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A Companion to User's Guide to Cryptography and Standards

1. X 690 Information technology ASN 1 encoding rules Specification of Basic Encoding Rules BER Canonical Encoding Rules CER and Distinguished Encoding Rules DER 13 337 X 691 Information technology ASN 1 encod ing rules Specification of Packed Encoding Rules PER 13 338 X 800 Data Communication Networks Open Sys tems Interconnection OSI Security Struc ture and Applications Security Architec ture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT Applications 315 325 X 802 Data Networks and Open System Communi cations Security Information Technol ogy Lower Layers Security Model 318 X 803 Data Networks and Open System Commu nications Security Information Tech nology Open Systems Interconnection Upper Layers Security Model 317 A 8 ITU T RECOMMENDATIONS 105 ITU T no Title Relevant chapter s Ref no X 805 Security Security architecture for systems providing end to end communications 3 339 X 810 Data Networks and Open System Commu nications Security Information Tech nology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Overview 319 X 811 Data Networks and Open System Commu nications Security Information Tech nology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Au t
2. 464 B Preneel V Rijmen and P C van Oorschot A security analysis of the Message Authenticator Algorithm MAA European Transactions on Telecommunications 8 455 470 1997 465 B Preneel and P C van Oorschot MDx MAC and building fast MACs from hash functions In D Coppersmith editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 795 volume 963 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 1 14 Springer Verlag 1995 466 B Preneel and P C van Oorschot A key recovery attack on the ANSI X9 19 retail MAC Electronics Letters 32 1568 1569 1996 BIBLIOGRAPHY 151 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 M O Rabin Digitalized signatures In R Lipton and R DeMillo editors Foundations of Secure Computation pages 216 231 Academic Press 1978 M O Rabin Probabilistic algorithm for testing primality Journal of Number Theory 12 128 138 1980 W Rankl and W Effing Smart Card Handbook John Wiley and Sons Ltd 3rd edition 2003 E Rescorla RFC 2631 Diffie Hellman Key Agreement Method In ternet Engineering Task Force June 1999 R L Rivest RFC 1320 The MD4 message digest algorithm Internet Engineering Task Force April 1992 R L Rivest RFC 1321 The MD5 message digest algorithm Internet Engineering Task Force April 1992 R L Rivest A Shamir and L Adleman A method for obtaining digital signatures and public key cryptosyst
3. International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11166 2 Banking Key management by means of asymmetric algorithms Part 2 Approved algorithms using the RSA cryptosystem 1994 230 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11568 1 Banking Key managemant retail Part 1 Introduction to key management 1994 231 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11568 2 Banking Key managemant retail Part 2 Key management techniques for symmetric ciphers 1994 232 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11568 9 Banking Key managemant retail Part 3 Key life cycle for symmetric ciphers 1994 233 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 7498 1 1994 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Ba sic Reference Model The Basic Model 2nd edition 1994 BIBLIOGRAPHY 131 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9797 1994 Information technology Security techniques Data integrity mech anism using a cryptographic check function employing a block cipher algorithm 2nd edition 1994 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 2 1994 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication Mechanisms Part 2 Entity authentication using symmetric techniques 1994
4. International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 3 1994 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication mechanisms Part 3 Entity authentication using a public key algorithm 1994 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10745 1995 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Up per layers security model 1995 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 4 1995 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication Part 4 Mechanisms using a cryptographic check function 1995 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC TR 13594 1995 Information technology Lower layers security 1995 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 1 1996 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 1 Overview 1996 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 2 1996 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 2 Authentication frame work 1996 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 3 1996 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 3 Access control frame work 1996 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 5 1996 Information technolo
5. 3610 Counter with CBC MAC CCM 5 16 510 94 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS RFC Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 3628 Policy Requirements for Time Stamping Au 14 458 thorities TSAs 3647 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 109 Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework A 7 ISO STANDARDS 95 A ISO standards The ISO and ISO IEC standards discussed in this book are listed in Ta ble A 7 Note that in the table the title given is that of the most recent edition of the standard 96 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS Table A 7 ISO and ISO IEC standards ISO no Title Relevant chapter s Ref no 7498 1 Information technology Open Systems In terconnection Basic Reference Model The Basic Model 3 233 7498 2 Information processing systems Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference Model Part 2 Security Architecture 219 7498 4 Information processing systems Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference Model Part 4 Management framework 220 8372 Information processing Modes of opera tion for a 64 bit block cipher algorithm 216 8730 Banking Requirements for message au thentication wholesale 222 8731 1 Banking Approved algorithm for message authentication Part 1 DEA 217 8731 2
6. International Organization for Standardization ISO 15782 2 2001 Banking Certificate management Certificate extensions 2001 280 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15816 2001 Information technology Security techniques Security in formation objects for access control 2001 281 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9594 8 2001 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection The Directory Part 8 Public key and attribute certificate frameworks 4th edition 2001 282 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15945 2002 Information technology Security techniques Specification of TTP services to support the application of digital signatures 2002 283 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15946 2 Information technology Security techniques Cryptographic tech niques based on elliptic curves Part 2 Digital signatures 2002 284 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15946 In formation technology Security techniques Cryptographic Tech niques based on Elliptic Curves 2002 285 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 18014 1 Information technology Security techniques Time stamping ser vices Part 1 Framework 2002 286 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 18014 2 Information technology Security techniques Time s
7. the Micali Schnorr generator 405 406 and the Blum Blum Shub generator 74 75 Details of all of these deterministic random bit generators can be found in Menezes et al 397 The NIST statistical tests for random bit generators is currently available as a special publication NIST Special Publication 800 22 436 Code for these tests is 16 7 NOTES 75 also available on the NIST website http csrc nist gov rng 816 2 The first attempt to produce some kind of standardised advice for choosing primes was probably the 1986 patent submitted by Hellman and Back U S patent 4 633 036 This defined a cryptographically strong prime as a prime number p where e p 1 has a large prime factor r e p 1 has a large prime factor s e r 1 has a large prime factor r and e s 1 has a large prime factor s It was thought at the time that the product of two primes of this form would make an ideal RSA modulus This advice has now been largely superseded as the difficulty in factoring an RSA modulus now appears to depend on other properties Both the ANSI X9 committee and the ISO IEC JTC1 have recently been working on standards on prime number generation These are ANSI X9 80 15 released in 2001 and ISO IEC 18032 308 which is at FDIS stage and should be published early in 2005 A discussion of the problems associated with the add two and test method of using a probabilistic primality test to generate a prime
8. tion of many cryptographic algorithms is referred to Menezes et al 397 84 2 1 The latest version of the Data Encryption Standard is contained in NIST FIPS Pub 46 3 431 and the corresponding ANSI standard 33 This version standardises both the original version and the Triple DES variant although the original version is not actually recommended for use as a confidentiality algorithm Triple DES is also standardised in the draft ISO IEC 18033 3 standard 292 Details of the exhaustive key search performed by Curtin and Dolske can be found in 120 The idea of building a dedicated machine for cracking DES by exhaustively search ing try all possible keys a DES cracker was first suggested by Wiener 511 The Electronic Frontier Foundation the organisation that practically demonstrated the practical weakness of 56 bit DES keys so effectively by building the DES cracker is contactable through its website http www eff org and details about the DES cracker in particular can be found at http www eff org descracker The existence of the DES cracker has put the final nail in the coffin of DES It is interesting that it is the short key an issue which was brought up during the standardisation process itself rather than any later cryptographic developments which has caused the cipher to fall The two greatest developments in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers were the dis covery of differential and linear cryptanalys
9. 13 315 338 2000 456 C P Pfleeger Security in Computing Prentice Hall PTR 2nd edition 1997 457 D Pinkas and R Housley RFC 3379 Delegated Path Validation and Delegated Path Discovery Protocol Requirements Internet Engineering Task Force September 2002 458 D Pinkas N Pope and J Ross RFC 3628 Policy Requirements for Time Stamping Authorities TSAs Internet Engineering Task Force November 2003 459 F Piper and S Murphy Cryptography A Very Short Introduction Oxford University Press 2002 460 W Polk R Housley and L Bassham RFC 3279 Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List CRL Profile Internet Engineering Task Force April 2002 461 G Poupard and J Stern Security analysis of a practical on the fly authentication and signature generation In K Nyberg editor Ad vances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 98 volume 1403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 422 436 Springer Verlag 1998 462 H Prafullchandra and J Schaad RFC 2875 Diffie Hellman Proof of Possession Algorithms Internet Engineering Task Force July 2000 463 B Preneel R Govaerts and J Vandewalle Hash functions based on block ciphers A synthetic approach In D R Stinson editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 793 volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 368 378 Springer Verlag 1993
10. 135 200 but well outside the scope of this book 814 5 There are two relevant standards that specify time stamping mechanisms ISO IEC 18014 and IETF RFC 3161 The ISO IEC 18014 standard has three parts ISO IEC 18014 1 285 which describes the general principles of time stamping ISO IEC 14 7 NOTES 67 18014 2 286 which describes three mechanisms for producing independent i e unlinked time stamping tokens and ISO IEC 18014 3 298 which describes a mech anism for linking tokens IETF RFC 3161 21 standardises a time stamping mech anism that is similar to one of the mechanisms specified in ISO IEC 18014 2 These standards only describe the technical means by which time stamps may be produced but any use of a time stamping authority must also be correctly man aged In particular the ISO IEC 18014 recommends that a time stamping author ity should be managed according to the guidelines set down in ISO IEC TR 14516 288 whilst IETF RFC 3161 recommends that a time stamping authority should be managed according to the guidelines in IETF RFC 3628 458 The specification of coordinated universal time is contained in ITU R TF 460 6 332 One potential drawback with linking time stamping tokens is that one must have copies all of the earlier time stamps in order to verify the ordering For example if an entity wishes to verify that a document A was stamped before document B then that entity will have to have the time stamp for
11. 14 17 18 19 20 21 X9 TG 26 1999 Technical Guideline Managing Risk and Mitigation Planning Withdrawl of ANSI X9 17 Financial Institution Key Man agement Wholesale 1999 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 71 2000 Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code 2000 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 42 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptogra phy 2001 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 63 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography 2001 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 79 1 2001 Part 1 Public Key Infrastructure Practices and Pol icy 2001 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 80 Prime Number Generation Primality Testing and Primality Certificates 2001 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 82 Random Number Generation Draft 2003 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 84 2003 Biometric Information Management and Security for the Financial Services Industry 2003 C Adams RFC 2025 The Simple Public Key GSS API Mechanism SPKM Internet Engineering Task Force October 1996 C Adams Constructing symmetric cipher
12. 16 7 NOTES 77 sensitive information used in a retail banking environment whilst ISO 13491 2 de scribes specific requirements not only for devices involve with PIN or key creation or manipulation but also devices with MAC and digital signature functionality The main general standard on security cryptographic modules is NIST FIPS Pub 140 2 435 The corresponding ISO IEC standard that is being developed is ISO IEC 19790 314 NIST also runs a certification service for FIPS 140 2 and for the preceding stan dard NIST FIPS Pub 140 1 428 Vendors can submit security modules to the certification service who will check whether the module achieves the claimed secu rity level At the time of writing Spring 2004 the NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Programme CMVP had certified 374 products with 111 more products under review More information about the CMVP can be found at http csrc nist gov cryptval 816 5 Biometric identification and authentication is a huge topic and several books have been written on the subject For more information on biometrics the reader is referred to Jain Bolle and Pankanti 344 and Nanavati Thieme and Nanavati 426 This chapter concentrates on the work contained in the published ANSI X9 84 standard 17 Other draft standards include the ISO IEC 19792 standard 295 work on which is at a very early stage the BioAPI specification 61 the Common Biometric Exchange File Format 43
13. Banking Approved algorithm for message authentication Part 2 Message authenti cator algorithm 227 8732 Banking Key managemant wholesale I1 12 218 9594 8 Information technology Open Systems In terconnection The Directory Part 8 Public key and attribute certificate frame works 10 13 260 281 9796 Information technology Security tech niques Digital signature scheme giving message recovery 225 9796 2 Information technology Security tech niques Digital signature schemes giving message recovery Part 2 Integer factor ization based mechanisms 287 9796 3 Information technology Security tech niques Digital signature schemes giving message recovery Part 3 Discrete loga rithm based mechanisms 277 302 9797 1 Information technology Security tech niques Message Authentication Codes MACs Part 1 Mechanisms using a block cipher 5 6 7 221 234 268 A 7 ISO STANDARDS 97 ISO no Title Relevant chapter s Ref no 9797 2 Information technology Security tech niques Message Authentication Codes MACs Part 2 Mechanisms using a hash function 7 278 9798 1 Information technology Security tech niques Entity authentication Part 1 General 10 226 252 9798 2 Information technology
14. Security tech niques Entity authentication Part 2 Mechanisms using symmetric encipherment algorithms 10 235 269 9798 3 Information technology Security tech niques Entity authentication Part 3 Mechanisms using digital signature tech niques 10 236 261 9798 4 Information technology Security tech niques Entity authentication Part 4 Mechanisms using a cryptographic check function 10 238 270 9798 5 Information technology Security tech niques Entity authentication Part 5 Mechanisms using zero knowledge techniques 10 271 310 9798 6 Information technology Security tech niques Entity authentication Part 6 Mechanisms using manual data transfer 10 307 9807 Banking and related financial services Re quirements for message authentication re tail 223 9979 Information technology Security tech niques Procedures for the registration of cryptographic algorithms 272 10116 Information technology Security tech niques Modes of operation for an m bit block cipher 224 248 303 10118 1 Information technology Security tech niques Hash functions Part 1 General 274 98 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS ISO Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 10118 2 Information technol
15. and C Paar editors Cryptographic Hardware and Em bedded Systems CHES 2001 volume 2162 of Lecture Notes in Com puter Science pages 220 234 Springer Verlag 2001 M Bond and R Anderson API level attacks on embedded systems IEEE Computer Magazine 34 10 67 75 October 2001 M Bond and P Zielinski Decimalisation attacks for PIN cracking 2002 Preprint Computer Laboratory University of Cambridge D Boneh Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem Notices of the American Mathematical Society AMS 46 2 203 213 1999 A Bosselaers and B Preneel editors Integrity Primitives for Secure Information Systems Final RIPE Report of the RACE Integrity Prim itives Evaluation volume 1007 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science Springer Verlag 1995 C Boyd A class of flexible and efficient key management protocols In 9th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop pages 2 8 IEEE Computer Society Press 1996 C A Boyd and A Mathuria Protocols for key establishment and authentication Springer Verlag 2003 S Bradner RFC 2026 The Internet Standards Process Revision 3 Internet Engineering Task Force October 1996 J Brandt and I Damg rd On generation of probable primes by incremental search In E F Brickell editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 92 volume 740 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 358 370 Springer Verlag 1992 J Brandt I Damg rd P Landrock and T P Ped
16. and SNOW 2 0 schemes 4 4 Asymmetric Ciphers Like the other parts of ISO IEC 18033 Part 2 on asymmetric ciphers is now nearing completion the current version is the Final CD and the selection of ciphers included in this draft standard appears to have stabilised The selected algorithms can be categorised into three categories e ElGamal based schemes ECIES KEM PSEC KEM ACE KEM e RSA based schemes RSA OAEP RSA KEM e Rabin based schemes HIME R 4 5 NOTES 11 4 5 Notes 84 1 This chapter is only meant to act as an introduction to the world of encryption not as an exhaustive study of the subject In terms of the study of standardisation very little is actually gained by describing the actual encryption schemes that we have discussed their methodologies are not easily understood and they are remarkably unenlightening on their own Semantic security was formally introduced by Goldwasser and Micali 176 and studied further by Micali Rackoff and Sloan 404 The more modern notions of security for symmetric and asymmetric ciphers and the relationships between these notions are discussed in two excellent papers one for symmetric ciphers 45 and one for asymmetric ciphers 46 The reader who is looking for a more comprehensive academic treatment of en cryption schemes is referred to one of the many introductory books on the subject 172 173 459 485 501 509 The reader who is looking for an algorithmic descrip
17. the TTP can revoke a user simply be refusing to issue it with the correct private keys for a particular date The key revocation problem will be discussed in more detail along with certificate based public key infrastructures in Chapter 13 88 2 The Digital Signature Algorithm contained in the Digital Signature Standard 432 is also contained in several other important standards including ANSI X9 30 1 4 ISO IEC 14888 3 259 and IEEE 1363 213 A standardised elliptic curve version of the DSA known as ECDSA also exists 8 432 284 213 Elliptic curves are complex mathematical structures that ap pear to have some useful cryptographic properties A good introduction to elliptic curve cryptography including information on the ECDSA is given by Hankerson Menezes and Vanstone 195 More technical information on the use of elliptic curves in cryptography can be found in Blake et al 67 and the security of ECDSA is discussed in detail in 68 The DSA and ECDSA signature schemes have also be recently evaluated by the NESSIE project in terms of its security and performance 446 447 It was evaluated against several other signature schemes some of which have also been standardised and judged to be one of the best of the proposed schemes The other signature scheme endorsed by the financial sector is known as rDSA and is specified in ANSI X9 31 7 The signature scheme contained in ISO TEC 9796 225 the first general purpo
18. 2001 C Gehrmann and K Nyberg Security in personal area networks In C J Mitchell editor Security for Mobility chapter 9 pages 191 230 IEE 2004 M Girault Hash functions using modulo n operations In D Chaum and W L Price editors Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 87 volume 304 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 217 226 Springer Verlag 1987 126 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 BIBLIOGRAPHY M Girault Self certified public keys In D W Davies editor Ad vances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 91 volume 547 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 490 497 Springer Verlag 1992 M Girault and J C Pailles On line off line RSA like In Proceedings of WCC 2003 2003 O Goldreich Foundations of Cryptography Basic Tools Cambridge University Press 2001 O Goldreich Foundations of Cryptography Basic Applications Cam bridge University Press 2004 O Goldreich S Goldwasser and S Halevi Public key cryptosystems from lattice reduction problems In B Kaliski editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 97 volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 165 179 Springer Verlag 1997 O Goldreich S Goldwasser and S Micali How to construct random functions Journal of the ACM 33 4 792 807 1986 S Goldwasser and S Micali Probabilistic encryption Journal of Computer and Sy
19. 2004 E Biham and L R Knudsen Cryptanalysis of the ANSI X9 52 CBCM mode In K Nyberg editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 798 volume 1403 of Lecture Notes im Computer Science pages 100 111 Springer Verlag 1998 E Biham and L R Knudsen Cryptanalysis of the ANSI X9 52 CBCM mode Journal of Cryptology 15 47 59 2002 E Biham and A Shamir Differential cryptanalysis of DES like cryp tosystems In A J Menezes and S A Vanstone editors Advances in Cryptology Crypto 90 volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 2 21 1990 E Biham and A Shamir Differential cryptanalysis of the full 16 round DES In E F Brickell editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 92 volume 740 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 487 496 Springer Verlag 1992 The BioAPI Consortium BioAPI Specification Version 1 1 March 2001 M Bishop Computer Security Art and Science Addison Wesley 2002 J Black and P Rogaway CBC MACs for arbitrary length messages The three key constructions In M Bellare editor Advances in Cryp tology Crypto 2000 volume 1880 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 197 215 Springer Verlag 2000 J Black and P Rogaway A block cipher mode of operation for paral lelizable message authentication In L R Knudsen editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 2002 volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 384 397 Springer Verlag 2002
20. 272 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9979 In formation technology Security techniques Procedures for the reg istration of cryptographic algorithms 2nd edition April 1999 273 International Organization for Standardization ISO 13491 2 2000 Banking Secure cryptographic devices retail Part 2 Security compliance checklists for devices used in magnetic stripe card systems 2000 274 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10118 1 Information technology Security techniques Hash functions Part 1 General 2nd edition 2000 275 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10118 2 Information technology Security techniques Hash functions Part 2 Hash functions using an n bit block cipher 2nd edition 2000 276 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 17799 In formation technology Code of practice for information security management 2000 BIBLIOGRAPHY 135 277 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9796 3 2000 Information technology Security techniques Digital sig nature schemes giving message recovery Part 3 Discrete logarithm based mechanisms 2000 278 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9797 2 In formation technology Security techniques Message Authentica tion Codes MACs Part 2 Mechanisms using a hash function 2000 279
21. 450 493 September 1995 Filed on 29th December 1993 A Malpani R Housley and T Freeman Internet Draft draft ietf pkix scvp 13 Simple Certificate Validation Protocol Internet Engi neering Task Force October 2003 M Matsui Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher In T Helle seth editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 93 volume 765 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 386 397 Springer Verlag 1993 M Matsui New block encryption algorithm MISTY In E Biham editor Fast Software Encryption 4th International Workshop FSE 97 volume 1267 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 54 68 Springer Verlag 1997 T Matsumoto H Matsumoto K Yamada and S Hoshino Impact of artificial gummy fingers on fingerprint systems In R L van Renesse editor Optical Security and Counterfeit Deterrence Techniques IV Proceedings of SPIE Volume 4677 pages 275 289 2002 T Matsumoto Y Takashima and H Imai On seeking smart public key distribution schemes Transactions of the IECE of Japan E69 2 99 106 1986 BIBLIOGRAPHY 145 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 S M Matyas Key processing with control vectors Journal of Cryp tology 3 113 116 1991 5 M Matyas C H Meyer and J Oseas Generating strong one way functions with cryptographic algorithms IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin 27 5658 5
22. 5 Cipher Block Chaining CBC mode 5 6 Counter CTR mode 5 7 Output Feedback OFB mode 5 8 Cipher Feedback CFB mode 5 9 Choosing a mode of operation 5 10 Other modes 5 11 Notes Cryptographic hash functions 6 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 6 2 Standards for Hash Functions 6 3 Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers 6 4 Dedicated Hash Functions 6 5 Hash Functions Based on Modular Arithmetic 6 6 Choosing a Hash Function 6 7 Notes Message Authentication Codes MACs 7 1 Definitions and basic properties 7 2 Standards for MACs CONTENTS CONTENTS 7 8 CBE MAGS s iuga b er BS bun 7 4 MACs based on hash functions 7 5 Other MAC functions len 30 5 Notes uestes Eon Eee ad ngo m ue Parc Cuore Bei Digital signatures 8 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 8 2 Standards for digital signatures 2 22222 nn 8 3 The Digital Signature Algorithm DSA 8 4 RSA based signature schemes 2 2 2 2 2 2 nennen 8 5 Digital signatures and the law 2 2 2 lr 8 6 Choosing a digital signature scheme BU Noles un EY uh a a a ne rl a oe Er m E ur RUM a M A Non repudiation mechanisms 9 1 Introdtetlon c gute Bra a a e ee 9 2 Standards for non repudiation 9 3 Non repudiation model and services 9 4 Non repudiation using symmetric cryptography 9 5 Non repudiation using asymmetric cryptography 9 6 Time sta
23. 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 204 Certificate and CRL Profile 2478 The Simple and Protected GSS API Negoti 15 40 ation Mechanism 2479 Independent Data Unit Protection Generic 15 20 Security Service Application Program Inter face IDUP GSS API 2510 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 22 Certificate Management Protocols 2511 Internet X 509 Certificate Request Message 13 423 Format 2522 Photuris Session Key Management Protocol 12 357 2527 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 108 Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework 2528 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 206 Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm KEA Keys in Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates 2559 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 76 Operational Protocols LDAPv2 2560 X 509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure 13 424 Online Certificate Status Protocol OCSP 2585 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 205 Operational Protocols FTP and HTTP 2587 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 77 LDA Pv2 Schema 2630 Cryptographic Message Syntax 13 203 2631 Diffie Hellman Key Agreement Method 12 470 A 6 IETF REQUESTS FOR COMMENTS 93 RFC Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 2712 Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to
24. 6 NOTES 29 Internal collision based attacks against ARMAC were described by Preneel and van Oorschot 466 and Knudsen and Preneel 364 These attacks motivated the design of MacDES which was proposed by Knudsen and Preneel 364 as a superior alter native to ARMAC for use with weak block ciphers such as DES Subsequently Coppersmith Knudsen and Mitchell 115 116 found attacks which whilst not breaking the scheme in practice showed that the advantages of MacDES over AR MAC are not as great as previously thought although they are still significant The 3GPP MAC scheme was designed specifically for use with the 3GPP 64 bit block cipher KASUMI see Chapter 4 The best known attacks on this scheme are given in 362 although these attacks do not seriously threaten the security of the scheme The RMAC scheme was proposed in by Jaulmes Joux and Valette 347 Its inclu sion in a draft standard published by NIST in 2002 440 attracted a large number of negative comments and it no longer appears to be a candidate for standardisation A series of attacks against RMAC have been proposed see for example 361 363 which whilst not invalidating it raised doubts as to its claimed superiority to other schemes The XCBC scheme was originally proposed by Black and Rogaway 63 Subse quently Kurosawa and Iwata proposed a two key version TMAC 370 and the same authors then proposed a one key version OMAC 341 Whilst these scheme
25. 7 440 Modes of Operation The RMAC Authen tication Mode 800 38C Draft Recommendation for Block Cipher 5 16 441 Modes of Operation The CCM Mode for Au thentication and Confidentiality A 10 RSA PKCS 109 A 10 RSA PKCS The RSA Public Key Cryptography Standards PKCS that are discussed in this book are detailed in Table A 11 Table A 11 RSA PKCS standards PKCS Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 1 RSA Cryptography Standard 4 3 Diffie Hellman Key Agreement Standard 4 12 5 Password Based Cryptography Standard 4 7 Cryptographic Message Syntax Standard 13 8 Private Key Information Syntax Standard 4 10 Certification Request Syntax Standard 13 11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard 15 481 13 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Standard 4 110 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS A 11 SECG standards The SECG has only produced two standards These are listed in Table A 12 Table A 12 SECG standards SECG Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no SEC 1 Elliptic curve cryptography 4 498 SEC 2 Recommended elliptic curve domain param 4 499 eters Bibliography 1 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 19 Financial institution retail message authentication August 1986 2 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 9 1986 revised Fin
26. 8 12 215 Cryptography Amendment 1 Additional Techniques 1363 1 IEEE Standard Specification for Public Key 4 Cryptographic Techniques Based on Hard Problems over Lattices 1363 2 IEEE Standard Specification for Password 4 12 Based Public Key Cryptographic Techniques 90 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS A 6 IETF requests for comments The IETF Requests For Comments RFCs discussed in this book are listed in Table A 6 in ascending numerical order A 6 IETF REQUESTS FOR COMMENTS Table A 6 Internet RFCs 91 RFC Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 791 DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specifi 13 212 cation 1035 Domain Names Implementation and Spec 13 420 ification 1118 The Hitchhikers Guide to the Internet 2 369 1305 Network Time Protocol Version 3 Specifi 10 407 cation Implementation and Analysis 1319 The MD2 message digest algorithm 6 353 1320 The MD4 message digest algorithm 6 471 1321 The MD5 message digest algorithm 6 472 1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic 13 860 Mail Part II Certificate Based Key Man agement 1507 DASS Distributed Authentication Security 10 359 Service 1508 Generic Security Service Application Pro 15 380 gram Interface 1509 Generic Security Service API C bindings 15 512 1510 The Kerberos Networ
27. Dedicated Hash Functions 6 5 Hash Functions Based on Modular Arithmetic 6 6 Choosing a Hash Function 6 7 Notes 86 1 Many people have tried to define the properties that a hash function must have in order to be secure These definitions are usually sufficient for most uses of a hash function but almost always the definitions are not sufficient for some small set of anomalous cases The properties of 1 and 2 pre image resistance and collision resistance are the normal benchmark levels of security for a hash function The notions of 1 and 2 4 pre image resistance was first noted by Merkle 398 399 Collision resistance was introduced by Damg rd 121 Most hash functions that are 2 7 pre image resistant or collision resistant are also 1 pre image resistant but this is not necessarily the case A good example of a collision resistant hash function that is not pre image resistant can be found in Menezes et al Suppose g is a collision resistant hash function that produces outputs of length k in bits We can define a new hash function h by setting ille if a k MT O g x otherwise 6 1 This hash function is clearly not pre image resistant However in order to find a collision in this hash function we need to find a collision in the hash function g and we have already stated that g is a collision resistant hash function Hence h is a collision resistant hash function that is not pre image resistant The relationship betw
28. H Krawczyk A modular approach to the design and analysis of authentication and key exchange protocols In 30th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing pages 419 428 ACM Press 1998 M Bellare A Desai E Jokipii and P Rogaway A concrete secu rity treatment of symmetric encryption In Proceedings of the 38th IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science pages 394 403 IEEE 1997 BIBLIOGRAPHY 115 46 48 91 92 93 M Bellare A Desai D Pointcheval and P Rogaway Relations among notions of security for public key encryption schemes In H Krawczyk editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 98 volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 26 45 Springer Verlag 1998 M Bellare J Kilian and P Rogaway The security of the cipher block chaining message authentication code In Y G Desmedt editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 94 volume 839 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 341 358 Springer Verlag 1994 M Bellare and C Namprempre Authenticated encryption Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm In T Okamoto editor Advances in Cryptology Asiacrypt 2000 volume 1976 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 531 545 Springer Verlag 2000 M Bellare and P Rogaway Random oracles are practical A paradigm for designing efficient protocols In Proc of the First ACM Conference on Computer and Communications S
29. Information technology Open Systems In 3 237 terconnection Upper layers security model A 7 ISO STANDARDS 99 ISO Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 11166 1 Banking Key management by means of 12 228 asymmetric algorithms Part 1 Principles procedures and formats 11166 2 Banking Key management by means of 12 229 asymmetric algorithms Part 2 Approved algorithms using the RSA cryptosystem 11568 1 Banking Key management retail Part 11 230 1 Introduction to key management 11568 2 Banking Key management retail Part 11 231 2 Key management techniques for symmet ric ciphers 11568 3 Banking Key management retail Part 11 232 3 Key life cycle for symmetric ciphers 11568 4 Banking Key management retail Part 11 255 4 Key management techniques for public key cryptosystems 11568 5 Banking Key management retail Part 11 256 5 Key life cycle for public key cryptosystems 11568 6 Banking Key management retail Part 11 262 6 Key management schemes 11770 1 Information technology Security tech 11 246 niques Key Management Part 1 Framework 11770 2 Information technology Security tech 12 247 niques Key Management Part 2 Mech anisms using symmetric techniques 11770 3 Information technology Security te
30. J Black P Rogaway and T Shrimpton Black box analysis of the block cipher based hash function constructions form PGV In M Yung editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2002 volume 2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 320 335 Springer Verlag 2002 J Black and H Urtubia Side channel attacks on symmetric encryp tion schemes The case for authenticated encryption In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium San Francisco CA USA August 5 9 2002 pages 327 338 USENIX 2002 BIBLIOGRAPHY 117 67 68 69 d 2 71 72 Cy 74 75 76 I Blake G Seroussi and N Smart Elliptic Curves in Cryptography Cambridge Univeristy Press 1999 I Blake G Seroussi and N Smart Elliptic Curves in Cryptography II Further Topics Cambridge University Press 2004 to appear S Blake Wilson D Johnson and A Menezes Key agreement proto cols and their security analysis In M Darnell editor Cryptography and Coding 6th IMA International Conference volume 1355 of Lec ture Notes in Computer Science pages 30 45 Springer Verlag 1997 S Blake Wilson and A Menezes Entity authentication and authen ticated key transport protocols employing asymmetric techniques In B Christianson B Crispo T M A Lomas and M Roe editors Se curity Protocols 5th International Workshop volume 1361 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 137 158 Springer Verlag 1998 G
31. MD2 was submitted by Kaliski MD4 was broken outright by Dob bertin 137 who managed to show that the hash function was not collision resistant Neither MD2 and MD5 have been broken outright yet but in both cases it has been shown that the round functions are not collision resistant 479 129 138 This means that it is possible to find distinct intermediate hash variables H H and data input blocks D D such that D H D H This is not the same as being able to find collisions in the complete hash function but it is a good first step In fact the attack against MD2 is even stronger it has been shown that collisions could be found in the complete MD2 hash function were it not for a checksum block which is added to the input as part of the padding 479 6 7 NOTES 25 Subsequently it has been shown that MD2 is not even a pre image resistant hash function 421 The security of all of these algorithms were called into question during the Crypto 2004 conference A paper by Biham and Chen 56 demonstrated new techniques for finding inputs to the SHA 0 hash function a precursor to the SHA 1 hash func tion whose hash codes are close A similar method apparently independently discovered was proposed by Wang et al for finding collisions in MD4 MD5 and the RIPEMD hash functions 506 It is not currently thought that the SHA family of hash functions or WHIRLPOOL are like to be broken in the near future nor does the ex
32. NESSIE NESSIE Security Report version 2 0 Available from http www cryptonessie org 2003 New European Schemes for Signatures Integrity and En cryption NESSIE Performance of optimized implementa tions of the NESSIE primitives version 2 0 Available from http www cryptonessie org 2003 P Q Nguyen and I E Shparlinski The insecurity of the Digital Sig nature Algorithm with partially known nonces Journal of Cryptology 15 3 151 176 2002 M A Nielsen and I L Chuang Quantum Computation and Quantum Information Cambridge University Press 2000 M Nystrom and B Kaliski RFC 2986 PKCS 10 Certification Request Syntax Specification Version 1 7 Internet Engineering Task Force November 2000 H Ohta and M Matsui RFC 2994 A Description of the MISTY1 Encryption Algorithm lnternet Engineering Task Force November 2000 Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Stan dards OASIS XML Common Biometric Format Committee Specifi cation 1 1 June 2003 T Palmer PKI needs good standards Information Security Techni cal Report 8 3 6 13 2003 K G Paterson and A Yau Padding oracle attacks on the ISO CBC mode encryption standard In T Okamoto editor Topics in Cryp tology CT RSA 2004 volume 2964 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 305 323 Springer Verlag 2004 150 BIBLIOGRAPHY 455 E Petrank and C Rackoff CBC MAC for real time data sources Journal of Cryptology
33. R Blakley Safeguarding cryptographic keys In Proceedings of the National Computer Conference 1979 volume 48 of American Feder ation of Information Processing Societies Proceedings pages 313 317 1979 D Bleichenbacher Chosen ciphertext attacks against protocols based on the RSA encryption standard PKCS 1 In H Krawczyk editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 98 volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 1 12 Springer Verlag 1998 D Bleichenbacher On the generation of DSA one time keys Lecture given at the 6th Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography ECC 2002 2002 L Blum M Blum and M Shub Comparison of two pseudo random number generators In D Chaum R L Rivest and A T Sherman editors Advances in Cryptology Crypto 82 pages 61 78 Plenum Publishing 1982 L Blum M Blum and M Shub A simple unpredictable pseudo random number generator SIAM Journal on Computing 15 364 383 1986 S Boeyen T Howes and P Richard RFC 2559 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols LDA Pv2 Internet Engineering Task Force April 1999 S Boeyen T Howes and P Richard RFC 2587 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema Internet Engineering Task Force June 1999 118 78 79 80 8l 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 BIBLIOGRAPHY M Bond Attacks on cryptoprocessor transaction sets In C K Koc D Naccache
34. Science pages 306 318 Springer Verlag 2003 T Iwata and K Kurosawa Stronger security bounds for OMAC TMAC and XCBC In T Johansson and S Maitra editors Progress in Cryptology Indocrypt 2003 volume 2904 of Lecture Notes in Com puter Science pages 402 415 Springer Verlag 2003 A Jain R Bolle and S Pankanti editors Biometrics Personal Identification in Networked Society Kluwer Academic Press 1999 M Jakobsson Method and apparatus for immunizing against offline dictionary attacks U S Patent Application 60 283 996 Filed on 16th April 2001 M Jakobsson and S Wetzel Security weaknesses in Bluetooth In David Naccache editor Topics in Cryptology CT RSA 2001 vol ume 2020 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 176 191 Springer Verlag 2001 E Jaulmes A Joux and F Valette On the security of randomized CBC MAC beyond the birthday paradox limit A new construction In J Daemen and V Rijmen editors Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption FSE 2002 volume 2365 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 231 251 Springer Verlag 2002 J Jonsson On the security of CTR CBC MAC In K Nyberg and H M Heys editors Selected Areas in Cryptography SAC 2002 volume 2595 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 76 93 Springer Verlag 2002 A Joux Multicollisions in iterated hash functions applications to cascaded constructions In M Frankl
35. Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 909 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentiction and key generation functions fl f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 5 Summary and results of design and evaluation May 2002 155 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 33 102 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 9G Security Security architec ture September 2003 156 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 206 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentiction and key generation functions fl f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 2 Algorithm Specification June 2003 157 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 55 216 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification BIBLIOGRAPHY 125 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the A5 3 Encryption Algorithm for GSM and ECSD and the GEA3 En cryption Algorithm for GPRS Document 1 A5 3 and GEA3 Specifi
36. Trans 12 396 port Layer Security TLS 2743 Generic Security Service Application Pro 15 383 gram Interface Version 2 Update 1 2744 Generic Security Service API Version 2 C 15 513 bindings 2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS 13 425 2853 Generic Security Service API Version 2 Java 15 352 Bindings 2875 Diffie Hellman Proof of Possession Algo 13 462 rithms 2986 PKCS 10 Certification Request Syntax 13 450 Specification Version 1 7 2994 A Description of the MISTY1 Encryption Al 4 451 gorithm 3029 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 25 Data Validation and Certification Server Pro tocols 3039 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 8 13 483 Qualified Certificates Profile 3075 XML Signature Syntax and Processing 8 142 3161 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 14 21 Time Stamp Protocol TSP 3174 US Secure Hash Algorithm SHA 1 6 141 3279 Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet 13 460 X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List CRL Pro file 3280 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure 13 207 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List CRL Profile 3281 An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for 13 160 Authorization 3379 Delegated Path Validation and Delegated 13 457 Path Discovery Protocol Requirements 3394 Advanced Encryption Standard AES Key 5 484 Wrap Algorithm
37. as a good if somewhat technical introduction Other good sources include Kou 367 and Davies and Price 128 52 CHAPTER 11 KEY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS Chapter 12 Key establishment mechanisms 54 CHAPTER 12 KEY ESTABLISHMENT MECHANISMS 12 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 12 2 Standards for Key Establishment Part 4 of ISO iEC 11770 currently under development covers key establish ment mechanisms based on weak secrets i e human memorable secrets such as passwords These mechanisms discussed in more detail in Section 12 6 are typically based on asymmetric cryptography although they are rather different in nature from the mechanisms discussed in Section 12 5 12 3 Physical Mechanisms 12 4 Mechanisms using symmetric cryptography Recently several attacks has been found against Key Establishment Mech anism 12 from ISO IEC 11770 2 One attack uses a method similar to the attack noted by Boyd on the ISO 8732 key establishment protocol discussed in Section 12 4 2 and allows an attacker to force a user to re use an ex pired key A second attack uses the possibility of a poor implementation to deceive a user into believing he is executing the protocol with another registered user when in fact he is interacting with the attacker 12 5 Mechanisms using asymmetric cryptography 12 6 Key establishment based on weak secrets 12 7 Key establishment for mobile networks 12 8 Choosing a key establishment scheme 12 9 Notes 81
38. by RFC 3280 207 Two other PKIX certificate profile documents RFCs 3279 and 3281 460 160 were published at the same time RFC 3279 superseding RFC 2528 206 A second more specialised PKIX certificate profile RFC 3039 483 covering Qual ified Certificates was published in 2001 RFC 3039 is based on the now superseded PKIX certificate profile RFC 2459 A useful introduction to qualified certificates is provided in Chapter 6 of 165 For further details of the X 509 WAPcert and other wireless PKI issues see 124 The EMV certificate format is defined in Book 2 of the EMV 2000 specifications 145 813 4 The Certificate Management Protocol is specified in RFC 2510 22 and uses the Certificate Request Message specified in RFC 2511 423 Both CRM and CMP are also specified in ISO IEC 15945 282 and the identical ITU T recommendation X 843 331 A proof of possession technique appropriate for Diffie Hellman key pairs is defined in RFC 2875 462 A survey of proof of possession techniques is provided in 416 PKCS 7 and PKCS 10 whilst originally produced by RSA Inc have since been published as Internet RFCs the latest versions are available as RFC 2315 355 PKCS 7 v1 5 and RFC 2986 450 PKCS 10 v1 7 v1 5 of PKCS 10 was previously published as RFC 2314 354 The CMC protocol which builds upon PKCS 10 is specified in RFC 2797 425 CMC uses the Cryptographic Message Syntax essentially a superset of
39. by not restarting OFB every time a message is encrypted That is after encrypting a message the encrypter stores the final value of X to be used as the Starting Variable for the next message However even with this approach a single key should not be used to encrypt more than V2 blocks for the following reason Knowledge that the keystream will with high probability not repeat leaks information about the plaintext see Bellare et al 45 20 MODES OF OPERATION A proof of security for the version of OFB contained in the 3GPP standard 149 was published by Kang et al in 2001 356 However this proof was shown to be incorrect by Iwata and Kurosawa in 2003 342 although this does not mean that any significant weakness has been found in this function Indeed by making a slightly stronger assumption about the security of the block cipher Iwata and Kohno 340 have recently provided a new proof of security for this modified OFB mode 85 8 The CFB mode is an example of what is known as a self sychronising stream cipher such systems have a long history see also Chapter 4 In fact a version of CFB mode was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1979 134 If used with j 1l then this technique will after a delay recover from all types of errors including insertion or deletion of bits see Chapter 6 of 397 85 9 Error propagation is probably only desirable if data integrity and data origin au thent
40. cations September 2003 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI ETSI SR 002176 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures ESI Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures March 2003 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI ETSI TS 102023 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures ESI Policy re quirements for time stamping authorities January 2003 S Farrell and R Housley RFC 3281 An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization Internet Engineering Task Force April 2002 J Feghhi J Feghhi and P Williams Digital Certificates Applied Internet Security Addison Wesley 1999 D F Ferraiolo D R Kuhn and R Chandramouli Role Based Access Control Artech House 2003 A Fiat and A Shamir How to prove yourself Practical solutions to identification and signature problems In A M Odlyzko editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 86 volume 263 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 186 194 Springer Verlag 1987 W Ford Computer Communications Security Principles Standard Protocols and Techniques PTR Prentice Hall 1994 W Ford and M S Baum Secure Electronic Commerce Prentice Hall PTR 2nd edition 2001 C Gehrmann C J Mitchell and K Nyberg Manual authentication for wireless devices Cryptobytes 7 1 29 37 2004 C Gehrmann and K Nyberg Enhancements to Bluetooth baseband security In Proceedings of Nordsec 2001 November
41. for Standardization ISO IEC 14888 1 1998 Information technology Security techniques Digital signa tures with appendir Part 1 General 1998 259 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 14888 3 1998 Information technology Security techniques Digital signa tures with appendix Part 8 Certificate based mechanisms 1998 260 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9594 8 1998 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection The Directory Part 8 Authentication framework 3rd edition 1998 261 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 3 1998 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication Part 3 Mechanisms using digital signature techniques 2nd edition 1998 262 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11568 6 Banking Key managemant retail Part 6 Key management schemes 1999 263 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11770 3 Information technology Security techniques Key Management Part 3 Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques 1999 264 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 14888 2 1999 Information technology Security techniques Digital signa tures with appendix Part 2 Identity based mechanisms 1999 265 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15408 1 1999 Information technology Se
42. functions fl f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 4 Design Conformance Test Data 12 153 T S 35 909 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 5 Summary and results of design and evalu ation 12 154 TS 55 216 Specification of the A5 3 Encryption Algo rithm for GSM and ECSD and the GEA3 Encryption Algorithm for GPRS Document 1 A5 3 and GEA3 Specifications 157 84 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS A 2 ANSI standards The ANSI standards discussed in this book are listed in Table A 2 A 2 ANSI STANDARDS 85 Table A 2 ANSI X series standards ANSI Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no X3 92 Data Encryption Algorithm 4 33 X3 106 American National Standard for Information 5 32 Systems Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation X9 9 Financial institution message authentication 7 2 wholesale X9 17 Financial Institution Key Management 11 3 Wholesale X9 19 Financial institution retail message authenti 7 1 cation X9 24 Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key 11 12 29 Management Part 1 Using Symmetric Techniques X9 30 1 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 8 4 Services Industry Part 1 The Digital Sig nature Algorithm DSA X9 3
43. have been proposed along with Triple DES for inclusion in the ISO encryption standard 292 For more information on the history and politics of cryptography the reader is referred to Diffie and Landau 135 and Hoffman 200 84 2 3 The AES is available as NIST FIPS Pub 197 434 It is the primary recommenda tion of the NESSIE algorithm analysis project for a 128 bit block cipher It appears that the main reasons why Rijndael was selected as the AES are its flexibility and its efficiency on a wide variety of software and hardware platforms it is especially well designed for use with smart cards for example A good overview of the AES standardisation process is given in Burr 95 and Danielyan 123 However recently there have been some interesting papers that have shown up some unusual properties of Rijndael The most of interesting of these are by Courtois and Pieprzyk 119 and by Murphy and Robshaw 422 Both of these rely on the fact that the inner structure of the AES can be easily represented as a simple algebraic structure thus giving rise to a description of the cipher as a series of simple low degree algebraic equations Whether these properties will give rise to practical attacks against the AES is not yet known however this does not seem to be stopping the standardisation or implementation of the cipher Despite these unusual properties AES has been approved by the U S government to protect confidential informat
44. in Cryptology Eurocrypt 2001 volume 2045 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 453 474 Springer Verlag 2001 120 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 BIBLIOGRAPHY D W Chadwick Understanding X 500 The Directory Chapman and Hall 1994 Z Chen Java Card Technology for Smart Cards Architecture and Programmer s Guide Addison Wesley Longman Publishing Co 2000 P Cheng and R Glenn RFC 2202 Test cases for HMAC MD5 and HMAC SHA 1 Internet Engineering Task Force September 1997 Z Cheng and R Comley Attacks on an ISO IEC 11770 2 key establishment protocol Available from http eprint iacr org 2004 249 2004 W R Cheswick S M Bellovin and A D Rubin Firewalls and Internet Security Repelling the Wily Hacker Addison Wesley 2nd edition 2003 S Chokhani Toward a national public key infrastructure IEEE Communications Magazine 32 9 70 74 September 1994 S Chokhani and W Ford RFC 2527 Internet X 509 Public Key In frastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework Internet Engineering Task Force March 1999 S Chokhani W Ford R Sabett C Merrill and S Wu RFC 3647 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework Internet Engineering Task Force November 2003 J Clulow The design and analysis of cryptographic APIs for security device
45. more than two parties The simplest way to split akey K between n users is to generate n key fragments k k such that K k 6k 0 0k 12 1 This has the disadvantage that the key cannot be legitimately recovered unless all the key fragments are correctly received More complex schemes exist in which the key is split between n users but the key can be recovered provided that some smaller threshold number of key fragments are correctly received These schemes are known as secret sharing schemes the first examples of which were independently given by Blakley 71 and Shamir 487 in the late 1970s 812 4 The ISO IEC 11770 2 key establishment mechanisms that use direct communica tion are strongly based on the ISO IEC 9798 2 entity authentication schemes 269 see Chapter 10 The idea of using a trusted third party to facilitate key establishment was first introduced by Needham and Schroeder 444 in 1978 Whilst their protocol was subsequently broken 42 130 the idea remained All of the ISO IEC 11770 2 key establishment mechanisms that make use of a key distribution centre are based on the Bauer Berson and Feiertag correction 42 to the Needham and Schroeder protocol The ISO 8732 protocol described in Section 12 4 2 is similar to the key establishment protocol proposed by Boyd 83 although the Boyd protocol uses nonces for freshness instead of timestamps and was published about a decade after the ISO 8732 protocol was
46. partial message recovery It should be noted that the current scheme can only sign messages that are at most the size of the modulus less the size of the hash header and trailer fields The scheme can be extended to sign messages of any length Here we split a message m into two parts a recoverable part m and a non recoverable part ma The recoverable part of the message m must be short enough that it can be included in the message representative The message representative is constructed as before but only the recoverable part of the message is included i e the message representative has the form a header padding m hash trailer 8 6 It is important that the hash code is still computed by applying the hash function to the whole message m Signature verification is given in the obvious way The verification algorithm re computes the message representative from the signature and checks that the hash code is valid using both the recoverable part of the message contained in the message representative and the non recoverable part which must be sent along with the signature If the signature is valid i e the hash codes match then the recoverable part of the signature is released Unlike the DSA scheme RSA based signature schemes cannot be used by more than one user If two users wish to use RSA based signature schemes then they must both compute completely separate public and private keys and no parameters can be shared or t
47. recommend digital signature schemes by publishing references to well defined standards Such a recommendation has been published as ETSI SR 002176 158 and includes references to ISO IEC 14888 3 259 IEEE 1363 213 and FIPS 186 2 432 The UK have enacted this EU directive in the Electronic Communications Act 184 38 CHAPTER 8 DIGITAL SIGNATURES Advice on interpreting this Act can be found in the explanatory notes provided by the UK government 185 and the Law Commission report 377 Both the US and the EU legislation recognise the need for a digital signature to be verified using a public key that has been correctly validated see Chapter 13 and both the ESIGN Act and the EU Directive 1999 93 EC states the requirements that a certificate authority CA must satisfy in order to be considered secure The IETF have produced a profile for qualified certificates the EU notion of a secure certificate for use on the Internet This profile is contained in IETF RFC 3039 483 Chapter 9 Non repudiation mechanisms 39 40 CHAPTER 9 NON REPUDIATION MECHANISMS 9 1 Introduction 9 2 Standards for non repudiation 9 3 Non repudiation model and services 9 4 Non repudiation using symmetric cryptogra phy 9 5 Non repudiation using asymmetric cryptogra phy 9 6 Time stamping and non repudiation 9 7 Notes 89 1 Zhou s book on non repudiation 518 provides a very detailed analysis of the topic Earlier work of note on the
48. released The Kerberos key distribution protocol 445 500 is discussed in detail in Chapter 10 The attack against the ISO 8732 protocol described in Section 12 4 2 was noted by Boyd Colin Boyd personal communication April 2004 The attack against Key Establishment Mechanism 12 of ISO IEC 11770 2 was presented by Cheng and Comley 105 812 5 12 9 NOTES 57 The Diffie Hellman protocol was introduced in the famous paper by Diffie and Hellman 133 This paper introduced both the Diffie Hellman special function described in Section 12 5 1 and the Diffie Hellman key agreement protocol described in Section 12 5 2 The tweaked version of the Diffie Hellman function in which small subgroups are avoided has been attributed by Boyd and Mathuria 84 to Vanstone but no original paper seems to exist on the subject It should be noted that special function P defined in Section 12 5 1 is denoted by F in ISO IEC 11770 3 We have changed this designation to avoid confusing this function with the keying material The more complicated key agreement protocol using nonces discussed in Sec tion 12 5 2 is actually the MTI A 0 protocol developed by Matsumoto Takashima and Imai 391 There have been several proposed attacks against this scheme that suggest it can be broken if it is not implemented carefully see for example 94 One of the more interesting attacks 351 demonstrates that an attacker can success fully impersonate an
49. signatures 31 32 CHAPTER 8 DIGITAL SIGNATURES 8 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 8 2 Standards for digital signatures ISO IEC 9796 3 and all three parts of ISO IEC 14888 are currently being revised as part of a major reorganisation of ISO IEC signature standards This reorganisation will involve all the elliptic curve based signature schemes currently standardised in ISO IEC 15946 parts 2 and 4 being included in either ISO TEC 9796 3 or ISO IEC 14888 3 More specifically the scopes of the revised standards will be as follows e ISO IEC 9796 3 2nd edition will as at present be concerned with reversible digital signature schemes based on discrete logarithms It will include all the mechanisms specified in the current 1st edition of ISO IEC 9797 6 as well as all the reversible elliptic curve based schemes specified in ISO IREC 15946 4 e ISO IEC 14888 1 2nd edition will provide an updated and gener alised model for the non reversible signature schemes specified in parts 2 and 3 of ISO IEC 14888 e The 2nd edition of ISO IEC 14888 2 will be concerned with non reversible signatures schemes whose security rests on the difficulty of integer factorisation This revised standard will therefore contain all the factorisation based mechanisms from the 1st editions of ISO IEc 14888 2 and ISO IEC 14888 3 together with certain new mechanisms developed since the 1st editions were published e ISO IEC 14888 3 end edition will specify
50. signed message was introduced later see for example 173 It is as was stated in the main body of the text unclear how useful the stronger notion of forgery is It is possible to imagine a situation where finding such a forgery would break the intent of the system consider for example a situation where Alice orders drinks from Bob online Alice may repeatedly send in the same order and hence the same message and so Bob might be concerned about making sure that a new message he receives is genuine and not just an old message being re sent by an attacker This property is called message freshness and is quite a common problem in designing security protocols see Chapter 10 In order to convince himself that a message is genuine he requires Alice to digitally sign the message and only believes that the message is genuine if it contains a new signature that he has not seen before Such a system would require that the signature scheme used satisfied the stronger notion of unforgeability in order to work Such a system would also be unwieldy and is unlikely to be used in practice as more elegant solutions to the freshness problem exist see Chapter 10 For deterministic schemes where each message has only one possible signature the two notions of unforgeability are equivalent By now it should not come as much of a surprise for the reader to discover that 34 CHAPTER 8 DIGITAL SIGNATURES descriptions of many popular digital
51. the public key for this public file This public file is playing the role of the CA The term PKI is of much more recent origin it does not even appear in the 1997 Handbook of Applied Cryptography 397 The earliest published reference to the term appears to be April 1994 when Berkovits et al published a study on the subject 54 Later the same year Chokhani discussed a US national PKI 107 In September 1995 NIST ran an invitational workshop on the subject 429 The IETF PKIX Working Group was also established in the fall of 1995 with the goal of developing Internet standards needed to support an X 509 based PKI By the late 1990s the term was ubiquitous 813 2 13 8 NOTES 61 The first work on developing PKI standards predates the term PKI by some years What has become known as the X 509 certificate format was first standardised in 1988 112 as part of the first edition of the ITU T X 500 directory services rec ommendations note that they were then referred to as CCITT recommendations For a general guide to X 500 directories see 102 Three subsequent editions of this ITU T recommendation have been published 316 327 328 with the most recent edition the fourth edition being published in 2000 In each case an aligned ISO IEC standard ISO IEC 9594 8 was published a year or two later the most recent third and fourth editions having been published in 1998 and 2001 260 281 The original work on X 509 was p
52. to enable application layer protocols to traverse network firewalls RFC 2203 143 allows Remote Procedure Call RPC protocols to use GSS API security services The other two RFCs pro vide enhancements to the base GSS API functionality RFC 2478 40 specifies a security negotiation mechanism for GSS API It enable GSS API peers to deter mine whether their credentials share common cryptographic mechanism s and if so to invoke security context establishment for a selected common mechanism This is most useful for applications using GSS API implementations supporting multiple cryptographic mechanisms RFC 2479 20 extends GSS API for applica tions requiring protection of a generic data unit such as a file or message in a connectionless way It is thus suitable for applications such as secure electronic mail where data needs to be protected without any on line connection with the intended recipient s of that data 815 4 The current version v2 11 revision 1 of PKCS 11 is specified in 481 A detailed critique of PKCS 11 has been provided by Clulow 111 815 5 Clulow s 2003 Master s Thesis 110 contains descriptions of a number of possible crypto API vulnerabilities in commercial hardware security modules Attacks on the key management interface for recent versions of the IBM 4758 have been identified by Bond and Anderson 78 79 An example of unnecessary flexibility in a crypto API which enables an attack is desc
53. tool for attacking certain types of cryp tosystem particularly knapsack cryptosystems see 509 It wasn t until the N TRU public key cryptosystem was proposed during the rump session of the Crypto 96 conference that it was considered a viable basis for a cryptographic scheme The N TRU encryption scheme was shown to be equivalent to a particular lattice prob lem 117 and it seems that for suitably chosen parameters this problem would be hard to solve thus showing the security of the cryptosystem Despite this security proof there have been many problems with NTTRU and it has not yet been fully accepted by the cryptographic community Other lattice schemes have since been proposed for example 174 proposed by IBM Research but have similarly failed to be universally accepted As we have stated one of the main strengths of lattice based cryptography is that it seems to be resistent to attacks made by quantum computers Quantum computing is a vastly complex subject that takes in elements of mathematics atomic physics and cryptography and is far beyond the scope of this book It is known however that a quantum computer would be able to efficiently break both the RSA and the Diffie Hellman schemes 491 For more information the reader is referred to 449 84 4 4 The ISO standard on asymmetric encryption ISO IEC FCD 18033 2 304 is the first to so fully embrace the use of hybrid ciphers Of the seven algorithms pro posed for
54. topic includes the 1997 Ph D theses of Roe 474 and Zhou 517 A discussion of the concept of repudiation in law can be found in Appendix I of 165 89 2 ISO IEC 13888 Parts 1 3 were published in 1997 and 1998 250 251 257 Part 1 is currently being revised and the FDIS text was published in late 2003 294 89 3 A detailed discussion of non repudiation services and mechanisms for the provision of such services can be found in chapter 9 of 165 89 4 A number of authors have proposed more complex non repudiation protocols de signed to force message recipients to provide the evidence necessary to provide non repudiation of delivery For example Zhou and Gollmann 520 proposed use of a TTP which does not release the key necessary to decrypt a message until it receives a signed receipt essentially an NRD token to prevent denial of service attacks where messages from the TTP are blocked the TTP is required to post the decryption key for the message on a public web site This and other solutions are also discussed in 519 see also 518 9 7 NOTES 41 89 5 The use of digital signatures to provide non repudiation services is in most cases inextricably linked with the use of Public Key Infrastructures discussed in Chap ter 13 and TTP services especially time stamping services discussed in Chap ter 14 42 CHAPTER 9 NON REPUDIATION MECHANISMS Chapter 10 Authentication protocols 43 44 CHAPTER 10 A
55. two inputs that have the same hash code after trying Jar 2 different inputs Therefore since block cipher hash function 1 and block cipher hash function 2 have maximum outputs of size n and 2n respectively we would expect to find collisions in these hash functions purely by chance after 2 and 2 trials respectively In fact for block cipher hash function 1 there is an even stronger result It has been shown 65 463 that if we assume that the underlying block cipher is in some sense perfect then the best possible attack against block cipher hash function 1 is the birthday attack given above 6 4 Most dedicated hash functions seem to be developed as a result of standards initia tives or focuesed research projects the SHA family of hash functions were developed for the NIST secure hash standard 438 the RIPEMD family of hash functions was developed by several members of the RIPE project 82 and WHIRLPOOL was de veloped for evaluation by the NESSIE project 446 447 Many of the standardised dedicated hash functions including the four of the five SHA variants and WHIRLPOOL have recently been analysed by the NESSIE project The final security report 446 found no major weaknesses in any of these hash functions The NESSIE project also conducted extensive performance tests for these hash functions on multiple platforms 447 All of the MDx algorithms were designed by Rivest 353 471 472 although the IETF RFC for
56. was given by Rivest Shamir and Addleman 473 Since its inception there have been numerous attacks made against the RSA cipher but none of them have proved enough to break the scheme completely There are however too many to detail here A good survey of the attacks against RSA can be found in 81 84 4 2 Both the RSA PKCS and the SECG standards are freely available on the internet see Chapter 2 for more information about obtaining standards The most famous attack against RSA PKCS was by Bleichenbacher 72 and attacked not the RSA scheme itself but the padding system used to format messages before they were encrypted using RSA After the initial efforts of the SECG elliptic curve cryptog raphy has been quickly accepted by the both cryptographers and implementors It is now also standardised by the IEEE 1363 group 213 215 ISO IEC JTC1 284 and is now even being included in the RSA PKCS A good introduction to ellip tic curve cryptography is given by Hankerson Menezes and Vanstone 195 More technical issues associated with elliptic curves are discussed in Blake Seroussi and Smart 67 68 84 4 3 There are two IEEE standards published 213 215 and two more in development Of the two standards in development only the draft standard on lattice based techniques proposes any kind of encryption scheme Lattice based cryptography seems to have been developed in a rather bizarre fash ion Initially lattices were only used as a
57. 1 Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public 8 16 7 Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry rDSA X9 42 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 12 16 12 Services Industry Agreement of Symmetric Keys Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptogra phy X9 52 Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of 52 27 Operation X9 55 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 13 5 Services Industry Extensions to Public Key Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists X9 57 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 13 6 Services Industry Certificate Management X9 62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 8 8 Services Industry The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA X9 63 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial 12 13 Services Industry Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptogra phy X9 69 Framework for Key Management Extensions 12 9 86 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS ANSI Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no X9 71 Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code 7 11 X9 79 1 Part 1 Public Key Infrastructure Prac 13 14 14 tices and Policy X9 80 Prime Number Generation Primality Test 16 15 ing and Primality Certificates X9 82 Random Number Generation 16 16 X9 84 Biometric Information Management and Se 16 17 curity for the Financial Services Industry A 3 BSI STANDARDS 87 A 3 BSI stan
58. 11 Cryptographic Token Interface Standard Revision 1 November 2001 P Ryan S Schneider M Goldsmith G Lowe and B Roscoe The modelling and analysis of security protocols The CSP approach Addison Wesley 2000 S Santesson W Polk P Barzin and M Nystrom RFC 3039 In ternet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile Internet Engineering Task Force January 2001 J Schaad and R Housley RFC 3394 Advanced Encryption Stan dard AES Key Wrap Algorithm Internet Engineering Task Force September 2002 B Schneier Applied Cryptography John Wiley and Sons Inc 2nd edition 1996 C P Schnorr Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards In G Brassard editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 89 volume 435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 239 252 Springer Verlag 1990 A Shamir How to share a secret Communications of the ACM 22 612 613 1979 C E Shannon A mathematical theory of communication Bell System Technical Journal 27 379 423 623 656 1948 C E Shannon Communication theory of secrecy systems Bell System Technical Journal 28 656 715 1949 J Shawe Taylor Generating strong primes Electronics Letters 22 16 875 877 1986 P W Shor Algorithms for quantum computation Discrete loga rithms and factoring In Proceedings of the IEEE 35th Annual Sym posium on Foundations of Computer Science pages 124 134 1994 V Shoup Using has
59. 2 1 Owing to the peculiar evolution of key management systems an evolution based on best practices in industry rather than by academic research it is difficult to track down the origin of many of the important concepts in key management Crucial concepts such as key authentication key confirmation and key control have grown up from the use of keys rather than from academic discussion and the 12 9 NOTES 55 development of key management standards by informed professionals has played an important role in the evolution of these ideas This chapter only introduces some of the many possible mechanisms that can be used to established shared secret keys For more information on this subject the reader is referred to Boyd and Mathuria 84 The basic principles of key establish ment using symmetric and asymmetric techniques are also discussed in Stallings 496 There is also a nice summary of the ISO 8732 standard for key establishment in wholesale banking sector in Davies and Price 128 It should be noted that whilst standard key agreement protocols are less suited to generating the complex keys required by asymmetric applications key agreement protocols can still be used to generate these keys A key agreement protocol will typically ensure that both parties can establish a suitably random binary string of some pre determined length in a confidential manner If this random string is used as the random bits that a key generation algorit
60. 2 3 and P h g1g2 P h g1 P h go 12 4 For more details see 376 The key transport mechanism given in Section 12 5 3 is both efficient and secure although some concerns have been raised about the fact that the signature is only computed on publicly available information Hence it is possible for a malicious attacker to substitute the correct signature with his own and thus attempt to fool B into thinking that the message was from him This attack only works if the attacker can also change the identifier 74 that has also been encrypted and even then the attacker still does not learn the value of the key 58 CHAPTER 12 KEY ESTABLISHMENT MECHANISMS 812 6 We have only briefly mentioned the mechanisms and the problems associated with key establishment using weak secrets passwords A more comprehensive study can be found in Boyd and Mathuria 84 The ISO IEC standard on such mechanisms ISO IEC 11770 4 is currently at the CD stage 300 812 7 An overview of the key establishment mechanisms used in 3GPP mobile networks can be found in Temple and Regnault 503 As we have mentioned the 3GPP key establishment algorithm is very similar to that found in the 2nd generation GSM mobile networks A good description of this earlier scheme can be found in Hillebrand 199 Future trends in security for mobile networks are discussed in Mitchell 414 The 3GPP key establishment scheme described in this section is standardised i
61. 2002 volume 2365 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 179 194 Springer Verlag Berlin 2002 D Welsh Codes and Cryptography Oxford University Press 1988 D Whiting R Housley and N Ferguson RFC 3610 Counter with CBC MAC CCM Internet Engineering Task Force September 2003 M J Wiener Efficient DES key search Technical Re port TR 244 Carleton University 1993 Available from http www ja net CERT Wiener des key search ps J Wray RFC 1509 Generic Security Service API C bindings In ternet Engineering Task Force September 1993 J Wray RFC 2744 Generic Security Service API Version 2 C bindings Internet Engineering Task Force January 2000 A C Yao Theory and applications of trapdoor functions In 27th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science FOCS pages 80 91 1982 W Yeong T Howes and S Kille RFC 1777 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol Internet Engineering Task Force March 1995 Y Zheng Digital signcryption or how to achieve cost signature amp encryption lt lt cost signature cost encryption In B Kaliski editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 97 volume 1294 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 165 179 Springer Verlag 1997 J Zhou Non repudiation PhD thesis Royal Holloway University of London 1997 J Zhou Non repudiation in electronic commerce Artech House 2001 J Zhou R Deng and F Bao Evolution of fair non repudiation wit
62. 3 and the OASIS XCBF format standard 452 It should be emphasised that the liveness of a biometric should be checked before the biometric measuremet is trusted There are cases where criminals have fooled fingerprint sensors using dead fingers that have forcibly been removed from the bodies of authorised personnel More recently Matsumoto et al 390 have shown that it is often possible to fool fingerprint sensors by making false fingerprints from melted gummy bears These gummy fingers have fooled both the biometric measurement system and the liveness test 16 6 The ISO IEC standard on information security management ISO IEC 17799 276 is based on the British Standard BS 7799 1 90 This standard consists of a series of guidelines for good information security management A second part to this national standard BS 7799 2 91 deals with the certification that an organisation is compliant with BS 7799 1 This standard is currently being reviewed by ISO IEC JTC1 SC27 78 CHAPTER 16 OTHER STANDARDS Chapter 17 Standards the future 79 80 CHAPTER 17 STANDARDS THE FUTURE Appendix A Tables of standards 8l 82 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS In this appendix we provide tables of standards documents listed in numeri cal order This should enable the reader faced with just a standard number to find out what the title of the standard is and where it is discussed in this book A 1 3GPP standards The
63. 659 1985 U Maurer Fast generation of prime numbers and secure public key cryptographic parameters Journal of Cryptography 8 123 155 1995 P McMahon RFC 1961 GSS API Authentication Method for SOCKS Version 5 Internet Engineering Task Force June 1996 A Medvinsky and M Hur RFC 2712 Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security TLS Internet Engineering Task Force October 1999 A J Menezes P C van Oorschot and S A Vanstone Handbook of Applied Cryptography CRC Press 1997 R C Merkle Secrecy authentication and public key systems Tech nical Report 1979 1 Information Systems Laboratory Stanford Uni versity 1979 R C Merkle Secrecy Authentication and Public Key Systems UMI Research Press 1982 R C Merkle One way hash functions and DES In G Brassard editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 89 volume 435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 428 446 Springer Verlag 1989 R C Merkle A fast software one way hash function Journal of Cryptology 3 43 58 1990 C H Meyer and S M Matyas Cryptography A new dimension in computer data security John Wiley and Sons 1982 C H Meyer and M Schilling Secure program load with manipula tion detection code In Proceedings of the 6 Worldwide Congress on Computer and Communication Security and Protection SECURI COM 88 pages 111 130 1988 S Micali C Rackoff and B Sloan The notion of security for
64. A Companion to User s Guide to Cryptography and Standards Alexander W Dent Chris J Mitchell 18th October 2004 v0 3 ii Contents 1 Introduction 1 1 Scope and purpose 2 2 ns 1 2 Structure of book 2 0 2 2 0 000007 L3 Termin loey roi ois et A eg hen 14 Modular Arithmetic 2 2 2222 onen We Notes xg seni A i oh ner AM Ta rU 2 Standards and the standardisation process 2 1 Why bother with standards 2 2 International standardisation organisations 2 3 National standardisation organisations 2 4 Industrial standardisation organisations 2 5 Cryptographic evaluation bodies 2 6 NOTES AN sib S eS Ea RE SS ee ee 3 Security mechanisms and security services 3 Tntrodi ctlomi ze Gf ee ees Rare 3 2 Security standards DE eani o aLi 3 8 A model for security Emm 3 4 Security services Como 3 5 Security mechanisms 2 oaoa 3 6 Relating services to mechanisms 2 2222220 3 7 Services and protocols layers 2 22222 llle 3 8 Security management 2L 3 9 Security frameworks nn ii iv 3 10 Notes Encryption 4 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 4 2 Block Ciphers 4 3 Stream Ciphers 4 4 Asymmetric Ciphers 4 5 Notes Modes of operation for block ciphers 5 1 Definitions and basic properties 5 2 Standards for modes of operation 5 3 Padding methods 5 4 Electronic Codebook ECB mode 5
65. AC since they involve adding one encryption operation to the EMAC construction A proof of security for 3GPP MAC was published in 2003 201 but the proof was shown to be flawed later in the same year 342 indeed it was shown that a proof of security for 3GPP MAC in the standard framework is impossible to achieve However by making a slightly stronger albeit reasonable assumption about the security of the block cipher Iwata and Kohno 340 have provided a proof of security for 3GPP MAC 30 CHAPTER 7 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES MACS 87 4 MDx MAC was proposed by Preneel and van Oorschot 465 in 1995 HMAC was proposed in 1996 by Bellare Canetti and Krawczyk 43 as a solution to problems with simpler flawed hash based MAC constructions involving simply concatenating a key with the data and then applying a hash function Such MAC schemes are susceptible to forgery attacks arising from the extensible property of hash functions see Chapter 6 HMAC was first standardised in Internet RFC 2104 368 before its adoption in ISO IEC 9797 2 278 It has since also been adopted as a US Federal Standard in NIST FIPS PUB 198 439 87 5 MAA was originally proposed in 1984 by Davies 126 The best known attack on MAA is due to Preneel Rijmen and van Oorschot 464 PMAC was proposed in 2001 by Black and Rogaway who submitted it for consideration by NIST The scheme was not formally published until 2002 64 Chapter 8 Digital
66. ASN 1 Parameterization of ASN 1 specifications 2002 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 690 07 02 Information technology ASN 1 encoding rules Specification of Basic Encoding Rules BER Canonical Encoding Rules CER and Distinguished Encoding Rules DER 2002 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 691 07 02 Information technology ASN 1 encoding rules Specification of Packed Encoding Rules PER 2002 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 805 10 2003 Security Security architecture for systems pro viding end to end communications 2003 T Iwata and T Kohno New security proofs for the 3GPP confiden tiality and integrity algorithms In B Roy and W Meier editors Proceedings of FSE 2004 volume 3017 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 427 445 Springer Verlag 2004 T Iwata and K Kurosawa OMAC One key CBC MAC In T Johans son editor Fast Software Encryption 10th International Workshop FSE 2003 volume 2887 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 129 153 Springer Verlag 2003 T Iwata and K Kurosawa On the correctness of security proofs for the 3GPP confidentiality and integrity algorithms In K G Paterson BIBLIOGRAPHY 141 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 editor Cryptography and Coding 9th IMA International Conference volume 2898 of Lecture Notes in Computer
67. C 1750 140 ISO IEC 18031 299 and ANSI X9 82 16 Of these only the IETF RFC is currently available Both ANSI X9 82 and ISO IEC 18031 currently at the CD stage should be published in the next couple of years Whilst it is generally true that an NRBG based on a physical source needs special ist hardware to measure the source this does not mean that the physical sources must themselves be new components IETF RFC 1750 points out that many exist ing computer systems naturally contain phenomena that could be used as entropy sources The standard suggests that audio input to a machine or the random fluctu ations in the rotational speed of a disk drive could both be used as effective entropy sources if hardware was put into place to measure the phenomena A large body of academic work has been published under on the subject of deter ministic random bit generators For example Yao 514 has shown that a random bit generator is secure produces bits which are effectively unbiased and indepen dent if not efficient attacker can determine the next bit of the RBGs output with probability significantly greater than 1 2 A good if somewhat technical overview of this theory is given by Goldreich 172 Examples of DRBG include the use of a suitably secure block cipher in counter or output feedback mode a proof that the CTR mode of operation provides suitably random output if the underlying block cipher is perfect is given by Bellare et al 45
68. Force January 1999 R Housley and P Hoffman RFC 2585 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols FTP and HTTP Internet En gineering Task Force May 1999 R Housley and W Polk RFC 2528 Internet X 509 Public Key In frastructure Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm KEA Keys in Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates Internet En gineering Task Force March 1999 R Housley W Polk W Ford and D Solo RFC 3280 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List CRL Profile Internet Engineering Task Force April 2002 R Housley D Whiting and N Fergu son Counter with CBC MAC Available from http csrc nist gov CryptoToolkit modes proposedmodes 2002 T Howes S Kille and W Yeong RFC 1778 The String Representa tion of Standard Attribute Syntaxes Internet Engineering Task Force March 1995 BIBLIOGRAPHY 129 210 C l Anson and C J Mitchell Security defects in CCITT recommen dation X 509 The directory authentication framework ACM Com puter Communication Review 20 2 30 34 1990 211 IBM PCI Cryptographic Processor CCA Basic Services Reference and Guide Release 2 41 September 2003 212 Information Sciences Institute University of Southern California RFC 791 DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification Internet Engi neering Task Force September 1981 213 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi
69. MDS e IETF RFC 3174 141 SHA 1 86 3 Block cipher hash function 1 was invented by Matyas Meyer and Oseas 393 in 1985 Block cipher based hash functions whose hash code is the same size as the block length have been systematically researched by Preneel Govaerts and 24 CHAPTER 6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS Vandewalle 463 Their conclusion is that the Matyas Meyer and Oseas is one of a class of only 12 secure hash functions Block cipher hash function 2 also known as MDC 2 was released by Matyas Meyer and Schilling 392 403 It is the subject of an IBM patent U S Patent Number 4 908 861 For block cipher based hash function 1 the function u that derives a block cipher key from an intermediate value is completely specified by the standard for the case when the underlying block cipher is DES One of the roles of this function in the case when the underlying block cipher is DES is to prevent weak DES keys 125 from being used The use of weak DES keys leads to a trivial attack against the scheme The birthday paradox is so named because of the phenomenon that in a group of only 23 people it is more likely than not that two people will share the same birthday The idea behind this seemingly illogical fact can also be applied to hash functions and MACs see Chapter 7 It turns out that if a hash function has an output of length n then despite their being 2 possible outputs for the hash function we would expect to find
70. N Haller and R Atkinson RFC 1704 On Internet authentication Internet Engineering Task Force October 1994 195 D Hankerson A J Menezes and S Vanstone Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography Springer Verlag 2004 196 D Harkins and D Carrel RFC 2409 The Internet Key Exchange IKE Internet Engineering Task Force November 1998 128 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 BIBLIOGRAPHY V Hassler X 500 and LDAP security comparative overview IEEE Network 13 6 54 64 November December 1999 J Henshall and S Shaw OST explained Ellis Horwood 1988 F Hillebrand GSM and UMTS The creation of global mobile com munications John Wiley and Sons Inc 2001 L J Hoffman editor Building in Big Brother Springer Verlag 1995 D Hong J S Kang B Preneel and H Ryu A concrete security analysis for 3GPP MAC In T Johansson editor Fast Software En cryption 10th International Workshop FSE 2003 volume 2887 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 154 169 Springer Verlag 2003 G Horng and C K Hsu Weakness in the Helsinki protocol Elec tronics Letters 34 354 355 1998 R Housley RFC 2630 Cryptographic Message Syntax Internet En gineering Task Force June 1999 R Housley W Ford W Polk and D Solo RFC 2459 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile Internet Engineering Task
71. NSI X9 42 12 IETF RFC 2631 470 IEEE 1363 213 215 and RSA PKCS 3 see Chapter 4 for more information about the RSA PKCS series of standards There are also several standardised elliptic curve versions of the Diffie Hellman protocol see ISO IEC 15946 284 ANSI X9 63 13 and IEEE 1363 213 215 The second class of techniques namely asymmetric key transport techniques are usually based on asymmetric encryption and digital signature schemes Asymmetric key transport schemes are standardised in ISO IEC 11770 3 263 and ISO 11166 228 229 56 CHAPTER 12 KEY ESTABLISHMENT MECHANISMS The IETF schemes are standardised in RFC 2246 132 the TLS protocol and RFC 2409 196 the IKE protocol These are fairly high level descriptions con cerned more with the describing the messages that need to be passed between two computers to facilitate establishing a key rather than concentrating on the key establishment technique itself An extension of the TLS protocol that uses the Kerberos authentication key establishment protocol is described in RFC 2712 396 812 3 The most common situation in which keys are distributed physically is in the dis tribution of PINs for ATM cards Here the key is distributed using several sealed packages the outer letter which contains the address of the recipient and the sealed inner letter which contains the actual PIN The idea of key splitting can be extended so that the key is split between
72. PKCS 7 which is specified in RFC 2630 203 813 5 A more detailed comparison of LDAP version 2 and X 500 directories has been given by Hassler 197 The PKIX certificate access protocol is defined in RFCs 2559 and 2587 76 77 This is based on the IETF LDAP v2 protocol which is defined in RFC 1777 515 RFC 2559 supersedes RFC 1778 209 The use of FTP and HTTP to distribute certificates is specified in RFC 2585 205 The DPD and DPV protocols for delegating certificate path discovery and validation are given in RFC 3379 457 Similar functionality to DPV and DPD is also supported by the Simple Certificate Validation Protocol SCVP specified in an Internet draft 387 Despite its appearance in an Internet draft SCVP has never been published in an RFC 13 8 NOTES 63 813 6 OCSP is specified in RFC 2560 424 It is also specified in ISO IEC 15945 282 The functioning of DVCS is specified in RFC 3029 25 SCVP 387 discussed above provides functionality broadly similar to that pro vided by OCSP but also incorporates functionality provided by DVD and DVP 813 7 The PKIX Certificate Policy and Certificate Management Framework was first pub lished as RFC 2527 in 1999 108 this has now been superseded by RFC 3647 109 published in November 2003 The ABA digital signature guidelines 31 published in 1996 have been very influ ential in influencing the development of CPs and CPSs Chapter 10 of Ford and Ba
73. Third Generation Partnership Project 3GPP standards that are dis cussed in this book are given in Table A 1 These standards are published by ETSI A 1 3GPP STANDARDS Table A 1 3GPP standards 83 3GPP no Title Relevant chapter s Ref no TS 33 102 Security Architecture 12 155 TS 33 105 Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements 4 148 TS 35 201 Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms Document 1 f8 and f9 Specification 4 149 TS 35 202 Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms Document 2 KA SUMI Specification 150 TS 35 205 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 1 General 12 151 TS 35 206 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions f1 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 2 Algorithm Specification 12 1156 TS 35 207 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions fl f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 3 Implementors Test Data 12 152 TS 35 208 Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentication and key generation
74. UTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 10 1 Introduction 10 2 Standards for entity authentication protocols 10 3 Cryptographic mechanisms 10 4 Timeliness checking mechanisms 10 5 Authentication using symmetric cryptogra phy 10 6 Authentication using asymmetric cryptogra phy Table 10 4 was based on the FCD text of ISO IEC 9798 5 As a result of changes made in the FDIS text the mechanism in ISO IEC 9798 5 clause 8 exists only in two variants and not three known as GPS1 and GPS2 as a result the text GPS1 2 3 should read GPS1 GPS82 10 7 Manual authentication protocols 10 8 Choosing an authentication protocol 10 9 Notes 810 1 Chapter 10 of Menezes van Oorschot and Vanstone 397 provides a more detailed discussion of authentication protocols A more recent comprehensive discussion of authentication protocols can be found in Boyd and Mathuria s book 84 The first discussion of authentication protocols is contained in the landmark 1979 paper of Needham and Schroeder 444 This paper contains a series of protocols based on different cryptographic primitives and has set the context for the now large literature on authentication protocols 810 2 The first published standard for authentication protocols was the 1988 edition of X 509 112 One section of this CCITT Recommendation contains a series of three authentication protocols based on the use of digital signatures under the heading 10 9 NOTES 45 of stron
75. abin On the security of joint signature and encryption In L Knudsen editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 2002 volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 83 107 Springer Verlag 2002 K Aoki T Ichikawa M Kanda M Matsui S Moriai J Nakajima and T Tokita The 128 bit block cipher Camellia IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals E85 A 11 24 2002 A Arsenault and S Turner Internet Draft draft ietf pkix roadmap 09 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Roadmap Internet Engi neering Task Force July 2002 T Austin and D Huaman PKI A Wiley Brief John Wiley and Sons Inc 2001 E Baize and D Pinkas RFC 2478 The Simple and Protected GSS API Negotiation Mechanism Internet Engineering Task Force De cember 1998 E Barkan E Biham and N Keller Instant ciphertext only crypt analysis of GSM encrypted communications In D Boneh editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2003 volume 2729 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 600 616 Springer Verlag 2003 R K Bauer T A Berson and R J Feiertag A key distribution pro tocol using event markers ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 1 3 249 255 August 1983 M Bellare R Canetti and H Krawczyk Keyed hash functions and message authentication In N Koblitz editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 96 volume 1109 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 1 15 Springer Verlag 1996 M Bellare R Canetti and
76. ain body of each chapter is not reproduced although the headings have been retained text is included under the original head ings where the status of the subject has changed or it seems appropriate to provide additional information As always we would very much welcome input of all kinds on the User s Guide and this companion We would particularly welcome corrections and additions to the existing text which we will do our best to acknowledge Alex Dent Chris Mitchell October 2004 Chapter 1 Introduction 2 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1 Scope and purpose 1 2 Structure of book 1 3 Terminology 1 4 Modular Arithmetic 1 5 Notes 1 1 There are many useful books on cryptography we mention just three Mur phy and Piper s book 459 provides a very simple introduction to cryptography Schneier s book 485 is a very readable account of modern cryptography In the notes in subsequent chapters we refer to books containing more detail on the topics covered in the particular chapter Of particular importance in this respect is the Handbook of Applied Cryptography 397 which provides a detailed and meticu lously researched account of cryptographic topics It is interesting to note that both modern cryptography and information theory owe a huge debt to the pioneering work of Shannon who published enormously influential papers on both topics in the post war years 488 489 81 4 There are many books providing simple expla
77. al authentication mechanisms Two of these mechanisms derive from work of Gehrmann and Nyberg 167 The other two mechanisms are due to Larsson 375 and Jakobsson 345 Some of the ISO IEC 9798 6 schemes may also be included in a future version of the Bluetooth standards The existing Bluetooth specifications already contain a solu tion to device imprinting but this solution has well known security shortcomings if the initial exchange between devices can be wiretapped 168 346 The first protocol of this type was proposed by Maher 386 who proposed using manual techniques to authenticate a standard Diffie Hellman key establishment process see Chapter 12 However the techniques contained in ISO IEC 9798 6 reduce the work involved for the human operator of the devices 810 8 The Bellare and Rogaway AKEP2 protocol possesses a proof of security 50 Blake Wilson Johnson and Menezes 69 70 examined signature based authentication protocols and have amongst other things shown that the the three pass signature based protocol from ISO IEC 9798 3 is secure For further details about proofs of security for authentication protocols the reader is referred to the books of Ryan et al 482 and Boyd and Mathuria 84 48 CHAPTER 10 AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS Chapter 11 Key management frameworks 49 50 CHAPTER 11 KEY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORKS 11 1 Standards for Key Management 11 2 Definitions and Basic Properties 11 3 The G
78. ancial institution message authentication wholesale April 1986 3 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 17 Financial Institution Key Management Wholesale 1995 4 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 30 1 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry Part 1 The Digital Signature Algorithm DSA 1997 5 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 55 1997 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services In dustry Extensions to Public Key Certificates and Certificate Revoca tion Lists 1997 6 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 57 1997 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services In dustry Certificate Management 1997 7 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 31 Digital Signatures Using Reversible Publis Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry rDSA 1998 8 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ECDSA 1998 9 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI X9 69 1998 American National Standard for Financial Services Framework for Key Management Extensions 1998 111 112 BIBLIOGRAPHY 10 Accredited Standards Committee X9 Financial Services ANSI 11 12 13
79. aphy Theory and Practice CRC Press 1995 Telecommunication Technology Association Korea TTAS KO 12 0004 128 bit symmetric block cipher SEED September 1999 R Temple and J Regnault nternet and wireless security Institute of Electrical Engineers 2002 Utah State Legislature Utah Digital Signature Act 1996 Available from http www le state ut us code TITLE46 TITLE46 htm S Vaudenay Security flaws induced by CBC padding Applications to SSL IPSEC WTLS In L R Knudsen editor Advances in Cryp tology Eurocrypt 2002 volume 2332 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 534 545 Springer Verlag 2002 Xiaoyun Wang Dengguo Feng Xuejia Lai and Hongbo Yu Collisions for hash functions MD4 MD5 HAVAL 128 and RIPEMD Available from http eprint iacr org 2004 199 2004 D Watanabe A Biryukov and C De Canniere A distinguishing attack of SNOW 2 0 with linear masking method In M Matsui and R Zuccherato editors Selected Areas in Cryptography 10th Annual 154 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 BIBLIOGRAPHY International Workshop SAC 2003 volume 3006 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 222 233 Springer Verlag Berlin 2004 D Watanabe S Furuya H Yoshida K Takaragi and B Preneel A new keystream generator MUGI In J Daemen and V Rijmen editors Fast Software Encryption 9th International Workshop FSE
80. articularly by Rogaway and Wagner 478 The EAX mode was proposed by Bellare Rogaway and Wagner 51 to provide an alternative to the CCM mode Another proposed alternative to the CCM mode is the OCB mode 476 However this mode has the disadvantage of having been patented and has not been made freely available instead it can be licensed under reasonable and non discriminatory terms The final alternative AES Key Wrap mode is given in IETF RFC 3394 484 but does not seem to be a serious contender for inclusion in the NIST standard The first draft of the ISO IEC standard on authenticated encryption ISO IEC 19772 313 contains specifications for the CCM OCB and AES Key Wrap modes of operation of a block cipher 816 4 The general security requirements for a security module that is to be used in the retail banking sector are described in ISO 13491 1 253 The second part of the standard ISO 13491 2 273 describes specific requirements for systems using mag netic card stripe systems both requirements for the cards themselves and the terminals which interact with them It may be thought since we have moti vated the discussion of security modules via the ANSI key management framework 29 230 231 232 that key management is the only function for which security modules are used in the financial sector This is not true ISO 13491 1 states that security modules can be used to protect messages cryptographic keys and other
81. ave provided a practical demonstration of the attack These attacks show that it is important that the padding method be selected appropriately and for error messages to be handled with great care As argued by Black and Urtubia the existence of such attacks argues strongly in favour of the use of authenticated encryption modes see Section 5 10 and Chapter 16 wherever possible 85 4 The ECB mode should not be used even for short messages unless the data being encrypted is highly random or unless a single key is only used to encrypt a small number of blocks To see why suppose a 64 bit block cipher is used to encrypt single blocks each made up of eight letters There will thus be only 268 2x 10 possible different plaintext blocks and hence after only around 264 500 000 plaintext blocks have been encrypted the same block is likely to occur twice 85 5 A proof of security for the CBC mode was published by Bellare et al in 1997 45 This proof requires the Starting Variable to be a secret known only to the legitimate sender and receiver The modification to CBC mode known as ciphertext stealing is due to Meyer and Matyas 402 Mitchell and Varadharajan 417 pointed out the hazards of using OFB mode to encrypt the final block 85 6 A formal treatment of CTR mode has been presented by Bellare et al in 45 85 7 The probability of the same sequence of bits being used to encrypt two different messages can be reduced
82. cate Request Message Format Internet Engineering Task Force March 1999 424 M Myers R Ankney A Malpani S Galperin and C Adams RFC 2560 X 509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol OCSP Internet Engineering Task Force June 1999 425 M Myers X Liu J Schaad and J Weinstein RFC 2797 Certificate Management Messages over CMS Internet Engineering Task Force April 2000 426 S Nanavati M Thieme and R Nanavati Biometrics Identity Veri fication in a Networked World John Wiley and Sons Inc 2002 427 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal In formation Processing Standards Publication 81 FIPS PUB 81 DES Modes of Operation December 1980 428 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal In formation Processing Standards Publication 140 1 FIPS PUB 140 1 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules January 1994 429 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Proceedings Public Key Infrastructure Invitational Workshop MITRE McLean Virginia USA September 1995 IR 5788 430 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal Infor mation Processing Standards Publication 196 FIPS PUB 196 Entity authentication using public key cryptography February 1997 148 BIBLIOGRAPHY 431 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal In formation Processing Standards Publicatio
83. ccess control framework come in fact from earlier pre standardisation efforts by ECMA 146 Chapter 4 Encryption 10 CHAPTER 4 ENCRYPTION 4 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 4 2 Block Ciphers In July 2004 NIST announced its intention to withdraw its support for the DES block cipher and asked for comments The proposed withdrawal would affect both NIST FIPS 46 3 the specification of DES and triple DES and NIST FIPS 81 the modes of operation for DES see Chapter 5 NIST would continue supporting the use of Triple DES through the publication of a Special Publication NIST SP 800 67 Despite this continued support for Triple DES the withdrawal announcement makes it clear that NIST would prefer all cryptographic applications requiring a block cipher to use the new AES ISO IEC 18033 3 on block ciphers is now nearing completion the current version is the Final CD and the selection of block ciphers included in this draft standard appears to have stabilised FCD 18033 3 contains a total of six block ciphers three 64 bit ciphers Triple DES called TDEA MISTY1 and CAST 128 and three 128 bit ciphers AES Camellia and SEED 4 3 Stream Ciphers Part 4 of ISO IEC 18033 on stream ciphers is also now nearing comple tion the current version is the Final CD and apart from the CFB OFB and CTR modes of operation of a block cipher contains two dedicated keystream generators for synchronous stream ciphers These are the MUGI
84. ch 12 263 niques Key Management Part 3 Mech anisms using asymmetric techniques 11770 4 IT security techniques Key Management 12 300 Part 4 Mechanisms based on weak secrets 13491 1 Banking Secure cryptographic devices re 15 16 253 tail Part 1 Concepts requirements and evaluation methods 13491 2 Banking Secure cryptographic devices re 15 16 273 tail Part 2 Security compliance check lists for devices used in magnetic stripe card systems 100 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS ISO Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 13594 Information technology Lower layers secu 3 239 rity 13888 1 Information technology Security tech 9 250 294 niques Non repudiation Part 1 Gen eral 13888 2 Information technology Security tech 9 257 niques Non repudiation Part 2 Mech anisms using symmetric techniques 13888 3 Information technology Security tech 9 251 niques Non repudiation Part 3 Mech anisms using asymmetric techniques 14516 Information technology Security tech 14 288 niques Guidelines for the use and man agement of Trusted Third Party services 14888 1 Information technology Security tech 8 258 niques Digital signatures with appendix Part 1 General 14888 2 Information technology Security tech 8 264 311 niques Dig
85. chniques Encryption algo 4 305 rithms Part 3 Block ciphers 18033 4 IT security techniques Encryption algo 4 306 rithms Part 4 Stream ciphers 19772 Information technology Security tech 5 16 313 niques Authenticated encryption mecha nisms 19790 Information technology Security tech 16 314 niques Security requirements for crypto graphic modules 19792 Information technology Security tech 16 295 niques A framework for security evalua tion and testing of biometric technology A 8 ITU T RECOMMENDATIONS 103 A 8 ITU T recommendations The ITU T Recommendations discussed in this book are listed in Table A 8 104 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS Table A 8 ITU T recommendations ITU T no Title Relevant chapter s Ref no X 509 The directory Public key and attribute certificate frameworks 10 13 112 316 327 328 X 680 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Specification of basic notation 13 333 X 681 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Information object specification 13 334 X 682 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Constraint specifica tion 13 335 X 683 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Parameterization of ASN 1 specifications 13 336
86. crypt then MAC approach is best The idea of a signcryption scheme an asymmetric scheme that acts as both an asymmetric encryption and digital signature scheme was first introduced by Zheng 516 Again there has been some recent research that have analysed the problem of signeryption from a provable security point of view Papers by An 34 and An Dodis and Rabin 36 have proposed security models that discuss the security properties that a signcryption scheme should have and have also examined the question of whether it is possible to get this security just by signing and encrypting a message in some order NIST are attempting to standardise a single mode of operation for a block cipher that provides authenticated encryption Currently a draft standard exists that contains the CCM mode 441 This choice has been the subject of fierce debate Much of the arguments for and against CCM mode are summarised on the relevant section of the NIST website http csrc nist gov CryptoToolkit modes The work on the ISO IEC standard on authenticated encryption is at a very early stage It is unclear which algorithms will be included in this standard The CCM mode of a block cipher has been proposed by Housley Whiting and Ferguson 208 and is included in IETF RFC 3610 510 IEEE 802 11i 214 and the draft NIST standard 441 A proof of security for this mode was produced by Jonsson 348 Despite this it has been heavily criticised p
87. ction design The attack shows that in certain constructions it is easier to find collisions in iterative hash functions than in random functions It is unclear whether this will lead to a re evaluation of the iterative method of designing hash functions It can be argued that a hash function can provide a certain set of limited security services on its own For example the hash of a message can be printed out and stored in a physically secure device such as a safe A user can then check the integrity of the message at a later date Alternatively a message could be sent over one channel and the hash of the message sent over a second again to ensure message integrity In essence a hash function can reduce the problem of message integrity from the need to protect the integrity of a long data string to the need to just protect the integrity of a short hash code As always descriptions of most of the hash functions discussed in this chapter can be found in Menezes et al 397 86 2 The major standards for hash functions are e ISO IEC 10118 1 274 General information about hash functions e ISO IEC 10118 2 275 Hash functions using an n bit block cipher e ISO IEC 10118 3 291 Dedicated hash functions e ISO IEC 10118 4 e NIST FIPS Pub 180 2 438 The SHA family of dedicated hash functions 254 Hash functions using modular arithmetic e IETF RFC 1319 353 MD2 e IETF RFC 1320 471 MD4 e IETF RFC 1321 472
88. curity techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 1 Introduction and general model 1999 266 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15408 2 1999 Information technology Security techniques Evaluation 134 BIBLIOGRAPHY criteria for IT security Part 2 Security functional requirements 1999 267 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15408 3 1999 Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 3 Security assurance requirements 1999 268 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9797 1 In formation technology Security techniques Message Authentica tion Codes MACs Part 1 Mechanisms using a block cipher 1999 269 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 2 1999 Information technology Security techniques Entity au thentication Part 2 Mechanisms using symmetric encipherment algorithms 2nd edition 1999 270 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 4 1999 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication Part 4 Mechanisms using a cryptographic check function 2nd edition 1999 271 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 5 1999 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication Part 5 Mechanisms using zero knowledge techniques 1999
89. d 100 The first standardised MAC technique is SMAC discussed in Appendix F of the 1980 US Federal Standard FIPS Pub 81 427 This was followed in the early 1980s by two US Banking Standards ANSI X9 9 2 and ANSI X9 19 1 the first of which was withdrawn in 1999 28 The subsequent ISO banking standards include ISO 8730 222 ISO 8731 Parts 1 and 2 217 227 and ISO 9807 223 ISO IEC 9797 1 268 is in fact the third version of the ISO IEC CBC MAC standard previous editions were published in 1989 221 and 1994 234 Work started on another revision of ISO TEC 9797 1 in late 2003 the new version will exclude MAC algorithms 5 and 6 and will include OMAC Other CBC MAC schemes include the 3GPP MAC scheme 149 RMAC was pro posed in 2002 by Jaulmes Joux and Valette 347 and was then included in a NIST draft 440 TMAC and OMAC were proposed by Iwata and Kurosawa 341 370 and are derived from a scheme known as XCBC due to Black and Rogaway 63 HMAC was originally proposed by Bellare Canetti and Krawczyk 43 before its adoption by the IETF in 1997 368 To assist implementors a set of test vectors for HMAC when used with the hash functions MD5 and SHA 1 was published in RFC 2202 104 ISO IEC 9797 2 which also incorporates HMAC was first published in 2000 278 like ISO IEC 9797 1 it includes test vectors for all the standardised MAC algorithms The US banking standard ANSI X9 71 11 also adopts HMAC 87 3 7
90. d to Chapter 7 of the Handbook of Applied Cryptography 397 5 2 The original NBS FIPS on block cipher modes of operation 427 was published in 1980 and ANSI X3 106 32 followed in 1983 The ISO 64 bit modes of operation standard ISO 8372 now withdrawn based very closely on ANSI X3 106 appeared in 1987 216 The n bit version of this latter standard namely ISO IEC 10116 has been through three revisions 224 248 303 The most recent 3rd edition of ISO IEC 10116 303 due to be published in late 2004 or 2005 contains the CTR mode first proposed by Diffie and Hellman in 1979 134 which is also contained in NIST Special Publication 800 38A 437 An overview of the NIST standardisation effort that led to NIST Special Publication 800 38A can be found in 95 5 11 NOTES 19 The 3GPP standard 3GPP TS 35 201 149 contains a modified version of OFB mode 85 3 Vaudenay 505 pointed out the possibility of attacks on messages encrypted us ing CBC mode in a special scenario where an attacker can modify messages and send them to the authorised decryptor and then observe error messages indicating padding format failures in decrypted messages In such a case an attacker can by repeating this process learn information about the plaintext This attack takes advantage of a particular choice for a padding method Black and Urtubia 66 and Paterson and Yau 454 have extended this attack to other padding techniques and Canvel h
91. dards The BSI standards discussed in this book are listed in Table A 3 Table A 3 BSI standards BSI Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 7799 1 Information technology Code of practice for 16 90 information security management 1199 2 Information security management Specifica 16 91 tion with guidance for use 88 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS A A ETSI standards ETSI standards that are included in this book are given in Table A 4 Table A 4 ETSI standards ETSI Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no SR 002176 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures 8 158 ESI Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures TS 102023 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures 14 159 ESI Policy requirements for time stamping authorities A 5 IEEE STANDARDS 89 A 5 IEEE standards The IEEE standards included in this book are detailed in Table A 5 Table A 5 IEEE standards IEEE Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 802 11i IEEE Draft Supplement to Standard for 16 214 Telecommunications and Information Ex change Between Systems LAN MAN Spe cific Requirements Part 11 Wireless Medium Access Control MAC and Physical Layer PHY Specifications Specification for Enhanced Security 1363 IEEE Standard Specifications for Public Key 4 8 12 213 Cryptography 1363a IEEE Standard Specifications for Public Key 4
92. dards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 202 8rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the 124 BIBLIOGRAPHY 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms Document 2 KA SUMI Specification June 2002 151 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 205 8rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentiction and key generation functions f1 fl f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 1 General June 2002 152 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 207 8rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentiction and key generation functions fl f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 3 Implementors Test Data June 2002 153 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 208 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the MILENAGE Algorithm Set An example algorithm set for the 3GPP authentiction and key generation functions fl f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 and f5 Document 4 Design Conformance Test Data June 2002 154 European
93. document A the time stamp for document B and all time stamps that have been issued in between The entity must then check that the time stamps were issued one after the other and that each contains the hash code of the previous time stamp This could be quite a time intensive job and would undoubtedly involve storing a lot of unrelated time stamping tokens Of course the time stamping authority isn t forced to include the hash code of the previous document in every time stamping token It is usually enough for a time stamp to include the hash code of the last time stamp token that the time stamping issued to that entity That entity could then determine the ordering of time stamps that they have been issued without needing to store lots of useless other tokens More information about time stamps and time stamping can be found in 92 93 191 192 68 CHAPTER 14 TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES Chapter 15 Cryptographic APIs 69 70 CHAPTER 15 CRYPTOGRAPHIC APIS 15 1 Introduction 15 2 Standards for crypto APIs 15 3 GSS API 15 4 PKCS 11 15 5 Security issues 15 6 Notes 15 1 There are many books see for example 183 on using cryptography within Java including Java GSS API There are also a significant number of books e g 103 469 covering the use and functionality of smart cards which are essentially a special type of hardware security module Thus some of the discussions on the interfaces offered by smart cards are al
94. e of this work see Bishop 62 or Ferraiolo Kuhn and Chandramouli 162 ISO IEC TR 15947 289 provides a framework for intrusion detection systems intrusion detection is also the focus of the IETF idwg working group the Intrusion Detection Exchange Format working group 3 6 8 MECHANISMS AND SERVICES For further information about OSI see for example Henshall and Shaw s book 198 and for a review in the context of security issues see Ford 164 83 7 Firewalls are a very widely used type of network security device Books on firewalls include those of Cheswick Bellovin and Rubin 106 and Zwicky Chapman and Cooper 521 The description of the Internet protocol hierarchy is based on Ford 164 In fact this protocol hierarchy is described in just about any modern book on computer networking see for example 497 3 8 The OSI management framework ISO IEC 7498 4 220 was published in 1989 The US DoD Orange Book 131 published in 1985 was the first standard for security system evaluation More recently the internationally harmonised Com mon Criteria have been developed and standardised in ISO TEC 15408 parts 1 3 265 266 267 There are many books describing the various evaluation criteria Ford 164 provides an introduction as does Gollmann 180 3 9 Chapter 6 pages 149 176 of Ford s book 164 is relevant to the discussion of the access control framework Many of the ideas in the a
95. eam cipher 157 has not yet been broken There are no known weaknesses in the third generation confidentiality algorithm f8 149 The general model for a stream cipher is adapted from ISO IEC FCD 18033 4 306 More information on the history and properties of the CFB OFB and CTR modes of operation for a block cipher can be found in Chapter 5 Both the MUGI 508 and SNOW 2 0 144 schemes were published as recently as 2002 Whilst some preliminary analysis of both these schemes has been performed 178 507 there are no known serious weaknesses of these schemes 84 4 Whilst the first encryption scheme was the hugely successful RSA scheme intro duced in 1978 473 the first probabilistic encryption scheme was introduced by Goldwasser and Micali 176 in 1984 Today almost all proposed asymmetric en cryption schemes are probabilistic because it has been found that deterministic schemes can not meet the high security criteria demanded of modern ciphers i e deterministic schemes cannot be semantically secure More information about the security requirements for modern asymmetric ciphers can be found in 46 84 4 1 The first asymmetric algorithm and the introduction of the concept of asymmetric algorithms was given in a paper by Diffie and Hellman 133 This paper contain the 14 CHAPTER 4 ENCRYPTION Diffie Hellman key agreement protocol but stopped short of giving an encryption scheme The first asymmetric encryption scheme
96. ecurity pages 62 73 1993 M Bellare and P Rogaway Entity authentication and key distri bution In D R Stinson editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 93 volume 773 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 232 249 Springer Verlag 1994 M Bellare P Rogaway and D Wagner The EAX mode of operation In B Roy and W Meier editors Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on Fast Software Encryption FSE 2004 volume 3017 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 389 407 Springer Verlag 2004 S M Bellovin and M Merritt Limitations of the Kerberos authentica tion system ACM Computer Communication Review 20 5 119 132 October 1990 S M Bellovin and M Merritt Limitations of the Kerberos authenti cation system In Proceedings of the Usenix Winter 1991 Conference Dallas TX USA January 1991 pages 253 267 Usenix Association 1991 S Berkovits S Chokhani J A Furlong J A Geiter and J C Guild Public key infrastructure study Final report April 1994 National Institute of Standards and Techhnology T Berners Lee RFC 1630 Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW Internet Engineering Task Force June 1994 116 96 97 58 99 60 61 62 63 A 65 66 BIBLIOGRAPHY E Biham and R Chen Near collisions in SHA 0 In M Franklin editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2004 volume 3152 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 290 305 Springer Verlag
97. een the different notions of security for a hash function are explored in 477 In a significantly proportion of cases however more is demanded from a hash function then the three standard properties of 1 pre image resistance 2 pre image resistance and collision resistance In many cases it is assumed that a hash function will behave like a random function This is especially true when analysing the security of asymmetric algorithms where it is known as the random oracle model 49 The concept that a function could be indistinguishable from a random function was first suggested by Goldreich Goldwasser and Micali 175 however unkeyed 6 7 NOTES 23 hash functions cannot be indistinguishable from a random function Nevertheless where hash functions are used in complex algorithms it is often assumed that unkeyed hash functions behave randomly in order to simplify the security analysis The first examples of an iterative hash function appear in the late 1970s 398 467 The modern general model is more closely aligned to the Merkle meta function proposed by 400 401 and Damg rd 122 The construction by Merkle seems to be the first to suggest that some form length parameter should be included in the input to the round function see padding method 3 in Section 6 3 1 This helps to prevent certain attacks However in 2004 Joux 349 gave an example of a type of attack that was enabled by the iterative nature of modern hash fun
98. ems Communications of the ACM 21 120 126 1978 M Roe Non repudiation and evidence PhD thesis University of Cambridge 1997 P Rogaway M Bellare and J Black OCB A block cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 6 365 403 2003 P Rogaway M Bellare J Black and T Krovetz OCB A block cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption In Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Computer and Com munications Security CCS 8 pages 196 205 ACM Press 2001 P Rogaway and T Shrimpton Cryptographic hash function ba sics Definitions implications and separations for preimage resistance second preimage resistance and collision resistance In B Roy and W Meier editors Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on Fast Software Encryption FSE 2004 volume 3017 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 371 388 Springer Verlag 2004 P Rogaway and D Wagner A critique of CCM Available from http www cs ucdavis edu rogaway papers 2003 N Rogier and P Chauvaud The compression function of MD2 is not collision free In 2nd Workshop on Selected Areas of Cryptography SAC 795 1995 152 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 BIBLIOGRAPHY J Rosenoer Cyberlaw The law of the Internet Springer Verlag 1997 RSA Laboratories PKCS 11 v2
99. eneral Framework 11 4 The ANSI X9 24 Framework 11 5 Notes This chapter covered the key management frameworks of three separate bodies The general details were taken from ISO IEC 11770 1 246 The remaining two parts 247 263 of this standard will be dealt with in the next chapter This part of the standard is almost unique in that it concentrates solely on the key management framework and provides no details of mechanisms that might be used to implement this framework The approach of ANSI X9 24 29 and ANSI X9 17 3 now withdrawn 10 is very different These standards approach the subject in terms of rules and requirements that must be satisfied These rules and requirements imply a key management framework but do not explicitly give one To a certain extent this means that the framework is open to interpretation by the developer but in reality the require ments are so strict that it would be difficult to misinterpret them The withdrawal of ANSI X9 17 has left something of a void in the ANSI standards portfolio The document that officially withdrew the standard ANSI X9 TG26 10 is more than a simple statement it details an entire strategy describing how the techniques of ANSI X9 17 could be replaced with newer techniques with minimum risk However whilst it cites newer ANSI standards as replacements for the key establishment mechanisms contained in ANSI X9 17 it does not appear to specify a new framework for wholesale key
100. entity X and retrieve the agreed key when communicating with that entity i e the attacker can impersonate X to X Obviously such an attack will not be relevant in most well implemented systems The idea that an entity can exert some measure of key control in key agreement protocols by selecting a more favourable key from a selection it has generated using several different parameter sets for example when B chooses a nonce that gives a more favourable key in the nonce based protocol of Section 12 5 2 was first introduced by Mitchell Ward and Wilson 418 The station to station protocol was first proposed by Diffie van Oorschot and Wiener 136 in a slightly different format to the protocol discussed here The original version did not sign A or B s identifiers but symmetrically encrypted the digital signatures under the newly established key K in order to demonstrate that both entities knew the key K The adapted version of the protocol we use is dis cussed in Boyd and Mathuria 84 and has been proven secure by Bellare Canetti and Krawczyk 44 101 The Menezes Qu Vanstone MQV key agreement protocol 376 is not included in the ISO IEC standard 263 but does appear in the IEEE 1363 213 ANSI X9 42 12 and ANSI X9 63 13 standards It uses the fact that when P is the Diffie Hellman protocol ie P h g g mod p we have certain multiplicative identities P hi ha g P hig P h2 g 12 2 P h ha g P hiP ha g 1
101. er 2003 294 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FDIS 13888 1 2003 Information technology Security techniques Non repudiation Part 1 General 2nd edition 2003 295 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC WD 19792 Information technology Security techniques A Framework for Security Evaluation and Testing of Biometric Technology 2003 296 International Organization for Standardization ISO 15764 2004 Road vehicles Extended data link security 2004 297 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 15946 4 Information technology Security techniques Cryptographic tech niques based on elliptic curves Part 4 Digital signatures giving message recovery 2004 298 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 18014 3 Information technology Security techniques Time stamping ser vices Part 3 Mechanisms producing linked tokens 2004 299 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 4th CD 18031 IT Security techniques Random bit generation June 2004 BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 300 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC CD 11770 4 IT Security techniques Key Management Part 4 Mechanisms based on weak secrets May 2004 301 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC CD 18031 Information technology Security techniques Random bit genera tion 2004 302 Inter
102. er and T Wright PKI in mobile systems In C J Mitchell editor Security for Mobility chapter 2 pages 11 33 IEE 2004 122 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 BIBLIOGRAPHY D W Davies Some regular properties of the Data Encryption Stan dard algorithm In D Chaum R L Rivest and A T Sherman editors Advances in Cryptology Crypto 82 pages 89 96 Plenum Publishing 1982 D W Davies A message authenticator algorithm suitable for a main frame computer In G R Blakley and D Chaum editors Advances in Cryptology Crypto 84 volume 196 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 393 400 Springer Verlag 1985 D W Davies and S Murphy Pairs and triplets of DES S boxes Journal of Cryptology 8 1 25 1995 D W Davies and W L Price Security for Computer Networks John Wiley and Sons Inc 2nd edition 1989 B den Boer and A Bosselaers Collisions for the compression function of MD5 In T Helleseth editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 93 volume 765 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 293 304 Springer Verlag 1993 D E Denning and G M Sacco Timestamps in key distribution protocols Communications of the ACM 24 533 536 1981 Department of Defense US DoD 5200 28 STD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 1985 T Dierks and C Allen RFC 2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1 0 I
103. er Verlag 2001 P Karn and W Simpson RFC 2522 Photuris Session Key Manage ment Protocol Internet Engineering Task Force March 1999 J Katz and M Yung Unforgeable encruption and chosen cipher text secure modes of operation In B Schneier editor Fast Software Encryption 7th International Workshop FSE 2000 volume 1978 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 284 299 Springer Verlag 2001 C Kaufman RFC 1507 DASS Distributed Authentication Security Service Internet Engineering Task Force September 1993 S Kent RFC 1422 Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail Part II Certificate Based Key Management Internet Engineer ing Task Force February 1993 L R Knudsen and T Kohno Analysis of RMAC In T Johansson editor Fast Software Encryption 10th International Workshop FSE 2003 volume 2887 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 182 191 Springer Verlag 2003 L R Knudsen and C J Mitchell Analysis of 3gpp MAC and two key 3gpp MAC Discrete Applied Mathematics 128 181 191 2003 L R Knudsen and C J Mitchell Partial key recovery attack against RMAC Journal of Cryptology to appear L R Knudsen and B Preneel MacDES MAC algorithm based on DES Electronics Letters 34 871 873 1998 BIBLIOGRAPHY 143 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 J Kohl and C Neuman RFC 1510 The Kerberos N
104. erformed as part of the development of the X 500 directory series recommendations The main initial customer for the standardised public key certificates was the parallel X 400 series of recommendations specifying the operation of an email system The 1988 version of the X 400 standards incor porated a large range of security features the key management for which was based round the use of X 509 certificates Interestingly while the X 400 recommendations have hardly set the world alight the X 509 public key certificate format dominates the field After the publication of the first edition of the X 509 recommendation the next main customer for the X 509 certificate format was again a secure email system this time the Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail PEM system 360 This system again used X 509 certificates as the basis of its key management however a number of additional certificate features were required by PEM which were incorporated into the X 509 version 2 certificate format 316 Subsequent growing interest in deploying X 509 PKIs revealed the need for further additions to the certificate format and these were incorporated into the version 3 certificate format 260 327 The PKIX Roadmap is currently only an Internet draft at the time of writing the latest version was published in January 2003 38 ISO IEC 15945 282 was published in 2002 the identically worded ITU T recom mendation X 843 was published a little earlie
105. ersen Zero knowledge authentication scheme with secret key exchange extended abstract In S Goldwasser editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 88 volume 403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 583 588 Springer Verlag 1990 M Briceno I Goldberg and D Wagner A pedagogical implemen tation of the GSM A5 1 and A5 2 voice privacy encryption algo rithms Available from http cryptome org gsm a512 htm 1999 K Brincat and C J Mitchell Key recovery atacks on MACs based on properties of cryptographic APIs In B Honary editor Cryptog raphy and Coding 8th IMA International Conference volume 2260 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 63 72 Springer Verlag 2001 BIBLIOGRAPHY 119 90 91 92 99 100 101 British Standards Institute BSI BS 7799 1 Information technology Code of practice for information security management 2000 British Standards Institute BSI BS 7799 2 Information security management Specification with guidance for use 2002 A Buldas P Laud H Lipmaa and J Villemson Time stamping with binary linking schemes In H Krawczyk editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 98 volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 486 501 Springer Verlag 1998 A Buldas H Lipmaa and B Schoenmakers Optimally efficient ac countable time stamping In H Imai and Y Zheng editors Public Key Cryptography 2000 volume 1751 of Lecture Note
106. etwork Authen tication Service V5 Internet Engineering Task Force September 1993 L M Kohnfelder Towards a practical public key cryptosystem 1978 B Sc thesis Department of Electrical Engineering MIT W Kou Networking Security and Standards Kluwer Academic Press 1997 H Krawczyk M Bellare and R Canetti RFC 2104 HMAC Keyed hashing for message authentication Internet Engineering Task Force February 1997 E Krol RFC 1118 The Hitchhikers Guide to the Internet Internet Engineering Task Force September 1989 K Kurosawa and T Iwata TMAC Two key CBC MAC In M Joye editor Topics in Cryptology CT RSA 2003 volume 2612 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 33 49 Springer Verlag 2003 K Y Lam Building an authentication service for distributed systems Journal of Computer Security 1 73 84 1993 L Lamport Time clocks and the ordering of events in a distributed system Communications of the ACM 21 558 565 1978 L Lamport Password authentication with insecure communication Communications of the ACM 24 770 772 1981 J Larmouth ASN 1 Complete Morgan Kaufmann 1999 J O Larsson Higher layer key exchange techniques for Bluetooth security Open Group Conference Amsterdam October 2001 L Law A Menezes M Qu J Solinas and S Vanstone An effi cient protocol for authenticated key agreement Designs Codes and Cryptography 28 2 119 134 2003 Law Commission Electron
107. f this book Section 1 2 of the Handbook of Applied Cryptography 397 and the foreword to 493 also provide brief introductions to security services and mechanisms 83 2 ISO 7498 2 219 was published in 1989 as one part of the OSI basic reference model and a version of this document was also adopted as CCITT Recommenda tion X 800 in 1991 315 an amendment to this latter recommendation addressing LAN security issues was published in 1996 325 The seven part ISO IEC security frameworks standard ISO IEC 10181 was pub lished in 1996 97 240 241 242 243 244 245 249 The identical ITU T recom mendations X 810 X816 were published a little earlier 319 320 321 322 323 324 326 ISO IEC TR 13594 239 the lower layers security model see also X 802 318 and the upper layers security model ISO IEC 10745 237 see also X 803 317 are not 3 10 NOTES 7 discussed in detail here However Ford 164 provides a comprehensive description of lower and upper layer security The ITU T security architecture for end to end systems i e X 805 was published in 2003 339 ISO IEC 15816 standardising security labels was published in 2001 280 and the identical ITU T recommendation X 841 was published a few months earlier 329 83 3 The CRAMM risk assessment methodology originated from a UK government ini tiative but today is a commercial product For more information about CRAMM see http www cra
108. first discussed by Lam 371 There are a number of other possible issues with the use of time stamps Gong 181 has pointed out that if an authentication protocol is executed when one party has 46 CHAPTER 10 AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS an incorrectly synchronised clock the messages sent in that protocol may be used later to impersonate one of the entities even after all clocks have been correctly synchronised Bellovin and Merritt 52 53 also provide a discussion of the risks of using time stamps One important scheme for providing securely synchronised clocks is the Network Time Protocol NTP Version 3 of which is specified in RFC 1305 407 An simplified version of NTP for Internet use known as the Simple Network Time Protocol SNTP is specified in RFC 2030 408 The NTP protocol uses symmetric cryptographic techniques and ongoing work within the IETF Secure Time Working Group is aimed at specifying how public key cryptography can be used to support NTP 409 The possibility of preplay attacks on protocols using predictable nonces was first pointed out by Gong 182 810 5 The existence of reflection attacks the motive for including the identifier for the recipient within the scope of encryption and MAC computations in symmetric cryp tography based protocols was first pointed out in 410 An alternative to the use of identifiers also pointed out in ISO IEC 9798 2 and 9798 4 is to employ uni directional keys i e separa
109. g authentication Unfortunately one of the three protocols contained a flaw as discovered by Burrows Abadi and Needham 96 97 98 99 see also 210 This flaw was rectified in the second and subsequent editions of the recommendation 316 327 328 see also the parallel ISO IEC standard ISO IEC 9594 8 281 ISO work on standards for authentication protocols started in the late 1980s cul minating in the publication in the early mid 1990s of the first editions of Parts 1 3 of ISO IEC 9798 226 235 236 Work on Part 4 commenced as the first three parts neared completion with the first edition appearing in 1995 238 All of these four parts were then revised essentially for editorial reasons no changes were made to the mechanisms and the revised standards appeared in the late 1990s 252 269 261 270 The original motivation for ISO IEC 9798 Parts 2 and 3 was provided by Needham and Schroeder 444 Work on ISO IEC 9798 5 started somewhat later and the standard was finally published in 1999 271 A revised version containing a larger selection of mecha nisms is now nearing publication 310 ISO TEC 9798 6 307 currently at FCD stage is of much more recent origin work only starting in early 2003 The stan dard adopts techniques previously proposed for Bluetooth and designed to enable mobile devices owned by a single individual to set up secure links NIST FIPS Pub 196 430 is based on ISO IEC 9798 3 and was publis
110. gy Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 5 Confidentiality frame work 1996 132 BIBLIOGRAPHY 244 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 6 1996 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 6 Integrity framework 1996 245 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 7 1996 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 7 Security audit and alarms framework 1996 246 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11770 1 Information technology Security techniques Key Management Part 1 Framework 1996 247 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11770 2 Information technology Security techniques Key Management Part 2 Mechanisms using symmetric techniques 1996 248 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10116 1997 Information technology Security techniques Modes of op eration for an n bit block cipher 2nd edition 1997 249 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10181 4 1997 Information technology Open Systems Interconnection Se curity frameworks for open systems Part 4 Non repudiation frame work 1997 250 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 13888 1 1997 Information tech
111. h TTP In J Pieprzyk R Safavi Naini and J Seberry editors Informa tion Security and Privacy 4th Australasian Conference ACISP 99 volume 1587 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 258 269 Springer Verlag 1999 BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 520 J Zhou and D Gollmann A fair non repudiation protocol In Proceed ings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy pages 55 61 IEEE Computer Society Press 1996 521 E D Zwicky D B Chapman and S Cooper Building Internet Firewalls O Reilly 2nd edition 2000
112. h functions as a hedge against chosen ciphertext attack In B Preneel editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 2000 volume 1807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 275 288 Springer Verlag 2000 G J Simmons editor Contemporary Cryptology The Science of Information Integrity IEEE Press 1992 BIBLIOGRAPHY 153 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 502 503 504 505 506 507 F Stajano Security for Ubiquitous Computing John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2002 F Stajano and R Anderson The resurrecting duckling Security issues for ad hoc wireless networks In B Christianson B Crispo J A Malcolm and M Roe editors Security Protocols 7th International Workshop volume 1976 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 172 194 Springer Verlag 2000 W Stallings Cryptography and Network Security Prentice Hall 2003 W Stallings Data and Computer Communications Prentice Hall 7th edition 2004 Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group SEC 1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography September 2000 Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group SEC 2 Recommanded Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters September 2000 J G Steiner C Neuman and J I Schiller Kerberos an authentica tion service for open network systems In Proceedings Usenix Associ ation Winter Conference 1988 pages 191 202 USENIX Association Berkeley California February 1988 D R Stinson Cryptogr
113. he entire scheme is compromised 88 5 There are several technical i e non legal books that discuss the status of digi tal signatures in law including Adams and Lloyd 24 and Ford and Baum 165 Rosenoer 480 is by now a little out of date but does contain material on earlier developments such as the Utah Digital Signature Act The definitions of contract and signature in Section 8 5 are adapted from this latter source Electronic signatures are given legal status in the United States by the ESIGN Act 186 This follows on from certain state wide legislation such as the Utah Digital Signature Act 504 and the advice of the American Bar Association 30 It is interesting to note that there are some unusual definitions and seemingly paradoxical results of the US legislation For example the ESIGN Act specifically notes that a recording of an oral communication shall not qualify as an electronic record but that a recorded sound may act as an electronic signature It is also interesting to note that the Utah Digital Signature Act defines an asymmetric cryptosystem as an algorithm or series of algorithms which provide a secure key pair This somewhat contradicts the definitions we have been using in this book EU Directive 1999 93 EC 147 mandates that all European Union member states should enact legislation that allows electronic signatures to be presented as evidence in court It also notes that the EU has the right to
114. hed in 1997 The Kerberos protocol 500 445 was developed as part of the Athena project at MIT quite independently from the ISO TEC work The Kerberos protocol has evolved over time so that the version specified in RFC 1510 365 is actually Version 5 of the scheme The S KEY protocol specified in RFC 1760 193 is closely based on an original idea of Lamport published in 1981 373 RFC 1704 194 dating back to 1994 gives a lot of useful general advice on authentication methods for use across the Internet The Distributed Authentication Security Service DASS protocol is specified in RFC 1507 359 810 3 Using a combination of symmetric encryption and an MDC to provide origin au thentication and integrity protection for a message is not a recommended approach Both the method for encryption and the MDC technique need to be selected with considerable care Some versions of Kerberos possess vulnerabilities arising from the use of an inappropriate MDC see 53 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Section 9 6 5 of 3977 There is a large literature on zero knowledge protocols Section 10 4 of 397 contains a useful overview 810 4 The classic 1978 paper of Lamport 372 provides a detailed discussion of the use of various types of time stamps in a general distributed systems setting The need to keep a log of recently received messages to prevent replays of messages within the window of time stamp checking was
115. hentication Framework 320 X 812 Data Networks and Open System Communi cations Security Information Technol ogy Open Systems Interconnection Se curity Frameworks for Open Systems Access Control Framework 321 X 813 Data Networks and Open System Communi cations Security Information Technol ogy Open Systems Interconnection Se curity Frameworks for Open Systems Non repudiation Framework 326 X 814 Data Networks and Open System Communi cations Security Information Technol ogy Open Systems Interconnection Se curity Frameworks for Open Systems Confi dentiality Framework 322 X 815 Data Networks and Open System Commu nications Security Information Tech nology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems In tegrity Framework 323 X 816 Data Networks and Open System Commu nications Security Information Tech nology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Se curity Audit and Alarms Framework 324 106 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS ITU T Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no X 841 Security Information technology Secu 3 329 rity techniques Security information ob jects for access control X 842 Information technology Security tech 14 330 niques Guidelines for the use and man age
116. hm see Chapters 4 and 8 requires then any both parties can generate the same asymmetric keys by running the same key generation algorithm 12 2 1 Four main standard bodies have produced standards for key establishment using symmetric techniques Two of these are applicable only to specific sectors the ISO 8732 standard 218 which is applicable to the financial sector and the 3GPP TS 33 102 standard 155 which is only applicable to the mobile phone sector A general key establishment standard has been produced by the ISO IEC J TCI committee of which ISO IEC 11770 2 247 deals with key establishment using symmetric techniques The Kerberos protocol is standardised in IETF RFC 1510 365 Other IETF stan dards include the Photuris session key management protocol which is contained in IETF RFC 2522 357 812 2 2 There are two main approaches to key establishment using asymmetric techniques The general ISO IEC JTC1 standard ISO IEC 11770 3 263 defines several key establishment mechanisms based on a general function that satisfies certain security properties Hence the standard does not strictly speaking define any complete protocols However there is a tacit understanding that these protocols should be instantiated using the Diffie Hellman function see Section 12 5 1 Other standards are more specific Almost all the standardised key agreement protocols are based on the Diffie Hellman protocol and this is standardised in A
117. hni cal Guideline Managing Risk and Migration Planning Withdrawal of ANSI X9 9 Financial linstitution Message Authentication Codes MAC Wholesale 1999 American Bankers Association ANSI X9 24 2002 Retail Financial Services Symmetric Key Management Part 1 Using Symmetric Techniques 2002 American Bar Association Digital Signature Guide lines Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce 1996 Available from http www abanet org scitech ec isc dsg pdf American Bar Association Information Security Committee Section of Science and Technology Digital Signature Guidelines 1996 American National Standards Institute ANSI X3 106 1983 Ameri can National Standard for Information Systems Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation 1983 American National Standards Institute ANSI INCITS 92 1981 R1998 Data Encryption Algorithm formerly ANSI X3 92 1981 R1998 1998 J H An Authenticated encryption in the public key setting Security notions and analyses Available from http eprint iacr org 2001 079 2001 114 35 40 41 44 45 BIBLIOGRAPHY J H An and M Bellare Constructing VIL MACs from FIL MACs Message authentication under weakened assumptions In M J Wiener editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 99 volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 252 269 Springer Verlag 1999 J H An Y Dodis and T R
118. ic Commerce Formal Requirements in Commercial Transactions 2001 M Leech M Ganis Y Lee R Kuris D Koblas and L Jones RFC 1928 SOCKS Protocol Version 5 Internet Engineering Task Force March 1996 D J Lehmann On primality tests SIAM Journal of Computing 11 9 374 375 1982 144 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 BIBLIOGRAPHY J Linn RFC 1508 Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Internet Engineering Task Force September 1993 J Linn RFC 1964 The Kerberos Version 5 GSS API Mechanism Internet Engineering Task Force June 1996 J Linn RFC 2078 Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2 Internet Engineering Task Force January 1997 J Linn RFC 2743 Generic Security Service Application Program In terface Version 2 Update 1 Internet Engineering Task Force January 2000 G Lowe An attack on the Needham Schroeder public key authenti cation protocol Information Processing Letters 56 131 133 1995 G Lowe Breaking and fixing the Needham Schroeder public key pro tocol using FDR In T Margaria and B Steffen editors Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems Second Interna tional Workshop TACAS 96 volume 1055 of Lecture Notes in Com puter Science pages 147 166 Springer Verlag 1996 D P Maher Secure communication method and apparatus U S Patent Number 5
119. ication services are to be based on a combination of encryption and the addi tion of redundancy Unfortunately none of the known constructions of this type i e which simply involve adding redundancy to data prior to applying encryption using one of the standard modes satisfy any of the reasonable security definitions see for example 35 358 Reliably achieving confidentiality and integrity would appear to require a somewhat more sophisticated approach e g as provided by the authenticated encryption modes briefly discussed in Section 5 10 2 85 10 Prior to the publication of ANSI X9 52 in 1998 27 various other modes of opera tion specifically designed for use with triple DES had been proposed and some of them appeared in draft versions of this standard One of them known as CBCM was shown to be weak by Biham and Knudsen 57 58 and was removed from the published standard The first working draft of ISO IEC 19772 appeared in early 2004 313 The OCB mode was originally proposed by Rogaway Bellare and Black 475 The CCM mode is contained in RFC 3610 510 and NIST special publication 800 38C 441 a draft NIST recommendation for an authenticated encryption mode AES key wrap is specified in Internet RFC 3394 484 Chapter 6 Cryptographic hash functions 22 CHAPTER 6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS 6 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 6 2 Standards for Hash Functions 6 3 Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers 6 4
120. in editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2004 volume 3152 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 306 316 Springer Verlag 2004 A Joux G Poupard and J Stern New attacks against standard ized MACs In T Johansson editor Fast Software Encryption 10th International Workshop FSE 2003 volume 2887 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 170 181 Springer Verlag 2003 M Just and S Vaudenay Authenticated multi party key agreement In K Kim and T Matsumoto editors Advances in Cryptology Asi acrypt 96 volume 1163 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 36 49 Springer Verlag 1996 142 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 BIBLIOGRAPHY J Kabat and M Upadhyay RFC 2853 Generic Security Service API Version 2 Java Bindings Internet Engineering Task Force June 2000 B Kaliski RFC 1319 The MD2 message digest algorithm Internet Engineering Task Force April 1992 B Kaliski RFC 2314 PKCS 10 Certification Request Syntax v1 5 Internet Engineering Task Force October 1997 B Kaliski RFC 2315 PKCS 7 Certification Message Syntax v1 5 Internet Engineering Task Force October 1997 J S Kang S U Shin D Hong and O Yi Provable security of KASUMI and 3GPP encryption mode f8 In C Boyd editor Advances in Cryptology Asiacrypt 2001 volume 2248 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 255 271 Spring
121. inclusion only two are not hybrid ciphers and of the five hybrid ciphers 4 5 NOTES 15 proposed four are KEM DEM constructions The idea of a hybrid asymmetric encryption scheme has been cryptographic folklore for years and almost all prac tical uses of asymmetric encryption involve hybrid schemes including the PGP encryption scheme SSL TLS encryption and IPSec However it has only recently been formalised Whilst a KEM DEM construction is far from being the only way in which one can construct a hybrid cipher it does have certain attractive security features The concept was introduced by Shoup 492 in 2000 It now appears likely that the ISO IEC standard will contain at least one KEM based on RSA RSA KEM and at least one KEM based on the Diffie Hellman key agreement protocol ECIES KEM and or PSEC KEM PSEC KEM was the primary choice of the NESSIE evaluation project for an asymmetric encryption scheme 16 CHAPTER 4 ENCRYPTION Chapter 5 Modes of operation for block ciphers 18 MODES OF OPERATION 5 1 Definitions and basic properties 5 2 Standards for modes of operation 5 3 Padding methods 5 4 Electronic Codebook ECB mode 5 5 Cipher Block Chaining CBC mode 5 6 Counter CTR mode 5 7 Output Feedback OFB mode 5 8 Cipher Feedback CFB mode 5 9 Choosing a mode of operation 5 10 Other modes 5 11 Notes 5 1 For a more detailed treatment of modes of operation for block ciphers the reader is referre
122. ing a key establishment scheme 54 12 9 NOUGS Js ah In tete e fe Se potete Rr ee n Deo nee e ded Se 54 13 Public Key Infrastructures 59 13 1 Whatisa PK rs era rn aes 60 13 2 PKI standards 22 2 Beers a ee meine 60 13 3 Certificate formats lr 60 13 4 Certificate management llle 60 13 5 Certificate storage and retrieval sls 60 13 6 Certificate status discovery nenn 60 13 7 Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements 60 13 8 NOTES uuu daa REDE d be E ete y Rak cre and 60 14 Trusted Third Parties 65 14 1 Definitions and basic properties 66 14 2 Standards for managing trusted third parties 66 14 3 TTP requirements llle 66 14 4 TTP architectures lll 66 14 5 Time stamping authorities 2 2 222m nn 66 CONTENTS vii 14 6 Digital archiving authorities 2 2 222 nenn 66 TAT 3Notes en bep re se AO ios oer ORE 66 15 Cryptographic APIs 69 15 1 Introduction na 21 2 e re an net ek A 70 15 2 Standards for crypto APIs 2 2 2 22 222 nen 70 15 3 G5S API i ARES ED ua EE TO IDA PKGS FAL 2222 54 ay eee PERS BI 70 15 5 Security issues 2A 70 15 0 Notes 72 3 er urb t ROC ICE De en re er 70 16 Other standards 73 16 1 Random bit generation ll 74 16 2 Prime number generation nennen 74 16 3 Authenticated Encryption 2 222222 nn nennen 74 16 4 Security modules ns 74 16 5 Standard
123. ion 113 84 2 4 4 5 NOTES 13 The criteria for the cryptographic algorithms used in third generation mobile phones were first set down in June 1999 148 Since then it has been updated several times the latest version having been released in July 2001 The cryptographic algorithm requirements do not specifically mention the need for a block cipher but only specify the properties that the confidentiality and integrity functions f8 and f9 should have It is the specification of f8 and f9 149 that contains the first explicit references to the KASUMI block cipher 150 84 2 5 The general guidelines for the selection of encryption algorithms for standardisation by ISO is given in ISO IEC 18033 1 currently out for FDIS ballot 309 The part of ISO IEC 18033 concerning block ciphers is Part 3 305 which is currently at the FCD stage Of the six schemes in FCD 18033 3 AES MISTY1 and triple DES have already been discussed Camellia 37 is rather similar to AES CAST 128 19 is a Canadian national standard and SEED 502 is a Korean national standard 4 3 The A5 1 and A5 2 stream ciphers were also reverse engineered by Briceno Gold berg and Wagner 88 and have been attacked by numerous authors the most recent and damning of which is by Barkan Biham and Keller 41 This final attack is pretty devastating recovering the secret key by observing encrypted ciphertexts as they are transmitted and relatively quickly The A5 3 str
124. ions Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Upper Layers Security Model 1994 318 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 802 04 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Lower Layers Security Model 1995 319 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 810 11 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Overview 1995 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 811 04 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Authentication Frame work 1995 320 321 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 612 11 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Access Control Frame work 1995 BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 322 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 614 11 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Confidentiality Frame work 1995 323 International Teleco
125. is Differential cryptanalysis was intro duced into the public domain by Biham and Shamir 59 although their work is 12 CHAPTER 4 ENCRYPTION similar to an unpublished attack against DES by Davies later published by Davies and Murphy 127 Biham and Shamir went on to use differential cryptanalysis to break DES 60 even though it seems as if one of the design conditions for the cipher was its resistance to exactly this kind of cryptanalysis Linear cryptanalysis was introduced by Matsui 388 and has also been applied to DES In July 2004 NIST asked for comments regarding a proposed withdrawal of DES 442 The proposal would remove NIST s support for the DES algorithm by with drawing NIST FIPS 46 3 431 and NIST FIPS 81 427 Support for Triple DES would be provided via a Special Publication NIST SP 800 67 443 84 2 2 The ISO register of cryptographic algorithms can be found on the Internet at http www iso register com The register is currently maintained by Royal Holloway on behalf of the BSI and ISO The procedures for registering a cryptographic algorithm are given in ISO IEC 9979 272 The block cipher IDEA 397 was one of the original choices for use with the PGP e mail encryption system and is the subject of a Swiss National Standard The block cipher MISTY1 389 is the primary recommendation of the NESSIE algorithm analysis project for a 64 bit block cipher and is contained in an IETF RFC 451 Both algorithms
126. istence of attacks that find collision in a hash function necessarily mean that hash function is completely useless for example it is not currently thought that the popular MAC based on the HMAC construction see Section 7 using MD5 is broken Prudence however suggests that the use of these algorithms is phased out 86 5 The MASH family of hash functions were developed through a long series of papers that broke previous schemes and then proposed repairs A survey of the early work on the MASH family can be found in 169 The MASH family of hash functions would probably be of most use in a situation where dedicated hardware for modular arithmetic exists and in particular when this dedicated hardware exists but the remaining computing power is limited 26 CHAPTER 6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS Chapter 7 Message Authentication Codes MACs 28 CHAPTER 7 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES MACS 7 1 Definitions and basic properties 7 2 Standards for MACs 7 3 CBC MACs 7 4 MACs based on hash functions 7 5 Other MAC functions 7 6 Notes 87 1 For a more general treatment of MACs the reader is encouraged to refer to Section 9 5 of 397 Properties required of a MAC algorithm are specified in ISO IEC 9797 1 268 The known key one wayness property is required in some applications of MAC functions see for example ISO 15764 296 87 2 The idea of computing a CBC MAC using DES as the block cipher is now over 25 years ol
127. ital signatures with appendix Part 2 Identity based mechanisms 14888 3 Information technology Security tech 8 259 312 niques Digital signatures with appendix Part 3 Certificate based mechanisms 15408 1 Information technology Security tech 3 265 niques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 1 Introduction and general model 15408 2 Information technology Security tech 3 266 niques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 2 Security functional requirements 15408 3 Information technology Security tech 3 267 niques Evaluation criteria for IT security Part 3 Security assurance requirements 15764 Road vehicles Extended data link security 1 296 A 7 ISO STANDARDS 101 ISO Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 15782 1 Certificate management for financial services 13 290 Part 1 Public key certificates 15782 2 Banking Certificate management Cer 13 279 tificate extensions 15816 Information technology Security tech 3 280 niques Security information objects for ac cess control 15945 Information technology Security tech 13 282 niques Specification of TTP services to support the application of digital signatures 15946 2 Information technology Security tech 8 283 niques Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic Curve
128. ity techniques Entity authentication Part 5 Mecha nisms using zero knowledge techniques 2nd edition June 2004 311 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC WD 14888 2 IT security techniques Digital signatures with appendix Part 2 Integer factorization based mechanisms 2nd edition June 2004 138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 312 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC WD 14888 3 IT security techniques Digital signatures with appendix Part 3 Discrete logarithm based mechanisms 2nd edition June 2004 313 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC WD 19772 2004 Information technology Security techniques Authenticated encryption mechanisms 2004 314 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC WD 19790 Information technology Security techniques Security require ments for cryptographic modules 2004 International Telecommunication Union CCITT Recommendation X 800 1991 Data Communication Networks Open Systems Inter connection OSI Security Structure and Applications Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT Applica tions 1991 315 316 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 509 1993 The directory Authentication framework 2nd edi tion 1993 317 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 803 07 94 Data Networks and Open System Communicat
129. ization ISO IEC 9797 1989 Data cryptographic techniques Data integrity mechanism using a cryptographic check function employing a block cipher algorithm De cember 1989 130 BIBLIOGRAPHY 222 International Organization for Standardization ISO 8730 1986 Banking Requirements for message authentication wholesale 2nd edition 1990 223 International Organization for Standardization SO 9807 Banking and related financial services Requirements for message authenti cation retail 1991 224 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10116 1991 Information technology Modes of operation for an n bit block cipher algorithm 1991 225 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9796 Infor mation technology Security techniques Digital signature scheme giving message recovery September 1991 226 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 1 1991 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication mechanisms Part 1 General model 1991 International Organization for Standardization SO 8731 2 1992 Banking Approved algorithm for message authentication Part 2 Message authenticator algorithm 2nd edition 1992 227 228 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11166 1 Banking Key management by means of asymmetric algorithms Part 1 Principles procedures and formats 1994 229
130. k Authentication Ser 10 12 15 865 vice V5 1630 Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW 13 55 1704 On Internet authentication 10 194 1750 Randomness recommendations for security 16 140 1760 The S KEY one time password system 10 193 1777 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 13 515 1778 The String Representation of Standard At 13 209 tribute Syntaxes 1928 SOCKS Protocol Version 5 15 378 1961 GSS API Authentication Method for SOCKS 15 395 Version 5 1964 The Kerberos Version 5 GSS API Mechanism 15 381 2025 The Simple Public Key GSS API Mechanism 15 18 SPKM 2026 The Internet Standards Process Revision 3 2 85 2030 Simple Network Time Protocol SNTP Ver 10 408 sion 4 for IPv4 IPv6 and OSI 2078 Generic Security Service Application Pro 15 382 gram Interface Version 2 92 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS RFC Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 2104 HMAC Keyed hashing for message authen 7 368 tication 2202 Test cases for HMAC MD5 and HMAC SHA 7 104 1 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification 15 143 2246 The TLS Protocol Version 1 0 12 132 2314 PKCS 10 Certification Request Syntax 13 354 v1 5 2315 PKCS 7 Certification Message Syntax v1 5 13 355 2409 The Internet Key Exchange IKE 12 196 2459 Internet X
131. management within the financial sector It is unclear whether the revised version of ANSI X9 24 is meant to fill this role or whether ANSI X9 17 has been superseded by the the corresponding ISO standard ISO 8732 218 Soon after the ANSI X9 standards were originally published the ISO technical committee on banking ISO TC68 began work on producing corresponding inter national standards The results were ISO 8732 218 which is based on ANSI X9 17 and ISO 11568 230 231 232 255 256 262 which is based on ANSI X9 24 Of particular relevance to this chapter is ISO 11568 1 230 which introduces the con cept of key management ISO 11568 2 231 which introduces many of the general ideas contained in Section 11 2 and ISO 11568 3 232 which specifies the key life cycle for secret symmetric keys The framework that these documents establish is almost identical to that of ANSI X9 24 Of the remaining parts of ISO 11568 parts 4 and 5 255 256 discuss the public key life cycle and will be discussed in chapter 13 The last part ISO 11568 6 262 contains descriptions of key management schemes that are approved for use in retail 11 5 NOTES 91 situations As this does little to enlighten the reader as to the technical reasons for implementing a key management scheme in a particular way it will not be discussed further There are several good introductory texts available on key management Chapter 12 of Menezes et al 397 serves
132. ment of Trusted Third Party services X 843 Security Information technology Secu 13 331 rity techniques Specification of TTP ser vices to support the application of digital sig natures A 9 NIST FIPS 107 A 9 NIST FIPS The NIST Federal Information Processing Standards FIPS that are dis cussed in this book are listed in Table A 9 Note that only the most recent editions are listed Table A 9 NIST FIPS NIST FIPS Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 46 3 Data Encryption Standard 4 431 81 DES Modes of Operation 5 427 140 2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic 16 435 Modules 180 2 Secure Hash Standard 6 438 186 2 Digital Signature Standard 8 432 196 Entity Authentication Using Public Key 10 430 Cryptography 197 Specification for the Advanced Encryption 4 434 Standard AES 198 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication 7 439 Code HMAC The NIST special publications are listed in Table A 10 108 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS Table A 10 NIST Special Publications NIST SP Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 800 22 A statistical test suite for random and pseu 16 436 dorandom number generation for crypto graphic applications 800 38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 5 437 Operation Methods and Techniques 800 38B Draft Recommendation for Block Cipher
133. mm com 83 4 The discussion of security services in this chapter is very much oriented towards communications security issues This contrasts with the common division of secu rity services into Confidentiality Integrity and Availability CIA in a computer security context For more details of this approach see for example Chapter 1 of Gollmann 180 or Chapter 1 of Pfleeger 456 The division of non repudiation into two sub services contrasts with the approach in ISO IEC 13888 1 see Chapter 9 where a total of eight non repudiation services are defined A description of LAN protocols X 25 PSNs IP and TCP can be found in just about any book on computer networking see for example Stallings 497 83 5 Defining encryption mechanisms to be a special case of encipherment mechanisms and defining hash functions as a separate class of encipherment mechanisms de parts somewhat from common use of these terms Indeed most cryptographers would equate encipherment and encryption and would regard hash functions as being something else entirely The reason we have departed from the commonly used terminology is that the usage here would appear to be the only way to apply the ISO 7498 2 classification of mechanisms without making major modifications to it Although access control mechanisms are not discussed in this book they are ex tremely important and have been the focus of a huge amount of research effort For further details of som
134. mmunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 815 11 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Integrity Framework 1995 324 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 816 11 95 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Security Audit and Alarms Framework 1995 325 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 800 Amendment 1 10 96 Security Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT Applications Amendment 1 Layer Two Security Service and Mechanisms for LANs 1996 326 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 818 10 96 Data Networks and Open System Communications Security Information Technology Open Systems Interconnection Security Frameworks for Open Systems Non repudiation Frame work 1996 327 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 509 08 97 The directory Authentication framework 3rd edi tion 1997 328 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 509 03 2000 The directory Public key and attribute certificate frameworks 4th edition 2000 329 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 841 10 2000 Security Informatio
135. mping and non repudiation 920 Notes oem une x ern d mb E eo ee eie Ne uites 10 Authentication protocols 10 7 Introduction s escu c9 Boer Ry er el 10 2 Standards for entity authentication protocols 10 8 Cryptographic mechanisms 10 4 Timeliness checking mechanisms 10 5 Authentication using symmetric cryptography 10 6 Authentication using asymmetric cryptography 10 7 Manual authentication protocols 10 8 Choosing an authentication protocol 10 9 Notes 4322 ass ES ar Bo ee A es ul 28 28 28 28 31 32 32 33 33 33 33 33 39 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 vi CONTENTS 11 Key management frameworks 49 11 1 Standards for Key Management 50 11 2 Definitions and Basic Properties 50 11 3 The General Framework nenn 50 11 4 The ANSI X9 24 Framework 50 11 5 Notes ei Me Reeth ae a el ieee Se Sones eee Mg v aes dts 50 12 Key establishment mechanisms 53 12 1 Definitions and Basic Properties 54 12 2 Standards for Key Establishment 54 12 3 Physical Mechanisms ll 54 12 4 Mechanisms using symmetric cryptography 54 12 5 Mechanisms using asymmetric cryptography 54 12 6 Key establishment based on weak secrets 2 2 2 2 54 12 7 Key establishment for mobile networks 54 12 8 Choos
136. n 3GPP TS 33 102 155 The MILENAGE algorithm set the example algorithms that 3GPP have provided for the fl f5 functions are given in a series of five standards the general introduction 151 the algorithm specification 156 the implementors test data 152 the conformance test data 153 and the summary and results of the design and evaluation process 154 Chapter 13 Public Key Infrastructures 60 CHAPTER 13 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURES 13 1 What is a PKI 13 2 PKI standards 13 3 Certificate formats 13 4 Certificate management 13 5 Certificate storage and retrieval 13 6 Certificate status discovery 13 7 Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements 13 8 Notes Because of the potential practical importance of PKIs there are a number of books on this topic including those of Adams and Lloyd 23 Austin and Huaman 39 and Feghhi Feghhi and Williams 161 Ford and Baum s book on secure e commerce also provides extensive coverage of PKI issues 165 indeed this latter book provides a particularly accessible introduction to PKI issues 813 1 The Handbook of Applied Cryptography 397 page 587 attributes the concept of public key certificate to the 1978 thesis of Kohnfelder 366 The idea is implicit in the Rivest Shamir Adleman paper of February 1978 473 where the notion of a public file signing a message containing an end user public key is described and where every user is equipped with
137. n 46 3 FIPS PUB 46 3 Data Encryption Standard October 1999 432 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal In formation Processing Standards Publication 186 2 FIPS PUB 186 2 Digital Signature Standard DSS January 2000 433 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Common Biometric Exchange File Format CBEFF January 2001 434 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal Infor mation Processing Standards Publication 197 FIPS PUB 197 Speci fication for the Advanced Encryption Standard AES November 2001 435 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal In formation Processing Standards Publication 140 2 FIPS PUB 140 2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules June 2001 436 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST NIST Special Publication 800 22 A statistical test suite for random and pseudoran dom number generation for cryptographic applications May 2001 437 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST NIST Spe cial Publication 800 38A Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation Methods and Techniques December 2001 438 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal In formation Processing Standards Publication 180 2 FIPS PUB 180 2 Secure Hash Standard August 2002 439 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Federal Infor mation Proce
138. n technology Security tech niques Security information objects for access control 2000 330 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 842 10 00 Information technology Security techniques Guidelines for the use and management of Trusted Third Party ser vices October 2000 331 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 843 10 2000 Security Information technology Security tech 140 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 BIBLIOGRAPHY niques Specification of TTP services to support the application of digital signatures 2000 International Telecommunication Union JTU R Recommendation TF 460 6 02 02 Standard frequency and time signal emissions February 2002 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 680 07 02 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Specification of basic notation 2002 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 681 07 02 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Information object specification 2002 International Telecommunication Union JTU T Recommendation X 682 07 02 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One ASN 1 Constraint specification 2002 International Telecommunication Union ITU T Recommendation X 683 07 02 Information technology Abstract Syntax Notation One
139. national Organization for Standardization ISO IEC CD 9796 3 IT Security techniques Digital signature schemes giving message recovery Part 3 Discrete logarithm based mechanisms 2nd edition June 2004 303 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FCD 10116 Information technology Security techniques Modes of operation for an n bit block cipher 3rd edition 2004 304 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FCD 18033 2 IT security techniques Encryption Algorithms Part 2 Asymmetric Ciphers June 2004 305 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FCD 18033 3 IT security techniques Encryption Algorithms Part 3 Block Ciphers May 2004 306 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FCD 18033 4 IT security techniques Encryption Algorithms Part 4 Stream Ciphers June 2004 307 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FCD 9798 6 IT security techniques Entity authentication Part 6 Mecha nisms using manual data transfer June 2004 308 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FDIS 18032 IT security techniques Prime number generation June 2004 309 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FDIS 18033 1 IT security techniques Encryption Algorithms Part 1 General July 2004 310 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC FDIS 9798 5 IT secur
140. nations of modular arithmetic and related concepts Indeed almost any book on modern cryptography will provide an explanation Chapter 2 of the Handbook of Applied Cryptography 397 provides an extremely useful introduction to not only modular arithmetic but also many other mathematical concepts necessary to understand modern cryptography Chapter 2 Standards and the standardisation process 4 THE STANDARDISATION PROCESS 2 1 Why bother with standards 2 2 International standardisation organisations 2 3 National standardisation organisations 2 4 Industrial standardisation organisations 2 5 Cryptographic evaluation bodies 2 6 Notes There are thousands of standards on a huge range of different topics as a quick look on the ISO website will confirm and all of them are designed to specify a common method of doing a routine task The eight reasons for standardisation given by the BSI and discussed in Section 2 1 are taken from the BSI website A history of ISO standardisation body is available on their website http www iso ch iso en aboutiso introduction fifty fifty html Several standards are mentioned during the discussion of standardisation bodies these will be discussed in detail later in the book SEC 1 498 and SEC 2 499 will be discussed in Chapter 4 ISO 8370 222 and ISO 8371 217 227 will be discussed in Chapter 7 ISO IEC TR 14516 288 will be discussed in Chapter 14 ISO IEC WD 19790 314 ISO IEC CD 18031 301 a
141. nd BS 7799 90 91 will be discussed in Chapter 16 The sister organisation to IETF the Internet Research Task Force IRTF is also involved with cryptography The IRTF conducts its research by creating small research groups to work on topics related to the Internet and one such research group the Crypto Forum Research Group CFRG is focused on cryptography More information about the IRTF can be found at http www irtf org whilst information about the CFRG can be found on their homepage http www irtf org cfrg For more information about the IETF and its standardisation efforts the reader is referred to two of the IETF s own standards RFC 1118 369 and RFC 2026 85 For more general information on the standardisation Chapter 15 of Menezes van Oorschot and Vanstone 397 and the appendices of Ford 164 both contain introductions to the subject Chapter 3 Security mechanisms and security services 6 MECHANISMS AND SERVICES 3 1 Introduction 3 2 Security standards 3 3 A model for security 3 4 Security services 3 5 Security mechanisms 3 6 Relating services to mechanisms 3 7 Services and protocols layers 3 8 Security management 3 9 Security frameworks 3 10 Notes 3 1 The OSI model is specified in ISO IEC 7498 1 the second edition of which was published in 1994 233 Ford s book 164 provides an excellent standards based introduction to network security that is essentially complementary to the scope o
142. neering Task Force September 1997 144 P Ekdahl and T Johansson A new version of the stream cipher SNOW In K Nyberg and H Heys editors Selected Areas in Cryp tography 9th Annual International Workshop SAC 2002 volume 2595 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 47 61 Springer Verlag Berlin 2003 145 EMVCo EMV2000 Integrated Circuit Card Specification for Paymewnt Systems Book 2 Security and Key Management De cember 2000 146 European Computer Manufacturers Association ECMA TR 46 Se curity in Open Systems A Security Framework July 1988 147 European Parliament and the Council of the European Union Direc tive 1999 93 EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Community framework for electronic signatures 1999 Available from http europa eu int eur lex pri en oj dat 2000 1 013 1 01320000119en00120020 pdf 148 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 33 105 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Cryptographic Al gorithm Requirements June 2001 149 European Telecommunications Standards Institute ETSI 3GPP TS 35 201 3rd Generation Partnership Project Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects 3G Security Specification of the 3GPP Confidentiality and Integrity Algorithms Document 1 f8 and f9 Specification June 2002 150 European Telecommunications Stan
143. neers Inc IEEE Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography 2000 214 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc EEE Draft Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Ex change Between Systems LAN MAN Specific Requirements Part 11 Wireless Medium Access Control MAC and Physical Layer PHY Specifications Specification for Enhanced Security 2002 215 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc IEEE Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptography Amendment 1 Addi tional Techniques 2004 216 International Organization for Standardization ISO 8372 1987 In formation processing Modes of operation for a 64 bit block cipher algorithm 1987 217 International Organization for Standardization ISO 8731 1 1987 Banking Approved algorithm for message authentication Part 1 DEA 1987 218 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 8732 Bank ing Key managemant wholesale 1988 219 International Organization for Standardization ISO 7498 2 1989 Information processing systems Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference Model Part 2 Security Architecture 1989 220 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 7498 4 1989 Information processing systems Open Systems Interconnec tion Basic Reference Model Part 4 Management framework 1989 221 International Organization for Standard
144. nology Security techniques Non repudiation Part 1 General 1997 251 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 13888 3 1997 Information technology Security techniques Non repudiation Part 3 Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques 1997 252 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9798 1 1997 Information technology Security techniques Entity authen tication Part 1 General 2nd edition 1997 253 International Organization for Standardization ISO 13491 1 1998 Banking Secure cryptographic devices retail Part 1 Concepts requirements and evaluation methods 1998 254 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10118 4 Information technology Security techniques Hash functions Part 4 Hash functions using modular arithmetic 1998 BIBLIOGRAPHY 133 255 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11568 4 Banking Key managemant retail Part 4 Key management techniques for public key cryptosystems 1998 256 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 11568 5 Banking Key managemant retail Part 5 Key life cycle for public key cryptosystems 1998 257 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 13888 2 1998 Information technology Security techniques Non repudiation Part 2 Mechanisms using symmetric techniques 1998 258 International Organization
145. non reversible signature schemes based on discrete logarithms This new standard will therefore include all the discrete logarithm based mechanisms from the current versions of ISO IREC 14888 2 and ISO IEC 14888 3 as well as all the mechanisms from ISO IEC 15946 2 The end result of this reorganisation should be two rather more consistently structured series of signature standards 8 8 THE DIGITAL SIGNATURE ALGORITHM DSA 33 8 3 The Digital Signature Algorithm DSA 8 4 RSA based signature schemes 8 5 Digital signatures and the law 8 6 Choosing a digital signature scheme 8 7 Notes 88 1 The idea that a digital signature could replace a handwritten signature was first proposed in the seminal paper by Diffie and Hellman 133 This was also the paper that first introduced the notion of asymmetric cryptography Whilst this paper introduced the idea of a digital signature it wasn t until about a decade later that the security requirements for a digital signature scheme that we now accept as being correct were introduced The notion of forgery that we have used in Section 8 1 was first introduced by Goldwasser Micali and Rivest in a paper published in 1988 177 Before this time it was considered impossible to find a signature scheme that was unforgeable in this sense The stronger notion of forgery where an attack is deemed successful if the attacker forges a signature for a new message or finds a new signatures for a previously
146. nternet Engineering Task Force January 1999 W Diffie and M E Hellman New directions in cryptography IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 22 644 654 1976 W Diffie and M E Hellman Privacy and authentication An intro duction to cryptography Proceedings of the IEEE 67 397 427 1979 W Diffie and S Landau Privacy on the Line MIT Press 1999 W Diffie P C van Oorschot and M J Wiener Authentication and authenticated key exchange Designs Codes and Cryptography 2 107 125 1992 H Dobbertin Cryptanalysis of MD4 In D Gollmann editor Fast Software Encryption Third International Workshop volume 1039 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 71 82 Springer Verlag 1996 H Dobbertin The status of MD5 after a recent attack CryptoBytes 2 2 1 6 1996 BIBLIOGRAPHY 123 139 W Doonan Internet Draft draft ietf cat sskm 01 SPKM with Shared Secret Keys SSKM Internet Engineering Task Force 1999 140 D Eastlake S Crocker and J Schiller RFC 1750 Randomness recommendations for security Internet Engineering Task Force De cember 1994 141 D Eastlake and P Jones RFC 3174 US Secure Hash Algorithm SHA 1 Internet Engineering Task Force September 2001 142 D Eastlake J Reagle and D Solo RFC 3075 XML Signature Syntax and Processing Internet Engineering Task Force March 2001 143 M Eisler A Chiu and L Ling RFC 2203 RPCSEC_GSS Protocol Specification Internet Engi
147. number is given by Brandt 86 There are several popular primality tests that are currently in use These include the Miller Rabin test 468 the Frobenius Grantham test 187 and the Lehmann test 379 These algorithms are all probabilistic and have relatively small error probabilities Recently a new primality test has been proposed by Agarwal Saxena and Kayal 26 This paper is very interesting from a mathematical point of view as it proposes a fast using a mathematical definition of the word fast deterministic method for testing the primality of a number Unfortunately even though the algorithm is mathematically classed as a fast algorithm in practice the algorithm is very slow when compared to the probabilistic test mentioned above Hence it is not thought to be of significant use for generating primes for cryptographic applications Prime number generation algorithms that do not make use of primality tests include Maurer s algorithm 394 and the Shawe Taylor algorithm 490 816 3 Whilst the problems of authenticated encryption and in particular the order in which one should apply an encryption and MAC algorithm have been discussed for many years we are have recently begun to see some formal analysis of the problem Bellare and Namprempre 48 have analysed the problem to see what can be proven 76 CHAPTER 16 OTHER STANDARDS about the different types of schemes and have come to the conclusion that the En
148. o concentrate on describing the practical uses of signature schemes 88 3 36 CHAPTER 8 DIGITAL SIGNATURES The Digital Signature Algorithm was first introduced by Kravitz as a proposed NIST FIPS standard in 1991 and was officially declared a standard in 1994 432 It is also the subject of a U S patent U S patent number 5 231 668 although no licence is required for its use For a proof of the correctness of the DSA algorithm see Stinson 501 A short proof is also contained in an appendix of NIST FIPS 186 2 432 It should be noted that there is a small chance that the DSA algorithm will fail to verify a valid signature This happens if S 0 mod q In this case it is impossible to invert S modulo q i e there is no integer value W such that S W 1 mod q Hence the verification algorithm fails at step 1 Also if the DSA is to be used by more than one entity in a system it is not necessary for each entity to generate a complete new public key The public parameters of the system p q and g can be used by every participant This means that each entity only has to generate a secret key x between 1 and q 1 and a public value y g mod p It is easy to show that the DSA signature scheme is insecure whenever the same value k is used to sign two different messages Suppose R S and R S are signatures for two different messages m and m but that both of these signatures have been computed using the same value of k It i
149. ogy Security tech 6 275 niques Hash functions Part 2 Hash functions using an n bit block cipher 10118 3 Information technology Security tech 6 291 niques Hash functions Part 3 Dedi cated hash functions 10118 4 Information technology Security tech 6 254 niques Hash functions Part 4 Hash functions using modular arithmetic 10181 1 Information technology Open Systems 3 240 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 1 Overview 10181 2 Information technology Open Systems 3 241 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 2 Authentication framework 10181 3 Information technology Open Systems 3 242 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 3 Access control framework 10181 4 Information technology Open Systems 3 249 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 4 Non repudiation framework 10181 5 Information technology Open Systems 3 243 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 5 Confidentiality framework 10181 6 Information technology Open Systems 3 244 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 6 Integrity framework 10181 7 Information technology Open Systems 3 245 Interconnection Security frameworks for open systems Part 7 Security audit and alarms framework 10745
150. persmith and A Shamir Lattice attacks on NTRU In W Fumy editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 97 volume 1233 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 52 61 Springer Verlag 1997 J S Coron D Naccache and J P Stern On the security of RSA padding In M Weiner editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 99 volume 1666 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 1 18 Springer Verlag 1999 N T Courtois and J Pieprzyk Cryptanalysis of block ciphers with overdefined systems of equations In Y Zheng editor Advances in Cryptology Asiacrypt 2002 volume 2501 of Lecture Notes in Com puter Science pages 267 287 Springer Verlag 2002 M Curtin and J Dolske A brute force seach of DES keyspace login The Magazine of the USENIX Association May 1998 also available from http www interhack net pubs des key crack I B Damg rd Collision free hash functions and public key signa ture schemes In D Chaum and W L Price editors Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 87 volume 304 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 203 216 Springer Verlag 1987 I B Damg rd A design principle for hash functions In G Brassard editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 89 volume 435 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 416 427 Springer Verlarg 1989 E Danielyan Goodbye DES welcome AES The Internet Protocol Journal 4 2 15 21 June 2001 J Dankers T Garefalakis R Schaffelhof
151. prob abilistic cryptosystems SIAM Journal on Computing 17 412 426 1988 S Micali and C P Schnorr Efficient perfect random number gener ators In S Goldwasser editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 88 146 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 BIBLIOGRAPHY volume 403 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 173 198 Springer Verlag 1988 S Micali and C P Schnorr Efficient perfect polynomial random number generators Journal of Cryptography 3 157 172 1991 D L Mills RFC 1305 Network Time Protocol Version 3 Specifica tion Implementation and Analysis Internet Engineering Task Force March 1992 D L Mills RFC 2030 Simple Network Time Protocol SNTP Ver sion 4 for IPv4 IPv6 and OSI Internet Engineering Task Force October 1996 D L Mills Internet Draft draft ietf stime ntpauth 04 Public Key Cryptography for the Network Time Protocol Version 2 Internet Engineering Task Force November 2002 C J Mitchell Limitations of challenge response entity authentication Electronics Letters 25 1195 1196 1989 C J Mitchell Key recovery attack on ANSI retail MAC Electronics Letters 39 361 362 2003 C J Mitchell On the security of XCBC TMAC and OMAC Techni cal Report RHUL MA 2003 4 Mathematics Department Royal Hol loway University of London August 2003 C J Mitchell Truncation attacks on MACs Elect
152. r 331 ISO IEC 15945 is concerned with the TTP services primarily CA services necessary to support the use of dig ital signatures It is to a large extent based on the mechanisms specified in RFCs 2510 and 2511 22 423 The two part standard ISO 15782 significantly extends the generic PKI standards within a banking context Part 1 290 provides a general model and rules for cer tificate management It has a significant degree of commonality with the earlier US banking standard ANSI X9 57 6 Part 2 279 defines banking specific extensions to X 509 certificates and this too builds upon an earlier US standard namely ANSI X9 55 5 ANSI X9 79 1 14 provides banking specific guidance on Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements A useful general discussion of PKI standardisation and the need for additional PKT standards has been provided by Palmer 453 813 3 62 CHAPTER 13 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURES ASN 1 is specified in a series of ITU T recommendations X 680 X 683 333 334 335 336 ASN 1 encoding rules are given in X 690 and X 691 337 338 A comprehensive guide to ASN 1 can be found in 374 and a helpful brief introduction is given in Appendix C of 165 The formats for DNS names IP addresses and URIs are specified in RFCs 1035 420 791 212 and 1630 55 respectively The first version of the PKIX X 509 profile RFC 2459 204 was published in 1999 in April 2002 this was superseded
153. ribed by Bond 80 In this attack PINs can be discovered much more efficiently than would normally be the case by the fact that a decimalisation table used in PIN verification computations is a parameter to one of the API functions although in practice the table is fixed and hence does not need to be a parameter This allows special false tables to be offered to the API permitting fast searches of the PIN space The existence of such an attack has independently been observed by Clulow 110 Problems with key control for MAC keys have been identified in 411 413 If the degree of truncation of the MAC is not bound securely to the key which is not the case for Cryptoki or the IBM 4758 API then this enables accelerated attacks on MAC functions Finally certain possible attacks on partial computations for MACs have been iden tified 89 although it is not clear whether this is a problem to which existing crypto APIs are prone since most such APIs are at least partially confidential 72 CHAPTER 15 CRYPTOGRAPHIC APIS Chapter 16 Other standards 73 74 CHAPTER 16 OTHER STANDARDS 16 1 Random bit generation 16 2 Prime number generation 16 3 Authenticated Encryption 16 4 Security modules 16 5 Standards for the use of biometric techniques 16 6 Information security management 16 7 Notes 816 1 There are three standards that discuss the generation of random bit in a systematic and self contained way IETF RF
154. ronics Letters 39 1439 1440 2003 C J Mitchell Security for Mobility Institution of Electrical Engi neers 2004 C J Mitchell and L Chen Comments on the S KEY user authenti cation scheme ACM Operating Systems Review 30 4 12 16 October 1996 C J Mitchell and R Schaffelhofer The personal PKI In C J Mitchell editor Security for Mobility chapter 3 pages 35 61 IEE 2004 C J Mitchell and V Varadharajan Modified forms of cipher block chaining Computers and Security 10 37 40 1991 C J Mitchell M Ward and P Wilson On key control in key agree ment protocols Electronics Letters 34 980 981 1998 BIBLIOGRAPHY 147 419 C J Mitchell and C Y Yeun Fixing a problem in the Helsinki protocol ACM Operating Systems Review 32 4 21 24 October 1998 420 P Mockapetris RFC 1035 Domain Names Implementation and Specification Internet Engineering Task Force November 1987 421 Fr d ric Muller The MD2 hash function is not one way In P J Lee editor Advances in Cryptology Asiacrypt 2004 volume of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages Springer Verlag 2004 422 S Murphy and M Robshaw Essential algebraic structure within the AES In M Yung editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2002 vol ume 2442 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 1 16 Springer Verlag 2002 423 M Myers C Adams D Solo and D Kemp RFC 2511 Internet X 509 Certifi
155. s Part 2 Digital signa tures 15946 3 Information technology Security tech 12 niques Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic Curves Part 3 Key establish ment 15946 4 Information technology Security tech 8 297 niques Cryptographic Techniques based on Elliptic Curves Part 4 Digital signa tures giving message recovery 15947 Information technology Security tech 3 289 niques IT intrusion detection framework 17799 Information technology Code of practice 14 16 276 for information security management 18014 1 Information technology Security tech 14 285 niques Time stamping services Part 1 Framework 18014 2 Information technology Security tech 14 286 niques Time stamping services Part 2 Mechanisms producing independent tokens 18014 3 Information technology Security tech 14 298 niques Time stamping services Part 3 Mechanisms producing linked tokens 18031 IT security techniques Random bit gener 16 299 ation 18032 IT security techniques Prime number gen 16 308 eration 18033 1 IT security techniques Encryption algo 4 309 rithms Part 1 General 102 APPENDIX A TABLES OF STANDARDS ISO Relevant Ref no Title chapter s no 18033 2 IT security techniques Encryption algo 4 304 rithms Part 2 Asymmetric ciphers 18033 3 IT security te
156. s 2003 M Sc Dissertation University of Natal Durban South Africa J Clulow On the security of PKCS 11 In C D Walter C K Koc and C Paar editors Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems CHES 2003 5th International Workshop volume 2779 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 411 425 Springer Verlag 2003 Comit Consultatif International de T l graphique et Telephonique CCITT Recommendation X 509 1988 The directory Authentica tion framework 1988 Committee on National Security Systems CNSS Policy No 15 Fact Sheet No 1 National Policy om the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard AES to Protect National Security Systems and National Security Information June 2003 Available from http www nstissc gov Assets pdf fact sheet pdf BIBLIOGRAPHY 121 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 D Coppersmith S Halevi and C Jutla ISO 9796 1 and the new forgery strategy Available from http grouper ieee org groups 1363 Research Cryptanalysis html 1999 D Coppersmith L R Knudsen and C J Mitchell Key recovery and forgery attacks on the MacDES MAC algorithm In M Bellare editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 2000 volume 1880 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 184 196 Springer Verlag 2000 D Coppersmith and C J Mitchell Attacks on MacDES MAC algo rithm Electronics Letters 35 1626 1627 1999 D Cop
157. s are provably secure some anomalies in the design of TMAC and OMAC have re cently been identified 412 An attack on ISO IEC 9797 1 MAC algorithm 5 was described in 2003 by Joux Poupard and Stern 350 As a result MAC algorithms 5 and 6 are likely to be omitted from the next edition of ISO IEC 9797 1 since they do not appear to offer significant advantages over other standardised CBC MAC schemes and they are much less efficient A series of tables in Annex B of ISO IEC 9797 1 provide a detailed guide to the best known attacks on all the standardised CBC MAC schemes In recent years considerable progress has been achieved in developing mathematical proofs of the security of CBC MAC schemes Whilst details of these proofs are beyond the scope of this book we briefly review the main known results The first main result regarding provably secure CBC MAC schemes was achieved in 1984 by Bellare Kilian and Rogaway 47 who showed that SMAC is secure for fixed length messages In 2000 Petrank and Rackhoff 455 proved that EMAC is secure if the message length is a multiple of n and hence is also secure as long as the padding method is 1 1 i e Padding Method 2 or 3 is used Proofs of security also exist for all the recently proposed schemes including RMAC 347 XCBC 63 343 TMAC 343 370 and OMAC 341 343 Whilst ARMAC and MacDES do not possess proofs of security heuristically one would expect them to be at least as secure as EM
158. s easy to see that S S k hash m hash m mod q 8 3 and so hash m hash m S From here it is easy to recover the private key x as k mod q 8 4 Sk hash m 5 x 8 5 It should be clear that attack can also be used if an attacker can find out the value k used to create a signature R S for a message m Nguyen and Shparlinski 448 have gone further and shown that it is possible to recover the private key if only a fraction of the bits of k are known to the attacker Bleichenbacher 73 also proposed an attack against DSA by noting that in the original specification of the algorithm small values of k mod q were more likely to occur than larger ones The DSS was subsequently changed to make sure that k is chosen randomly out of all possible values 88 4 The use of RSA as a signature scheme was first proposed in the initial paper on the RSA scheme by Rivest Shamir and Adleman 473 The method they proposed is very similar to the methods used today to prove the integrity of a message by supplying an encrypted version of that message or a hash code of that message Since that paper the main efforts in this area have been to try and find efficient ways of securely formatting the message representative before encryption More details on the improved RSA signing function can be found in ISO IEC 9796 2 287 8 7 NOTES 37 It is possible to adapt the given scheme to provide
159. s for the use of biometric techniques 74 16 6 Information security management 74 16 7 JNOUGS nn ne al er Den eb RC 74 17 Standards the future 79 A Tables of standards 81 A l BEPP standards eon era Rom Rp ea 82 A ANSI standards s ese eR emen om ow 84 A3 BSLstandazd8 4 cd ark a Redon EON ES ed 87 A4 ETSI stand rds 44 pon 8 wen na LAG ar rk 88 A 5 THEE standards tn g see 2 2 2522 ea en 89 A 6 IETF requests for comments 2 0084 90 A ISO standards win4 leues cR is Be Tue ye ad 95 A 8 ITU T recommendations 0 103 ALS NIST FIPS 122 32 202 eo te Bay Rae fe ee 107 AS LOURSA PROS ein aoe eue aem a ee ee ie weh 109 A JISEGCG standards 022 xo ee ees 110 viii CONTENTS Preface x CONTENTS This companion is intended to supplement and update the User s Guide to Cryptography and Standards Such is the speed at which standards evolve that the User s Guide is unfortunately already out of date at the time of writing and it has yet to hit the streets Our plan is to regularly update this companion so that in conjunction with the User s Guide itself the reader is given information that is as current as we can make it The structure of this companion is identical to that of the User s Guide All the end of chapter notes the complete appendix and the entire list of ref erences are reproduced from the User s Guide updated where appropriate The text from the m
160. s in Computer Science pages 293 305 Springer Verlag 2000 M Burmester On the risk of opening distributed keys In Y Desmedt editor Advances in Cryptology Crypto 94 volume 839 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 308 317 Springer Verlag 1994 W E Burr Selecting the Advanced Encryption Standard IEEE Security and Privacy 1 2 43 52 March April 2003 M Burrows M Abadi and R Needham Authentication A practical study in belief and action In M Vardi editor Proceedings of the Sec ond Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning and Knowledge pages 325 342 Morgan Kaufmann 1988 M Burrows M Abadi and R Needham A logic of authentication ACM Operating Systems Review 23 5 1 13 1989 M Burrows M Abadi and R Needham A logic of authentication Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Series A 426 233 271 1989 M Burrows M Abadi and R Needham A logic of authentica tion Technical Report 39 Digital Equipment Corporation Systems Research Center February 1990 Revised version C M Campbell Jr Design and specification of cryptographic capa bilities In D K Branstad editor NBS Special Publication 500 27 Computer security and the Data Encryption Standard pages 54 66 U S Department of Commerce National Bureau of Standards 1977 R Canetti and H Krawczyk Analysis of key exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels In B Pfitzmann editor Ad vances
161. s using the CAST design procedure Designs Codes and Cryptography 12 283 316 1997 C Adams RFC 2479 Independent Data Umit Protection Generic Security Service Application Program Interface IDUP GSS API In ternet Engineering Task Force December 1998 C Adams P Cain D Pinkas and R Zuccherato RFC 3161 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp Protocol TSP Internet Engineering Task Force August 2001 BIBLIOGRAPHY 113 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Ww Se 30 31 32 33 C Adams and S Farrell RFC 2510 Internet X 509 Public Key In frastructure Certificate Management Protocols Internet Engineering Task Force March 1999 C Adams and S Lloyd Understanding PKI Concepts Standards and Deployment Considerations Addison Wesley 2nd edition 2002 C Adams and S Lloyd Understanding PKI Concepts Standards and Deployment Considerations Addison Wesley 2nd edition 2003 C Adams P Sylvester M Zolotarev and R Zuccherato RFC 3029 Internet X 509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Validation and Certi fication Server Protocols Internet Engineering Task Force February 2001 M Agrawal N Kayal and Nitin Saxena PRIMES is in P Available from http www cse iitk ac in news primality html 2002 American Bankers Association ANSI X9 52 1998 Triple Data En cryption Algorithm Modes of Operation 1998 American Bankers Association ANSI X9 T G 24 1999 Tec
162. se ISO IEC standard for signatures was attacked by Coron Naccache and Stern 118 although they do not manage to completely break the scheme The scheme was eventually broken by Coppersmith et al 114 and by Grieu 188 As a result of these attacks ISO IEC 9796 was withdrawn There are no known attacks against the schemes contained in either ISO IEC 9796 2 287 or ISO IEC 9796 3 277 The 2nd edition of ISO IEC 9796 3 which has been expanded to incorporate the elliptic curve based mechanisms specified in ISO IEC 15946 4 297 is currently at the committee draft stage 302 The general purpose ISO IEC standard on non reversible signature schemes is ISO IEC 14888 It consists of three parts a general introduction 258 a series of identity based mechanisms 264 and a series of certificate based mechanisms 259 Many of the schemes contained in ISO IEC 14888 3 can also be implemented using elliptic curve techniques These schemes are standardised in ISO IEC 15946 part 2 283 The revised and re organised parts 2 and 3 of ISO IEC 14888 are currently at working draft stage 311 312 The new text for ISO IEC 14888 3 incorporates all the mechanisms currently specified in ISO IEC 15946 2 283 As we have mentioned IETF RFCs have tended to endorse other signature stan dards such as the Digital Signature Algorithm rather than standardise new signa ture schemes of their own IETF documents and standards such as IETF RFC 3075 142 tend t
163. signature schemes can be found in Menezes et al 397 A more mathematical treatment of the field of digital signatures can be found in Stinson 501 88 1 2 The example of how to construct a reversible signature scheme from a non reversible signature scheme demonstrates how it is necessary to send the message along with signature when using a non reversible scheme So in practice the reversible signa ture scheme that we constructed is often the scheme that is actually used We did not show that it is possible to construct a non reversible signature scheme from a reversible signature scheme If S and V are the signing and verification algorithms of a reversible signature scheme then it is possible to construct a non reversible signature scheme by setting the signing and verification algorithms S and V to be S m sx S m sx 8 1 and f u valid ifm V o Px Y m o Px invalid otherwise ae Unlike the previous example where a reversible scheme was constructed from a non reversible scheme this scheme is of little use and is very unlikely to be used in practice 88 1 3 Identity based cryptography i e asymmetric cryptography where the public key can be derived from the recipients identity has huge advantages Because the public key is intrinsically bound to the identity of the entity to whom the key belongs there is no need to install an expensive public key infrastructure to authenticate that key Whilst we ha
164. so of relevance to crypto APIs 15 2 Version 2 update 1 of GSS API is specified in RFC 2743 383 Previous versions of the GSS API specification can be found in RFC 1508 380 version 1 and RFC 2078 382 version 2 The current release of PKCS 11 is version 2 11 481 This and previous versions of the PKCS 11 specifications are available at http www rsasecurity com rsalabs pkcs index html The current version of the interface to the IBM 4758 hardware security module is specified in 211 NIST FIPS Pub 140 2 was released in 2001 435 the 2 in the title indicates that this is the second revision of FIPS 140 The two parts of the ISO banking standard for secure cryptographic devices ISO 13491 were published in 1998 253 273 15 3 The current version of the GSS API C bindings are specified in RFC 2744 513 which supersedes RFC 1509 512 The parallel Java bindings are given in RFC 2853 352 The Kerberos v5 GSS API mechanism is described in RFC 1964 381 Note that Kerberos v5 itself is specified in RFC 1510 365 for more details see Chapter 10 The SPKM mechanism is specified in RFC 2025 18 15 6 NOTES 71 There are four other RFCs which relate to use of GSS API Two of these describe how GSS API can be used to support specific functions RFC 1961 395 describes how GSS API can be used to provide authentication for v5 of the SOCKS Protocol itself specified in RFC 1928 378 SOCKS is designed
165. ssing Standards Publication 198 FIPS PUB 198 The Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code HMAC March 2002 440 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST NIST Special Publication 800 38B Draft recommendation for block cipher modes of operation The RMAC authentication mode October 2002 441 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST NIST Special Publication 800 38C Draft Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation The CCM Mode For Authentication and Confidentiality September 2003 442 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST Announc ing Proposed Withdrawal of Federal Information Processing Standard FIPS for the Data Encryption Standard DES and Request for Comments U S Federal Register 69 142 44509 44510 July 2004 BIBLIOGRAPHY 149 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST NIST Special Publication 800 22 Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm TDEA Block Cipher May 2004 R M Needham and M D Schroeder Using encryption for authenti cation in large networks of computers Communications of the ACM 21 993 999 1978 B C Neuman and T Ts o Kerberos an authentication service for computer networks IEEE Communications Magazine 32 9 33 38 September 1994 New European Schemes for Signatures Integrity and Encryption
166. stem Science 28 270 299 1984 S Goldwasser S Micali and R L Rivest A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen message attacks SIAM Journal of Computing 17 2 281 308 April 1988 J D Golic A weakness of the linear part of stream cipher MUGI In B Roy and W Meier editors Fast Software Encryption 11th In ternational Workshop FSE 2004 volume 3017 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 178 192 Springer Verlag Berlin 2004 D Gollmann What do we mean by entity authentication In Proceed ings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy pages 46 54 IEEE Computer Society Press 1996 D Gollmann Computer Security John Wiley and Sons 1999 L Gong A security risk of depending on synchonized clocks ACM Operating Systems Review 26 1 49 53 January 1992 L Gong Variations on the themes of message freshness and replay In Proceedings Computer Security Foundations Workshop VI pages 131 136 IEEE Computer Society Press June 1993 L Gong G Ellison and M Dageforde Inside Java 2 Platform Secu rity Architecture API Design and Implementation Addison Wesley 2nd edition 2003 BIBLIOGRAPHY 127 184 Government of the United Kingdom Blectronic Communications Act 2000 2000 Available from http www hmso gov uk acts acts2000 20000007 htm 185 Government of the United Kingdom Explanatory Notes to Electronic Communications Act 2000 2000 Available from http www hmso gov
167. tamping ser vices Part 2 Mechanisms producing independent tokens 2002 287 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 9796 2 2002 Information technology Security techniques Digital signa ture schemes giving message recovery Part 2 Integer factorization based mechanisms 2nd edition 2002 136 BIBLIOGRAPHY 288 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC TR 14516 Information technology Security techniques Guidelines for the use and management of Trusted Third Party services 2002 289 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC TR 15947 2002 Information technology Security techniques IT intrusion detection framework 2002 290 International Organization for Standardization ISO 15782 1 2003 Certificate management for financial services Part 1 Public key certificates 2003 291 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC 10118 3 Information technology Security techniques Hash functions Part 3 Dedicated hash functions 2nd edition 2003 292 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC CD 18033 3 Information technology Security techniques Encryption Algo rithms Part 3 Block Ciphers 2003 293 International Organization for Standardization ISO IEC CD 9798 6 Information technology Security techniques Entity authentica tion Part 6 Mechanisms using manual data transfer Decemb
168. te keys for protecting messages sent from A to B and from B to A The limitations of S KEY in the case where the host can be impersonated appear to have been observed by a number of authors in the mid 1990s see for example 415 or Note 10 7 of 397 AKEP2 was first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 50 and is given as Protocol 12 20 in 397 A version of this protocol is included in a 1999 Internet draft 139 although this draft has now expired Note that neither of the TTP protocols standardised in ISO IEC 9798 2 are quite the same as the Needham Schroeder protocol because of the need to address the problem identified by Denning and Sacco 130 If Kerberos is used with a guessable password as the long term secret shared by the client and the authentication server then password guessing attacks may be possible This and other possible security issues with Kerberos are discussed by Bellovin and Merritt in 52 53 who also propose possible solutions to the password guessing problem For details of the current version of Kerberos see http web mit edu kerberos www 810 6 The ID based unilateral authentication protocol specified in clause 5 of ISO IEC 9798 5 is a generalisation of the Fiat Shamir protocol 163 due to Guillou and Quisquater 189 The integer factorisation based unilateral authentication pro tocol given in clause 6 of ISO IEC 9798 5 is the QG2 protocol of Guillou and Quisquater 190 The unilateral au
169. thentication protocol based on discrete loga rithms in ISO IEC 9798 5 clause 7 is due to Schnorr 486 The GPS1 and GPS2 10 9 NOTES AT unilateral authentication mechanisms specified in clause 8 of the draft 2nd edition of ISO IEC 9798 5 are due to Girault Paill s Poupard and Stern 170 171 461 Finally the unilateral authentication protocol based on asymmetric encryption given in clause 9 3 of ISO IEC 9798 5 is due to Brandt et al 87 Early versions of the ISO IEC 9798 3 three pass mutual authentication protocol using signatures and nonces were subject to interleaving attacks see for example 179 The mutual authentication mechanism based on asymmetric encryption is known as the Helsinki protocol An earlier version of this protocol was shown to be flawed by Horng and Hsu 202 and subsequently fixed in 419 Interestingly the flaw and the fix mirror the changes proposed after similar problems were identified in a Needham and Schroeder protocol by Lowe 384 385 If the asymmetric encryption function in use has the non malleability property see for example 46 then the hash codes do not need to be included in messages M and M of the Helsinki protocol 810 7 The problem of initialising personal devices is discussed by Stajano and Anderson in 494 495 For a general guide to manual authentication see 166 168 The current version of ISO IEC 9798 6 the first CD 293 contains a total of four different manu
170. uk acts en 2000en07 htm 186 Government of the United States of America Electronic Signa tures in Global and National Commerce Act 2000 Available from http frwebgate access gpo gov cgi bin getdoc cgi dbname 106_cong_bills amp docid f s761e 187 J Grantham A probable prime test with high confidence Journal of Number Theory 72 32 47 1998 188 F Grieu A chosen message attack on the ISO IEC 9796 1 signature scheme In B Preneel editor Advances in Cryptology Eurocrypt 2000 volume 1233 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 70 80 Springer Verlag 2000 189 L C Guillou and J J Quisquater A practical zero knowledge proto col fitted to security microprocessor minimizing both trasmission and memory In C G G nther editor Advances in Cryptology Euro crypt 88 volume 330 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science pages 123 128 Springer Verlag 1988 190 L C Guillou M Ugon and J J Quisquater Cryptographic authen tication protocols for smart cards Computer Networks 36 437 451 2001 191 S Haber and W Stornetta How to time stamp a digital document Journal of Cryptography 3 2 99 111 1991 192 S Haber and W Stornetta Secure names for bit strings In Proceed ings of the 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security pages 28 35 ACM Press 1997 193 N Haller RFC 1760 The S KEY one time password system Internet Engineering Task Force February 1995 194
171. um 165 provides an excellent introduction to this subject 64 CHAPTER 13 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURES Chapter 14 Trusted Third Parties 65 66 CHAPTER 14 TRUSTED THIRD PARTIES 14 1 Definitions and basic properties 14 2 Standards for managing trusted third parties 14 3 TTP requirements 14 4 TTP architectures 14 5 Time stamping authorities 14 6 Digital archiving authorities 14 7 Notes 14 1 14 4 Several standards discuss the management of trusted third parties in some form or another These include e the general ISO IEC guideline on the use of trusted third parties ISO IEC TR 14516 288 which is identical to the International Telecommunication Union recommendation ITU T X 842 330 e the IETF RFC on the management of time stamping authorities IETF RFC 3628 458 which is identical to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute standard ETSI TS 102023 159 e the ANSI standard on PKI policies 14 e and the ISO IEC information security management guidelines ISO IEC 17799 276 The ISO IEC standard on information security management will be discussed in detail in Chapter 16 Some people are uncomfortable with a TTP service provider s obligation to reveal confidential to law enforcement agencies This is a classic example of the debate between civil liberty groups and law enforcement agencies about the use of strong cryptographic primitives by criminals This debate is well documented
172. ve not explicitly stated it it is important to know which domain a user belongs to before attempting to derive their public key This domain will define exactly how to derive the public key from a user s identity However there are also some problems that are intrinsically associated with using identity based cryptography Since a user s public key is defined by their identity the key generation algorithm can no longer be a random process but must be deterministic In order to make this process secure private keys must be generated by a trusted third party that has some extra secret knowledge about the signature scheme This means that the trusted third party has complete control over the key generation process and has access to the private key of all the other entities in the system There is also a problem with revocation Once a private key has been issued for an identity by the trusted third party that private key will be valid forever Hence there must be some extra mechanism in place to inform users if a public key is revoked Online key status discovery protocols as discussed in Section 13 6 of Chapter 13 are particularly useful in this respect Another interesting solution is to derive a public key from a combination of the user s identity and the current 8 7 NOTES 35 date The user will only be able to obtain the associated private key if the TTP that controls key generation will issue that private key to the user hence

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