information Application Notes In order to guarantee the validity of ePassport user data when AA request is received from inspection system BIS or EIS TOE generates digital signature from the random number value received in the AA request process with the AA chip authentication private key stored on the protected memory area which is provided to the inspection system Inspection system verifies the digital signature with AA chip authentication public key acquired from EF DG15 to verify the authenticity of TOE Also in the case of EAC CA request from EIS ECDH calculation is performed using the temporary public key generated using EAC CA chip authentication public key information of EF DG14 and the EAC CA chip authentication private key stored on the protected memory of TOE thus EIS verifies the authenticity of TOE depending on the success of EAC CA FDP RIP 1 Subset residual information protection Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FDP_RIP 1 1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the selection allocation of the resource to deallocation of the resource from the following objects a BAC session key b EAC session key c BAC authentication key d SCPO2 session key random number value Application Notes After a session termination the TSF shall not remain the BAC session ke
32. 11 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 43 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG e FCS_COP 1 1 FCS_COP 1 2 FCS_COP 1 3 FCS_COP 1 4 FPR_UNO 1 e FCS CKM 2 1 FCS_CKM 4 e FDP ACC 1 1 FDP ACF 1 1 FDP RIP 1 FDP UIT 1 e FIA AFL 1 1 FIA UAU 1 1 FIA UAU 1 2 FIA UAU 4 FIA UAU 5 e FMT_MSA 1 FMT MSA 3 FMT_MTD 1 1 FMT SMF 1 FMT SMR 1 e FPT FLS 1 FPT ITI 1 FPT TST 1 2 2 2 Protection Profile Additions The items described below are additional to the protection profile for this security target Security Environment e T Personalization agent authentication reuse Security Objective e O SCPO2 e OAA security function requirement e FCS CKM 1 2 FCS_CKM 3 e FDP ACC 1 2 FDP_ACF 1 2 FDP_DAU 1 e FIA AFL 1 2 FIA_UAU 1 3 e FMT_MOF1 2 FMT_MTD 1 3 2 3 Package Claime This Security Target is conforming to assurance package as follows Assurance Package EAL5 augmented with ADV IMP 2 2 4 Conformance Rationale This Security Target is claiming ePassport Protection Profile V2 1 2 4 1 Rationale for Conformance of Security Problem Definitions Re established for this security target of ePassport Protection Profile are T RESIDUAL_INFO among the threats A inspection system among the assumptions and P PERSONALIZATION AGENT P EPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL among the organizational security policies and it conforms to the all the rest of security environment and the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co
33. AU 1 2 shall have dependency with FIA_UID 1 but the dependency changed to FIA_UAU 1 1 by refinement operation Since the EAC TA is executed after the BAC mutual authentication FIA_UAU 1 2 depends on FIA_UAU 1 1 and FIA_UAU 1 1 depends on FIA_UID 1 Therefore indirectly the dependency is satisfied 6 3 3 2 Dependency of TOE Security Assurance Requirements The dependency of EAL5 provided in Common Criteria is already satisfied Therefore the rationale for this is omitted The dependency of the augmented security assurance requirements is as shown in Table 23 ADV_IMP 2 shall have dependency with ALC_CMC 5 but ADV_IMP 2 is augmented to enable analysis on the entire implementation representation in order to check if the TSF is accurately implemented and defect code does not exist And ADV_IMP 2 is not augmented in Security Target because CM at ALC_CMC 5 level which provides automated measure to identify if the changes in configuration items affect other configuration items is determined to be not necessarily required Table 23 Dependency of Added Assurance Components Number Assurance Component Dependency Reference Number ADV_TDS 3 EAL4 1 ADV IMP 2 ALC TAT 1 EAL4 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 123 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ALC CMC 5 N A 6 4 Rationale of Mutual Support and Internal Consistency This rationale demonstrates that the TOE s
34. Also this security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 68 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG T Damage to Biometric Data by generating issuing and distributing certificates necessary in the EAC through implementation of the EAC PKI OE Range RF Communication This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of T Skimming and enforce the organizational security policies of P Range RF Communication by ensuring that RF communication distance between the MRTD chip and the Inspection System is less than 5cm and that RF messaging is not established if the page of the ePassport attached with the IC chip is not opened Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 69 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 5 Definition of Extended Component This chapter identifies the extended security requirement of this Security Target and provides the explanation about them This Security Target is the extended security requirements and it defines the following No extended component Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 70 129 Lacns XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 6 Security Requirements Security requirements specify security functional and assurance requirements that must be satisfied by the TOE that claims this Security Target In this Protection Profile the external entities specif
35. CDSA operation the co processor of the IC chip or cryptographic libraries loaded in the IC chip shall implement countermeasures to prevent exploiting of leakage information OE Inspection System The Inspection System shall implement security mechanisms according to the type of the Inspection System so that not to violate the ePassport access control policies of the Personalization agent and to ensure the order of application Also the Inspection System shall securely destroy all information used in communication with the TOE after the session termination OE IC Chip The IC chip the underlying platform of the TOE provides the random number generation Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 60 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG and cryptographic operation to support security functions of the TOE It also detects the TOE s malfunction outside the normal operating conditions and provides functions of the physical protection to protect the TOE from physical attacks using the probing and reverse engineering analysis OE MRZ Entropy Personalization agent shall ensure the MRZ entropy to ensure the secure BAC authentication key OE PKI The Issuing State of the ePassport shall execute certification practice to securely generate manage a digital signature key and to generate issue operate destroy certificates according to the CPS by implementing the PA PKI and EAC PKI according to the ePassport PKI System
36. CP02 security mechanism OS management of loading installation deletion of application program life cycle management of OS and application programs and such TOE becomes ePassport only after installation of ePassport so it is impossible to load install delete other applications The composition elements of the IC chip TOE is based on includes IC chip hardware dedicated IC chip firmware and cryptographic calculation software library for RSA ECC calculation TOE actives the active shield temperature sensor voltage sensor filter and such of the IC chip hardware and provides security measures against physical attacks by encrypting ROM RAM and EEPROM When generating random numbers random number generator TRNG is used and when performing TDES cryptographic calculation secure DES module is used to countermeasure attacks such as SPA and DPA Also ECC cryptographic calculation software library is used to perform ECDH encryption key exchange and ECDSA digital signature generation verification calculations and countermeasure attacks such as SPA and DPA and RSA cryptographic calculation software library is used to generate digital signature and countermeasure attacks such as SPA and DPA Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 19 129 Lacns XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 1 2 1 TOE Type ePassport which uses XSmart e Passport V1 2 is designated as the standard by ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization and ISO
37. DO 2MX2 module RSA digital signature generation and verification ECDH key exchange ECC RSA Library ECDSA digital signature generation and verification HASH calculation 1 3 Preparation Rules This security target uses English terms to clearly convey several meanings and acronyms The used notation shape and preparation rules follow the common criteria of information protection system referred to as common criteria hereafter Common criteria allows repetition allocation selection and elaboration that can be performed in a security function requirement Each operation is used in this security target Repetition Used when a component is repeated multiple times with various application of an operation The result of a repetition operation is denoted with the repetition number in parentheses as in repetition number Selection Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 40 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Used to select one or more selection items provided by the common criteria for information protection system The result of selection operation is denoted underlined and Italicized Elaboration Used to limit the requirement further by adding details to the requirement The result of an elaboration operation is denoted in bold Allocation Used to allocate a certain value to a non specified parameter e g password length The result of an allocation operation is denote
38. ENT 48 TABLE 12 EPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES id es 53 TABLE 13 THE MAPPING BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES ee ese ees se ee see ee ee see ee 62 TABLE 14 DEFINITION OF SUBJECT OBJECT RELATED SECURITY ATTRIBUTES AND OPERATION 71 TABLE 15 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REOUIREMENTS ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee Re ee ee ee ee ee ee 72 TABLE 16 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER SUBJECT 71 TABLE 17 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER OBJECT ese ees se ee see ee ee eene ee ee eke Ge ee ee Ge ee AR Ge ee AR Ge ee AR Ge ee ee Ge ee AR Ge ee ee ee 71 TABLE 18 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER SUBJECT esse see id es 79 TABLE 19 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER OBJECT seen 79 TABLE 20 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ses ee ai Re Re ee ee ee ee ee ee ee Re ee ee ee oia ios 91 TABLE 21 CORRESPONDENCE OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS 111 TABLE 22 SECURITY FUNCTION COMPONENT DEPENDENCY iese ees es se ee ee ee se ee ee ee ge ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee Re ee ee Ee 123 TABLE 23 DEPENDENCY OF ADDED ASSURANCE COMPONENTS in 123 TABLE 24 TOE SECURITY FUNCTION ese ees se ee ee oe ee ee Ge ee ee Ge GR Re Ge RR Ge RR Ge RR Ge Re Re Re Re ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 126 TABLE 25 TOE ASSURANCE METHOD eeuse se ee ese ee ee eene ee ee ee ee ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee Re Ge Re Re Ge Re Re Ge Re Re Ge ee ee Ge ee ee ee ee ee 128 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Pa
39. E_LITE_ENG ALC_LCD 1 2D The developer shall provide life cycle definition documentation Content and presentation elements ALC_LCD 1 1C The life cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the TOE ALC_LCD 1 2C The life cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and maintenance of the TOE Evaluator action elements ALC_LCD 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ALC_TAT 2 Applied Implementation Standard Dependencies ADV_IMP 1 Implementation representation of the TSF Developer action elements ALC_TAT 2 1D The developer shall provide the documentation identifying each development tool being used for the TOE ALC_TAT 2 2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementation dependent options of each development tool ALC_TAT 2 3D The developer must describe the implementation standard he she is applying Content and presentation elements ALC_TAT 2 1C Each development tool used for implementation shall be well defined ALC_TAT 2 2C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation ALC_TAT 2 3C The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all implementation dependent options Evaluator action el
40. E_LITE_ENG ePassport Application Program MRTD Application A program to load on the ePassport IC chip that is programmed according to LDS of ePassport standard and provides security mechanisms such as BAC and EAC ePassport Authentication Information The information stored on ePassport IC chip in LDS format to support ePassport security mechanism including SOD for PA chip authentication public key for EAC AA chip authentication public key etc ePassport IC Chip MRTD Chip A contactless IC chip including ePassport application programs and the IC chip operating system necessary for operating them and supporting communication protocol according to ISO IE 14443 ePassport TSF Data The information stored on the protected memory area of ePassport IC chip to support ePassport security mechanism KDM Key Derivation Mechanism The mechanism to generate encryption key and MAC key from seed value using hash algorithm KDF Key Derivation Function A function generating encryption key and MAC key from seed value using hash algorithm Inspection The procedure where the immigration authority inspects the ePassport IC chip presented by the ePassport carrier and confirms the identity of the ePassport carrier through verification of ePassport IC chip IS Inspection System An information system which implements optical MRZ reading capability and security mechanisms PA BAC EAC AA etc to support ePassport inspection and consists of
41. GENT O AA This security objective is mapping Threats T EPASSPORT REPRODUCTION because TOE shall implement AA security mechanism that the inspection system is utilizing for recognizing the illegal reproduction of TOE O BAC This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P ePassport Access Control as the TOE implements the BAC security mechanism to control access to the personal data of the ePassport holder therefore gives the read rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System of which the BAC mutual authentication is successfully completed This security objective is required to counter the threats of T Forgery_Corruption_Personal Data and T Skimming as the TOE allows the read rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System by generating the BAC session key during the BAC mutual authentication and denies access by the Inspection System that does not have the read rights O EAC This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P ePassport Access Control as the TOE implements the EAC CA and EAC TA to control access to the biometric data of the ePassport holder therefore gives the read rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System of Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 65 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE
42. ISO 9797 in order to generate message authentication code to prevent data counterfeiting falsification PA Passive Authentication A security mechanism which proves that the identification information recorded on the ePassport is not counterfeit or falsified by verifying the has value of the corresponding ePassport user value according to the reading rights of the ePassport access control policy where the inspection system with DS certificate verifies the digital signature signed on SOD PA PKI Highest Authentication Authority CSCA Country Signing Certification Authority The highest authentication authority which generates and issues CSCA certificate and DS certificate by securely generating digital signature key in the PA PKI passport digital signature system to support PA security mechanism Probing An attack exploring data by plugging in a probe to the IC chip RAM Random Access Memory A volatile memory device that retains recorded information only while power is supplied and a storage area for storing data temporarily used by the operating system or application programs Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 15 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG ROM Read Only Memory A type of semiconductor memory device where the contents can be read but not modified SCPO2 Secure Channel Protocol 02 mutual authentication A symmetric key based entity authentication protocol defined in GlobalPlatform 2 1 1 Card
43. L This security function allows only successfully authenticated Personalization agent to write ePassport user data amp TSF data through secure messaging 7 1 8 SF BASIC ACCESS CONTROL This security function allows only successfully authenticated inspection system through BAC mutual authentication to read ePassport user data excluding ePassport applicant bio information through BAC secure messaging which guarantees confidentiality and integrity 7 1 9 SF EXTENDED ACCESS CONTROL This security function allows only the inspection system which succeeded EAC TA on EAC secure messaging through EAC CA to read the ePassport user data through EAC secure messaging which guarantees confidentiality and integrity 7 1 10 SF ACTIVE AUTHENTICATION This security function implements AA security mechanism which allows the inspection system to judge the illegal piracy state of TOE This security function can be selectively used according to the issuance policy of the Personalization agent 7 2 Assurance Method Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 127 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG This clause defines the assurance method required by TOE assurance requirements according to EAL5 Added assurance requirement is ADV_IMP 2 Table 25 TOE Assurance Method Assurance Assurance Method Document ID Requirements ASE_INT 1 XSmart e Pa
44. LC CMC 4 10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in accordance with the CM plan Evaluator action elements ALC CMC 4 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ALC CMS 5 Development tools CM coverage Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements ALC CMS 5 1D The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE Content and presentation elements ALC_CMS 5 1C The configuration list shall include the following the TOE itself the evaluation evidence required by the SARs the parts that comprise the TOE the implementation representation and security flaw reports and resolution status ALC_CMS 5 2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items ALC_CMS 5 3C For each TSF relevant configuration item the configuration list shall indicate the developer of the item Evaluator action elements ALC_CMS 5 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ALC_DEL 1 Delivery procedures Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 104 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ALC DEL 1 1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the consumer ALC DEL 1 2D The developer shall u
45. LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 112 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG relationship as operations FDP_ACC 1 2 Subset access control OS Access Control This component defines the list of subjects objects and operations in order to determine the control scope of OS access control policy The OS access control policy defined in this component defines the Personalization agent as the subject executable file application programs Personalization agent basic information Personalization agent authentication information as objects and their relationship as operations thus satisfying security objective O Access Control FDP_ACF 1 1 Security attribute based access control ePassport access control In order to enforce the ePassport access control policies this component defines security attributes of subjects and objects defined in FDP_ACC 1 1 and specifies the ePassport access control rules Security attributes and the ePassport access control rules defined in this component satisfy the security objectives of O Management and O Access_Control as only the authorized Personalization agent with the Personalization agent issuing authorization can perform management functions Also this component satisfies the security objectives of O BAC O EAC and O Access_Control because the read rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder and ePassport authentication data etc is allowed only to the subjects holding the BAC authorization a
46. LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 128 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 129 129
47. M DEFINITION cccccccssscssssssscscssssessessscesccsscssscsscssecssesseessensesssesseesseess 49 3 1 THREATS eee 49 3 2 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 52 NR CSU OG 54 4 SECURITY OBIECTIVES iese dees eesesssse sede eed ees ee dees be doe eed Ge Ge bed Gee be de Ge eN ee dode oe ge sd de nee dee ke ede de 57 4 1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ur 57 4 2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT eie ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 59 4 3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 61 5 DEFINITION OF EXTENDED COMPONENT ccccccssscssssssssscsssccssscsssssssssscsssccssssssssssssssssenee 70 6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS secsesiscssccsssssscecsscsssscesssssecssstsssccssssecedsscscedsseseczestesecsdasssecesssssccnsssesessecee 71 6 1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS 72 6 2 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 91 6 3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE 110 6 4 RATIONALE OF MUTUAL SUPPORT AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 124 7 TOE SUMMARY SPECTFICATION ccccccsssssssssscssssssscsccsssesscesscesseessesesessccs
48. Management rights are acquired when the Personalization agent succeeds in Personalization agent authentication FDP_ACF 1 2 The TSF shall enforce the following in order to determine whether to allow the operation between a controlled subject and a controlled object a The corresponding operation is permitted only if the security properties of the subject are included in the access rights security properties of the object and the operation matches the operation security properties of the object FDP_ACF 1 3 The TSF shall specifically permit the access of the subject to the object based on the following additional rules none FDP_ACF 1 4 The TSF shall specifically deny the access of the subject to the object based on the following rules a At the termination Phase all operations except read operation for Personalization agent basic information are denied b The deletion operation for ePassport application programs is denied c The selection operation for an application program not installed is denied FDP_DAU 1 Basic Data Authentication Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 80 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG FDP DAU 1 1 The TSF shall provide the ability to generate the evidence to be used for guaranteeing the validity of ePassport user data FDP DAU 1 2 The TSF shall provide an inspection system with the ability to
49. P02 mutual authentication as replaying Application Notes When the TOE uses the same values for the authentication information and SCP02 session key they are vulnerable to ciphertext only attack T TSF DATA MODIFICATION When the ePassport personalization agent records the TSF data the threat agent can modify the data and attempt to access in the stored TSF data using outer interfaces through the inspection system lt BAC related Threats in the TOE Use phase gt T Eavesdropping Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 49 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG In order to find out the personal data of the ePassport holder the threat agent may eavesdrop the transmitted data by using the terminal capable of the RF communication T FORGERY CORRUPTION PERSONAL DATA In order to forge and corrupt the personal data of the ePassport holder stored in the MRTD chip the threat agent may attempt access to read the user data by using the unauthorized Inspection System T BAC AUTHENTICATION KEY DISCLOSE In order to find out the personal data of the ePassport holder the threat agent may obtain the read rights of the BAC authentication key located inside the TOE and disclose the related information Application Notes BAC authentication key is generated by the personalization agent in the ePassport personalization phase and stored in the protective memory region of IC chips ePassport T BAC REPLAYATTACK The threat ag
50. RTD ICAO Table 1 Identification of Security Target This document is the security target regarding the XSmart e Passport V1 2 which is the TOE implemented on the XSmart V2 2 ePassport IC chip product of LG CNS XSmart e Passport V1 2 is implemented on the IC chip composition elements After XSmart e Passport V1 2 is packaged by COB type it is equipped with an inlay consisting of a part of ePasspost booklet and is used for ePassport only S3CT9KW and S3CT9KC are contact contactless IC chips of Samsung Electronics implementing TOE and it is certified CC authentication separately from BSI Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 17 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG e PP used Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1 0 June 2007 BSI PP 0035 e TOE S3CT9KW 16 bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Revision 0 S3CT9KC 16 bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card Revision 0 e Certification Number BSI DSZ CC 0639 2010 BSI DSZ CC 0639 2010 MA 01 e Assurance Level CC EAL 5 AVA_VAN 5 ALC DVS 2 e Certified cryptography library TORNADO 2MX2 Secure RSA ECC library v1 0 TOE is composed of the software format of the OS and ePassport application program e The OS is composed of Java layer GP layer Native OS NOS GP Layer performs to manage life cycle of applications such as loading installing and deletion of applications according to GP Standard In accordance with Java C
51. S Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 101 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ADV FSP 1 Basic functional specification Developer action elements AGD OPE 1 1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance Content and presentation elements AGD OPE 1 1C The operational user guidance shall describe for each user role the user accessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment including appropriate warnings AGD_OPE 1 2C The operational user guidance shall describe for each user role how to use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner AGD_OPE 1 3C The operational user guidance shall describe for each user role the available functions and interfaces in particular all security parameters under the control of the user indicating secure values as appropriate AGD OPE 1 4C The operational user guidance shall for each user role clearly present each type of security relevant event relative to the user accessible functions that need to be performed including changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF AGD_OPE 1 5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE including operation following failure or operational error their consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation AGD_OPE 1 6C The operational user guidance shall for each user role describe the security
52. Specification SCPO2 Session Key A session key generated in the SCP02 mutual authentication process SPA Simple Power Analysis A method of inferring encryption key by collecting and analyzing the power consumption in the cryptographic lt process COB Chip On Board As semiconductor fabrication technology the way a microchip or adie attach directly to the final circuit board or electrically interconnection Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 16 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 1 Security Target Introduction This section provides the information necessary for identifying and controlling security target and TOE 1 1 Security Target Identification Subject XSmart e Passport V1 2 Security Target Lite Author LG CNS Evaluation Criteria Information Protection System Common Criteria V3 1r3 Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5 ADV_IMP 2 Protection Profile ePassport Protection Profile V2 1 Product XSmart V2 2 TOE XSmart e Passport V1 2 Component of TOE XSmart e Passport V1 2 User Manual TOE code ROM code identification Identification XSMART_EPASS120_m03 rom impelemented on S3CT9KW XSMART_EPASS130_m01 rom impelemented on S3CT9KC EEPROM code identification XSMART_EPASS120_m03 eep impelemented on S3CT9KW XSMART EPASS130 m01 rom impelemented on S3CT9KC IC Chip S3CTOKW S3CT9KC Keywords ePassport M
53. TE ENG ECC Library The ECC library provides functions such as ECDSA digital signature generation and verification ECDH key exchange ECC key pair generation and ECC public key verification In TOE however only the functions of ECDSA digital signature generation and verification and ECDH key exchange are used The ECC library includes countermeasures against SPA DPA EMA DFA and such RSA Library The RSA library provides functions such as RSA digital signature generation verification and key pair generation The RSA library also includes countermeasures against SPA DPA EMA DFA and so on Also this library includes functions of SHA 1 SHA 224 SHA 256 SHA 384 SHA 512 IC Chip The IC chip certified with CCRA EAL5 assurance level includes IC chip hardware and firmware and is the IT environment of TOE not included in TOE scope The IC chip hardware includes the microprocessor executing the executable code of TOE memory such as RAM ROM and EEPROM which stores TOE TOE user data and TSF data T DES which support cryptographic calculation of TOE and dedicated cryptographic calculation processor of TORNADO 2MX2 DES AES The memory of IC chip is protected through encryption and the IC chip hardware provides security measures against physical attacks through shield sensor and filter The IC chip provides security measures against attacks such as SPA DPA and DFA The firmware included in the IC chip provides the management te
54. TSF Developer action elements ADV FSP 5 1D The developer must provide function specification ADV FSP 5 2D The developer must provide traceability from function specification to SFR Content and presentation elements ADV_FSP 5 1C Function specification must express TSF completely ADV FSP 5 2C Function specification must describe TSFI in a semi standardized Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 98 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG method ADV_FSP 5 3C Function specification must describe the objective and usage method for all TSFI ADV_FSP 5 4C Function specification must identify and describe all parameters related to each TSFI ADV FSP 5 5C Function specification must describe all actions related to each TSFI ADV FSP 5 6C Function specification must describe all direct error messages occurring as a result of each TSFI call ADV FSP 5 7C Function specification must describe all error messages occurring from causes other than TSFI calls ADV FSP 5 8C Traceability must provide the rationale for each error message whose function specification is included in TSF implementation but occurring from causes other than TSFI call ADV_FSP 5 9C Traceability must prove that SFR is traced to TSFI in function specification Evaluator action elements ADV FSP 5 1E The evaluator must confirm that provided information satisfies all evidence requirements ADV_FSP 5 2E The evaluator must determine if the function spe
55. The EAL Evaluation Assurance Level of this Security Target was selected as EAL5 ADV IMP 2 by considering the value of assets protected by the TOE and level of threats etc EAL5 allows the developer to acquire the maximum assurance from security engineering based on strict commercial development methodology which refers to applying an eased Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 120 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG version of expert security engineering techniques Such TOE must be designed and developed with the intention of achieving EAL5 assurance The additional cost from strict development is not very great EAL5 demands high level of security with independent assurance from the development planned by the developer or the user and is applicable to a case which requires using a strict development methodology without the burden of inappropriate cost due to expert security engineering techniques Security Target partially selected assurance components that are higher than EAL4 The rationale of the augmented with assurance components are as follows ADV_IMP 2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF The TOE is an operating system and application program operated in the MRTD chip Therefore it largely depends on the IC chip in terms of cryptographic operation function and physical security To ensure the secure MRTD chip the reliability and secure operation of not only the TOE bu
56. _ENG which the EAC TA is successfully completed This security objective is required to counter the threats of T Damage_to_Biometric_Data and T Skimming as the TOE allows the read rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System through the EAC TA by generating the EAC session key during the EAC CA and denies access by the Inspection System that does not have the read rights Also it is mapping Threats T EPASSPORT_REPRODUCTION because of providing means to recognize the illegal reproduction of TOE through EAC_CA O SCPO2 This security objective shall perform Organizational Security Policies P EPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL P PERSONALIZATION AGENT as TOE shall authorize ePassport personalization agent implement SCP02 mutual authentication for personalizing securely and provide management means about ePassport applicant information and TSF data to only personalization agent succeeding SCP02 mutual authentication 4 3 2 Security Objective Rationale for Operating Environment OE ePassport_Manufacturing_Security This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of T ePassport_Reproduction by ensuring that Physical security measures security printing etc for the ePassport are prepared to detect reproduction of the MRTD chip and attack attempt of the Grandmaster chess replacement of the portrait and modification of the MRZ data etc OE Procedures_of_ePassport_Holder_Check
57. all demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and SFR enforcing modules in the TOE design ATE_DPT 3 2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF subsystems in the TOE design have been tested ATE_DPT 3 3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that the SFR enforcing modules in the TOE design have been tested Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 107 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Evaluator action elements ATE DPT 3 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ATE FUN 1 Functional testing Dependencies ATE COV 1 Evidence of coverage Developer action elements ATE FUN 1 1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results ATE FUN 1 2D The developer shall provide test documentation Content and presentation elements ATE FUN 1 1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans expected test results and actual test results ATE FUN 1 2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for performing each test These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests ATE FUN 1 3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the tests ATE_FUN 1 4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the ex
58. all threats ASE_OBJ 2 5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives enforce all OSPs ASE_OBJ 2 6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions Evaluator action elements ASE 0BJ 2 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE_ECD 1 Extended components definition Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements ASE_ECD 1 1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements ASE_ECD 1 2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition Content and presentation elements ASE_ECD 1 1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security requirements Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 95 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ASE ECD 1 2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component for each extended security requirement ASE ECD 1 3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended component is related to the existing CC components families and classes ASE ECD 1 4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components families classes and methodology as a model for presentation ASE ECD 1 5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective ele
59. ard Standard Java layer provides functions such as firewall deletion residual information memory management transaction process and so on NOS actually performs I O handling according to ISO IEC 7816 and ISO IEC 14443 and memory management through the chip interface After ePassport application is installed the Operating system only performs the functionality of passport it becomes impossible to install or delete applications anymore e EPassport application is an implementation of MRTD standards defined by International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO and EAC standard of BSI After ePassport program is loaded on ROM for the first time it is active throughout the processing of installation and issuance 1 2 TOE Outline XSmart V2 2 ePassport product of LG CNS is the type of manufactured COB loading TOE on S3CT9KW or S3CT9KC Samsung Electronics IC chip The type of COB component of the e passport booklets is to be made with the inlay and is used after issuing TOE is composed of the software format of the OS and ePassport application programs TOE manages ePassport application data such as ePassport MRZ area information ePassport applicant basic information bio information including Passport applicant face and fingerprints encryption key for authentication and secure communication etc and performs access control to ePassport user data by authenticating Personalization agent Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rig
60. as at least one TOE security function requirement tracing to it e Each TOE security functional requirement traces back to at least one TOE security objectives Table 21 presents the mapping between the security objectives and the security functional requirements Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 110 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Table 21 Correspondence of Security Objectives and Security Function Requirements Security Objective TOE Security Objective Mechanism Residual Application Procedure of Security Function Requirements O Certificate Authentication O Access Control O Session Termination O Secure Messaging O Reuse Prevention D ro E D D O O Security O Secure State O Deletion Information O SCP02 O AA O BAC gt lt O EAC FCS_CKM 1 1 FCS_CKM 1 2 x FCS_CKM 2 1 x X FCS CKM 3 X FCS CKM 4 X FDP ACC 1 1 FDP ACC 1 2 FDP ACF1 1 X X FDP_ACF 1 2 X FDP_DAU 1 X X FDP_RIP 1 X X FDP_UCT 1 x FDP_UIT 1 X X FIA_AFL 1 1 X X FIA_AFL 1 2 x FIA_UAU 1 1 x FIA_UAU 1 2 X FIA_UAU 1 3 X FIA_UAU 4 X X X FIA_UAU 5 X FIA UID 1 X X FMT_MOF 1 1 X FMT_MOF 1 2 X FMT MSA 1 X FMT_MSA 3 X FMT_MTD 1 1 X FMT_MTD 1 2 x FMT_MTD 1 3 FMT_MTD 3 X X X FMT SMF 1 x X FMT SMR 1 X FPT_FLS 1 X FPT ITI 1 x X FPT_TST 1 X gt lt DC AE x lt x lt x lt gt x lt DC
61. ation and provides a method to verify integrity for the encryption key The cryptographic algorithms included in TOE are as shown in Table 7 Table 7 Cryptographic Algorithms used by TOE RSA SHA 1 operation mode Classification Algorithm Use Hash SHA 1 SHA 224 SHA 256 BAC session key and EAC session key generation Key ECDH operation mode Generation of shared confidential information in EAC CA Exchange confidentiality of SCP02 secure messaging Encryption confidentiality of BAC secure messaging TDES operation mode Decryption confidentiality of EAC secure messaging SCP02 session key generation Integrity of SCPO2 secure messaging Retail MAC operation mode Integrity of BAC secure messaging MAC Integrity of EAC secure messaging Full Triple DES MAC operation Generation of authentication information of SCP02 mode mutual authentication ECDSA SHA 1 operation mode Verification of digital signature in EAC TA ECDSA SHA 224 operation Digital mode Verification of digital signature in EAC TA Signature ECDSA SHA 256 operation mode Creation of digital signature in AA Functions Excluded from TOE The functions provided in XSmart e Passport V1 2 but excluded from TOE are function for integrity and verification of global PIN and PIN of application program remote method invocation RMI TDES algorithm ECDH key exchange algorithm ECDSA digital signature generation and verification algorithm RSA digital signature generation
62. ation issuance management of CSCA certificate and DS certificate according to the authentication task regulations of passport digital signature system According to the ePassport issuance policy if EAC security mechanism is supported the digital signature key necessary for verification of access rights for ePassport applicant bio information and the authentication tasks such as generation issuance management of CVCA certificate CVCA link certificate and DV certificate are performed Items regarding establishment of passport digital signature and authentication tasks such as authentication server key generation devices physical procedural security measures and such follow the ePassport issuance policy Authentication authority generates the IS certificate using CVCA certificate and DV certificate and then provides them to the inspection systems The types of certificates used in ePassport system is as follows in Table 2 Table 2 Types of Certificates Passport Digital Use Certificate Subject Certificate Signature System Verification of ePassport PA PKI highest authentication CSCA certificate user data PA PKI authority falsification counterfeiting Personalization agent DS certificate Verification of access EAC PKI highest authentication CVCA certificate rights to ePassport authority CVCA link certificate EAC PKI applicant Authentication authority DV certificate bio information EAC inspection system IS certi
63. cation Notes When EAC TA fails additional EAC TA is not permitted on the same EAC secure messaging while terminating the channel FIA UAU 1 1 Timing of authentication BAC Mutual Authentication Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification FIA_UAU 1 1 The TSF shall allow a indication that support the BAC mechanism b None on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated FIA_UAU 1 2 The TSF shall authenticate the user successfully before allowing any other actions mediated by TSF on behalf of the user except the action specified in FIA_UAU 1 1 FIA_UAU 1 2 Timing of authentication EAC TA Hierarchical to No other components Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 83 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Dependencies FIA_UAU 1 1 Timing of authentication BAC mutual authentication FIA_UAU 1 1 The TSF shall allow a to perform the EAC CA b to read user data except the biometric data of the ePassport holder c AA Performance on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated FIA_UAU 1 2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user FIA UAU 1 3 Timing of authentication SCPO2 mutual authentication Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification FIA_UAU 1 1 The TSF shall al
64. cedure ALC_DVS 1 Identification of security measures ALC_LCD 1 Life cycle model defined by developer ALC_TAT 2 Applied implementation standard Test ATE COV 2 Analysis of test range ATE_DPT 3 Modularization design test ATE_FUN 1 Function test ATE_IND 2 Independent test specimen test Vulnerability Test AVA_VAN 4 Systematic vulnerability analysis 6 2 1 Security Target ASE_INT 1 ST Introduction Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements ASE_INT 1 1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction Content and presentation elements ASE_INT 1 1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference a TOE reference a TOE overview and a TOE description ASE_INT 1 2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST ASE_INT 1 3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE ASE_INT 1 4C The TOE overview shall summarize the usage and major security features of the TOE ASE_INT 1 5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type ASE_INT 1 6C The TOE overview shall identify any non TOE hardware software firmware required by the TOE ASE_INT 1 7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 92 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ASE INT 1 8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE Evaluator action elements ASE INT 1 1E The evaluato
65. cessing ePassport identity information and the security mechanism to securely protect it according to the LDS Logical Data Structure format defined in ePassport standard and EAC standard ePassport application program provides security management function for ePassport application program to the authenticated Personalization agent through SCP02 security mechanism provided in the card manager and permits access to ePassport user data through BAC and EAC secure messaging only when the access rights were acquired through BAC and EAC secure messaging Also AA security mechanisms are provided as methods to judge counterfeiting of ePassport user data Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 27 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Card Manager Card manager provides management function of OS defined in GP standard and VGP standard Card manager provides functions such as loading installation deletion of application programs management of Personalization agent basic information and authentication information and management of OS and application program life cycle After installation of the LDS card manager does not work anymore absolutely so additional installation or deletion of applications is impossible Among the functions of card manager implemented in XSmart e passport V1 2 the Global PIN which can be used commonly by all application programs on the card is a function for verifying user passwor
66. cification substantializes SFR precisely and completely ADV_IMP 2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF Dependencies ADV_TDS 3 Basic modular design ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools ALC_CMC 5 Advanced support Developer action elements ADV IMP 2 1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for the entire TSF ADV IMP 2 2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description and the entire implementation representation Content and presentation elements ADV_IMP 2 1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions ADV_IMP 2 2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 99 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG development personnel ADV IMP 2 3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the entire implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence Evaluator action elements ADV IMP 2 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ADV INT 2 Well Structured Inside of TSF Dependencies ADV_IMP 1 Expression of Implementation regarding TSF ADV_TDS 3 Basic Modularization Design ALC_TAT 1 Well Defined Development Tool Developer action elements ADV_INT 2 1D The d
67. component satisfies the security objective of O Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures by disabling the unauthorized external entity to move on to the next phase of inspection procedures by terminating session if the BAC mutual authentication fails In addition this component satisfies the security objectives of O BAC O EAC and O Access_Control because access to user data is denied by terminating session as the SCP02 mutual authentication or BAC mutual authentication failure is considered that there is no the access rights for user data FIA_AFL 1 2 Authentication failure handling Retry Prohibition This component detects if the number of authentication attempts for EAC TA is greater than 1 and requires prohibiting retry of EAC TA in the same user session This component regards the failure in EAC TA as having no access rights to ePassport applicant bio information and thus denies access to ePassport applicant bio information thus satisfying Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 115 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG security objectives of O Security Mechanism Application Procedure O EAC and O Access Control FIA_UAU 1 1 Timing of authentication BAC Mutual authentication This component defines the functions the user to be performed before the BAC mutual authentication and executes the BAC mutual authentication for user In this component the BAC mutual authentication is executed in order to enable the In
68. cseascesseessensseese 126 7 1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTION eee cernes encens 126 7 2 ASSURANCE METHOD vn eee se Se ein Gas 127 7 3 RATIONALE OF TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee de ee ee 128 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 3 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 4 129 LGCNS XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG List of Tables TABLE 1 IDENTIFICATION OF SECURITY TARGET idee 17 TABLE 2 TYPES OF CERTIFICATES se EE 22 TABLE 3 LIFE CYCLE OF EPASSPORT IC CHIP AND TOE ese ees se ee ese ee ee eke ee ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee ee 25 TABLE 4 TOE ASSETS EAA tance eee 30 TABLE 5 LDS CONTENTS WHERE TOE USER DATA IS STORED ee esse see se ee eene ee ee ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee ee ee ee ee 32 TABLE 6 EPASSPORT SECURITY MECHANISMS ee ee Ge ee AR Ge ee AR Ge ee AR Ge ee ee Ge ee ee Ge ee ee ee ee ee ee 33 TABLE 7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS USED BY TOE ss 39 TABLE 8 THE ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM USED BY THE TOE ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee 40 TABLE 9 RATIONALE FOR RE ESTABLISHED SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS 46 TABLE 10 ADDED SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee oe ee oe ee ee ee ee ee ee ee Re ee Re ee ee ee 47 TABLE 11 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR IT ENVIRONM
69. d in brackets as in allocated value 1 4 Composition of Security Target The referenced documents are described for cases where the user needs background or related information beyond what is mentioned in this security target and the definition of terms are provided to aid in understanding of the terms or acronyms used in this security target Section 1 of Security Target Introduction provides TOE outline information necessary for identification of security target Section 2 of Conformance Claim claims conformance to Common Criteria Protection Profile and Package and describes the rationale of conformance claims and the method of conformance by the security target Section 3 of Security Problem Definitions describe the security problems of TOE and TOE operation environment from the perspectives of threats organizational security policies and assumptions Section 4 of Security Objectives describe the security objectives for TOE and the operation environment to countermeasure the threats identified in the security problem definitions perform organizational security policies and support assumptions Section 5 of Extended Component Definition identifies the extended security requirement of this security target and provides due explanation Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 41 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Section 6 of Security Requirements describe the function and assurance requirements t
70. d which is not used in the TOE and therefore is excluded from TOE scope Runtime Environment The runtime environment provides the functions of JCRE JCVM and JCAPI which are the composition elements of Javacard platform defined in Javacard standard The runtime environment provides TSF protection functions such as firewall transaction processing and removal of residual information for secure operation of ePassport application program and provides cryptographic calculation function to ePassport application program The remote invocation RMI provided by Javacard virtual machine JCVM and the owner PIN verification provided by Javacard API to manage the unique PIN for each application program are not used in TOE and therefore are excluded from TOE scope Native OS NOS The Native OS provides functions including hardware dependent implementation IC chip start up resource management of the hardware implementation of the algorithm and chip secure setting Also CVM Cardholder Verification Method of NOS which is responsible for practical implementation of global PIN in card manager and owner PIN of Javacard API in NOW is also excluded from TOE scope ECC RSA Library V1 0 The ECC RSA library certified with CCRA EAL5 assurance level is a part of IC chip composition elements and the IT environment of TOE not included in TOE scope Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 28 129 La cns XSMART ASE LI
71. e Read Write Read Write Read Write List of Subjects nee 5 ase 7 e 7 ee Security Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Right Attribute i i i i i ERE Allow Deny Deny Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Inspection Authorization ME L i Subjec System EAC E Authorization Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Ee ae Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow Deny Allow P PKI The Issuing State of the ePassport shall execute certification practice to securely generate manage a digital signature key and to generate issue operate destroy certificates according to the CPS by implementing the PA PKI and EAC PKI according to the ePassport PKI System Also The Issuing State of the ePassport shall update certificates according to the policies to manage valid date of certificates therefore securely deliver them to the Verifying State and Inspection System When the EAC TA provides the TOE with CVCA link certificate DV certificate and IS certificate after the Inspection System obtaining information from EF CVCA stored in the TOE the TOE shall internally update certificates by verifying validity of the certificates P RANGE_RF_COMMUNICATION The RF communication distance between the MRTD chip and Inspection System shall be less than 5cm and the RF messaging shall not be established if the page of the ePassport attached with IC chip is not opened 3 3 Assumption
72. e This component defines that the application program gives the ability to determine the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 117 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG action regarding the change of OS life cycle only to Personalization agent This component allows the application program to determine whether the change of OS life cycle state when the Personalization agent installs the application program thus satisfying security objective of O Management FMT_MSA 1 Management of security attributes This component requires to restrict the ability of initializing user security attributes only to the TSF as an action to be taken if the TSF detects modification of the transmitted TSF data in FPT_ITI 1 This component satisfies the security objectives of O Secure_Messaging and O Access_Control as the integrity is ensured and access to the MRTD application data is blocked by resetting the previously given security attributes of the Personalization agent or the Inspection System as an action to be taken if the TSF detects modification of the transmitted TSF data FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute Initialization This component requires that when generating objects the security properties have a limited value as the default value and that specifying initial values are denied In this component in order to perform ePassport access control policy and OS access control policy the security properties for ePassport user data and OS user
73. ecurity Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 97 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG features of the TSF cannot be bypassed ADV_ARC 1 2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities ADV_ARC 1 3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF Content and presentation elements ADV_ARC 1 1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail commensurate with the description of the SFR enforcing abstractions described in the TOE design document ADV_ARC 1 2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs ADV ARC 1 3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF initialization process is secure ADV_ARC 1 4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF protects itself from tampering ADV_ARC 1 5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF prevents bypass of the SFR enforcing functionality Evaluator action elements ADV_ARC 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ADV_FSP 5 Semi standardized and complete function specification providing additional error information Dependencies ADV_TDS 1 Basic Design ADV_IMP 1 Expression of Implementation regarding
74. ecurity requirements have a mutually supportive and internally consistency In 6 3 3 1 Dependency of TOE security functional requirements and 6 3 3 2 Dependency of TOE security assurance requirements the dependency is analyzed as a supportive relationship among security requirements of which it is necessary to depend on other security requirements in order to achieve a security objective because a security requirement is insufficient In case the dependency was not satisfied additional rationale is provided Also security functional requirements although there is no dependency among security functional requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistency in relation to the TSF operations as of the following In the Personalization phase the Personalization agent records the MRTD application data FMT_MTD 1 1 FMT_MSA 3 and deactivates writing function so that the TOE is not modified by external entities when delivering the TOE to the Operational Use phase FMT_MOF 1 1 FMT_SMF 1 The role of the Personalization agent as such is defined as the security role FMT_SMR 1 and is controlled by the ePassport access control policies FDP_ACC 1 1 FDP_ACF 1 1 Therefore these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent The TSF after identifying the Inspection System FIA_UID 1 executes the BAC mutual authentication FIA_UAU 1 1 the EAC TA FIA_UAU 1 2 and SCP02 mutual authentication FIA_UAU 1 3
75. efore the Personalization agent identified in FIA_UID 1 uses management function on ePassport applicant identification information and TSF data If the authentication fails detection by FIA_AFL 1 2 is allowed and if the authentication succeeds the management functions on ePassport applicant basic information and TSF data are allowed thus satisfying security objectives of O Session Termination O SCP02 O Access Control FIA_UAU 4 Single use authentication mechanisms Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 116 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG This component requires that authentication related information sent by the TSF to the Inspection System in the SCPO2 mutual authentication BAC mutual authentication and the EAC TA is not replay This component satisfies the security objectives of O Replay Prevention O BAC O EAC and O SCO02 as the TSF executes the SCPO2 mutual authentication BAC mutual authentication and EAC TA by generating different random numbers used in the SCPO2 mutual authentication BAC mutual authentication and EAC TA per session and transmitting them to the Inspection System FIA_UAU 5 Multiple authentication mechanisms This component defines various authentication mechanisms and defines the rules for applying authentication mechanisms according to the type of user data the inspection system wishes to access For this component the Personalization agent is given the issuing rights management rights
76. el data is encrypted using TDES encryption algorithm to provide confidentiality and MAC Verification using Retail MAC algorithm provides integrity lt OS Access Control gt TOE provides access control function which permits only the Personalization agent that acquired management rights by succeeding in SCPO2 mutual authentication to have the application program management function to load install delete executable code and application program to the OS at the ePassport issuance Phase and usage Phase and the write rights to the basic information of the Personalization agent Also the access control function which prohibits performance of all operations except reading the Personalization agent basic information at the termination Phase of TOE life cycle is provided lt ePassport Access Control gt TOE provides access control function which permits only the Personalization agent that acquired management rights by succeeding in SCP02 mutual authentication to perform the write functions for ePassport user data and TSF data Also access control function provided for ePassport user data reading rights based on the access rights of inspection system granted through performance of security mechanisms at the ePassport usage Phase Security Management TOE limits the method of managing the security properties of user and user data of the ePassport application program and OS and the TSF data such as session key authentication key and GP registry to the
77. ements ALC_TAT 2 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ALC_TAT 2 2E The evaluator must confirm that the implementation standard is applied Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 106 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG 6 2 5 Testing ATE COV 2 Analysis of coverage Dependencies ADV FSP 2 Security enforcing functional specification ATE FUN 1 Functional testing Developer action elements ATE COV 2 1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage Content and presentation elements ATE COV 2 1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification ATE COV 2 2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the functional specification have been tested Evaluator action elements ATE COV 2 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ATE DPT 3 Modularization Design Test Dependencies ADV ARC 1 Security architecture description ADV TDS 4 Semi standardized modular design ATE FUN 1 Functional testing Developer action elements ATE DPT 3 1D The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing Content and presentation elements ATE DPT 3 1C The analysis of the depth of testing sh
78. emory to generate digital signature when requested by the inspection system and provides it to the inspection system and the inspection system verifies the digital signature with AA chip authentication public key acquired in EF DG15 to confirm if the AA chip authentication private key of protected memory and the AA chip authentication public key of EF DG15 are a valid key pair so that whether EF file has been modified or not can be checked thus satisfying security objective O AA Also this component performs ECDH calculation using the temporary public key generated by EIS with EAC chip authentication public key information of EF DG14 and the EAC chip authentication private key stored on the protected memory of TOE Depending on the success of EAC CA and depending on whether the EAC chip authentication private key of protected memory and EAC chip authentication public key of EF DG14 are a valid key pair or not the modification of EF can be confirmed thus satisfying security objective O EAC FDP_RIP 1 Subset residual information protection This component ensures that previous information is not included when the TSF allocates or deallocates memory resources for the SCP02 session key BAC authentication key BAC session key EAC session key and random numbers This component satisfies the security objective of O Deleting Residua Info as it ensures that previous information of the SCP02 session key BAC authentication key BAC session key and EAC sessio
79. ends TOE random Personalization Secure Channel Protocol 02 number and MAC value to SCP02 agent Full Triple DES MAC Personalization agent to mutual authentication TDES CBC authenticate itself authentication information SCPO2 Retail MAC TOE performs MAC calculation on SCP02 session key the TOE random number and Personalization agents random number and verifies the MAC value of the Personalization agent SCP02 SCP02 Secure Messaging Encrypted communication using secure TDES CBC SCP02 session key SCPO2 session key used in SCPO2 messaging Retail MAC mutual authentication Security Function TOE provides security functions such as identification and authentication user data protection security management TSF protection and cryptography support Identification and Authentication Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 34 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG TOE provides SCP02 mutual authentication BAC mutual authentication EAC CA EAC TA AA as the methods for identification and authentication lt SCP02 Mutual Authentication gt SCPO2 Secure Channel Protocol 02 is the security mechanism for authenticating Personalization agent with write add and renew rights for ePassport applicant identity information and TSF data in TOE and includes SCPO2 mutual authentication and secure messaging TOE and Personalization agent use Personalization agent authentication information and SC Sequence Counter to
80. ent may bypass the BAC mutual authentication by replay after intercepting data transmitted by the TOE and the Inspection System in the initial phase of the BAC mutual authentication Application Notes The TOE delivers the random number of plaintext to Inspection System according to get challenge instruction of the Inspection System in the BAC Therefore the threat agent can bypass the BAC mutual authentication by intercepting the random number and response value of the Inspection System and re transmitting the response value of the Inspection System to the next session Also the threat agent may find the transmission data as threat agent can generate the BAC session key after obtaining the BAC authentication key by T BAC Authentication Key Disclose lt EAC related Threats in the Operational Use phase gt T DAMAGE TO BIOMETRIC DATA The threat agent may disclose forge and corrupt the biometric data of the ePassport holder by using terminal capable of the unauthorized RF communication etc Application Notes Only the EIS that succeeded the EAC TA can access the read rights the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 50 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG biometric data of the ePassport holder Therefore the threat agent may attempt to obtain the biometric data by using the unauthorized Inspection System and BIS etc T EAC CA_BYPASS The threat agent may bypass the authentication of the Inspection System so that
81. es Object Operation Security Access Rights Security Properties of Properties of Object Object Read rights BAC rights EAC rights TT er ere Write rights rights ePassport applicant bio information Read rights EAC rights Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 77 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Personalization agent issuance Write rights rights Read rights BAC rights EAC rights ePassport authentication information Personalization agent issuance Write rights rights Read rights BAC rights EAC rights EF CVCA Personalization agent issuance Write rights rights Read rights BAC rights EAC rights EF COM Personalization agent issuance Write rights rights Application Notes The BAC authorization is the right given to the user identified with the Inspection System that supports the MRTD application by FIA_UID 1 when the BAC mutual authentication succeeds The EAC authorization is the right given when the Inspection System with the BAC authorization succeeds in the EAC CA and the EAC TA and the read rights of the biometric data is included in all of CVCA certificate DV certificate and IS certificate held by that Inspection System Even when the EAC CA and the EAC TA succeed the Inspection System has only the BAC authorization if the certificates do not include the read rights The issuance rights of Personalization agent is acquired when the use of ePassport applicati
82. es the issued ePassport and when going through domestic foreign immigration presents the ePassport to the immigration officer for inspection During immigration according to the ePassport immigration policy of each country either the officer verifies the ePassport or unattended inspection system verifies ePassport The registration issuance agency collects the basic bio information of the ePassport applicant and cooperates with the police and such relevant agencies to confirm the identity and requests the issuance of ePassport with such information Personalization agent digitally signs the ePassport user data ePassport identification information and authentication information to generate security object referred to as SOD hereafter and records on the ePassport IC chip along with the ePassport identification information received from the registration issuance agency Also the ePassport TSF data is recorded onto the protected memory area and the ePassport IC chip is embedded to the passport and then the ePassport is produced and issued The details of the data recorded on the ePassport is explained in Table 4 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 21 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG The Personalization agent generates the digital signature key necessary for falsification counterfeiting verification of ePassport user data stored on the ePassport IC chip and performs the authentication tasks such as gener
83. eveloper must design and implement so that the entire TSF is well structured inside ADV_INT 2 2D The developer must provide explanation and justification for the inside of TSF Content and presentation elements ADV_INT 2 1C Justification must describe the characteristics used to judge the meaning of well structured ADV_INT 2 2C The explanation of inside the TSF shall prove that the entire TSF is well structured Evaluator action elements ADV_INT 2 1E The evaluator must confirm that the provided information satisfies all evidence requirements ADV_INT 2 2E The evaluator must perform internal analysis regarding TSF ADV_TDS 4 Basic modular design Dependencies ADV_FSP 5 Semi standardized and complete function specification providing additional error information Developer action elements ADV_TDS 4 1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 100 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG ADV_TDS 4 2D The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional specification to the lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design Content and presentation elements ADV_TDS 4 1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems ADV_TDS 4 2C The design must designate each module as SFR Execution SFR Support or SFR No_interference and describe TSF from the perspectives of modules ADV_TDS 4 3C The design shall
84. ey certificate renewal after ePassport issuance Phase Secure At the time of ePassport issuance ePassport Memory ePassport issuance date is recorded but at the ePassport TSF Current date usage Phase it is updated internal by TOE to the Data most recent issue date of CVCA link certificate DV certificate or IS certificate of issuance country BAC authentication encryption key BAC authentication key BAC authentication MAC key BAC session encryption key BAC session key BAC session MAC key Temporary EAC session encryption key Memory EAC session key EAC session MAC key Issuing authority related basic data such as Personalization agent Basic data Personalization agent identification information serial number and issuance date OS Personalization agent authentication User Confidential key for SCPO2 mutual authentication data Data Application program executable file code loaded on OS Executable file the OS Memory Application program Application program instance installed on the OS OS management data such as installed application GP registry program ID application program life cycle state OS and application program rights TSF OS Life Cycle OS life cycle state value Data Temporary SCPO2 session key SCPO2 session encryption key and MAC key Memory Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 31 129 ic XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG LDS where ePassport User Data of TOE is stored defines the file s
85. ey using KDF from the exchanged BAC TDES CBC Encryption Key key sharing random number Key Distribution SHA 1 MAC key based on TDES based key Retail MAC distribution protocol Encrypt with BAC session key BAC BAC session key generate MAC and send message secure ISO Secure Messaging Encryption Key fm Verify MAC with BAC session key messaging MAC key decrypt and receive message ECDH Key Distribution EAC chip TOE performs Ephemeral static D EAC EAC CA Protocol authentication H Key Distribution Protocol Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 33 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG public key EAC chip authentication private key EAC EAC session key Encrypted communication using secure ISO Secure Messaging Encryption Key the EAC session key shared in the messaging MAC key EAC CA process IS certificate verification using CVCA certificate ECDSA SHA 1 certificate chain and link certificate CVCA link certificate EAC TA ECDSA SHA 224 Digital signature verification DV certificate ECDSA SHA 256 regarding EIS transfer message IS certificate for EIS authentication AA authentication ePassport TOE generates and sends digital public key AA Piracy RSA SHA 1 signature to inspection system to AA authentication Verification authenticate itself private key TOE performs MAC calculation on the TOE random number and Personalization agent s random number and s
86. f S3CTOKW 16 bit RISC Microcontroller For Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and Ecc Library including specific IC Dedicated Software Version 1 0 Samsung Elctronics 2010 03 31 GPCS GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2 1 1 GlobalPlatform Inc March 2003 VGP VISA GlobalPlatform 2 1 1 Card Implementation Requirements Version 1 0 VISA May 2003 VGPG VISA GlobalPlatform 2 1 1 Card Production Guide Version 1 0 VISA February 2004 JCVM Java Card Platform 2 2 1 Virtual Machine Specification Sun Microsystems October 2003 JCRE Java Card Platform 2 2 1 Runtime Environment Specification Sun Microsystems October 2003 JCAPI Java Card Platform 2 2 1 Application Programming Interface Sun Microsystems October 2003 MRTD Machine Readable Travel Document Part 1 Machine Readable Passport Volume 2 Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification Capability Doc 9303 ICAO Sixth Edition 2006 EAC Advanced Security Mechanism for Machine Readable Travel Documents Extended Access Control EAC Version 1 11 TR 03110 BSI 2007 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 7 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Definition of Terms Among the terms used in this security target those that are also used in common criteria follow the common criteria DV Document Verifier Certification authority that generates and issue
87. ficate 1 2 3 TOE Scope In this security target the life cycle of TOE is divided into Phases among the entire life cycle for ePassport of development production issuance usage and such and TOE operation environment and the scope of physical logical TOE are defined as follows 1 2 3 1 Life Cycle and Operation Environment of TOE IC Chip Composition Elements Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 22 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG S3CT9KW S3CT9KC of Samsung Electronics which is the composition element of the IC chip is a product certified with CCRA EAL5 assurance level and the composition elements included in the authentication area are IC chip hardware firmware recorded on ROM and cryptographic calculation software library as shown in the following IC Chip Hardware 16 bit microprocessor CPU 6KB RAM 2 5KB Crypto RAM 384KB ROM 144KB EEPROM S3CT9KW or 80KB EEPROM S3CT9KC Memory protection unit MPU random number generator RNG timer TIM DES calculation engine DES big number calculation engine TORNADO 2Mx2 RF interface address and data bus ADBUS Software Library for Cryptographic Calculation RSA ECC Library O ECDSA key generation O ECDSA sign verify O ECDH key sharing O RSA key generation O RSA sign verify O Hash function SHA 1 SHA 224 SHA 256 SHA 384 SHA 512 Non Determinant Random Number Generator TRNG Figure 3 illustrates the composition diagram of
88. from the random value for session key generation shared in the BAC mutual authentication BAC Secure Messaging BAC Secure Messaging A messaging which encrypts the transfer data with BAC session key generates message authentication value with BAC session MAC key before transfer to provide confidentiality and integrity of transfer data BAC Authentication Key Document Basic Access Keys BAC authentication key and MAC key generated by using key derivation mechanism from MRZ passport number passport number check digit date of birth date of birth check digit expiry date expiry date check digit for mutual authentication of ePassport IC chip and inspection system BAC inspection system BIS BAC Inspection System Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 11 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG An inspection system which implements BAC PA and AA security mechanism CSCA Certificate A certificate proving the validity of digital signature verification key against the digital signature generation key of PA PKI highest authentication authority by self signing the digital signature verification key with the digital signature generation key of the PA PKI highest authentication authority CVCA Link Certificate A certificate where the EAC PKI highest authentication authority generates a new CVCA certificate before the expiration of CVCA certificate and digitally signs with the digital signature generation key correspo
89. ge 5 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG List of Figures FIGURE 2 ENTIRE COMPOSITION DIAGRAM OF EPASSPORT SYSTEM 21 FIGURE 3 IC CHIP HARDWARE COMPOSITION DIAGRAM sien 24 FIGURE 4 TOE OPERATION ENVIRONMENT sise 26 FIGURE 5 TOE SCOPE sanden ad EE EE EE ee 27 FIGURE 6 LOGICAL SCOPE OF Nie EE rerent 30 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 6 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Referenced Documents CC Common Criteria for Evaluation of IT Security Version 3 1r3 CCBM 2009 07 001 CEM Common Methodology for Evaluation of IT Security Version 3 1r3 CCBM 2009 07 004 SCG Guide to Preparing Submission Material of SmartCard Evaluation for Developers Korea Internet amp Security Agency 2005 4 OSCPP E Passport Protection Profile Version 2 1 National Intelligence Service 2010 5 JCSPP Java Card System Protection Profile Collection Version 1 0b Sun Microsystems Inc August 2003 ICPP Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1 0 BSI PP 0002 Atmel Smart Card IC Hitachi Europe Ltd Infineon Technologies AG and Philips Semiconductors July 2001 MRTDPP Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application Basic Access Control Version 1 0 BSI PP 0017 BSI August 2005 MRTDEPP Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application Extended Access Control Version 1 1 BSI PP 0026 BSI September 2006 ICST Security Target Lite o
90. generate SCP02 session key and then mutually verify the MAC value for the exchanged random numbers to perform mutual authentication If the SCP02 mutual authentication fails the session is terminated and if it succeeds TOE forms a secure messaging using SCP02 session key lt BAC Mutual Authentication gt The inspection system supporting BAC uses BAC authentication key generated from the optically read MRZ and TOE either generates BAC authentication key from MRZ information of DG1 or uses stored BAC authentication key to each encrypt the generated random number values and exchange The inspection system supporting BAC and the TOE perform mutual authentication by confirming the exchanged random number value If the BAC mutual authentication fails the session is terminated lt EAC CA gt EAC CA implements the Ephemeral static DH key distribution protocol to provide EAC session key distribution and chip authentication TOE sends EAC chip authentication public key so that it can be authenticated by the inspection system and uses the temporary public key received from the inspection system to perform key distribution protocol If the EAC CA succeeds TOE forms EAC secure messaging using EAC session key Even if EAC CA fails BAC secure messaging is maintained and the inspection system can confirm that TOE has been pirated lt EAC TA gt EAC TA implements the digital signature based Challenge Response authentication protocol so that TOE can a
91. he TOE of this security target must satisfy Section 7 of TOE Summary Specification describes the TOE security function and assurance method satisfying TOE security requirements Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 42 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 2 Conformance Claim This section describes the explanation of TOE and the product type operation environment and evaluation scope of TOE 2 1 Common Criteria Conformance Claim This Security Target claims conformance to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation part 1 Introduction and general model Version 3 1r3 July 2009 CCMB 2009 07 001 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation part 2 Security functional requirements Version 3 1r3 July 2009 CCMB 2009 07 002 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation part 3 Security assurance requirements Version 3 1r3 July 2009 CCMB 2009 07 003 as follows Part 2 Conformant Part 3 Conformant 2 2 Protection Profile Claim 2 2 1 Protection Profile Re establishment The following are the items of security target which re established the protection profile Security Environment e A inspection system e TRESIDUAL INFO e PPERSONALIZATION AGENT e PEPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL Security Objective e O Session Termination e O Access Control e OE Information Leakage Measure Security Function Requirement Copyright 20
92. he standard below Standard List Encryption Key Encryption Key Destruction Type Access Method JCAPI clearKey TDES RSA ECC encryption key destruction 6 1 2 User Data Protection FDP_ACC 1 1 Subset access control ePassport access control Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ACF 1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the ePassport access control policy on a Subjects 1 Personalization agent Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 75 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG 2 Inspection System 3 None b Objects 1 Personal data of the ePassport holder EF DG1 EF DG2 EF DG5 EF DG13 EF DG16 2 Biometric data of the ePassport holder EF DG3 EF DG4 3 ePassport authentication data EF DG14 EF DG15 EF SOD 4 EF CVCA 5 EF COM 6 None c Operations 1 Read 2 Write 3 None FDP_ACC 1 2 Subset access control OS access control Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ACF 1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACC 1 1 The TSF shall enforce OS access control policy on a Subject 1 Personalization agent b Object 1 Executable File 2 Application program 3 Personalization agent basic information 4 Personalization agent authentication information c Operation 1 Load 2 Install 3 Delete 4 Read 5 Write 6 Change Copyright
93. hts reserved Page 18 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG and inspection systems The ePassport application programs comprising TOE implement ePassport standard and EAC standard with Javacard technology ePassport application program at the issuance Phase uses SCP02 security mechanism of card manager to authenticate the Personalization agent and grants writing rights for ePassport user data and TSF data and at the usage Phase uses BAC and EAC security mechanism to authenticate inspection system and grants reading rights for ePassport user data performing access control Also to allow inspection systems to detect counterfeiting and delicacy of ePassport AA functions are provided The OS which is the other part of TOE is composed of Javacard platform and card manager Javacard platform is a runtime environment which allows multiple application programs including ePassport application program to safely execute on a single IC chip Javacard platform according to Javacard standard provides functions of firewall memory management such as deletion of residual information transaction processing and such and provides the encryption key management and cryptographic calculation functions through API for application programs to perform cryptographic calculations Card manager performs management function for OS Card manager according to GP standard and WGP standard provides manager rights authentication through S
94. ic Analysis A method inferring the encryption key collecting and analyzing the electromagnetic wave leaked from cryptographic calculation process Grandmaster Chess Attack An attack which uses the IC chip that can perform the relay for messaging between ePassport IC chip and the inspection system to disguise as the ePassport IC chip GP Registry A storage area for information necessary for management of the operating system and installed application programs IC Chip Integrated Circuit Chip An important semi conductor to process the functions of SmartCard and an processor including four function units of mask ROM EEPROM RAM and I O port ICAO PKD A storage are for DS certificates operated and managed by ICAO which distributes online Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 14 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG the requested DS certificate of the corresponding country when requested by domestic foreign inspection systems IS certificate A certificate used to verify the digital signature value transferred to inspection system by ePassport IC chip in EAC TA process where DV digitally signed digital signature verification key of EIS with digital signature generation key LDS Logical Data Structure A logical data structure defined in ePassport specification to store ePassport user data on ePassport IC chip MAC Key Key for Message Authentic Code A key used in symmetric key ciphering algorithm according to
95. icating with the MRTD Chip through the unauthorized RF communication terminal without the ePassport holder realizing it lt Threats related to IC Chip Support gt T MALFUNCTION Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 51 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG In order to bypass security functions or to damage the TSF and TSF data stored in the TOE threat agent may occur malfunction of the TOE in the environmental stress outside the normal operating conditions lt Other Threats in the Operational Use phase gt T LEAKAGE_CRYPTOGRAPHICKEY_INFO By using electric power and wave analysis devices the threat agent may obtain key information used in cryptographic technique applied to the ePassport security mechanism by analyzing information of electric power and wave emitted in the course of the TOE operation T EPASSPORT_REPRODUCTION The threat agent may masquerade as the ePassport holder by reproduction the MRTD application data stored in the TOE and forgery identity information page of the ePassport T RESIDUAL_INFO The threat agent may disclose to critical information by using residual information remaining while the TSF data such as BAC authentication key BAC session key EAC session key DV certificate and IS certificate etc are recorded and used in temporary memory 3 2 Organizational Security Policies The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies OSP as security rules
96. identify all subsystems of the TSF ADV_TDS 4 4C The design must provide semi standardized explanation on each subsystem of TSF and when necessary must support non standardized explanation text ADV_TDS 4 5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all subsystems of the TSF ADV_TDS 4 6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the modules of the TSF ADV_TDS 4 7C The design shall describe each SFR enforcing module in terms of its purpose and relationship with other modules ADV_TDS 4 8C The design shall describe each SFR enforcing module in terms of its SFR related interfaces return values from those interfaces interaction with other modules and called SFR related interfaces to other SFR enforcing modules ADV_TDS 4 9C The design shall describe each SFR supporting or SFR non interfering module in terms of its purpose and interaction with other modules ADV_TDS 4 10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behavior described in the TOE design that they invoke it Evaluator action elements ADV_TDS 4 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ADV_TDS 4 2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete instantiation of all security functional requirements 6 2 3 Guidance Documents AGD_OPE 1 Operational user guidance Dependencies Copyright 2011 LG CN
97. ied in security requirements include Personalization agent BIS EIS ePassport IC chip This Security Target defines all subjects objects operation security attributes employed in security requirements as Table 14 Also it defines SSC Send Sequence Counter with session security attributes related to establishing secure messaging Table 14 Definition of Subject Object related Security Attributes and Operation s Pro vise Bisa saad porties Operation Subject Security Object Operation Access Rights Properties at Security Properties BIS BAC Rights ePassport Read Rights BAC Rights EAC Rights Applicant Basic Info ys pi EE 5 P Write Rights Issuing Authority Issuance Rights Read EIS BAC Rights ePassport Applicant Read Rights EAC Rights Write EAC Rights Bio Information Write Rights Issuing Authority Issuance Rigt Issuing Issuing Authority ePassport Read Rights BAC Rights EAC Rights Authori t uthorlty Issuance Rights Authentication Info Write Rights Issuing Authority Issuance Rights EF CVCA Read Rights BAC Rights EAC Rights Write Rights Issuing Authority Issuance Rights EF COM Read Rights BAC Rights EAC Rights Write Rights Issuing Authority Issuance Rights Subject Object Security Properties ESS Properties Security Properties ksuing Management Executable File Load Rights Management Rights Y Usage Rights Delete Rights Management Rights Pe Insta Application Install Rights Management R
98. ights Delete Program Deletion Rights Management Rights at Selection Rights Usage Rights Write Issuing Authority Read Rights Usage Management Rights Change Basic Information Write Rial Management Rights Change Rights Management Rights Issuing Authority Write Rights Management Rights Authentication Info Change Rigt Management Hel Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 71 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 6 1 TOE Security Function Requirements The security requirement of this Security Target consists of the components from Part 2 of the common criteria The following table 15 shows the security requirement using in this Security Target in order to satisfy TOE security objective identified in the previous chapter Table 15 TOE Security Functional Requirements Security Functional Security Functional Components Class FCS_CKM 1 1 Cryptographic key generation Key Derivation Mechanism FCS_CKM 1 2 Cryptographic key generation Generation of SCPO2 Session Key Cryptographic FCS_CKM 2 1 Cryptographic key distribution KDF Seed Distribution for Support FCS BAC session key generation FCS_CKM 3 Cryptographic key access FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction User Data Protection FDP FDP_ACC 1 1 Subset access control ePassport access control FDP_ACC 1 2 Subset access control operation system access control FDP ACF 1 1 Security at
99. ility to initialization the security attributes security attributes of subjects defined in FDP ACF 1 1 and FDP ACF 1 2 to TSF Application Notes As an action to be taken if the TSF detects modification of the transmitted TSF data in FPT_ITI 1 the TSF shall reset security attributes of subjects defined in FDP_ACF 1 1 and FDP ACF 1 2 FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute initialization Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_MSA 1 Management of security attributes FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_MSA 3 1 The TSF shall enforce the ePassport access control policy OS access control policy to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP FMT_MSA 3 2 The TSF shall allow the None to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created Application Notes The operation security properties and access rights security properties of objects of ePassport access control policy and OS access control policy are determined according to Table 17 of FDP_ACF 1 1 and Table 189 of FDP_ACF 1 2 by the implemented logic of TOE at the development Phase and the change of default value is not allowed FMT_MTD 1 1 Management of TSF data Certificate Verification Info Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD 1 1 The TSF shall restrict the ab
100. ility to write in secure memory the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 87 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG a EAC chip authentication private key b initial current date c initial CVCA certificate d initial CVCA digital signature verification key e AA chip authentication private key to Personalization agent in the Personalization phase FMT_MTD 1 2 Management of TSF data SSC Initialization Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD 1 1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the SSC Send Sequence Counter to TSF Application Notes The TSF shall initialize SSC as O in order to terminate the BAC secure messaging before establishing the EAC secure messaging after generating the EAC session key FMT_MTD 1 3 Management of TSF data OS Management Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MTD 1 1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the GP registry to Personalization agent FMT_MTD 3 Secure TSF data Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_MTD 1 Management of TSF data FMT_MTD 3 1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for TSF data Application Notes The TSF shall use only secure value safe as random numbers so that to respond t
101. ing of identification FMT_SMR 1 1 The TSF shall maintain the roles a Personalization agent b None FMT_SMR 1 2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 89 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Application Notes The Personalization agent is defined as the role to execute a and c security management function of FMT SMF 1 The TSF executes security management functions to FMT MTD 1 2 and b of FMT SMF 1 However the TSF is not defined as the role since it is not a user 6 1 5 TSF Protection FPT FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FPT_FLS 1 1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur a Failure detected in self testing by FPT_TST 1 b Conditions outside the normal operating of the TSF detected by the IC chip c State with power supply shut off during TSF operation FPT_ITI 1 Inter TSF detection of modification Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FPT_ITI 1 1 The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data during transmission between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product within the following metric strength of Retail MAC FPT_ITI 1 2 The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data transmitted between the TSF and a remote
102. ion may change GP registry This component limits the rights for GP registry change to Personalization agent thus satisfying security objective of O Managemen t FMT_MTD 3 Secure TSF Data This component requires to allow only secure values as the TSF data in order to ensure the secure random numbers and to ensure that valid date of certificates used in EAC TA has not expired This component satisfies the security objective of O Replay_Prevention because only the secure random numbers are used in order to prevent a replay attack when the TSF generates session key Also the TSF compares the CVCA link certificate provided by the Inspection System with the CVCA certificate stored in the TOE in order for verification of the IS certificate used in the EAC TA If the CVCA certificate update is necessary the TSF internally updates the CVCA certificate CVCA digital signature verification key current dates and EF CVCA therefore maintains the TSF data as secure values This component satisfies the security objectives of O Certificate_Verification and O EAC because the EAC TA can be successfully executed by verifying the DV certificate and IS certificate with the secure CVCA certificate FMT_SMF 1 Specification of management functions This component provides the means to manage the MRTD application data in the Personalization phase This component satisfies the security objective of O Management as it defines the writing function of user data and TSF data in
103. ized Inspection System as it ensures the application order of security mechanisms so that to enable the EAC CA execution by only the Inspection System with access rights for the EAC chip authentication public key through the BAC execution O Session_Termination This security objective ensures that the TOE prevents continuous authentication attempts of authentication in order for access to forge and corrupt the personal or biometric data of the ePassport holder and terminates session in case modification for the transmitted TSF data is detected Therefore this security objective is required to counter the threats of T Forgery_Corruption_Personal Data T Damage_to_Biometric_Data T BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose and T TSF_Data_Modification O Secure_Messaging Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 63 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG This security objective ensures that the TOE establishes the BAC or EAC secure messaging for secure transmission of the personal and biometric data of the ePassport holder to the Inspection System and provides the confidentiality and integrity for the transmitted personal and biometric data of the ePassport holder Therefore this security objective is required to counter the threats of T Damage to Biometric Data and T Eavesdropping O Certificate Verification This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P PKI as it ensures for the TOE t
104. key of EIS EAC TA EAC Terminal Authentication A security mechanism which implements a digital signature based Challenge Response authentication protocol where ePassport IC chip authenticates EIS with ePassport IC chip using IS certificate where ePassport IC chip uses IS certificate to verify the value where EIS digitally signed the temporary public key with its digital signature generation key in EAC CA process Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 13 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG EAC PKI Highest Authentication Authority CVCA Country Verifying Certification Authority Highest authentication authority which generates and issues CVCA certificate CVCA link certificate and DV certificate by securely generating digital signature key in the EAC PKI passport digital signature system to support EAC security mechanism EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory A non volatile memory device which retains data for a long period of time without power a storage area storing major properties to be protected by the operating system and ePassport application programs such as ePassport user data and portions of TSF data EF COM Includes LDS version information and tag information for Data Groups EF CVCA EF type file specifying the list and reading rights for CVCA digital signature verification key identification information needed for verification of CVCA certificate validity EMA Electromagnet
105. ll demonstrate that the TOE type is consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed ASE_CCL 1 8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 93 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed ASE CCL 1 9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed ASE CCL 1 10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of security requirements is consistent with the statement of security requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed Evaluator action elements ASE CCL 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE SPD 1 Security problem definition Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements ASE SPD 1 1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition Content and presentation elements ASE SPD 1 1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats ASE SPD 1 2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent an asset and an adverse action ASE SPD 1 3C The securit
106. low reading Personalization agent basic information which will be performed on behalf of the user before the user is authenticated FIA_UAU 1 2 The TSF shall authenticate the user successfully before allowing any other actions mediated by TSF on behalf of the user except the action specified in FIA_UAU 1 1 FIA_UAU 4 Single use authentication mechanisms Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FIA_UAU 4 1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to a BAC mutual authentication b EAC TA c SCPO2 mutual authentication FIA_UAU 5 Multiple authentication mechanisms Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 84 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG FIA UAU 5 1 The TSF shall provide a BAC mutual authentication b EAC TA c SCPO2 mutual authentication to Support user authentication FIA UAU 5 2 The TSF shall authenticate any user s claimed identity according to the a The BIS or EIS shall succeed the BAC mutual authentication in order to have the BAC authorization b The EIS in order to have the EAC authorization shall succeed the BAC mutual authentication EAC CA and EAC TA and include the read rights of biometric data in all of the CVCA certificate DV certificate and IS certificate For this the TSF shall provide the EAC CA c For Personalization agent to have issua
107. mation etc Application Notes The TOE denies the request to access EF SOD by the Inspection System that failed the BAC mutual authentication As the BIS supports the BAC and PA security mechanisms it obtains the read rights for the personal and authentication data of the ePassport holder if the BAC mutual authentication using the BAC authentication key succeeds Then by establishing the BAC secure messaging with the BAC session key it ensures the confidentiality and integrity of all transmitted data The BIS verifies the SOD by executing the PA after the BAC Then by calculating and comparing a hash value for the personal and authentication data of the ePassport holder it verifies the forgery and corruption for the personal and authentication data of the ePassport holder As the EIS supports the BAC EAC and PA security mechanisms it obtains the read rights for the personal authentication and biometric data of the ePassport holder The EIS when the BAC mutual authentication and secure messaging succeed executes the EAC CA by using the EAC chip authentication public key read in the BAC to verify the genuine TOE Then it executes the PA in order to verify the EAC chip authentication public key When the EAC CA is succeeded the BAC secure messaging is ended and the EAC secure messaging with the EAC session key is started and the EAC TA that the TOE authenticates inspection system The Inspection System is executed When the EAC TA is succeeded
108. me FTP ITC 1 OR FTP TRP 1 N A NO 1 14 FIA AFL 1 1 FIA UAU 1 16 18 15 FIA AFL 1 2 FIA UAU 1 17 16 FIA UAU 1 1 FIA UID 1 21 17 FIA UAU 1 2 FIA UAU 1 1 16 NO 2 18 FIA UAU 1 3 FIA UID 1 21 19 FIA UAU 4 20 FIA_UAU 5 21 FIA_UID 1 s FMT_SMF 1 30 22 Mon E E ae FMT_SMR 1 31 FMT_SMF 1 30 23 EMT MORT nr FMT_SMR 1 31 FDP ACC 1 OR FDP_ICF 1 6 24 FMT_MSA 1 30 FMT_SMR 1 31 FMT_MSA 1 24 25 FMTAMSA 33 RER FMT_SMR 1 31 FMT_SMF 1 30 26 FMT MTD 1 1 ee FMT SMR 1 31 FMT SMF 1 30 27 FMT MTD 1 2 ee FMT SMR 1 31 FMT SMF 1 30 28 EMMA oe AE FMT_SMR 1 31 29 FMT_MTD 3 FMT_MTD 1 26 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 122 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Numb Security Function Dependency Reference er Component 30 FMT_SMF 1 31 FMT_SMR 1 FIA_UID 1 21 32 FPT_FLS 1 33 FPT_ITI 1 34 FPT_TST 1 z Table 22 Security Function Component Dependency NO 1 FDP_UCT 1 and FDP_UIT 1 have dependency with FTP_ITC 1 or FTP TRP 1 but the dependency in this PP is not included FDP_UCT 1 and FDP_UIT 1 require secure messaging between the Inspection System and the TOE Since the secure messaging between Inspection System and TOE is the unique channel it is not necessary to be logically separated from other communicational channels Therefore in this Security Target requirements of FTP_ITC 1 are not defined NO 2 FIA_U
109. means that prevent to acquire key information Therefore it is mapping Threats T LEAKAGE_CRYPTOGRAPHICKEY_INFO OE Inspection_System This security objective for environment is required to support the assumption of A Inspection System and enforce the organizational security policies of P Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures and P ePassport_Access_Control as the Inspection System implements and ensures application order of security mechanisms in Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 67 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG accordance with the type of the Inspection System so that not to violate the ePassport access control policies of the Personalization agent and by ensuring that information used in communication with the TOE is securely destroyed after session termination This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of T Eavesdropping as the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data are ensured by establishing the BAC secure messaging after generating the BAC session key through the BAC key distribution when the Inspection System communicates with the TOE This security objective for environment is required to counter the threats of T Forgery Corruption Personal Data T Damage to Biometric Data T Skimming and T EAC CA Bypass as the Inspection System supports the BAC mutual authentication EAC and PA This security objective for environment is required to counter the
110. ments such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements can be demonstrated Evaluator action elements ASE ECD 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE ECD 1 2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly expressed using existing components ASE REQ 2 Derived security requirements Dependencies ASE_OBJ 2 Security objectives ASE_ECD 1 Extended components definition Developer action elements ASE_REQ 2 1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements ASE_REQ 2 2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale Content and presentation elements ASE_REQ 2 1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the SARs ASE REQ 2 2C All subjects objects operations security attributes external entities and other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined ASE_REQ 2 3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the security requirements ASE REQ 2 4C All operations shall be performed correctly ASE_REQ 2 5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied or the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being satisfied Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 96 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ASE REQ 2 6C The security requirements ra
111. n key is not available when destroying these keys according to the method of destruction defined in FCS CKM 4 Also this component satisfies the security objective of O Replay_Prevention by ensuring that previous information of random numbers used for the SCPO2 mutual authentication BAC mutual authentication TAC TA and generation of session key is not available FDP_UCT 1 Basic data exchange confidentiality This component defines the method to protect from disclosure when transmitting objects such as the personal data and the biometric data of the ePassport holder within the scope of the ePassport access control policies This component establishes the BAC or EAC secure messaging by performing cryptographic operations for the personal data of the ePassport holder etc transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System with the BAC session encryption key or the biometric data of the ePassport holder etc transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System with the EAC session encryption key Therefore this component satisfies the security objective of O Secure_Messaging as the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 114 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG confidentiality of user data is ensured This component satisfies the security objective of O Replay Prevention by ensuring that the BAC session encryption key is not used the same as the BAC authentication key when establishing the BAC secure messaging FDP
112. nce rights or management rights it must succeed in SCP02 mutual authentication FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FIA_UID 1 1 The TSF shall allow a to establish the messaging based on ISO IEC 14443 4 on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified FIA_UID 1 2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user Application Notes TOE recognizes the external entity requesting the use of ePassport application programs at the ePassport issuance Phase as the Personalization agent and as the inspection system if at the ePassport usage Phase Also if the use of card manager is requested at the ePassport issuance or usage Phase it is recognized as Personalization agent 6 1 4 Security Management Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 85 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG FMT_MOF 1 1 Management of security functions behavior ePassport write Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MOF 1 1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable the functions writing function to Personalization agent in the Personalization phase Application Notes The Personalization agent delivers the ePassport to the Operational Use phase by deactivating writi
113. nd the read rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder is allowed only to the subjects holding the EAC authorization The explicitly deny rules of FDP_ACF 1 4 defined in this component satisfy the security objective of O Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures because the application order of security mechanisms is ensured as access by the Inspection System is denied when the order of transmitted instructions specified in 2 1 Inspection Procedures of the EAC specifications is violated FDP_ACF 1 2 Security attribute based access control OS Access Control This component defines the security properties of subjects and objects defined in FDP_ACC 1 2 and specifies OS access control rules in order to perform OS access control policy The security properties and OS access control rules defined in this component grants management rights to the Personalization agent so that only authorized Personalization agent may perform OS management functions thus satisfying security objectives O Management and O Access Control Also it provides OS management method only to the subject with Personalization agent management rights thus satisfying security objective O SCPO2 Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 113 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG FDP DAU 1 Basic Data Authentication This component in order to verify the validity of ePassport user data uses the AA chip authentication private key stored on protected m
114. nding to the previous CVCA certificate CVCA Certificate A certificate which includes the value where EAC PKI highest authentication authority digitally signs the digital signature verification key with the digital signature generation key of EAC PKI highest authentication authority to prove the validity of CVCA link certificate and DV certificate CVM Cardholder Verification Method A SmartCard user authentication method using a password which is a personal identification number DFA Differential Fault Analysis A method of inferring the encryption key by inducing malfunction through enforced deformation of voltage or clock in the encryption calculation process DPA Differential Power Analysis A method of inferring the encryption key by collecting a large amount of power usage consumed in the encryption calculation process and performing a statistical analysis DS certificate Document Signer Certificate A certificate of Personalization agent signed with the digital signature generation key of PA PKI highest authentication authority used by inspection system to verify SOD of PA security mechanism DV certificate Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 12 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG A certificate including the value of digitally signing digital signature verification key of inspection system with digital signature generation key of DV to prove the validity of digital signature verification key of i
115. ng function after recording the MRTD application data in the Personalization phase FMT_MOF 1 2 Management of security functions behavior OS security function Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_MOF 1 1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable the functions the following security functions to stop resume load delete change Security Function Role Change of life cycle of application programs Personalization agent Installation of application programs Personalization agent Deletion of application programs Personalization agent Change of Personalization agent key Personalization agent Application Notes This determines whether to grant the application programs installed by the Personalization agent the rights to change OS life cycle The application program may change the OS life cycle to the states of CARD_LOCKED and TERMINATED only FMT_MSA 1 Management of security attributes Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 86 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG FMT SMR 1 Security roles FMT SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT MSA 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the ePassport access control policy OS access control policy to restrict the ab
116. ng the MRZ in the current technological level shall be at least 56bit The ST author may change MRZ entropy according to the level of the threat agent Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 56 129 X XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 4 Security Objectives This security target defines security objectives by categorizing them into the TOE and the environment The security objectives for the TOE are directly handled by the TOE The security objectives for the environment are handled by technical process related means supported from IT environment in order to provide TOE security functionality accurately 4 1 Security Objectives for the TOE The followings are security objectives to be directly handled by the TOE O Management The TOE shall provide the means to manage the MRTD application data in the Personalization phase to the authorized Personalization agent Application Notes In the Personalization phase the Personalization agent shall deactivate the writing function after recording the MRTD application data O Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures The TOE shall ensure instruction flow according to ePassport inspection procedures of the EAC specifications Application Notes The TOE shall ensure that the application order of PA BAC and EAC security mechanisms conforms to 2 1 1 Standard ePassport Inspection Procedure and 2 1 2 Advanced ePassport Procedure of the EAC specifications and shall not allow reques
117. nside of TSF ADV TDS 4 Semi standardized modularization design ALC CMS 5 Scope of configuration management of development tools ALC TAT 2 Applied implementation standard ATE DPT 3 Modularization design test Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 48 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 3 Security Problem Definition Security Problem Definition defines threats organizational policy and assumptions that intended to be processed by TOE and TOE environment 3 1 Threats The ePassport is used by possession of individuals without physically controlled devices therefore both logical and physical threats is occurred The threat agent is an external entity that attempts illegal access to assets protected by the TOE by using the physical or logical method outside the TOE In this protection profile the IC chip provides functions of physical protection in order to protect the TOE according to the A IC_Chip Therefore the physical threat of the IC chip itself by the high level threat agent is not considered Therefore the threat agent to the TOE has the moderate level of expertise resources and motivation lt Threats to the TOE in the Personalization phase gt T Personalization _Agent_Authentication_Replay After intercepting the transmitted information from TOE and personalization agent in the initial process of the personalization agent authentication mechanism SCPO2 the threat agent may bypass the SC
118. nspection system EAC Extended Access Control A security mechanism composed of EAC CA procedure for chip authentication and EAC TA procedure for inspection system authentication where only EAC supporting inspection system EIS can read the bio information of ePassport applicant to control access to ePassport applicant bio information stored on ePassport IC chip EAC Session Key EAC session encryption key amp MAC key used to establish a secure messaging for transfer protection of ePassport applicant bio information and generated using KDF with the key shared with EIS through Ephemeral Static DH key distribution protocol in the EAC CA process as seed value EAC Chip Authentication Public Key and EAC Chip Authentication Private key DH key pair used by the ePassport IC chip to authenticate itself to the EAC supporting inspection system in EAC CA process and recorded in the ePassport IC chip issuance Phase by the Personalization agent EAC inspection system EIS EAC Inspection System An inspection system which implements BAC PA and EAC security mechanisms with the option of AA EAC CA EAC Chip Authentication A security mechanism which implements Ephemeral Static DH key distribution protocol PKCS 3 ANSI X 42 etc so that EAC supporting inspection system can authenticate ePassport IC chip through key confirmation for the EACP chip authentication public key and private key of ePassport IC chip and the temporary public key and private
119. nt for Personalization agent authentication failure FIA UAU 1 3 Defines security function requirement for performing SCPO2 mutual authentication to authenticate Personalization agent FMT MOF 1 2 Adds security function requirement that only Personalization agent may grant the function to change the OS life cycle status to application programs FMT MTD 1 3 Defines security function requirement for GP registry management of OS Security Requirements for IT Environment Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 47 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Table 11 Security Requirements for IT Environment Protection Profile Security Target Rationale FCS_CKM 2 2 FCS_CKM 2 2 provided by OE IC chip FCS_COP 1 1 FCS_COP 1 1 provided by OE IC chip FCS_COP 1 2 FCS_COP 1 2 provided by OE IC chip FCS_COP 1 3 FCS_COP 1 3 provided by OE IC chip FCS COP 1 4 FCS COP 1 4 provided by OE IC chip 2 4 4 Rationale for Conformance of Assurance Requirements This security target confroms to all assurance requirements of EAL4 ADV IMP 2 AVA VAN 4 assurance level required by ePassport Protection Profile and the additionally defined assurance requirements are of EAL5 and are as follows Added Assurance Requirements ADV FSP 5 Semi standardized and complete function specification providing additional error information ADV INT 2 Well structured i
120. o be different per session and shall not use the BAC authentication key as the BAC session key Also the TOE shall not provide critical information necessary in deriving session key by generate the BAC session key with the same random number used in the BAC mutual authentication O Access_Control The TOE shall provide the access control function so that access to the MRTD application data is allowed only to external entities granted with access rights according to the ePassport access control policies of the Personalization agent Application Notes Only the authorized Personalization agent in the Personalization phase can record the MRTD application data or TSF data and access control policies for the read rights according to the type of the Inspection System shall be built in the Operational Use phase Also the access control policy is established about operation system user data including execute file application program and fundamental information for personalization agent or authority in the personalization or operational use phase Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 58 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG O BAC The TOE executes the BAC mutual authentication of the Inspection System with the TOE by implementing the BAC security mechanism in order to allow the read rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System Also the TOE generates the BAC session key to be u
121. o check the valid date on the basis of the CVCA link certificate provided by the Inspection System therefore to automatically update the certificate and the current date This security objective is required to counter the threats of T Damage_to_Biometric_Data and T IS_Certificate_Forgery by determining the status of forgery as the TOE verifies validity of the CVCA link certificate DV certificate and IS certificate in the EAC TA O Secure_State This security objective is required to counter the threat of T Malfunction as the TOE detects modification of the TSF and data through self testing and protects the TOE itself by preserving a secure state so that malfunction of TSF do not occur Also this security objective should not delete the application program and operate Organizational Security Policies P APPLICATION PROGRAM INSTALL O Deleting Residua Info This security objective is required to counter the threat of T Residual Info by deleting all of the previous security related information BAC session key and EAC session key etc so that it is not included when the TOE allocates or deallocates memory resources therefore ensuring that information is not available This security objective is required to counter the threat of T BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose by providing the means to ensure that residual information remaining in temporary memory is not available O Replay_Prevention This security objective is required to counter the threat
122. o moderate attack potential The TSF shall preserve secure values by verifying valid data of the CVCA link certificate DV certificate and IS certificate provided by the EIS Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 88 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG when executing the EAC TA and internally updating the CVCA certificate CVCA digital signature verification key current date and EF CVCA if necessary FMT SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies No dependencies FMT_SMF 1 1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions a Function to write user data and TSF data in the Personalization phase b Function to verify and update the CVCA certificate CVCA digital signature verification key and current data in the Operational Use phase c A Function to load install and delete executable files and application programs at the issuance Phase and usage Phase of ePassport B Function to write change Personalization agent basic information Personalization agent authentication information and GP registry at the issuance Phase and usage Phase of ePassport C Granting application programs the rights to change the OS life cycle at the issuance Phase and usage Phase of ePassport D Function to inquire about Chip Serial Number of ePassport FMT_SMR 1 Security roles Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FIA_UID 1 Tim
123. ocess Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 24 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG RSA ECC Cryptographic Library e Key distribution calculation for EAC session key distribution in EAC process e Digital signature verification calculation for certificate verification in EAC process e Hash calculation using SHA algorithm e Digital signature generation calculation using chip authentication private key in AA process TOE Life Cycle Table 3 shows the IC chip life cycle divided into ePassport IC chip life cycle and TOE life cycle Phase by Phase and the delivery process is omitted From the life cycle of Table 3 TOE development process is Phase 1 development and 2 production and TOE operation environment corresponds to 3 issuance 4 usage and 5 termination Table 3 Life Cycle of ePassport IC Chip and TOE Phase ePassport IC Chip Life Cycle TOE Life Cycle IC chip developer designs the IC chip 1 and develops dedicated IC chip S W Bevek EE aE ae OE OE ea Ey re Me yg ae opment 2 S W developer uses IC chip and dedicated IC chip S W to develop TOE OS ePassport application program IC chip producer performs the ROM Masking of TOE chip identifier recording and production of IC chip 2 4 ePassport producer performs initialization of COS Produ ePassport producer installs ePassport application ction program to generate user data storage area in EEPROM according to ePassport LDS
124. ognition and encryption key for authentication between the inspection systems and ePassport and for secure message communication Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 20 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG 1 2 2 ePassport System Figure 2 illustrates the entire composition diagram of ePassport system Personalization agent ePassport personalization PKI System operation Requests tor issuing of the aPasspor Reception Organization identity data f Recording ePasspon i EAC PKI i identity data Collecting Passport Identity data Delivery the n Cresing recording i s H CVCA Passport 7 Check identy of Manufacturing authentication data L if i the ePassport holder issuing ePasspor H Eo H Reviewing suitabilty of ePassport Hi nerstes ii Generates issuarance Recording i CYCA CVCA certiicata CVCA link TSF dats i i DV cerfficate I tt i Distributing CSCA certificate and DS caertficata Inspection system ePassport Document verifier Passport Inspection Distributing Generating Distributing CVCA certficate S certificate CVCA cerificae CVCA link certificate CVCA link certificate and OY certificate and DY certificate IS certificate Figure 2 Entire Composition Diagram of ePassport System ePassport applicant requests the issuance of ePassport and receives the ePassport properly issued according to ePassport issuance policy ePassport applicant carri
125. on is not employed for not only temporarily generated information in the temporary memory area such as BAC session key EAC session key SCP02 session key and random number but also the information generated in the protected memory are such as BAC authentication key lt Transaction Processing gt TOE provides transaction function to detect TSF malfunctioning when a power supply shut off or enforced termination of TSF service during operation occurs and resume TSF service from the state before the malfunctioning lt Self Test gt TOE performs TSF data change detection and measure functions and performs self test to verify the integrity of stored TSF data and executable code Also when a failure from self test or an abnormal operation status from the IC chip is detected it maintains secure state so that malfunctioning of TSF does not occur Cryptography Support TOE provides hash calculation and provides random number generation key exchange calculation operation mode encryption decryption calculation operation mode and MAC and digital signature calculation operation mode using the IC chip and cryptographic calculation library TOE guarantees that encryption related information cannot be found by abusing physical phenomenon current voltage electromagnetic change etc occurring during Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 38 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG performance of cryptographic calcul
126. on program is requested at the ePassport issuance Phase according to FIA_UID 1 and the user recognized as the Personalization agent has succeeded in the Personalization agent authentication FDP_ACF 1 2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed a Execution of the operation is allowed only when security attributes of subjects are included in security attributes of the object s access rights and operations corresponds to security attributes of the object s operation b None Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 78 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG FDP_ACF 1 3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules None FDP_ACF 1 4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules a Explicitly deny access of subjects to objects if instructions order of the inspection system is not correct in order to ensure the application order of security mechanisms according to 2 1 Inspection Procedures of the EAC specifications b Explicitly deny read of subjects to biometric data if there is no the read rights of biometric data in IS certificate of the EIS that has the EAC authorization c Explicitly deny access read write etc of the unauthorized Inspection System to all objects d None FDP_ACF 1 2 Security att
127. pected test results Evaluator action elements ATE FUN 1 1EThe evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample Dependencies ADV_FSP 2 Security enforcing functional specification AGD_OPE 1 Operational user guidance AGD_PRE 1 Preparative procedures ATE_COV 1 Evidence of coverage ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing Developer action elements ATE_IND 2 1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 108 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Content and presentation elements ATE IND 2 1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing ATE IND 2 2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in the developer s functional testing of the TSF Evaluator action elements ATE IND 2 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ATE IND 2 2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test results ATE IND 2 3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified 6 2 6 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN 4 Methodical vulnerability analysis Dependencies ADV_ARC 1 Security architecture description ADV FSP 2 Complete functional specification ADV_TDS 3 Basic modular design
128. phic key access method of access using memory address compliant with the following no standard Caution when Applying The application programs loaded on TOE may call the command to access the key according to the standards below Standard List Encryption Key Encryption Key Access Type Access Method GPCS PUT Key command Encryption key storage VGP STORE DATA command LDS PUT Key command Encryption key storage STORE DATA command JCAPI getKey DES key inspection setKey DES key storage getS ECPrivateKey inspection Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 74 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG setS ECPrivateKey storage getW ECPublicKey inspection setW ECPublicKey storage getExponent RSAPrivateKey inspection getModulus RSAPublicKey inspection setExponent RSAPrivateKey storage setModulus RSAPublicKey storage FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction Hierarchical to No other components Hierarchical to No other components FDP_ITC 2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM 4 1 The TSF shall destroy the cryptographic key and MAC key according to the specified encryption key destruction method filling with 0 compliant with the following no standard Caution when Applying The application programs load on TOE may call the command to destroy the key according to t
129. port digital signature and management of authentication related records Reverse Engineering Analyzing completed products in detail to understand and reproduce the basic design concepts and applied technologies Certificate Electronic information signed electronically on digital signature verification key by issuance authority to confirm and prove that the digital signature generation key uniquely belongs to the owner Applet Application program executed on the Javacard platform written in Javacard language ePassport A passport containing contactless IC chip with identification and other information of the passport applicant according to the international standard prescribed by ICAO and ISO ePassport User Data Includes ePassport identification information and ePassport authentication information ePassport Identification Information Includes ePassport application basic information and bio information ePassport Applicant Basic Information Visually distinguishable information and other identification information printed on the identification information page of ePassport stored on ePassport IC chip in LDS structure ePassport Applicant Bio Information Sensitive Data The fingerprint and or iris information of the ePassport applicant stored on ePassport IC chip in LDS structure ePassport Applied Data Includes ePassport user data and TSF data Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 9 129 XSMART_AS
130. procedures practices or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations P INTERNATIONAL_COMPATIBILITY The Personalization agent shall ensure compatibility between security mechanisms of the ePassport and security mechanism of the Inspection System for immigration Application Notes The international compatibility shall be ensured according to the ICAO document and EAC specifications P SECURITY_MECHANISM_APPLICATION_PROCEDURES The TOE shall ensure the order of security mechanism application according to the type of the Inspection System so that not to violate the ePassport access control policies of the Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 52 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Personalization agent Application Notes The operation flow of the TOE differs according to the type of security mechanisms supported by the Inspection System The basic operation flow depends on 2 1 1 Standard ePassport Inspection Procedure and 2 1 2 Advanced ePassport Procedure of the EAC specifications P APPLICATION_PROGRAM_INSTALL The Personalization agent shall approve application program installing after checking that application programs loaded in the MRTD chip does not affect the secure TOE Application notes The application program installing can only be done by organizations holding the same authority as the Personalization agent Also ePassport application program installed in the IC chips cannot be deleted in
131. r security objectives and additionally defined security objectives are O AA and O SCPO2 Re established Security Objective e O Session Termination the failure of SCPO2 mutual authentication for Personalization agent authentication is added to session termination situations and the case of EAC TA failure which does not terminate the session is deleted and re established e O Access Control re established for TOE to provide access control for OS e OE Information Leakage Measure re established for the TOE environment of IC chip and cryptographic library to provide information leakage measure Added Security Objective e O AA added as a security objective to provide a method for inspection system to determine the authenticity of TOE Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 45 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG e O SCP02 added to support SCP02 security mechanism for Personalization agent authentication 2 4 3 Rational for Conformance of Security Function Requirements This security target conforms to the security function requirement of ePassport Protection Profile and the operations are completed and re established according to the preparation rules allowed in the security function requirement of Table 9 and the security function requirements of Table 10 were additionally defined Re established Security Function Requirements Table 9 Rationale for Re established Security Function Requirements
132. r shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE INT 1 2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference the TOE overview and the TOE description are consistent with each other ASE_CCL 1 Conformance Claim Dependencies ASE_INT 1 ST Introduction ASE_ECD 1 Extended components definition ASE_REQ 1 Stated security requirements Developer action elements ASE_CCL 1 1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim ASE_CCL 1 2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale Content and presentation elements ASE_CCL 1 1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim conformance ASE_CCL 1 2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended ASE_CCL 1 3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended ASE_CCL 1 4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended components definition ASE_CCL 1 5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement packages to which the ST claims conformance ASE_CCL 1 6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a package as either package conformant or package augmented ASE_CCL 1 7C The conformance claim rationale sha
133. ribute based access control OS access control Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute initialization FDP_ACF 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the OS access control policy to objects based on the following Table 18 and Table 19 Table 18 Security Properties per Subject Subject Security Properties Personalization agent Usage rights management rights Table 19 Security Properties per Object Security Properties Object Operation Security Access Rights Security Properties Properties Loading rights Management rights E citable File Em Deletion rights Management rights Loading rights Management rights Application Program Deletion rights Management rights Selection rights Usage rights Personalization Reading rights Usage rights management rights Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 79 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG agent Basic Selection rights Management rights Information Changerights Management rights Personalization Selection rights Management rights agent ma EE Authentication Change rights Management rights Information Caution when Applying Usage rights are acguired by the user recognized as the Personalization agent when the use of card manager is reguested at the ePassport issuance Phase and usage Phase according to FIA UID 1
134. roviding a method to verify the authenticity of TOE User Data Protection TOE provides access control and secure messaging for user data protection lt SCP02 Secure Messaging gt TOE establishes SCPO2 secure messaging using the SCPO2 session key generated in the SCPO2 mutual authentication process to perform secure communication with the Personalization agent which performed the SCPO2 mutual authentication successfully When sending data through this channel data is encrypted using TDES encryption algorithm to provide confidentiality and MAC Verification using Retail MAC algorithm provides integrity lt BAC Secure Messaging gt TOE confirms the reading rights of inspection system for ePassport applicant Basic Information through BAC mutual authentication and then generates BAC secure messaging using the BAC session key shared through BAC key distribution to transfer ePassport applicant basic information securely When sending data through this channel data is encrypted using TDES encryption algorithm to provide confidentiality and MAC Verification using Retail MAC algorithm provides integrity lt EAC Secure Messaging gt TOE generates EAC secure messaging using EAC session key shared through EAC key distribution of EAC CA process to perform secure communication with the inspection Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 36 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG system When sending data through this chann
135. rtificate_Forgery and support the assumption of A Certificate_Verification OE Personalization_Agent This security objective for environment is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P International_Compatibility and P Personalization_Agent by ensuring that the TOE is delivered to the Operational Use phase after securely issuing the ePassport so that the Personalization agent can check that the issuing subject has not been changed verifying normal operation and compatibility of the ePassport in the Personalization phase and deactivating writing function This security objective for environment also is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P ePassport Access Control as it defines the role of the Personalization agent Also this security objective for environment is required to support the assumption of A Certificate_Verification because the Personalization agent makes certificates necessary in the PA and EAC support available to the Inspection System This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of T TSF Data Modification because the Personalization agent deactivates writing function in the Operational Use phase therefore disables the writing function for modification of the TSF data OE Handling information leakage For this environment the security objective shall analyze emitted power or radio wave information in the cryptographic operation of ePassport IC chip and provide
136. s The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used in order to limit the scope of security consideration A Certificate_Verification The Inspection System such as the BIS and the EIS verifies the SOD after verifying validity of the certificate chain for the PA CSCA certificate DS certificate in order to verify for forgery and corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE For this the DS certificate and CRL shall be verified periodically The EIS shall securely hold the digital signature generation key that corresponds to the IS certificate and shall provide the TOE with the CVCA link certificate the DV certificate and the IS certificate in the EAC TA Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 54 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Application Notes The Inspection System should connect to ICAO PKD periodically and download CSCA certificates to verify the certificate for PA of the inspection system A Inspection System The Inspection System shall implement security mechanisms of the PA the BAC and the EAC according to the ICAO document and EAC specifications on the basis of the verifying policy of the ePassport for the ePassport holder Also after session ends the BIS and the EIS shall securely destroy all information used in communication and the TOE such as the BAC session key the EAC session key and session infor
137. s IS certificate Personalization Agent Authority which receives ePassport identification information and such from receipt issuance authority generates SOD by electronically signing it record them on IC chip of ePassport then generate TSF data for ePassport stores them on protected memory area of IC chip of ePassport and operates PA PKI and or EAC PKI SOD Document Security Object Generated digital signature of Personalization agent on the identification authentication information of ePassport recorded in the ePassport issuance Phase Object implemented as Signed Data Type of RFC 3369 Cryptographic Message Syntax 2002 8 and encoded in DER method Executable File A collection of executable modules stored on EEPROM Executable Module The executable code of a single application program Ciphertext Only Attack An attack attempting deciphering based on the ciphertext collected by threat agents Encryption Key The key used in TDES to encrypt data for data exposure protection Passport Digital signature Unique information signed on ePassport with the digital signature generation key issued by the issuance authority for issuance and confirmation of recorded items of electronically processed passport Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 8 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Passport Digital signature System A system to provide authentication service such as issuance of certificates necessary for pass
138. s Security Target consist of the following components from Part 3 of the CC summarized in the following Table 20 and evaluation assurance level is EAL5 ADV_IMP 2 In this Security Target the assurance components are augmented follows e ADV IMP 2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF Table 20 Assurance Requirements Assurance Class Assurance Component Security Target ASE_INT 1 Security Target Introduction ASE_CCL 1 Conformance Claims ASE_SPD 1 Definition of Security Problems ASE_OBJ 2 Security Objective ASE_ECD 1 Extended Component Definitions ASE_REQ 2 Derived Security Requirements ASE_TSS 1 TOE Summary Specification Development ADV_ARC 1 Security Structure Specification Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 91 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG ADV_FSP 5 Semi Standardized and Complete Function Specification Providing Additional Error Information ADV_IMP 2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of TSF ADV_INT 2 Well structured inside of TSF ADV_TDS 4 Semi standardized modularization design Manual AGD_OPE 1 User operation manual AGD_PRE 1 Preparation procedure Life Cycle Support ALC_CMC 4 Production support reception procedure and automation ALC_CMS 5 Scope of configuration management of development tools ALC_DEL 1 Distribution pro
139. s and notifies of abnormal operation status so as to prevent TSF malfunction and in the case power supply is shut off during TSF operation the operations stopped by power supply shut off are restored to the state before the operation began to maintain secure state when the TOE reoperates thus satisfying the security objective of O Secure State FPT ITI 1 Inter TSF detection of modification This component requires to detect modification in the transmitted TSF data and defines an action to be taken if modifications are detected This component satisfies the security objectives of O Secure_Messaging and O Session_Termination by detecting modification of the transmitted TSF data in the Operational Use phases and by performing an action to be taken such as terminating the related messagings deleting the related session key and management actions specified in FMT_MSA 1 etc if modifications are detected FPT_TST 1 TSF testing This component requires self testing to detect loss of the TSF and the TSF data by various failure unexpected failure mode lack of the IC chip design and intentionally damage to the TSF etc For this component self tests are performed on TSF when initiating TOE to prove precise operative of O Secure State Also the integrity of TSF and TSF data stored on TOE is verified to detect their loss and detecting the loss thus satisfying security objective of O Secure State 6 3 2 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
140. s to write user data in EF domain and the means to write TSF data in secure memory only to the authorized Personalization agent in the Personalization phase and prevents unauthorized access using external interface by deactivating the MRTD application data writing function of the Personalization agent in the Operational Use phase Therefore this security objective is required to counter the threats of T TSF Data Modification and T BAC Authentication Key Disclose and to enforce the organizational security policies of P ePassport Access Control and P Personalization Agent Also this security objective provides the Personalization agent with the means to record CVCA certificate in secure memory in the Personalization phase therefore is required to counter the threat of T IS Certificate Forgery O Security Mechanism Application Procedures This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P Security Mechanism Application Procedures since the TOE ensures that the application order of the PA BAC and EAC security mechanisms according to 2 1 1 Standard ePassport Inspection Procedure and 2 1 2 Advanced ePassport Procedure of the EAC specifications and by not allowing requests from the Inspection System that do not correspond to the security mechanism application order Also this security objective is required to counter the threat of T EAC CA Bypass by eliminating the cases of demonstrating the genuine TOE to the unauthor
141. se the delivery procedures Content and presentation elements ALC DEL 1 1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer Evaluator action elements ALC DEL 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ALC DVS 1 Identification of security measures Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements ALC DVS 1 1D The developer shall produce and provide development security documentation Content and presentation elements ALC DVS 1 1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical procedural personnel and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation in its development environment Evaluator action elements ALC DVS 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ALC DVS 1 2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied ALC LCD 1 Developer defined life cycle model Dependencies No dependencies Developer action elements ALC LCD 1 1D The developer shall establish a life cycle model to be used in the development and maintenance of the TOE Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 105 129 XSMART_AS
142. sed for the BAC secure messaging O EAC The TOE authenticates the Inspection System by implementing the EAC security mechanism EAC CA and EAC TA in order to allow the read rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System Also the TOE generates the EAC session key to be used for the EAC secure messaging O SCPO2 TOE implements the security mechanism SCPO2 to provide means managing ePassport application data by only the authorized personalization agent and performs SCPO2 mutual authentication between TOE and inspection system O AA TOE implements AA security mechanism to recognize the illegal reproduction of TOE by the inspection system 4 2 Security Objectives for the Environment The following are security objectives handled by IT fields or nontechnical procedure related means OE ePassport_Manufacturing_Security Physical security measures security printing etc for the ePassport shall be prepared to detect reproduction of the MRTD chip and attack attempt of the Grandmaster chess replacement of the portrait and modification of the MRZ data etc OE Procedures_of_ePassport_holder_Check The Immigration officer shall prepare for procedures to check identity of the ePassport holder against the printed identity information page of the ePassport OE Application_Program_Install Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 59 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG
143. session FPT_ITI 1 and reset the access rights of the Inspection System FMT_MSA 1 Therefore these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent The TSF must execute self testing FPT_TST 1 under the conditions decided by the ST author In case the failure is detected the TOE must preserve a secure state FPT_FLS 1 Therefore these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 125 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG 7 TOE Summary Specification 7 1 TOE security function This clause explains TOE security function TSF satisfying the security requirements described in the last section Each security function is described with its name and a simple explanation Detailed information is given in the function specification document Table 24 TOE security function Security Function Explanation SF_CARD_MANAGEMENT Management of card data SF_AUTHENTICATION Identification and authentication SF_COUNTER_MEASURE Security measures SF_OBJECT_ACCESS Access control for Java Objects SF_RESOURCE_MANAGEMENT Resource management SF_CRYPTOGRAPHY Support Cryptography SF_PERSO_CONTROL Support ePassport issuance SF_BASIC_ACCESS_CONTROL Support Basic Access Control SF_EXTENDED_ACCESS_CONTROL Support Extended Access Control SF_ACTIVE_AUTHENTICATION S
144. spection System identified in FIA_UID 1 to execute the indication function to support the BAC mechanism and to read the personal data of the ePassport holder This component satisfies the security objectives of O Session Termination O BAC and O Access_Control as it enables detection by FIA_AFL 1 1 if the authentication fails and allows the read rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder if the authentication succeeds FIA UAU 1 2 Timing of authentication EAC TA This component defines the functions the user to be performed before the EAC TA and executes the EAC TA for user In this component only the Inspection System of which the BAC mutual authentication succeeded in FIA_UAU 1 1 can execute EAC CA and reading of user data exception of the biometric data of the ePassport holder To read the biometric data of the ePassport holder the EAC TA shall be executed This component satisfies the security objectives of O Security Mechanism Application Procedures O Session_Termination O EAC and O Access Control as it enables detection by FIA AFL 1 1 if authentication fails and allows the read rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder if authentication succeeds FIA UAU 1 3 Timing of authentication SCPO2 mutual authentication This component defines the functions the user can perform before SCPO2 mutual authentication and performs SCPO2 mutual authentication on the user This component performs SCPO2 mutual authentication b
145. ssport Security Target ASE CCL 1 XSmart e Passport Security Target ASE SPD 1 XSmart e Passport Security Target ASE 0BJ 2 XSmart e Passport Security Target ASE ECD 1 XSmart e Passport Security Target ASE REQ 2 XSmart e Passport Security Target ASE TSS 1 XSmart e Passport Security Target ADV ARC 1 XSmart e Passport Structure Analysis Document ADV FSP 5 XSmart e Passport Function Specification ADV INT 2 XSmart e Passport Interface Specification ADV IMP 2 XSmart e Passport Implementation Verification Document ADV TDS 4 XSmart e Passport Design Document AGD OPE 1 XSmart e Passport Manual AGD PRE 1 XSmart e Passport Manual ALC CMC 4 XSmart e Passport Configuration Management Document ALC CMS 5 XSmart e Passport Configuration Management Document ALC DEL 1 XSmart e Passport Distribution Guide ALC DVS 1 XSmart e Passport Life Cycle Support Document ALC LCD 1 XSmart e Passport Life Cycle Support Document ALC TAT 2 XSmart e Passport Life Cycle Support Document ATE COV 2 XSmart e Passport Test Analysis Document ATE_DPT 3 XSmart e Passport Test Analysis Document ATE_FUN 1 XSmart e Passport Test Document ATE_IND 2 AVA_VAN 4 7 3 Rationale of TOE Summary Specification 7 3 1 Conformance of TOE Assurance Requirements Assurance verification method is provided through Table 25 of TOE summary specification of section 7 regarding assurance requirements needed for selected evaluation assurance level Copyright 2011
146. st functions regarding IC chip hardware 1 2 3 3 Logical Scope of TOE TOE communicates with the inspection system according to the communication protocol defined in ISO IEC 14443 4 TOE implements the security mechanism defined in ePassport Standard and EAC Standard and provides access control and security management functions Also it provides self protection functions for TSF such as self test secure state preservation and separation of area Figure 6 shows the logical scope of TOE Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 29 129 La cns XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Inspection system Software ePassport application OS PA EE SS EE EE EE ma TOE XSmart e Passport V1 2 BAC Identification Authentication User data protection BAC ePassport BAC Mutual Authentication Access control Secure channel OS EAC SCP02 Mutual Authentication SCPO2 Secure channel Inspection Issuance system SCPO2 Issuance ePassport OS management Application data management Application program management Life cycle management Cryptography support TSF protection RSA ECC Library Digital signature 7 7 7 7 verification ey creation ey creation F GP Area separation Reference monitor RER 7 Deletion of ECDH key exchange d dl en residual information ECDSA digital signature Key destruction Self test verification EEE DE N EE DES operation Remote method invocation PIN verification
147. t also the IC chip must be verified After ePassport is issued with IC chip inside it is difficult to make a correction even if a fault occurs and accordingly the attacker may abuse this Therefore ADV_IMP 2 was added to implement TSF precisely and analyze the expression of the entire implementation for existence of faulty code 6 3 3 Rationale of Dependency 6 3 3 1 Dependency of TOE Security Functional Requirements Table 22 shows dependency of TOE functional components Numb Security Function Dependency Reference er Component FCS_CKM 2 OR FCS_COP 1 3 1 FCS CKM 1 D ee eee FCS CKM 4 5 FCS_CKM 2 OR FCS COP 1 3 2 FCS CKM 1 2 ee FCS CKM 4 5 FDP ITC 1 OR FDP_ITC 2 OR FCS CKM 1 1 3 FES CKM 2 1 EER EE POS CRM tt gt Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 121 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Numb Security Function Dependency Reference er Component FDP ITC 1 OR FDP_ITC 2 OR FCS CKM 1 4 FCSSCKM 3n PTR FCS CKM 4 5 5 FCS_CKM 4 FDP ITC 1 OR FDP_ITC 2 OR FCS CKM 1 1 6 FDP ACC 1 1 FDP ACF 1 8 7 FDP_ACC 1 2 FDP_ACF 1 9 FDP_ACC 1 7 8 FDP ACF 1 1 femme FMT MSA 3 25 FDP ACC 1 7 9 Pl RR FMT MSA 3 25 10 FDP DAU 1 11 FDP_RIP 1 FTP_ICT 1 OR FTP_TRP 1 N A NO 1 12 FDP UETL ET ere FDP_ACC 1 OR FDP_IFC 1 6 FDP ACC 1 OR FDP_IFC 1 6 13 FDP UIT 1 frem
148. the terminal for RF communication with ePassport IC chip and the system sending commands to the ePassport IC chip through this terminal and processing the responses Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 10 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG AA Active Authentication A security mechanism where ePassport IC chip verifies its authenticity by signing on the random number transferred from the inspection system and the inspection system verifies the authenticity of ePassport IC chip by verifying the signature value Application Protocol Data Unit APDU A data format for exchanging packaged data between SmartCard and terminal APDU is divided into command APDU and response APDU TPDU of subordinate layer according to the communication protocol between the card and the terminal exists and APDU is converted to appropriate TPDU and then transferred BAC Basic Access Control A security mechanism which implements the symmetric key based entity authentication protocol for mutual authentication of ePassport IC chip and inspection system and the symmetric key based entity authentication protocol for generating session key needed to establish a secure messaging between them BAC Mutual Authentication Mutual authentication of ePassport IC chip and inspection system according to ISO 9798 2 symmetric key based entity authentication protocol BAC Session Keys BAC session keys and MAC keys generated using key derivation mechanism
149. the Personalization phase Also this component satisfies the security objective of O Certificate Verification as it provides the function for the TSF to update the CVCA certificate the CVCA digital signature verification key and current dates etc by itself in the Operational Use phase Also this component provides application program management function Personalization agent basic information Personalization agent authentication information functions for reading changing GP registry and granting OS life cycle change rights to application program as methods to manage OS application data thus satisfying security objective O Management FMT SMR 1 Security roles This component defines the role of the Personalization agent to manage the MRTD application data This component satisfies the security objective of O Management as it defines the role of the Personalization agent that executes the writing function of user data and TSF data in the Personalization phase Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 119 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG FPT FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state This component requires that when malfunctioning such as failure detected in self test and abnormal operation status detected by IC chip a secure state is maintained This component stops the operation of TOE when it detects change in integrity of TSF data or executable code in the self test of FPT TST 1 or the IC chip detect
150. the encryption key of the specified encryption key length of 112 bit with the specified encryption key generation algorithm Appendix E 4 1 DES Session Keys Part 3 Block ciphers compliant with the following standard of GP standard ISO IEC 18033 3 FCS_CKM 2 1 Cryptographic key distribution KDF Seed Distribution for BAC session key generation Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 73 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ITC 1 Import of user data without security attributes or FDP_ITC 2 Import of user data with security attributes or FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM 2 1 The TSF shall distribute KDF Seed for the BAC session key generation in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method selection key Establishment mechanism 6 assignment other cryptographic key distribution method that meets the following selection ISO IEC 11770 2 assignment other standards FCS_CKM 3 Cryptographic key access Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ITC 1 Input of user data without security properties or FDP_ITC 2 Input of user data with security properties or FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS CKM 3 1 The TSF shall perform encryption key storage inspection using the specified cryptogra
151. threat of T SessionData Reuse as the Inspection System generate different temporary public key per session to be transmitted to the TOE in the EAC CA OE IC Chip This security objective for environment is required to support the assumption of A IC Chip as it uses EAL4 SOF high IC chip that generates random number and provides cryptographic operation in order to support security functions of the TOE and provides the malfunction detection and physical protection etc In case performing TDES operation RSA operation or ECDSA operation the co processor of the IC chip or cryptographic libraries loaded in the IC chip shall implement countermeasures to prevent exploiting of leakage information Also it is mapping to Threats T Handling Information Leakage T MALFUNCTION due to detecting the malfunction OE MRZ Entropy This security objective for environment is required to support the assumption of A MRZ Entropy by providing MRZ entropy necessary for the Personalization agent to ensure the secure BAC authentication key OE PKI This security objective for environment is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P PKI and supports the assumption of A Certificate Verification by implementing and operating the ePassport PKI System that executes certification practice according to CPS such as to generate digital signature key and to generate issue distribute of certificates necessary in supporting PA and EAC security mechanisms
152. tionale shall trace each SFR back to the security objectives for the TOE ASE REQ 2 7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet all security objectives for the TOE ASE REQ 2 8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARS were chosen ASE REQ 2 9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent Evaluator action elements ASE REQ 2 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE TSS 1 TOE summary specification Dependencies ASE INT 1 ST introduction ASE REQ 1 Stated security requirements ADV FSP 1 Basic functional specification Developer action elements ASE TSS 1 1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification Content and presentation elements ASE TSS 1 1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each SFR Evaluator action elements ASE TSS 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE TSS 1 2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description 6 2 2 Development ADV ARC 1 Security architecture description Dependencies ADV FSP 1 Basic functional specification ADV TDS 1 Basic design Developer action elements ADV ARC 1 1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the s
153. to go through EAC CA by using the threat agent generated EAC chip authentication public key T IS_CERTIFICATE_FORGERY In order to obtain the access rights the biometric data of the ePassport holder the threat agent may attempt to bypass the EAC TA by forging the CVCA link certificate DV certificate and IS certificate and requesting verification of the certificates to the TOE lt BAC and EAC related Threats in the Operational Use phase gt T SESSIONDATA_REUSE In order to find out the transmitted data through the secure messaging the threat agent may derive session keys from a number of cryptographic communication texts collected by using the terminal capable of wide ranging RF communication Application Notes When the TOE and Inspection System use the BAC authentication key as the BAC session key they are vulnerable to ciphertext only attack as the same session key is used in each BAC session When the BAC session key is generated with the same random number used in the BAC mutual authentication critical information necessary in deriving the session key may be provided to an attacker as the first random number of the TOE is transmitted as plaintext In case the EIS transmits temporary public key in the EAC CA and random number in the EAC TA to other sessions in the same way and the TOE continues to use them they may be vulnerable to ciphertext only attack T SKIMMING The threat agent may read information stored in the IC chip by commun
154. tribute based access control ePassport access control FDP ACF 1 2 Security attribute based access control OS access control FDP_DAU 1 Basic data authentication FDP_RIP 1 Subset residual information protection FDP_UCT 1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UIT 1 Data exchange integrity identification and Authentication FIA FIA_AFL 1 1 Authentication failure handling user session termination FIA_AFL 1 2 Authentication failure handling retry prohibited FIA_UAU 1 1 Timing of authentication BAC mutual authentication FIA_UAU 1 2 Timing of authentication EAC TA FIA_UAU 1 3 Timing of authentication SCPO2 mutual authentication FIA_UAU 4 Single use authentication mechanism FIA_UAU 5 Multiple authentication mechanism FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification Security Management FMT FMT_MOF 1 1 Management of security functions behavior ePassport writing FMT_MOF 1 2 Management of security functions behavior OS life cycle change FMT_MSA 1 Management of security attributes FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute initialization FMT_MTD 1 1 Management of TSF data information certificate verification FMT MTD 1 2 Management of TSF data SCC initialization FMT MTD 1 3 Management of TSF data OS management FMT MTD 3 Secure TSF data Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reser
155. tructures of MF DF EF and Table 5 shows the contents of EF DG1 EF DG16 where a portion of TOE user data is stored Table 5 LDS Contents where TOE User Data is Stored category DG Contents LDS Structure Document type Issuance State Name of Holder Document number Check Digit Doc Number Detail s Nationality Recorded in DG1 date of birth MRZ Check Digit DOB Sex Date of expiry or Valid Until date Issuer Application User Application Check Digit DOE VUD AID A0 yg 47 1001 DF Composite Check Digit Encoded DG2 Encoded face EF COM Common Data Identification DG3 Encoded finger s Short File ID 1E Features EF DG1 EF DG9 DG4 Encoded Iris s MRZ Data Data Group 9 Short File ID 01 Short File ID 09 DG5 Displayed Portrait EF DG2 EF DG10 DG6 7 Data Group 2 Data Group 10 Short File ID 02 Short File ID 0A DG7 Displayed signature DG8 bas DG10 EF SOD EF DG16 Miscellaneous DG11 Additional Personal Detail s ile ID 1D Data Group 16 iti r il s Short File1D 1D sport File ID 10 DG12 Additional Document Detail s DG13 S EAC chip authentication public DG14 key AA Digital Signature Verification DG15 Key Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 32 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG DG16 Person s to Notify Securit
156. ts from the Inspection System that do not correspond to the security mechanism application order O Session_Termination The TOE shall terminate the session in case of failure of the BAC mutual authentication failure of the EAC TA or detecting modification in the transmitted TSF data O Secure_Messaging The TOE shall ensure confidentiality and integrity to protect the transmitted user and TSF data Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 57 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG O Certificate Verification The TOE shall automatically update the certificate and current date by checking valid date on the basis of the CVCA link certificate provided by the Inspection System O Secure State The TOE shall preserve secure state from attempt of modification of TSF and data at start up Application Notes The ePassport application program should not be deleted in the personalization and operational use phase O Deleting_Residua_Info When allocating resources the TOE shall provide means to ensure that previous security related information Ex BAC session key EAC session key etc is not included O Replay_Prevention The TOE shall ensure generation and use of different random number per session for the secure cryptographic related information used in security mechanisms Application Notes The TOE shall generate the transmitted data to the Inspection System in the BAC mutual authentication and EAC TA t
157. upport Active Authentication 7 1 1 SF_CARD_MANAGEMENT This is the card management function which includes the functions such as command processing application program identification management life cycle management and internal structure management of card management service 7 1 2 SF_AUTHENTICATION This function manages the security channel for administrator authentication and provides functions such as maintaining message integrity confidentiality and terminating security channel and for user authentication also provides the function of Global PIN commonly used in the card and Owner PIN independently used by the application programs through API 7 1 3 SF_COUNTER_MEASURE This provides security measures when security violation occurs and also provides defensive measures against security attacks 7 1 4 SF_RESOURCE_MANAGEMENT Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 126 129 XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG This is responsible for resource management and provides the removal function for residual information when allocating returning 7 1 5 SF_OBJECT_ACCESS This controls the access and remote access of application programs to Java objects generated by application programs 7 1 6 SF_CRYPTOGRAPHY This security function provides cryptographic functions such as generation verification of digital signature encryption decryption hash value generation and random number generation 7 1 7 SF_PERSO_CONTRO
158. uthenticate the inspection systems supporting EAC The value which the inspection system digitally signed on the temporary public key used in EAC CA process is verified by TOE with IS certificate to authenticate the inspection system When TOE receives CVCA link certificate DV certificate and IS certificate from the inspection system supporting EAC it uses the CVCA digital signature verification key in protected Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 35 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG memory area to verify CVCA link certificate and checks the expiry date of CVCA link certificate and renews the CVCA digital signature verification key and the current date within TOE when necessary Once TOE confirms that the certificate is appropriate by verifying IS certificate it permits read access by the inspection system to the ePassport applicant bio information and sends through EAC secure messaging lt AA gt AA Active Authentication implements the digital signature based Challenge Response authentication protocol so that the inspection system can authenticate TOE Once TOE generate the digital signature with AA chip authentication private key in protected memory area on top of the received value provided by the inspection system the inspection system verifies with the EF DG15 AA chip authentication public key acquired through BAC secure messaging or EAC secure messaging to authenticate TOE AA is a security mechanism p
159. ved Page 72 129 XSMART ASE LITE ENG FMT SMF 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT SMR 1 Security roles FPT FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state Protection of the TSF FPT_ITI 1 Inter TSF detection of modification FPT FPT_TST 1 TSF TESTING 6 1 1 Cryptographic Support FCS_CKM 1 1 Cryptographic key generation Key Derivation Mechanism Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FCS_CKM 2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic operation FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM 1 1 The TSF shall generate encryption keys and MAC keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Appendix 5 1 Key Derivation Mechanism and specified cryptographic key sizes 112bit that meet the following the ICAO document Application Notes The TOE generates the BAC authentication key BAC session key and EAC session key by using key derivation mechanism BAC authentication key is generated and provided by the Personalization agent or in the case the Personalization agent does not provide it it is generated directly by TOE and recorded on the protected memory area of TOE FCS_CKM 1 2 Cryptographic key generation Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FCS_CKM 2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic operation FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM 1 1 The TSF shall generate
160. y the EAC session key and random numbers etc in temporary memory The BAC session key the EAC session key and the BAC authentication key etc can be ensured unavailable by destroying them with the method defined in FCS_CKM 4 FDP_UCT 1 Basic data exchange confidentiality Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 81 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel or FTP_TRP 1 Trusted path FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control FDP_UCT 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the ePassport access control policy to transmit receive object in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure Application Notes When the Inspection System successfully completes the BAC mutual authentication the TSF protects from disclosure by using the BAC session encryption key When the EAC CA is successfully executed data transmitted thereafter are protected from disclosure by using the EAC session encryption key FDP_UIT 1 Data exchange integrity Hierarchical to No other components Dependencies FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control or FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel or FTP_TRP 1 Trusted path The TSF shall enforce the ePassport access control policy to transmit receive user data in a manner protected from modification deletion insertion and replay errors
161. y Mechanism TOE provides information protection functions such as confidentiality integrity access control and authentication for protection of ePassport user data and TSF data such as ePassport identity information and ePassport authentication information Such information protection functions are implemented with SCPO2 security mechanism of GP Standard BAC security mechanism of ePassport Standard and EAC security mechanism of EAC Standard Table 6 summarizes ePassport security mechanisms Table 6 ePassport Security Mechanisms ePassport security mechanism Cryptographic IT Security characteristic of the Security Security Cryptography Key Certificate TOE Mechanism characteristic Type A function performed by the Access control for SOD ePassport N a a function inspection system no e Read rights BIS EIS PA User Data performed by the cryptographic calculation on e Write rights Personalization Authentication inspection system TOE s part agent TOE decrypts IS transfer value Symmetric Key Based Entity performs MAC calculation and BAC authentication Authentication Protocol verifies to confirm if inspection BAC mutual key TDES CBC system has access rights authentication Encryption Key SHA 1 TOE encrypts performs MAC MAC key Retail MAC calculation and sends to inspection system to verify itself Symmetric Key Based Key Generate BAC session key by BAC Distribution Protocol BAC session k
162. y problem definition shall describe the OSPS ASE SPD 1 4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the operational environment of the TOE Evaluator action elements ASE SPD 1 1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence ASE 0BJ 2 Security objectives Dependencies ASE SPD 1 Security problem definition Developer action elements Copyright 2011 LG CNS Co Ltd All rights reserved Page 94 129 La cns XSMART ASE LITE ENG ASE 0BJ 2 1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives ASE_OBJ 2 2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale Content and presentation elements ASE_OBJ 2 1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ 2 2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs enforced by that security objective ASE_OBJ 2 3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the operational environment back to threats countered by that security objective OSPs enforced by that security objective and assumptions upheld by that security objective ASE_OBJ 2 4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security objectives counter

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