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        IMCA Safety Flash 07/11
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1.         OIMCA   Pes E gt  4 Safety Flash    IMCA Safety Flash 07 1   July 2011    These flashes summarise key safety matters and incidents  allowing wider dissemination of lessons learnt from them  The information below has been  provided in good faith by members and should be reviewed individually by recipients  who will determine its relevance to their own operations     The effectiveness of the IMCA safety flash system depends on receiving reports from members in order to pass on information and avoid repeat incidents   Please consider adding the IMCA secretariat  imca imca int com  to your internal distribution list for safety alerts and or manually submitting information  on specific incidents you consider may be relevant  All information will be anonymised or sanitised  as appropriate     A number of other organisations issue safety flashes and similar documents which may be of interest to IMCA members  Where these are particularly  relevant  these may be summarised or highlighted here  Links to known relevant websites are provided at www imca int com links Additional links should  be submitted to webmaster imca int com    I Reliance on Crane Limits Caused Crane Damage and Dropped Objects    A member has reported an incident in which a crane was damaged and objects fell to the deck in the vicinity of personnel   The incident occurred when a crane operator  whilst attempting to stow the block during the hours of darkness  had  difficulties in seeing it due to poor lighti
2.   There were no injuries and little  damage occurred        Galley deep fat fryer    The incident was investigated and the following was noted     No procedure existed detailing that the fryer should be refilled after cleaning       The risk assessment did not identify the risk of fire if the unit was switched on without oil being at the required level in  the vat       The galley team shift handover was inadequate       The galley team had inadequate knowledge of the fryer operation        The unit was routinely being switched on at the main isolation point  despite there being two thermostatic controls to  operate the vats independently of one another        Not all galley staff had the confidence to tackle the fire  and had not attended recent emergency drills     This was the second deep fat fryer fire on a company vessel in the previous six months  both having similar causes     It was noted that a fire risk with deep fat fryers will always exist where personnel are not adequately trained in the correct  operation and maintenance of such equipment  It was also noted that key errors were made where the unit was left without  oil in one vat and then switched on with no check made that it was functioning correctly  and that there were no control  measures in place for the cleaning of the fryer     The following actions weere outlined       Ensure that the processes and procedures concerning the fryers are suitable and that sufficient controls are in place for  their safe op
3.   to protect the diver from the   equalising  HP water jet at the rear during work       Itis possible that due to constant handling  the barrel may have become loose at the screw end        Failure of pre use inspection to check the tightness of the barrel may also have contributed to the barrel falling off     Subsequently  modifications were made to this and all similar HP water jetting guns  in order to prevent recurrence of the  incident     BAFETY PIN WITH HOCK  END    NUT    pE       Modifications made to HP water jetting gun    6 Incorrect Information in User Manual for Fixed Fire Fighting System    A member has reported that incorrect information was discovered in a user manual for a Pyrosense SPI Pyrogen Fixed  Fire Fighting System  A review of this manual revealed misleading information  with paragraphs 4 and 5 on page 6 of 49  contradicting one another     The manual reviewed was PyroSense SP I Fire detection and fire suppression system  installation and user manual     Paragraph 4 states that    a pulsating sound will confirm that manual discharge signal is activated  After 5 seconds the sound will stop  pulsating and a uniform sound will be heard  At this point the MAG generator will be discharged into the protected enclosure        Paragraph 5  meanwhile  says that    in the event of a fire the visual and acoustic alarms will be conscious  sic  this is thought to be a  misprint of    constant      and turn to pulsating when the Pyrogen MAG generator is discharg
4.  equipment prior to commencing  the lift     Embossed    Crosby G2140 3  30t shackle s       raf  a       P T  gt   bga   Es       Different shackles with working load limits embossed    4 Near Miss  Personnel Almost Caught Between Crane House and Scaffold Pipe    A member has reported an incident in which someone was almost caught between a crane housing and a scaffold pipe  The  incident occurred when a non destructive testing  NDT  inspector was conducting an inspection at the stern of the crane   outside on the roller level  The access was from the scaffold around the crane  The inspector was positioned at a beam   behind a vertical scaffold pole  He had just finished the inspection of the welds and stepped back from the crane housing  onto the scaffold platform when the crane started slewing  A deck supervisor spotted the inspector on the scaffold platform  and asked him what he was doing  Immediately the deck supervisor ordered the crane driver to stop the crane  Had the  crane started to slew earlier  then he could have been caught between the crane housing and the scaffolding pipe     Inspection of welds inside the niche    Position of Inspector was astride    with legs in front of scaffold pole   Red line is inspector        Site of incident    The following direct causes to the incident were identified      The crane operator was not informed at the start of the work      There were inadequate guards or barriers      Log out tag out procedures were not applied    Su
5.  poor visibility should have prompted the crane operator to request assistance  from the deck crew  As soon as the incident had occurred  the situation should have been assessed prior to lowering the  block and possibly releasing any potential dropped objects     Actions taken included       Highlighting the fact that reliance on crane limits should not be the primary method for stowing the block when visibility  is poor or restricted        Banksmen should be in attendance to give the crane operator assistance when stowing the block  and reference to this  should be made be on the toolbox talk form for this task        Crane operators should ensure that all limits are checked at the correct intervals in accordance with manufacturer   s  instructions        2 Galley Fryer Fire    A member has reported an incident in which a fire occurred during routine cleaning and operation of a twin vat deep fat  fryer onboard a vessel  The night shift galley team were given the task of cleaning a twin vat deep fat fryer  This task was  carried out by them  however on completion only one of the twin vats was refilled with oil  This fact was not communicated  to the day shift galley team  The day shift team were required to use the fryer shortly after starting work  and it was  switched on by one of the stewards without any pre start checks being carried out  Shortly after the fryer was switched on a  small fire started in the left hand  empty  vat  which was quickly extinguished by the cook
6. bsequent to further investigation the following points were noted        A    last minute risk assessment    by the NDT inspector did not reveal the actual risks owing to his lack of experience  and  he did not notice that in case of crane slewing the scaffolding would rotate independently from his work spot       There was inadequate initial instruction  and information was not communicated properly to all the involved parties        The toolbox talk process was not conducted in accordance with established procedures     the work process was  discussed without involvement of all parties  deck crew crane operator      e The wrong crane operator was informed before the operation took place     this was done during an accidental  encounter in the accommodation           5   Injury  Failure of Subsea HP Water Jetting Gun    Following publication in IMCA safety flash 05 11  whch reported an incident where an injury sustained by a diver after the  subsea failure of a high pressure  HP  water jetting gun  a member would like to draw attention to a similar earlier incident   Whilst using an HP water jetting gun underwater  the rear barrel of the gun became unscrewed and fell causing minor injury  to the diver   s left arm  There was no injury or damage caused by the HP water jet  Upon closer inspection  it was noticed  that the threads on the barrel were worn     Our member noted the following       The rear barrel of the gun is a protective cover designed to be screwed onto the gun
7. ed        The audible alarm referred to in the user manual only sounds in the space where the release has been will be triggered  and  is not apparent outside  Should Pyrogen be released  there is no alarm  either audio or visual  outside the space other than a  LED on the release panel     The UK agent for the manufacturer has confirmed that the audible alarm is continuous changing to intermittent  thus  paragraph 4 is incorrect     Because the alarm is not audible outside of the space  our member has fitted the following appropriate visual warning lights       Amber indicates that the system is armed  and no entry is permitted until the system has been isolated by turning and  removing the key       Red indicates that Pyrogen has been released  and no entry should be made until the space has been ventilated and fire  extinguished     An older version of the manual can be found at www pyrogen com SP _MAN pdf        
8. eration and maintenance       Ensure that the risk assessment for the fryers and galley equipment is suitable and sufficient  and understood by all        Ensure that all the galley staff have been fully familiarised with all the galley equipment and fully understand the operation  and risks for each        Ensure that all members of the galley team are regularly trained in emergency requirements           3 Shackle in Rigging Assembly Below Required Safe Working Load  SWL     A member has reported that during a recent a recent spot check on a lifting bridle it was identified that a IZT shackle had  been fitted instead of a 30T shackle  The preassembled lifting bridle included 3 x 30T shackles  Crosby G2140  and   x I7T   Crosby G21 30  instead of 4 x 30T shackles  The certificate for the  7T shackle was cross checked against the identification  number on the attached tag plate and showed the shackle SWL as 30T  The shackle was removed and replaced with a 30T  shackle  30T working load limit  WLL  embossed      Although the shackles are almost identical in size  differences in the material grades determine the WLL  Both the material  grade and WLL are embossed on every shackle  It appears that an error was made during the certification process by the  supplier where a  7T shackle had been certified  ID tag attached with common certificate number  as part of a batch of 30T  shackles     This unsafe condition reinforces the requirement to conduct a pre use inspection of lifting
9. ng conditions and the boom angle of the crane  Consequently  the crane operator  relied on his upper crane limits to stop the block  The upper limit switch failed to operate due to a technical fault and the  wire socket was pulled into the sheave causing damage to the sheave  wire and rope guard  Sheared bolt heads from the rope  guard then fell to deck in the vicinity of personnel below     The crane operator then immediately lowered the block to position where he could cancel the alarms which were now    sounding  This action itself could have released further potential dropped objects which may have been held in place by the  block     An investigation noted the following points       The incident took place during a routine task and was considered low risk  but had the potential for a fatality or serious  permanent injury had a larger component fallen and struck any of the personnel below  Additionally  there could have  been a substantial impact on the project or vessel schedule with the crane being out of service for a long period of time        A significant contributory factor in this incident was the failure of the crane upper limit switch to automatically stop the  wire socket well in advance of the rope guard and sheave  However  the crane operator failed to perceive the risk of     two blocking    the crane even when faced with poor visibility of the boom tip  and relied upon the limit switch to safely  stow the block        The lighting conditions  boom angle and
    
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