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MDPU2 ST Ver1.11 - Common Criteria

1. TMalfuncti Attackers may destroy the results of processing performed by the ction TOE Threats TOE Attackers may deactivate the security functions of the TOE T Leak_Forced Attacker may disclose the data Key in EEPROM Following security objectives is used to cope with this threat TOE shall provide protection to the processing results of TOE s TOE Objectives O Malfunction encryption and computation from modification and to the security functions from deactivation caused by environmental stresses The following security functional requirements meet this objective This maintains the secure status of TOE when environmental stress FPT_FLS 1 occurred SER FPT_RCV 4 Automated recovery of TOE when environmental stress occurred If environmental stress occurred TOE itself automatically detects the FPT_PHP3 stress occurrence and executes a reset to TOE itself to maintain the secure status of TOE May 13 2005 52 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 14 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 2 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O Self_Test Self Test intends implementation of maintaining the reliability of the TOE as well as TSF function This security policy maintains the reliability of TSF by performing encryption
2. 12 FeliCa protocol This means the communication protocol ISO IEC 18092 This is the communication protocol to establish a secure channel between the Controller and the TOE and between the TOE and the Card 13 Formal Formal means the expression by a syntax language with restriction of meanings imposed based upon the established mathematical concept 14 IC dntegrated Circuit IC is an electronic component accommodated into a single semiconductor chip and designed to perform processing of various data and or to perform memory function 15 Internal Interface An internal interface connects between the CPU and other blocks in the IC Data Bus Line functions as the internal interface 16 IPL Authentication Mutual authentication necessary in entering to IPL Mode 17 Reader Writer This is an IT product for communication between the controller and the card To accomplish the communication between the controller and the card the reader writer converts the format of data packets of the controller and the card to make transmission and reception of both data packets possible 18 PP Protection Profile PP means a set of security requirements that satisfy the needs of a specific user about a category of TOE independent from its implementation 19 RAM Random Access Memory A volatile type memory device capable of random access to be used internal to the IC and requires supply of electrical power to maintain the data st
3. FTP_ITC 1 1 The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure FTP_ITC 1 2 The TSF shall permit remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel FTP_ITC 1 3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for ZPL Authentication Threats T Access FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification FIA_UID 1 1 The TSF shall allow IPL authentication 1 command on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified FIA_UID 1 2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user FIA_UAU 2 User authentication before any action FIA_UAU 2 1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF mediated actions on behalf of that user FIA_AFL 1 Authentication failure handling FIA_AFL 1 1 The TSF shall detect when a configurable number of unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to ZPL authentication FIA_AFL 1 2 When the specified number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or surpassed the TSF shall perform IPL Lock state Application Note for FIA_AFL 1 Customer specifies number of times of successive failure of IPL mutual auth
4. FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic operation Assignment FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation Assignment SOF basic FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction Assignment FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel Selection SOF basic Assignment FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic operation FCS_COP 1 1 IT Environment shall perform encryption decryption of data in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple Data Encryption Standard Triple DES and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits Triple DES that meet the following FIPS PUB 46 3 1999 October 25 DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD DES and FIPS PUB 81 1980 December 2 DES MODES OF OPERATION FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM 1 1 IT Environment shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm random number generation and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits Triple DES that meet the following none FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM 4 1 IT Environment shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physical overwriting of keys with zero bytes or a different key value that meets the following none i e there is no standard applicable here FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel FTP_ITC 1 1 IT Environment shall provide a communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels an
5. May 13 2005 11 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 TOE Description To facilitate reader s understanding to the requirements on security Chapter 2 provides the description on TOE Target of Evaluation and in addition accesses to the types of product or system For the applicability and the boundary of the TOE description is given as viewed from standpoints in both the physical configuration hardware and firmware as well as interface configuration and the logical configuration IT and security features of the TOE 2 1 Product Type RC S940 IC Chip Scope of TOE Out Scope of TOE 5 mM g Contactless Smart Card Figure 1 Block Diagram of RC S940 IC Chip The product type of the TOE is an IC Chip embedded into the Reader Writer The IC chip refer to Figure 2 Block Diagram of TOE IC chip that is the TOE consists of memories data bus security logic peripheral devices I O interface a dedicated CPU etc Although RF CARD Interface and Inactivated Circuit for future use is implemented in this IC chip they are out scope of TOE in this evaluation As the CPU an original 16 bit CPU is contained in this IC chip As memories ROM EEPROM and SRAM are contained in this IC chip To 16kBytes of ROM the ROM Program for control to the IC chip is stored To 128kBytes of EEPROM cryptographic keys firmware out scope of the TOE
6. decryption tests and self generation test of pseudo random number using FPT_TST 1 TSF testing This security policy also performs self validation to ROM and EEPROM using FDP_SDI 1 Stored data integrity monitoring at the initial start up of the TOE And maintains the TOE in secure conditions with FPT_FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state And FPT_RCV 4 Function recovery provide for secure operation mode in case of Encryption failure Pseudorandom number failure This TOE assumes the following threat Attackers may destroy the results of processing performed by the TOE Attackers may deactivate the security functions of the TOE Following security objectives is used to cope with this threat TOE Threats T Malfunction TOE Objectives O Self Test TOE spali provide protection to TSF and the memories from failures and deactivation The following security functional requirements meet this objective This performs self verification to following items at the time of initial start up of TOE Pseudo random number generation function FPT_TST 1 Encryption decryption function ROM EEPROM This performs checksum and party checking at the time of self verification of TOE This maintains the secure status of TOE when Encryption failure SFR FPT_SDI 1 FPT_FLS 1 i Pseudorandom number failure occurred Automated recovery of TOE when Encryption failure Pseudorandom number failure occu
7. 13 2005 24 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 3 3 Threats In the following the threats to the TOE are described As the TOE may be used in many different environments and use cases nature and value of the data to be protected are not known yet Therefore it is impossible to estimate motivation of attackers and the possible attack potential the TOE has to face Therefore from the start this TOE is just intended to provide a basic protection level i e its security functionality is claimed to be SOF basic and any vulnerabilities shall not be exploitable by attackers possessing a low attack potential 3 3 1 Threats to IC Chip Threats to IC Chip during the operational phases are listed below Expert level is assumed in this ST for the level of attackers who may launch attacks to the TOE This is because knowledge and techniques on the IC Chip are required since the TOE is an IC Chip Dedicated tools are necessary in addition to attack the IC Chip This means that knowledge and techniques for utilization of these tools are also necessary to launch attacks to the TOE For attackers with such levels of knowledge and techniques it is necessary to assume that they will launch attacks to the TOE with a distinct objective such as to gain money It is assumed that the overall attack potential is assumed to be low as the AVA_VLA 2 component is used T Malfunction
8. At the initial start up of the TOE performs CRC check to the ROM At the initial start up of the TOE performs Checksum test or CRC check to EEPROM At the initial start up of the TOE performs CRC check to EEPROM if the firmware is downloaded in EEPROM of TOE Security functional requirements satisfied FPT_TST 1 FDP_SDI 1 FPT_FLS 1 FPT_RCV 4 Protection of internal data Even if the data being written to EEPROM during loading firmware is corrupted Double Buffering protects the integrity of written data Double Buffering detects the corrupted data and restores the data to the state before data writing i e when loading firmware to one buffer fails still the previously loaded firmware in the other buffer will be active By setting One Time Write function to Enable state it is possible to inhibit illegal data write to EEPROM to protect parameters that define the behaviour of the security functions from being modified any further At the time of data write to EEPROM in addition Verify process is performed Security functional requirements satisfied _FDP_SDI 1 FPT_FLS 1 FPT_RCV 4 May 13 2005 44 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 6 2 Assurance Measures In this section the applicable assurance requirements to satisfy EALA assurance requirements in Part 3 of CC as well as the documents to satisfy it are enumerated Table 4 Assurance Measur
9. FPT_RCV 4 FDP_UIT 1 O Data_Acc FIA_UID 1 FIA_UAU 2 FIA_AFL 1 FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACF 1 FMT_SMR 1 FMT_MTD 1 FMT_MSA 1 A FMT_MSA 1 B FMT_MSA 2 FMT_MSA 3 FMT_SMF1 FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 4 FCS_COP 1 FTP_ITC 1 O Prot_Interface FDP_IFF 1 FDP_IFC 1 FCS_COP 1 FTP_ITC 1 FDP_UCT 1 Table 9 Security Objectives Rationale Addressed by TOE Objectives FPT_FLS 1 O Malfunction O Self_Test O InData_Pro FPT_PHP3 O Malfunction O Phys_Protection FPT_TST 1 O Self_Test FDP_IFC 1 O Leak_Protection O Prot_Interface FDP_IFF1 O Leak_Protection O Prot_Interface FDP_ITT 1 O Leak_Protection FPT_ITT 1 O Leak_Protection FPT_RCV4 O Malfunction O Self_Test O InData_Pro FDP_SDI 1 O InData_Pro FCS_COP 1 O Data_Acc O Prot_Interface FCS_CKM 1 O Data_Acc FCS_CKM 4 O Data_Acc FTIP_ITC 1 O Data_Acc O Prot_Interface FDP_UIT 1 O InData_Pro FDP_UCT 1 O Prot_Interface May 13 2005 50 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 10 Security Objectives Rationale continued SFR Addressed by TOE Objectives FIA_UAU 2 O Data_Acc FIA_AFL 1 O Data_Acc FDP_ACC 1 O Data_Acc FDP_ACF 1 O Data_Acc FMT_SMR 1 O Data_Acc FMT_MTD 1 O Data_Acc FMT_MSA 2 O Data_Acc FMT_MSA 3 O Data_Acc FMT_MSA 1 A O Data_Acc FMT_MSA 1 B O Data_Acc FMT_SMEF1 O Data_Acc Table 10 Security Functional Requiremen
10. Layout and Test Mode Protecting Functions of SE3 May 13 2005 66 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFF 1 FDP_ITT 1 and FPT_ITT 1 require TOE to enforce the Data Processing Policy to protect integrity and confidentiality of external and internal communication data SF6 protection of data passing through the interface protects external communication data and SF2 protection for information leakage prevents leakage from internal communication data Therefore this requirement is satisfied FPT_RCV 4 requires TOE to recover to a consistent and secure state from failure This requirement is satisfied by SE1 SE6 SE7 and SE8 SE1 resets TOE when it detects abnormal operating conditions SE6 detects and rejects communication packet if it fails integrity check SE7 provides self test function and enter secure state if it detects failure SE8 provides protection of internal data being written to EEPROM Therefore this SFR is satisfied FDP_SDI1 requires stored data integrity monitoring This requirement is satisfied by SF 6 SE7 and SE8 Details of these SFs are described in FPT_RCV 4 paragraph FDP_UCT 1 and FDP_UIT 1 require TOE to enforce the Data Processing Policy to data exchange for protecting confidentiality and integrity This policy is satisfied by SE6 Protection of data passing through the interface FCS_COP 1 require TOE to perform encr
11. Malfunction due to Environmental Stress Attackers may modify the results of processing performed by the TOE Attackers may deactivate the security functions of the TOE Attackers may modify the processing results of encryption or computation performed by the TOE by applying environmental stresses to the TOE Attackers also may deactivate the security functions of the TOE by applying environmental stresses to the TOE As attacking methods generation of illegal voltage illegal temperature or illegal frequency is assumed T Leak_Forced Forced Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data stored to EEPROM i e cryptographic keys Attackers may disclose the data stored to EEPROM i e cryptographic keys through acquisition and analysis of forcibly leaked information As the attacking methods DFA Differential Fault Analysis i e a method of searching by comparison between the normal and the corrupted data of encryption computation process results is assumed Note The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation T Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage Attackers may disclose the data stored internal to EEPROM i e cryptographic keys Attackers may disclose the data stored internal to EEPROM ie cryptographic keys during encryption or computation processes by acquiring and analyzing the inherently May 13 2005 25 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Cor
12. Public Version Version 2 04 Table 2 TOE Security Functional Requirements continued Strength Of Function Component ID Operation F nctons Secure security attribute N A Static attribute initialization Selection Assignment Management of security attributes Selection Assignment Management of security attributes Selection Assignment Specification of Management Functions Assignment Threats T Malfunction T Power_Down FPT_FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state FPT_FLS 1 1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur egal temperature Illegal voltage Illegal frequency Encryption failure Pseudorandom number failure Power failure and communication failure Threats T Malfunction FPT_TST 1 TSF testing FPT_TST 1 1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests that during initial start up to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF Application note for FPT_TST 1 The following self tests are performed Single testing of encryption and decryption during the initial start up using a known Combination of plain text cipher text key Comparison between random numbers of 16 Bytes sequentially generated twice during the initial start up to check whether these two random numbers have different values or not FPT_TST 1 2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data FPT_TST 1 3 The TSF shall prov
13. TE Delivery OE Delivery Table 6 Assumptions Rationale Objectives TOE TOE Environment Addressed by Assumption OE External_Manage A External_Data OE Pers A Priv OE CoSec_Com ACoSec_Com Table 7 Threats Rationale Objectives TOE TOE Environment Addressed by Threats O Malfunction T Malfunction T Leak_Forced O Self_Test T Malfunction O Leak_Protection T Leak_Inherent O Phys_Protection T Phys_Prob O Phys_Protection O Data_Acc T Phys_Manip T Access O Prot_Interface T Monitoring_Data O InData_Pro T Power_Down O Phys_Protection OE External_Manage T Clon OE Delivery TE Delivery May 13 2005 47169 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Adequacy of Assumptions and Security Objectives A External_Data External Data of TOE assumes the necessity of secure handling and management procedures of data to be managed external to TOE OEF External_Manage Management of External TOE data provides such capability within the environment A Priv Abuse by Privileged Users indicates the necessity of assigning the adequately trained and trustworthy personnel to the privileged positions OE Pers Personnel provides such capability within the environment A CoSec_Com Controller Secure Communication indicates the assumption that the controller is equipped with the c
14. Threats T Monitoring Data Attackers may perform the monitoring of transferred data The following security objectives are used to cope with this threat The TOE shall provide protection to the data being transferred on the TOE Objectives O Prot_Interface i R external interface from monitoring The following security functional requirements meet this objective FCS_COP 1 Controls encryption decryption processes of communication data Provides the capability for consistent interpretation of transmitted BIPITe received data Performs the External Data Transfer Protection Policy to provide FDP_UCT 1 F protection to the external data from exposure FDP_IFC 1 This performs the information flow control policy to the secret data This determines whether to accept or abort the data at the time of data FDP_IFF 1 transmission reception May 13 2005 59 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 20 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 9 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O InData_Pro TOE Data Protection intends implementation of providing protection to the integrity of data stored to the TOE This security policy maintains the integrity of communication data by detecting and aborting the corrupted data passing through
15. UART Answer to Reset Cipher Block Chaining Common Criteria Central Processing Unit Cryptographic Data Encryption Standard Differential Fault Analysis Differential Power Analysis Evaluation Assurance Level Electronic Code Book Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM Integrated Circuit Interface Initial Program Loader National Institute of Standards and Technology Protection Profile Random Access Memory Radio Frequency Read Only Memory Strength of Function Simple Power Analysis Static Random Access Memory Security Target TOE Security Functions Target of Evaluation Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter May 13 2005 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation 8 69 RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 This page is intentionally left blank May 13 2005 9 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 1 ST Introduction This is the Security Target for CC evaluation of RC S940 CXD9768GG product Roles to be accomplished by this Security Target during the development and evaluation stages are as described in ISO IEC 15408 CC This Security Target is applicable to this product only 1 1 ST and TOE Identification ST Identification Title of Security Target RC S940 Security Target Version number 2 04 Date of creation May 13 2005 ST Author Sony Corporation TOE Identification Product name
16. attributes and TSF data SE5 mutual authentication satisfy this policy FMT_SMR 1 is also satisfied by SF 5 because security roles are maintained by mutual authentication As a result FMT_SME 1 specification of above management functions is satisfied by SE5 May 13 2005 67 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 TOE s assurance measures detailed in Assurance Measures section page 43 demonstrates that reference to TOE Security Assurance Requirements section page 36 is done by such assurance measures The selection of SFRs Security Functional Requirements and SARs Security Assurance Requirements is performed based upon the security targets for the TOE and the security environment as well as the threats against them Thus this ST Security Target provides the evidence for the security functions capability to cope with all the threats launched against the TOE in collaboration with the assurance measures This TOE is the product intending the operation for commercial use as described in Claims on TOE Strength of Function Rationale page 63 of this document For the operation for commercial use the security under the operating environment shall be maintained and assured by the security functions installed to the TOE This TOE is the product intending operation for commercial use and because of this the TOE is required to comply with SOF Strength Of Fun
17. data TOE Objectives O Leak_Protection from leakage of information The following security functional requirements meet this objective FDP_IFC 1 This performs the information flow control policy to the secret data This performs the information flow control policy to the internal FDP_IFF 1 ae transmitting data FDP_ITT 1 This prevents exposure of user data at the time of user data transfer FPT_ITT1 This prevents exposure of TSF data at the time of TSF data transfer May 13 2005 55 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 17 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 5 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O Phys_Protection Physical Protection intends implementation of providing protection to the integrity and the confidentiality of TOE s IC chip and the data on Data Bus This security policy maintains the integrity and the confidentiality of data by automatic detection by FPT_PHP3 Resistance to physical attack when physical attack was launched This TOE assumes the following threat T Phys_Prob Attackers may disclose the data in the IC chip or in the TOE T Phys_Manip Attackers may disclose the data in the IC chip or in the TOE Attackers may create clones of the TOE itself of the security TOE Threats T Clh i
18. denied 2 If the TOE is in IPL Locked state firmware download is denied Application Note for FDP_ACC 1 and FDP_ACF 1 Access Control Policy defines the object usage rules i e rules applicable to the subjects that use the objects Thus only the personnel who satisfy the conditions defined in this policy is capable to use this function FMT_SMR 1 Security roles FMT_SMR 1 1 The TSF shall maintain the role of administrator FMT_SMR 1 2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles FMT_MSA 2 Secure security attributes FMT_MSA 2 1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security attributes FMT_MTD 1 Management of TSF data FMT_MTD 1 1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the IPL authentication key and IPL execution key to administrator FMT_MSA 3 Static attribute initialization FMT_MSA 3 1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy to provide restrictive default values for security attributes used to enforce the SFP FMT_MSA 3 2 The TSF shall allow the following authorized roles none to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created May 13 2005 37 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Application Note for FMT_MSA 3 The TOE cannot create new objects The only object is the firmware which is update during download operation The access cond
19. eE Eeee aE NSE AEn SARA OE apr A oR Ean a oea asee SRR 24 Ta L Physical Assuming E E beaba hd standby eb kdl ians 24 3 2 2 Personnel ASSUMmpt NS i iai cssssiassvevescssesasesedivelsstusveesdevlesdovessdevsits cesinuestesveass aciduversdsvsbinaantiavasecusbessctiabnteeds 24 3 23 C OMMECE VILY A SSUIMIPUIOM E E eo eavausevesseaeoucduesdse ENANS 24 Dee TMCS E AAEE T REEE EOE EE N eae O 25 Foke Threats to ICA sais aE ERE TAON 25 Fah ieas OROM Progra agiia Aa A 27 3 3 3 Threats Assumed to Environment sesees esssesesetesssssssrtesesssssstestssssssrtetteesssrtettsssnsrtettsnsserreessssnsrreetsessserent 27 3 4 Organizational Security PONIES eeii Teen rer E TE AEN REE TETTEN 28 A Sec rity Objectives siennes nerenin ENERE NEAN EE EEA NEE SEEE EEEE NEEE 29 4 1 Security Objectives for the FOE aini nicin na EESTE ANE SSASSN EASIEST SA SEAE Neasa 29 4 1 1 Security Objectives for the IC Chip nisnin ananin niaii iias 29 4 1 2 Security Objectives for the ROM Program cecscesesesseessscsessesssssesseesesseesessesseessssssssussneessenesseeneesees 30 4 2 Security Objectives for the Environment ccsesesseessseescseesnesesscssesneesessessesasesesssesesssesssssssssuesnsssesneeseenes 31 3 FP SOCUPITY IREGUITEMICIS sinsin n A A A AAA EARE AEE 32 5 TOE Security Requirements i oisi ATEA aen TASET STEATE Eai oea seeduscbsest 32 5 1 1 TOE Security Functional Requirements e ssssesseesssesesstestssesssseetessssntetesesssneetesrsssneettees
20. hints give in the guidance documentation see assumption A Priv May 13 2005 21 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 7 Intended Usage It is assumed that RC S940 will be used in the form of a reader Writer product manufactured utilizing the IC Chip including the TOE as well as the other components Because of this be careful that the following paragraphs describe the TOE s usage where the components are included that out of scope the TOE Customers are able to create the firmware to be downloaded to EEPROM of the IC Chip The firmware can be created utilizing the Sony provided library The firmware created utilizing this library is categorized into RC S940 Reader Writer Standard Firmware and Firmware developed by Customer Firmware developed by Customer is the firmware developed and created by the customers The firmware created in conformance with the specific purpose can be used after downloading it from the controller to EEPROM in the IC Chip and re starting the IC Chip With this it is possible to accomplish the TOE operation as a system or as a unit that provides the secure communication utilizing mutual authentication as well as data encryption Be careful that however the firmware out of scopes the TOE The list below shows an example of operation as a system or a unit provided by the methods described above Transp
21. in Figure 1 that are out scope of TOE because they are not activated in IPL Mode The TOE has the interface with these blocks and that is Data Bus Interface Communication Interface The Communication interface of TOE is realized by commands passing through the UART interface May 13 2005 18 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 6 Life cycle of IC Chip The life cycle of the TOE covers steps from the IC development to manufacturing factory The TOEP s life cycle consists of Process 1 to Process 4 Be careful that Process 5 to Process 9 constitutes the life cycle of the IC Chip including the TOE The table below shows life cycle of the TOE Firmware Customer s own application which would be downloaded into the EEPROM through IPL Function is out scope of the TOE Process 2 Process 1 Preparation generation of IPL Keys Designing the IC chip and ROM Program and Firmware option Location IC manufacturing factory Process 4 IC chip Manufacture 7 Process 7 IC Installing Case A Download Key Case B Download Key and Firmware e Process 8 TOE Delivery be s Process 9 TOE Delivery Case A IC Chip with Key Wooo IR 8 on De ee aa Location Customer May 13 2005 19 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 The internal delivery processes 3 5
22. the IC Chip ROM 16kB ROM built in the IC Chip ROM program stored in the ROM EEPROM 128kB 64kB x 2 EEPROM built in the IC Chip A part of data cryptographic keys and security function active data stored in the EEPROM Firmware out scope of the TOE stored in the EEPROM Security Logic The security logic contains a cipher co processor Triple DES random number generation function and detect function illegal voltage detect function illegal frequency detect function illegal temperature detect function Peripheral Equipment Peripheral equipment contains a timer interrupt controller reset controller and clock gear May 13 2005 16 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 4 ROM Program of TOE TOE starts up the program stored to the internal ROM at the time of power ON or reset After performed a sequence of processes such as initialization self test for security function EEPROM status checking the ROM program acquires the terminal status to determine its operating mode Execution of operations in IPL Mode and STOP Mode is performed by the ROM program Initialization After the power ON the ROM program performs initialization of the hardware for example a initialization of internal registers and b initialization of SRAM area Power ON Self Test TOE executes Power ON Self Test i e one of the security functions If the result o
23. the communication routes using FDP_SDI 1 Stored data integrity monitoring and FDP_UIT 1 Data exchange integrity And maintains the TOE in secure conditions with FPT_FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state And FPT_RCV 4 Function recovery provide for secure operation and automated recovery in case of Power failure This TOE assumes the following threat Attackers may destroy the data written to the TOE This threat includes the destruction of data resulted from unintentional accident The following security objective is used to cope with this threat TOE shall provide protection to the data internal to TOE from destruction and failure of data writing The following security functional requirements meet this objective TOE Threats T Power_Down TOE Objectives O InData_Pro FDP_SDI 1 Performs monitoring of memory data This maintains the secure status of TOE when Power failure occurred FPT_RCV 4 Automated recovery of TOE when Power failure occurred Performs detection of modified communication data when it is received FPT_FLS 1 FDP_UIT 1 May 13 2005 60 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Adequacy of IT Environment Security objectives and Security Function Requirements Table 21 Adequacy of the security objectives for IT environment and SFR 1 The relationship between the security objectives for IT
24. with the secure delivery procedures in Process 9 Roles and Responsibilities of Personnel IC developer IC developer is responsible for design work of the IC and development of the ROM program for the IC at the site of IC development manufacturer in which physical security measures are provided IC developer is the personnel to whom the authorities to perform design development and related jobs in the site of IC development manufacturer in which physical security measures are provided IC Manufacturing factory The IC manufacturing factory is responsible for manufacturing IC chip TOE at the IC manufacturing factory in which physical security measures are provided Manufacturing factory The Manufacturing factory is responsible for the installation of the key and firmware option Delivery personnel company The delivery personnel company are responsible for delivery of the IC chip blank chip from the IC manufacturing factory to the manufacturing factory and b delivery of the IC chip contain key and firmware from the manufacturing factory to the customer Customer also called Administrator The customer is responsible for receiving the TOE and TOE operation after TOE delivery Firmware Developer Customer or IC developer The firmware developer is responsible for developing firmware running on the TOE in Normal Mode The firmware must be developed by a trustworthy developer that observes the requirements and
25. DV_HLD 2 Included ADV_LLD 1 Included AGD_ADM 1 and AGD_USR 1 Both included 64 69 May 13 2005 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 8 2 5 Claims on TOE Strength Of Function Rationale As stated in the TOE Environment this TOE is a product intended for use where a basic security level is sufficient This is consistent with the choice of SOF basic Furthermore SOF basic is consistent with the choice of AVA_VLA 2 because both of them meanrestance against attackers possessing a low attack potential 8 2 6 Mutual Support between Security Requirements As shown in TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale page 48 of this document and in TOE Security Assurance Requirements Rationale page 61 of this document the selection of the security requirements can be said as reasonable Selection of SFRs Security Functional Requirements and SARs Security Assurance Requirements is performed based upon various assumptions regarding the threats to TOE and Security Environment as well as the security target SARs Security Assurance Requirements are appropriate for the assurance level of EALA EAL4 provides the security in the commercial level Claims of SOF Strength Of Function in addition are appropriate for the assurance level of EAL4 May 13 2005 65 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Ta
26. Functional Requirements Operation Strength of Functions Functional Component ID FPT_FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state Assignment FPT_PHP3 Resistance to physical attack Assignment SOF basic FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control Assignment FDP_IFF 1 Simple security attribute Assignment FDP ITT 1 Basic internal transfer protection Selection Assignment FPT_ITT 1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection Selection FDP_SDI 1 Stored data integrity monitoring Assignment FPT_RCV4 Function recovery Assignment FDP_UIT 1 Data exchange integrity Selection Assignment FDP_UCT 1 Basic data exchange confidentiality Selection Assignment FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic operation Assignment FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation Assignment SOF basic FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction Assignment FPT_TST 1 TSF testing Selection Assignment FTIP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel Selection SOF basic Assignment FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification Assignment SOF basic FIA_UAU 2 User authentication before any action N A SOF basic FIA_AFL 1 Authentication failure handling Assignment FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control Assignment FDP_ACE 1 Security attribute based access control Assignment FMT_SMR 1 Security roles Assignment FMT_MTD 1 Management of TSF data Selection Assignment May 13 2005 32 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target
27. PA to protect the confidentiality of the data internal to EEPROM i e cryptographic keys T Leak_Forced Forced Information Leakage is the threat intending disclosure of the data internal to EEPROM cryptographic keys O Malfunction Protection against Malfunction copes with this threat This security objective protects the confidentiality of data internal to EEPROM cryptographic key by protecting TOE s processing results of encryption or computation by detecting the environmental stress to TOE and performing the procedure to prevent occurrence of illegal operation T Phys_Prob Physical Probing and T Phys_Manip Physical Manipulation is the threat intending disclosure and manipulation of data in the IC Chip or on Data Bus of TOE O Phys_Protection Physical Protection is used to cope with this threat These security objectives protects the confidentiality and integrity of data stored to ROM using Tamper Resistance Layout and Test Mode Protecting Functions that make the analysis of data difficult even if any physical attack against TOE is launched by an attacker May 13 2005 48 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 T Power_Down Power Down is the threat intending destruction of data being written to the TOE In addition this threat includes destruction of data resulted from unintentional accidents O InData_Pro TOE Data Protection is used to cope with this threat Thes
28. RC S940 Product code CXD9768GG Version Ver 4 ROM ver 3 Mask set ver 3 Product IC chip for the reader writer Guidance documentation RC S940 Operation Guideline Version 1 1 February 20 2004 RC S940 IPL Users Manual Version 1 0 March 4 2004 RC S940 Administrator Tools Manual Version 1 0 February 19 2004 CC identification TSO15408 standard Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation CC ST created by Sony Corporation Evaluation body TUV Informationstechnik GmbH evaluation body Certification body Bundesamt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik May 13 2005 10 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S9 40 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 1 2 ST Overview The Target of Evaluation TOE the RC S940 CXD9768GG Ver 4 ROM ver 3 Mask set ver 3 is a platform IC Chip dedicated for Reader Writer for application in transportation systems distribution systems a commodities selling financial systems and site security The IC Chip provides security functionality for a secure download of firmware to the EEPROM and for secure communication between the controller and the IC Chip The product is developed and designed by Sony In this security target the TOE is described and a summary specification is given The security environment of the TOE is also defined The assets are identified which have to be protected through the security policy The threats against these asse
29. RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Control number 9768 ST E02 04 Date of issue May 13 2005 Sony Corporation May 13 2005 FeliCa Business Center Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 This page is intentionally left blank May 13 2005 1 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table of Contents ESE Miroi On aea e A A A aA a E a A A E A A E 10 TILST atid TOETU Ncn ON a A AE EA AEA E A 10 12S FOVENIEW e a a Si E a a esau EA A A EA aN 11 1 3 CC Conformance e Aa EE AANE AE EE EEA AEE AEE A 11 E AEE O E EE E AE E E E 11 2 TOE Deseripu Ome s cosh aiid utah cstatstateueashaabdots desesuesbt a aa aa a SE A AS 12 2 1 Product Types ienesis e E E EREE EA AAE T 12 PADEN To 0 A0 LO DEAE E RTE A E ET E E EE 14 DD Hardware Ob TOB nsis aoinne ai A A AR R A R A A RE aa 16 2 3 BIOCK DA it crisis wick ed crdods E e A AE A Ra 16 2 3 2 F nctonal Blocksof TOE mennan a a 16 ZA ROM Progra of TOE iraire irena REEE IEEE RaR 17 23 Interface of the TOE eraran A A ENTE NAA E EAA E AA 18 2 6 Life cycle of IC ACI Ip idinon ii aaa E AEE TE E EE A EEES 19 27 tended USATE a a a A a e a a a a E 22 Se POE SSCUNIEY Enne aara Ra E TS 23 JLA SSES nioi n a a E e a a R a E t 23 3 1 12 Primary Assets Of R O DEE EEEE AEAEE EOE EEE 23 3 2 ASSUMP ONS tissu nearne e E aeon
30. TOE External environment stored external TOE data key information and firmware must be controlled for confidentiality and integrity according to the owner s needs The personnel and systems in charge of this information are responsible for the maintenance of its required security Personnel Non IT environment shall provide the secure management and manipulation of data outside the TOE For example non IT environment an administrator IC designer developer IC manufacturer delivery personal Administrator and firmware developer shall provide the capability to perform secure management and manipulation of data outside the TOE The firmware developer shall design firmware to meet guidance documentation OE Delivery Delivery procedures Non IT environment shall provide the secure delivery procedure of TOE For example non IT environment delivery procedure shall provide the capability to perform the secure delivery of TOE The delivery selects specific transporters that perform transportation of the TOE And the delivery attaches seals to the package of the TOE May 13 2005 31 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 5 IT Security Requirements 5 1 TOE Security Requirements 5 1 1 TOE Security Functional Requirements The claimed minimum strength of functions level for the TOE security functional requirements is SOF basic Table 1 TOE Security
31. TOE Security Assurance Requirements Dependencies Table 24 Security Assurance Requirements Dependencies Depends on Satisfied by ACM_AUT 1 ACM_CAP3 Included as ACM_CAP4 ACM_CAP4 ACM_SCP1 Included as ACM_SCP 2 ALC_DVS 1 Included ACM_SCP2 ACM_CAP3 Included as ACM_CAP4 ADO_DEL 2 ACM_CAP3 Included as ACM_CAP4 ADO_IGS 1 AGD_ADM 1 Included ADV_FSP2 ADV_RCR 1 Included ADV_HLD 2 ADV_FSP 1 and ADV_RCR 1 Both included as ADV_FSP 2 ADV_IMP 1 ADV_LLD 1 Included ADV_RCR 1 Included ALC_TAT 1 Included ADV_LLD 1 ADV_HLD 2 Included ADV_RCR 1 Included ADV_RCR 1 Non N A ADV_SPM 1 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 AGD_ADM 1 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 AGD_USR 1 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 ALC_DVS 1 Non N A ALC_LCD 1 Non N A ALC_TAT 1 ADV_IMP 1 Included ATE_COV 2 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 ATE_FUN 1 Included ATE_DPT 1 ADV_HLD 1 Included as ADV_HLD 2 ATE_FUN 1 Included ATE_FUN 1 Non N A ATE_IND 2 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 AGD_ADM 1 and AGD_USR 1 Both included ATE_FUN 1 Included AVA_MSU 2 ADO_IGS 1 Included ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 AGD_ADM 1 and AGD_USR 1 Both included AVA_SOF 1 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 ADV_HLD 1 Included as ADV_HLD 2 AVA_VLA 2 ADV_FSP 1 Included as ADV_FSP 2 A
32. _CAP4 Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_SCP 2 Problem tracking CM coverage ADO_DEL 2 Detection of modification ADO_IGS 1 Installation generation and stat up procedures ADV_FSP2 Fully defined external interfaces ADV_HLD 2 Security enforcing high level design ADV_IMP 1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_LLD 1 Descriptive low level design ADV_RCR 1 Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_SPM 1 Informal TOE security policy model AGD_ADM 1 Administrator guidance AGD_USR 1 User guidance ALC_DVS 1 Identification of security measures ALC_LCD 1 Developer defined life cycle model ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools ATE_COV 2 Analysis of coverage ATE_DPT 1 Testing High level design ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample AVA_MSU 2 Validation of analysis AVA_SOF 1 Strength Of TOE security functional evaluation AVA_VLA 2 Independent vulnerability analysis May 13 2005 39 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 5 2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment The security requirements for the IT environment are extracted out of the requirements in Part 2 of CC All the requirements stated here define the security requirements for TSF environment not for TSF itself by replacing the term TSF with the term IT environment Table 3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment re EET
33. alidation of analysis Analysis Document AVA_SOF 1 Strength Of TOE security functional evaluation Strength of Functions Document AVA_VLA 2 Independent vulnerability analysis May 13 2005 Vulnerability Analysis Document FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 7 PP Claims There is no PP Protection Profile to which this ST conforms 7 1 PP Reference None 7 2 PP Tailoring None 7 3 PP Additions None May 13 2005 46 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 8 Rationale 8 1 Security Objectives Rationale This section certifies that a the security objectives for TOE and the security objectives for environment are adequately selected and b they correctly correspond with all the identified threats and the Assumptions Table 5 Security Protection Rationale Assumption Threats Addressed by Objectives TOE TOE Environment A External_Data OE External_Manage A Priv OE Pers A CoSec_Com OE CoSec_Com T Malfunction O Malfunction O Self_Test T Leak_Inherent O Leak_Protection T Leak_Forced O Malfunction T Phys_Prob O Phys_Protection T Phys_Manip O Phys_Protection T Access O Data_Acc T Monitoring_ Data O Prot_Interface T Power_Down O InData_Pro T Clon O Phys_Protection OE External_Manage
34. and 6 are manufacturer internally only and are not meant to be the delivery according to CC class ADO The TOE is delivered to the customer in processes 8 TOE Delivery IC Chip and 9 TOE Delivery Key Location IC developer Responsible Personnel IC developer Process 1 Designing the IC chip Process 2 Preparation generation of IPL Keys and Firmware option Contents In Processes 1 design of the IC chip is performed in locations under the security management in the development security environment In Process 2 in addition preparation generation of IPL Keys are performed In the case of firmware installed model of TOE the reader writer firmware is developed under the security management environment by Firmware Developer Location Responsible Personnel IC developer and IC manufacturing factory Items to be delivered Hardware design and ROM program Process 3 Internal Delivery Design Information Contents After the completion of design development processes hardware design information and ROM program are delivered to the IC manufacturing factory with the secure delivery procedures in Process 3 Location IC manufacturing factory Responsible Personnel IC manufacturer Process 4 IC chip Manufacture Contents In Process 4 the IC chip TOE is manufactured using hardware information and ROM program supplied from the IC developer Location Responsible Personnel Delivery personnel company Items
35. apability for a secure communication OE CoSec_Com Controller Secure Communications address these assumptions They ensure the controller device and the card device capable of establishing and using such a link Adequacy of threats and security objectives T Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress is the threat intending modification of TOE s processing results as well as deactivation of the security functions O Malfunction Protection against Malfunction copes with this threat These security objectives protect TOE s processing results of encryption or computation by detecting the environmental stress to TOE and performing the procedure to prevent occurrence of illegal operation O Self_Test TSF Self Test is also used to cope with this threat This security objectives maintains the operation and the functions of TOE and TSF by performing self tests for TOE s memories and encryption decryption functions as well as pseudo random number generation T Leak_Inherent Inherent Information Leakage is the threat intending disclosure of the data internal to EEPROM cryptographic keys _O Leak_Protection Protection against Inherent Information Leakage copes with this threat This security objective protects the confidentiality of data internal to EEPROM by converting the leaked information into non beneficial information form As the method of protection from inherent information leakage TOE shall be equipped with the security functions against SPA D
36. bing when stored or while being processed by the TOE SE3 supports the correct and secure operation of all other security functions and is effective in all operational modes permitted after TOE delivery Security functional requirements satisfied FPT_PHP 3 May 13 2005 41 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 SF4 Encryption of data To perform the encryption of communication data CRYPTO Engine and Pseudorandom Number Generator provide support to the encryption as well as the generation of pseudo random numbers Note The functionality of SF4 Pseudo random number generation and DES engine described in the following is limited to the operation of the TOE in IPL mode SF4 1 CRYPTO Engine CRYPTO Engine performs encryption decryption processes of communication data using the pseudo random numbers generated by Pseudorandom Number Generator Generation of this pseudo random number conforms to the following standards A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Applications except 2 6 Discrete Fourier Transform Spectral Test NIST Special Publication 800 22 with revisions dated May 15 2001 Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme AIS Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators AIS 20 Version 1 as of 1999 12 02 SF4 2 Cipher system supporte
37. ble to transmit and receive the objects in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure Application Note for FDP_UIT 1 and FDP_UCT 1 Thus these transferred data are addressed in Data Processing Policy defined in FDP_IFC1 1 FCS_COP 1 Cryptographic operation FCS_COP 1 1 The TSF shall perform encryption decryption of data in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple Data Encryption Standard Triple DES and cryptographic key size 112 bits Triple DES that meet the following FIPS PUB 46 3 1999 October 25 DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD DES and FIPS PUB 81 1980 December 2 DES MODES OF OPERATION May 13 2005 35 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation FCS_CKM 1 1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm internal random number generation and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits Triple DES that meet the following AIS20 Functionality Class K2 strength of mechanism medium FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction FCS_CKM 4 1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physical overwriting of keys with a different value by key update function that meets the following none i e there is no standard applicable here FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel
38. ction basic 8 4 PP Claims Rationale None May 13 2005 68 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 May 13 2005 69 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation
39. d Triple DES Cipher system For the mutual authentication in IPL mode between TOE and the controller a secure communication is achieved using Triple DES cipher system in which a 112 bit key is used Secure communication in IPL mode between TOE and the controller is achieved using Triple DES cipher system The mode of operation is CBC mode SF4 3 Processes supported The pseudo random number is used for encryption decryption processes of the communication data and as the data for noise generation as the countermeasures against DPA Security functional requirements satisfied FCS_CKM 1 FCS_COP 1 May 13 2005 42 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 SE5 SF6 6 1 2 Security Functions of ROM Program Mutual authentication This is the authentication function for prevention of illegal access SF5 1 IPL mutual authentication IPL mutual authentication is performed between the controller and TOE when the administrator who knows IPL authentication key executed IPL mutual authentication from the terminal to which the controller is connected During IPL mutual authentication the confidentiality of communication data on the interface is protected by Triple DES cipher system This is also true for the case of communication data after successful IPL mutual authentication SF 5 2 IPL Lock Function In this IPL mode IPL Lock function is activated to prevent illega
40. d provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure FTP_ITC 1 2 IT Environment shall permit remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted channel FTP_ITC 1 3 IT Environment shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for ZPL authentication May 13 2005 40 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 6 TOE Summary Specification 6 1 TOE Security Functions SE1 SE2 SE3 This section describes the TOE security functions that satisfy the security functional requirements enumerated in Chapter 5 The claimed minimum strength of functions level for the TOE security functions is SOF basic The security functions based on permutational or probabilistic mechanisms are SF3 the Tamper Resistance Layout part of SF3 SF4 1 SF4 2 SF4 3 SF5 1 and SF6 The encryption decrypt part of SF4 2 and entire SF6 are purely based on cryptographic mechanisms encrypt of arbitrary plain texts and therefore do not have to be SOF rated The claimed minimum strength of function for the remaining ones SF3 pseudo random number part of SF4 1 SF4 3 and SF5 1 is SOF basic For rating of SF4 1 and SF4 3 the corresponding requirements from AIS20 Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators Version 1 1999 12 02 will be applied with a targe
41. e security objectives protects the integrity of data internal to TOE using Roll Back to maintain the data in a state before it is written to the memory even if the data processing is interrupted during data writing to TOE As the method of protection check sum and parity check of external communication data verify at the time of data write or Rollback function is assumed T Access Invalid Access is the threat intending disclosure and modification of data internal to TOE O Data_Acc Data Access Control is used to directly cope with this threat These security objectives protect the confidentiality of data internal to TOE by performing the operation defined in Access Control Policy As the method of protection Authentication and Identification functions are assumed T Monitoring_Data Monitoring Data is the threat intending the disclosure of transferred data O Prot_Interface Protection Interface is used to cope with this threat These security objectives protect the confidentiality of TOE data by encrypting TOE data passing through the interface As the method of protection encryption of transferred data is assumed T Clon Cloning is the threat intending clone creation of TOE itself a part of TOE security functions or a part of security functions O Phys_Prot Physical Protection is used to cope with this threat These security objectives protects the integrity of data internal to ROM using Tamper Resistance Layout and Test Mode Protecti
42. ed May 13 2005 29 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 4 1 2 Security Objectives for the ROM Program O Data_Acc Data Access Control TOE shall provide protection to the data internal to TOE from illegal access As the method of protection from illegal access TOE shall be equipped with the security functions to provide protection to the integrity and the confidentiality of data internal to TOE As the method of protection Authentication and Identification functions are assumed O Prot_Interface Protection Interface The TOE shall provide protection to the external communication data being transferred on the external interface from monitoring As the countermeasures against monitoring the TOE shall be equipped with the security functions to provide protection to the secrecy of the data being transferred on the external interface As the method of protection encryption of transferred data is assumed OSelf_Test Self Test TOE shall provide protection to the data stored in the TOE from unauthorized modification and to TSF from failures and deactivation As the method of protection to the integrity of the stored data in the TOE and protection to TSF from failures and deactivation TOE shall be equipped with the functions to perform self validation to ROM EEPROM encryption decryption of communication data and generation of pseudo random numbers at the time
43. ed FMT_SMF 1 Included FMT_MSA 1 B FDP_ACC lor FDP_IFC 1 Both included FMT_SMR 1 Included FMT_SMF 1 Included FMT_MSA 2 ADV_SPM 1 Included FDP_ACC lor FDP_IFC 1 Both included FMT_MSA 1 A FMT_MSA 1 B Both Included and FMT_SMR 1 FMT_MSA 3 FMT_MSA 1 A FMT_MSA 1 B Both included and FMT_SMR 1 May 13 2005 62 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 FMT_SMF 1 Non N A Unsatisfied dependencies for FPT_AMT 1 The TOE is already the lowest platform There is no lower underlying abstract machine used by the TOE which can be tested There is no need to perform testing according to FPT_AMT 1 and the dependency in the requirement FPT_TST 1 is therefore considered to be satisfied 8 2 3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements Rationale The assurance level for this TOE is EALA With the embedment of this TOE to the carrier the TOE is the product installed with the security functions possible to be used for operations in various commercial purposes Thus the evaluation assurance level of EALA i e a reasonably high level in commercial area is regarded as appropriate for this TOE as it is providing evaluation of sufficient design detail low level design and implementation subset and an independent vulnerability analysis May 13 2005 63 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 8 2 4
44. eniai nirani iea reaa iar Tas EE EAEAN RAAST E Enea ER RAAE NEEN 50 8 2 1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale sseeesseesssssesreestssssertesesssssrtestsssssrrertsnsserreeessnesteees 50 8 2 2 TOE Security Functional Requirements Dependencies 0 eeseesesseesssstesscsseestssesessesnessesnssseeneeseensese 62 8 2 3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements Rationale seesssseseseesscsecncssesssesesaeesesasesessesssseseseesseaes 63 8 2 4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements Dependencies cccecseesesseessssessscsseesssstessssesssstssssseenseseeneese 64 8 2 5 Claims on TOE Strength Of Function Rationale we ccs essescessssssessesseesesseesssssessssssssnessesseeneeseeneese 65 8 2 6 Mutual Support between Security Requirements 00 0 0 cscs eesessesseseessesseesesseeseessesssuesssssessssseeneeseensese 65 8 3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale cece esessessesseessssesessssesesnsssesnsesesasesesseesessesssnessssnesnesseeneesees 66 84 PP Clams Ratones 68 May 13 2005 3 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 List of Tables Table 1 TOE Security Functional Requirement ccesessesseesescscssesscssesssssesssesesaesssussssussnsssesnssuesnessesnes 32 Table 2 TOE Security Assurance Requirement essesseesesseessstsssssssscsaeesesasesessessssesseesnsssesses 39 Table 3 Security Requirements for the IT Environment sessesseessesessessesseseeess
45. entication which is then set by IC manufacturer during fabrication In order to disable IPL Lock function data number of times of successive failure of IPL mutual authentication shall be set to 0 May 13 2005 36 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control FDP_ACC 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy on subject administrator objects firmware operations download FDP_ACF 1 Security attribute based access control FDP_ACF 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy to objects based on security attributes subject role administrator unauthenticated user IPL execution key IPL Lock State locked not locked FDP_ACF 1 2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine whether an operation to controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed or not In accordance with Access Control Policy it is possible to perform following operations 1 The administrator is authorized to download firmware 2 An unauthenticated user is not authorized to download firmware FDP_ACF 1 3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules none FDP_ACF 1 4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following rules 1 If the firmware download package has not been created using the IPL Execution key firmware download is
46. environment and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below OE CoSec_Com Controller Secure Communication is provided for the purpose of maintaining secure status of TSF data exchanged and shared between trusted IT products With them establishment of reliable channels between the environment and the TOE becomes possible FCS_COP1 Cryptographic operation provides supports required for the encryption operation in accordance with the specified standards and guidance In addition FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation and FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction provide supports necessary for generation and destruction of encryption keys FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel is used for maintaining the integrity of high reliability channel between TSFs This TOE assumes the following prerequisite TOE It is assumed that a controller can perform establishment of a secure N A CoSec_Com ct Assumption communication channel Following security objectives is used to cope with this prerequisite IT Environment IT environment shall provide secure communication channel for the Security OE CoSec_Com TOE objectives The following security functional requirements meet this objective FCS_COP 1 Performs encryption decryption processes of communication data FCS_CKM 1 Performs generation of encryption key SFR FCS_CKM 4 Performs disposition of the encryption key Provides the capability fo
47. es ACM_AUT 1 Assurance Requirement Name Document Name Development Configuration Partial CM automation ACM_CAP4 Generation support and acceptance procedure ACM_SCP 2 Problem tracking CM coverage Management Document ADO_DEL 2 Detection of modification Delivery Procedure Document ADO_IGS 1 Installation generation and stat up procedure Development Environment Document ADV_FSP 2 Fully defined external interfaces Interface Specifications ADV_HLD 2 Security enforcing high level design Higher Hierarchy Design Document ADV_IMP 1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF Source Code Block Diagram ADV_LLD 1 Descriptive low level design Lower Hierarchy Design Document ADV_RCR 1 Informal correspondence demonstration Development Relationship Diagram ADV_SPM 1 AGD_ADM 1 Informal TOE security policy model Administrator guidance AGD_USR 1 User guidance Security Policy Model document Documents for Administrator use ALC_DVS 1 Identification of security measures Development Environment Document ALC_LCD 1 Developer defined life cycle model Life Cycle Document ALC_TAT 1 Well defined development tools Tool Document ATE_COV 2 Analysis of coverage ATE_DPT 1 Testing High level design ATE_FUN 1 Functional testing ATE_IND 2 Independent testing sample Test Document AVA_MSU 2 V
48. etc are stored To 4kBytes of SRAM area the communication data and the process data are stored as temporary data In addition the security logic Random Number Generator CRYPTO Engine and Illegal Voltage Frequency Temperature sensors and the peripheral devices Timer interrupt controller Clock Gear and Reset Generator are used for maintaining the performance and the security May 13 2005 12 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 The security functions implemented to the IC chip are SF 1 Detection of illegal operation SE2 Protection to information leakage SE3 Physical protection SE4 Encryption of data SE5 Mutual authentication SE6 Protection of data passing through the interface SE7 self test and SE8 Protection of internal data The RC S940 has three operational modes Normal Mode IPL Mode and STOP Mode The Normal Mode allows normal communication with the controller and or card which is executed by firmware stored to EEPROM The IPL Mode is used to download firmware from the controller to RC S940 In this mode it is deactivated communication interface with the card The STOP Mode is entered automatically when for example the internal EEPROM data is damaged The STOP Mode prevents the RC S940 from being used under abnormal conditions All commands except maintenance command cannot therefore be executed The RC S940 also has Test Mode
49. f Power ON Self Test were failed the process after that is not executed and immediately moves to STOP Mode Determination of Operating Mode This function checks the integrity of the whole EEPROM and determines if double buffering see SE8 is activated Furthermore it determines the selected operating mode IPL Mode or Normal Mode and starts the TOE in this mode If an error occurs TOE enters STOP Mode ATR Generation Transmission When TOE started up in IPL Mode ATR Answer To Reset packet is transmitted from TOE to the controller This is the packet to know the internal status IPL STOP or Normal Mode of RC S940 IPL Mode IPL Mode is the operating mode for downloading the firmware to EEPROM internal to RC S940 STOP Mode STOP Mode is the operating mode to enter if any problems were detected that interferes RC S940 from operating Normal Mode Out of scope in this evaluation Normal Mode is the operating mode in which the downloaded reader writer firmware starts up Firmware of IC Chip Out scope of the TOE The firmware downloaded to EEPROM during IPL Mode out of scope the TOE Only the administrator who is privileged by the Controller is able to download the firmware to EEPROM area by establishing the communication with the IC Chip after encrypted mutual authentication and transiting to IPL Mode If the designated operating mode was Normal Mode the process of data is delegated to the firmware stored to EEPROM from the ROM P
50. f the TOE Note The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation Threats T Power_Down May 13 2005 34 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 FPT_RCV4 Function recovery FPT_RCV 4 1 The TSF shall ensure that Illegal temperature Illegal voltage Illegal frequency Encryption failure Pseudorandom number failure Power Failure and Communication Failure scenarios have property that the SF either completes successfully or for the indicated failure scenarios recovers to a consistent and secure state Threats T Power_Down T Monitoring_Data FDP_SDI 1 Stored data integrity monitoring FDP_SDIL1 1 The TSF shall monitor the user data stored to TSC for integrity errors accidental modification or intended unauthorized modification on all objects based on the following attributes checksum and parity of the transmit data CRC check of the ROM and parity check of the writing data to EEPROM FDP_UIT 1 Data exchange integrity FDP_UIT 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to be able to transmit and receive the user data in a manner protected from modification errors FDP_UIT 1 2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data whether modification has occurred FDP_UCT 1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FDP_UCT 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to be a
51. flexibility The interface to be used depends upon the operating environment of the IC Chip Because of this the interface and the firmware for activation of the interface as well as Normal Mode to start up the firmware are determined RF CARD I F and inactivated circuit are physical out scope of TOE Normal Mode operated by Firmware is logical out scope of TOE May 13 2005 14 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 TOE deliverables are summarized in the following table Item Type Item Version Date Form of delivery RC S940 4 BGA Package CXD9768GG RC S940 ROM program Embedded in ROM of RC S940 Documentation OG 1 1 Paper or electronic data RC S940 Operation Guideline February 20 2004 IPL UM 1 0 Paper or electronic data RC S940 IPL User s Manual March 4 2004 ATM 1 0 Paper or electronic data RC S940 Administrator Tools Manual February 19 2004 May 13 2005 15 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 3 Hardware of TOE 2 3 1 Block Diagram Block diagram of the TOE is as shown in Figure 2 below Security Logic Peripheral Equipment Figure 2 Block Diagram of TOE 2 3 2 Functional blocks of TOE Configuration of the functional blocks of TOE are as listed below CPU 16bit CPU with 16Mbytes of linear address space SRAM 4kB SRAM built in
52. for each authentication FDP_IFF 1 3 The TSF shall enforce the none FDP_IFF 1 4 The TSF shall provide the following none FDP_IFF 1 5 The TSF shall explicitly authorize an information flow based on the following rules none FDP_IFF 1 6 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules 1 If the communication data has not been encrypted by transaction key it is denied 2 If the parity of the communication data is not correct it is denied 3 If the checksum of the communication data is not correct it is denied FDP_ITT 1 Basic internal transfer protection FDP_ITT 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy to prevent disclosure of the user data when it is transmitted between physically separated parts of the TOE FPT_ITT 1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection FPT_ITT 1 1 The TSF shall protect TSF data from the disclosure when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE Application Note for FDP_ITT 1 and FPT_ITT 1 Because the Communication data between controller and the TOE is also transferred in the TOE between physically separated parts of the TOE internal transfer protection is required to protect communication data The refor FDP_ITT 1 and FPT_ITT 1 are related to the Data Processing Policy defined in FDP_IFF 1 because both SFRs ensure that this policy is not bypassed even in the case that User or TSF data is transmitted between physically separated parts o
53. functions or of a part of the security functions The following security objectives are used to cope with this threat TOE shall provide protection to the data in IC Chip and on Data Bus of TOE from physical analysis and altering TOE Objectives O Phys_Protection The following security functional requirements meet this objective If Physical Probing and Manipulation occurred TOE itself SFR FPT_PHP3 automatically detects the occurrence of such probing and executes a reset to TOE itself to maintain the secure status of TOE removed May 13 2005 56 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 18 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 7 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O Data_Acc Data Access Control intends implementation of providing protection to the integrity and the confidentiality of data in the TOE Based upon the security attributes enumerated in FDP_ACEF1 Security attribute based access control this security policy sets the basic rule with Access Control SFRs described in FDP_ACC 1 Subset access control In addition this security policy performs authentication of the TOE with FIA_UID 1 Timing of identification and FIA_UAU 2 User authentication before any action and performs management to the security attributes and the roles of
54. ide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code Threats T Malfunction T Phys_Prob amp T Phys_Manip FPT_PHP 3 Resistance to physical attack FPT_PHP 3 1 The TSF shall resist 7 Malfunction Physical Probing and Physical Manipulation to the TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated May 13 2005 33 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Threats T Leak_Inherent T Leak_Forced T Power_Down and T Monitoring_Data FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control FDP_IFC 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy on subjects controller TOE information User Data operation transmit or receive between controller and TOE FDP_IFF 1 Simple security attributes FDP_IFF 1 1 The TSF shall enforce the Data Processing Policy based on the following types of subject and information security attributes transaction key parity and checksum FDP_IFF 1 2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold Subject TOE is allowed to transmit data dedicated for the controller to subject Controller and receive data dedicated for the TOE from the Controller via the UART I F if it holds following rules 1 communication data shall be encrypted by transaction key 2 transaction key shall be changed
55. ins of IC chip ROM Program IPL authentication key and IPL execution key and Security Function Activated data are physical scope of TOE Operation of IPL Mode STOP Mode firmware download function Command Packet data Response Packet data Detection of illegal operation Protection information leakage Physical protection Encryption of data Mutual authentication Protection of data passing through the interface Self Test and Protection of internal data are logical scope of TOE Guidance Documentation is also part of TOE It consists of OG IPL UM and ATM OG RC S940 Operation Guideline Version 1 1 February 20 2004 IPL UM RC S940 IPL User s Manual Version 1 0 March 4 2004 ATM RC S940 Administrator Tools Manual Version 1 0 February 19 2004 These documentations are supplied to customer as administrator guidance and or user guidance OG summarizes the procedures necessary in performing a secure operation of the system utilizing Sony RC S940 that is an IC Chip for the reader writer of contactless card system that comprises to Sony FeliCa specification IPL UM and ATM provides information about security features and usage of RC S940 IPL Mode ATM describes requirement to firmware development The components listed below are out scope of the TOE The reason why these components listed here out scope of the TOE is to expand the radius of operation usage of this IC Chip by giving the customers with some degree of
56. is to the TOE itself Attacking methods of T Phys_Prob and T Phys_Manip is assumed May 13 2005 26 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 3 3 2 Threats to ROM Program Threats during the operational phases to ROM Program of the chip are listed below T Access Invalid Access Attackers may disclose or and modify the data in the TOE This threat assumes that attackers may disclose or modify the data in the TOE by illegally accessing the data in the TOE via the UART interface An attacker impersonating an administrator can illegally modify re write of IPL keys data in the TOE T Monitoring_Data Monitoring Data Attackers may disclose the external communication data Attackers may disclose the data transferred between the TOE and the IT product controller by monitoring the external interface As the attack method monitoring of the transferred data utilizing an analyzer is assumed T Power_Down Power Down Attackers may destroy the external communication data being transferred and or the internal communication data firmware being written to the EEPROM of TOE Attackers also may destroy such data by unintentional accidents By power down to the TOE or to the IT product controller attackers may destroy the data being transferred through external interfaces or the data being written to the EEPROM of TOE As the attack method forced power d
57. iter the carrier is the reader writer itself excluding TOE 3 Contact Smart Card Integrated Circuit Card with contacts 4 Contactless Smart Card Integrated Circuit Card without contacts 5 Controller Controls Reader Writer via UART I F and is part of the host 6 Data Bus This is the signal path used for handling of instructions and or data between each of blocks internal to the IC Chip and under the control of CPU 7 Dependency Dependency means the relationship between the requirements where the requirements of depended side shall be normally satisfied to accomplish the purpose of the requirements of depending side 8 EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory One of non volatile memory technologies that allows erasure and re write of data by electronic methods 9 Environment stress Increasing loads to the environment in which the system operates for example applying abnormal voltage or abnormal temperature to the system 10 Extension or Addition Extension or Addition means to add functional requirements not included in Part 2 of CC and or assurance requirement not included in Part 3 of CC to ST or PP 11 External Interface Device that interfaces between the IC and external devices RF CARD I F is also an external interface UART I F is also an external interface May 13 2005 5 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04
58. itions for this operation is restrictive i e access is only granted when the correct IPL execution key has been used and cannot be changed FMT_MSA 1 A Management of security attributes FMT_MSA 1 1 4 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes IPL execution key to administrator FMT_MSA 1 B Management of security attributes FMT_MSA 1 1 B The TSF shall enforce the Access Control Policy to restrict the ability to clear the security attributes ZPL Locked state to Administrator FMT_SME 1 Specification of Management Functions FMT_SME 1 1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions 1 change the IPL authentication key and IPL execution key 2 release IPL Lock state May 13 2005 38 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 5 1 2 TOE Security Strength of Function Claims The strength of function expected to TOE is SOF Basic in accordance with the recommendation in Part 3 of CC when selected EAL4 5 1 3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements The security assurance level for TOE is EAL4 In the table below the security assurance requirements of EALA extracted from Part 3 of CC are enumerated Table 2 TOE Security Assurance Requirements ACM_AUT 1 Partial CM automation ACM
59. l data access by spoofing an administrator during IPL mode If IPL mutual authentication successively failed this function locks the system and after that execution of IPL mutual authentication is impossible Allowable limit of successive failures of IPL mutual authentication is set up at the time of shipping of TOE Security functional requirements satisfied FIA_UID 1 FIA_UAU 2 FIA_ALF 1 FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACE 1 FMT_SMR 1 FMT_MTD 1 FMT_MSA 1 A FMT_MSA 1 B FMT_MSA 2 FMT_MSA 3 FMT_SME 1 FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 4 FCS_COP 1 FTP_ITC 1 Protection of data passing through the interface External interface used UART I F Communication in IPL mode Communication data during IPL mutual authentication is protected by Triple DES cipher system Communication data after successful IPL mutual authentication is also protected by Triple DES cipher system Parity check is used for checking the communication data packet Checksum is used for checking the communication data Security functional requirements satisfied FCS_COP 1 FDP_SDI 1 FTP_ITC 1 FDP_UIT 1 FDP_UCT 1 FPT_FLS 1 FPT_RCV 4 FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFF 1 May 13 2005 43 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 SE7 SE8 Self Test At the initial start up of the TOE performs self test on pseudo random number generation At the initial start up of the TOE performs self test on encryption decryption functions
60. n data To prevent illegal access to TOE this SFR provides secure FTP_ITC 1 ae communication channel between TOE and controller For execution of and manipulation to codes for memories internal to EDP_ACC1 IC IPL access control policy shall be performed This is also true for execution of and manipulation to all the related functions FDP_ACF1 Based upon IPL access control policy performs execution of and manipulation to IPL mode May 13 2005 58 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 19 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 8 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O Prot_Interface Protection Interface intends implementation of providing protection to the confidentiality of encrypted data passing through the interface with FDP_IFF 1 Simple security attributes based upon the information flow control policy specified by FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control This security policy maintains the confidentiality of data by encrypting the communication data with FCS_COP1 Cryptographic operation And The user data exchanged between TSF with FDP_UCT 1 Basic data exchange confidentiality FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel is used for maintaining the integrity of high reliability channel between TSEs This TOE assumes the following threat TOE
61. ncryption and computation processes from modification and b deactivation of the security functions caused by environmental stresses As the method of protection against environmental stresses TOE shall be equipped with the security functions for protection of a results of data processing internal to TOE i e encryption and computation from modification and b deactivation of the security functions As the method of protection detection of illegal operating condition is assumed O Leak_Protection Protection against Inherent Information Leakage Note The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from leakage of information As the method of protection from information leakage TOE shall be equipped with the security functions to provide protection to the confidentiality of the data internal to EEPROM i e cryptographic keys As the methods of protection countermeasures against SPA DPA are assumed O Phys_Protection Protection against Physical Probing TOE shall provide protection to the data in the TOE from physical probing and manipulation As the method of protection from physical probing and manipulation TOE shall be equipped with the security functions to protect the integrity and the confidentiality of data in the TOE As the method of protection Tamper Resistance Layout and Test Mode Protecting Functions are assum
62. ng Functions that make analysis of data difficult even if any physical attacks were launched to TOE by attackers In addition OF External_Manage Management of External TOE data provides assistance to opposition against this threat With these non IT environment security objectives protection is provided to the data external to TOE Adequacy of Threats and Security Objectives for non IT Environment TE Delivery During attack delivery is the threat intending disclosure and manipulation of TOE OE Delivery Delivery procedure is used to cope with this threat These security objectives for non IT environment protect the integrity and the confidentiality of the TOE itself by performing delivery of TOE with the secure and approved delivery procedures May 13 2005 49 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 8 2 Security Requirements Rationale 8 2 1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale Verifies that the security policy and the security functional requirements are adequately selected and the TOE meets the policy and the requirements above Table 8 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale TOE Objectives Addressed by SFR O Malfunction FPT_PHP3 FPT_FLS 1 FPT_RCV4 OSelf_Test FPT_TST 1 FDP_SDI 1 FPT_FLS 1 FPT_RCV 4 O Leak_Protection FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFF 1 FDP_ITT 1 FPT_ITT 1 O Phys_Protection FPT_PHP 3 O InData_Pro FDP_SDI 1 FPT_FLS 1
63. ng TOE profile key information and the firmware by administrator in databases not associated with the TOE This information could contribute to a cloning attack It is therefore important that the security of such data be adequately maintained 3 2 2 Personnel Assumptions A Priv Abuse by Privileged Users IC designer developer IC manufacturer delivery personal Administrator and firmware developer are assumed to be trustworthy It is assumed that IC designers IC developers IC manufacturers IC delivery personal Administrator and firmware developer who are privileged to operate and to manage the TOE are trained about operate and management of TOE do not perform illegal operate of TOE and keep confidentiality of IC design information ROM program firmware and cryptographic keys It is also assumed that firmware developer designs firmware to meet requirements from guidance documentation 3 2 3 Connectivity Assumption A CoSec_Com Controller Secure Communication It is assumed that the Controller is capable to establish a secure communication channel The controller should have the capability of establishing a secure communication channel with TOE This can be accomplished by mutual authentication and encryption technique Once such a secure channel is established the controller is authenticated and the communication is protected in confidentiality and in integrity The controller is outside the scope of this evaluation May
64. of initial start up As the method of protection Self Test at the time of initial start up is assumed O InData_Pro Internal Data Protection The TOE shall provide protection to the external communication data and the data stored to the TOE from destruction and or failure of data writing As the countermeasures against destruction of external and internal communication data and or failure of data writing to the EEPROM the TOE shall be equipped with the security function to provide protection to the integrity of external and internal communication data from destruction or failure of data writing As the method of protection check sum and parity check of external communication data verify at the time of data write or Rollback function is assumed May 13 2005 30 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 4 2 Security Objectives for the Environment IT Security Target for IT environment OE CoSec_Com Controller Secure Communication IT environment shall provide a secure communication channel to maintain the authenticity with the TOE As the capability of maintaining the authenticity with the TOE the Controller shall provide the mutual authentication and encryption functions Non IT Security Target for IT Environment OE External_Manage Management of External TOE data OE Pers Non IT environment shall provide the secure management to the data external to
65. ored to it 20 RF CARD I F RF is the acronym of Radio Frequency high frequency and RF CARD I F means the radio frequency communication interface RF CARD I F is mainly used for communication with the contactless smart card 21 ROM Read Only Memory This is a non volatile type memory to be used internal to the IC that requires no supply of electrical power to maintain the data stored to it ROM data may be contained one of many photo masks used for IC manufacturing May 13 2005 6 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 22 Semiformal Semiformal means the expression by a syntax language with restriction of defined meanings 23 SOF Basic This is the strength of function level of TOE of which as a result of analysis the functions are recognized to have sufficient resistance against temporary invasions to TOE s security launched by attackers with low level of attack potential 24 SOF Medium This is the strength of function level of TOE of which as a result of analysis the functions are recognized to have sufficient resistance against direct or intentional invasions to TOE s security launched by attackers with medium level of attack potential 25 SOF High This is the strength of function level of TOE of which as a result of analysis the functions are recognized to have sufficient resistance against planned and or organizational invasions to TOE s
66. ort System 1 In the case of using the TOE in transport systems the TOE can be used at the entrance gate or as money depositing new card issuing device in railway stations Transport System 2 In the case of using the TOE in transport systems the TOE can be used as transport fare box or new card issuing device in omnibus in this case TOE equipped carrier is installed in stand alone style Financial System In the case of using the TOE in financial systems the TOE can be used as an ATM or payment device for electronic payment Sales System In the case of using the TOE in sales systems the TOE can be used as payment device for electronic payment at station stands or convenience stores May 13 2005 22 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 3 TOE Security Environment Chapter 3 describes assets assumptions and threats of the TOE viewed from standpoints such as a the environment in which the TOE is intended to use and b various aspects related with security that in what manner the TOE is used in such environment The TOE described in this ST is a product intended for any kind of commercial use where a basic security level is sufficient Note The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation 3 1 Assets Assets that must be protected by TOE are defined as the Primary Assets Primar
67. own to the TOE or to the IT product controller is assumed The power down may occur because of unintentional accidents that result in destruction of data 3 3 3 Threats Assumed to Environment Threats assumed at the time of TOE delivery are as listed below TE Delivery Attacks during delivery Attackers may disclose or manipulate the data in the TOE Attackers may disclose or manipulate the data in the TOE by illegally accessing to the TOE under delivery that is by embedding illegal data to the TOE exchanging with cloned TOE manipulating the data in the TOE or intercepting the information in the TOE As attacking methods spoofing as the delivery personnel of the TOE is assumed May 13 2005 27 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 3 4 Organizational Security Policies None May 13 2005 28 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 4 Security Objectives This chapter describes the security objectives against threats identified in Chapter 3 TOE Security Environment of this document Note The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation 4 1 Security Objectives for the TOE 4 1 1 Security Objectives for the IC Chip O Malfunction Protection against Malfunction TOE shall provide protection to a results of TOE s e
68. poration RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 T Phys_Prob leaking information As attacking methods DPA Differential Power Analysis statistical analysis method of power consumption during encryption or computation processes or SPA Simple Power Analysis analysis method by a single observation of the power consumption graph during encryption or computation processes is assumed Note The reader is reminded that the operation of the TOE in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation Physical Probing Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE Attackers may disclose the data in the TOE through physical attack i e analysis to the TOE itself As attacking methods analysis through direct observation with an electron microscope or an optical microscope and direct electrical measurement is assumed T Phys_Manip Physical Manipulation T Clon Attackers may manipulate the IC chip circuit or the data in the TOE Attackers may manipulate the IC chip circuit or the data on Data Bus of the TOE using the results of physical attack i e analysis to the TOE itself As attacking methods FIB Focused Ion Beam i e a method for manipulating the IC chip circuit and data using ion beam is assumed Cloning Attackers may create clones of the TOE itself of a part of the TOE of the security functions or of a part of the security functions Attackers may create clones of the TOE by physical attack i e analys
69. r consistent interpretation of transmitted FTP_ITC 1 received data May 13 2005 61 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 8 2 2 TOE Security Functional Requirements Dependencies Table 23 Security Functional Requirements Dependencies FPT_FLS 1 ADV_SPM 1 Included FPT_PHP3 Non N A FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFF 1 Included FDP_IFF 1 FDP_IFC land FMT_MSA 3 Included FDP_ITT 1 FDP_ACC lor FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFC 1 included FPT_ITT 1 Non N A FPT_RCV4 ADV_SPM 1 Included FDP_SDI 1 Non N A FDP_UCT 1 FTP_ITC 1 or FTP_TRP 1 FTP_ITC 1 included FDP_ACC 1 or FDP_IFC 1 Both included FDP_UIT 1 FDP_ACC 1 or FDP_IFC 1 Both included FTP_ITC 1 or FTP_TRP 1 FTP_ITC 1 included FCS_COP 1 FDP_ITC 1 or FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 1 included FCS_CKM 4 and FMT_MSA 2 Both included FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 2 or FCS_COP 1 FCS_COP 1 included FCS_CKM4 FDP_ITC 1 or FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 1 included FPT_TST 1 FPT_AMT 1 See unsatisfied dependencies for FPT_AMT 1 on page 63 FTP_ITC 1 Non N A FIA_UID 1 Non N A FIA_UAU 2 FIA_UID 1 Included FIA_AFL 1 FIA_UAU 1 Included as FIA_UAU 2 FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACF 1 Included FDP_ACF 1 FDP_ACC 1 Included FMT_MSA 3 Included FMT_SMR 1 FIA_UID 1 Included FMT_MTD 1 FMT_SMR 1 Included FMT_SMEF 1 Included FMT_MSA 1 A FDP_ACC lor FDP_IFC 1 Both included FMT_SMR 1 Includ
70. rget Public Version Version 2 04 8 3 TOE Summary Specification Rationale As demonstrated in TOE Security Functions section page 39 TOE s security functions satisfy the requirements of all the security functions defined in TOE Security Requirements section page 29 The justification of the mapping between security functional requirements and the security enforcing functions is given in the table below and following descriptions sg 4 am om n n J SE2 SE5 SFR FPT_FLS 1 FPT_PHP3 FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFF1 FDP_ITT 1 FPT_ITT 1 FPT_RCV4 y FDP_SDI 1 FDP_UCT 1 FDP_UIT 1 FCS_COP 1 FCS_CKM 1 y FCS_CKM 4 FPT_TST 1 y FTP_ITC 1 FIA_UID 1 FIA_UAU 2 FIA_AFL 1 FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACFE1 FMT_SMR 1 FMT_MTD 1 FMT_MSA 1 A FMT_MSA 1 B FMT_MSA 2 FMT_MSA 3 FMT_SMF 1 S SE6 S SE7 S SE8 SISI SE1 N S SININIS SI ININSINIS S S S S SI INISINISINISINSISINI NINIS FPT_FLS 1 requires the TOE shall preserve a secure state even in environmental stress and or illegal operation This requirement is satisfied by illegal condition detection function of SF 1 checking parity and check sum of communication data by SF6 SF7 Self Test and protection of internal data by SE8 FPT_PHP 3 requires TOE to be resistant to physical attack This requirement is satisfied by illegal condition detection function of SF 1 and Tamper Resistant
71. rogram by re starting the IC Chip after download of the firmware completed Through the RF CARD I F activated by this firmware it is possible to establish the communication with a Contactless Smart Card This is the function to download the firmware to EEPROM area of the IC Chip Only the administrator is able to download the firmware by establishing the communication with the IC Chip after encrypted mutual authentication The firmware thus downloaded is the software developed by Sony Corporation or by the customer to make the communication possible between the IC Chip and a Contactless Smart Card Be careful that the firmware out scope of the TOE May 13 2005 17 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 5 Interface of the TOE The TOE is equipped with physical interface electrical interface logical interface as well as communication interface Physical Interface The physical interface of TOE is whole of the surface of the IC Chip Electrical Interface The electrical interface of TOE is all the external terminal pins of the IC Chip The external terminal pins of the IC can be grouped into a power supply pins b logic pins and c analog pins Logical Interface The logical interface of TOE is 1 UART interface 2 Mode set Interface and 3 Data bus interface Note The RC S940 contains some function blocks RF Card I F and inactivated circuit shown
72. rred FPT_RCV 4 May 13 2005 53 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 15 removed May 13 2005 54 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table 16 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 4 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O Leak_Protection Protection against Inherent Information Leakage intends implementation of providing protection to the confidentiality of leaked data stored to EEPROM If the user data transferred through the TOE leaked as variation in power consumption during encryption and computation processes FDP_ITT 1 Basic internal transfer protection makes the analysis of the leaked information difficult based upon the information flow control policy specified by FDP_IFC 1 Subset information flow control and FDP_IFF1 Simple security attributes In a manner similar to above FPT_ITT 1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection makes the analysis of the leaked TSF data difficult This TOE assumes the following threat Attackers may disclose the data internal to EEPROM e TOE Threats T Leak_Inherent cryptographic keys Following security objectives is used to cope with this threat TOE shall provide protection to the processing results and the
73. security launched by attackers with high level of attack potential 26 ST Security Target ST means a set of security requirements and specifications used as the clarified evaluation criteria of TOE 27 Strength of Function SOF SOF is the rating of security functions of TOE expressed by the minimum effort necessary to put the expected behavior of security functions invalid by launching direct attack against security mechanism in low level of hierarchy 28 TOE Target of Evaluation TOE is the object of evaluation at the time of acquiring the certification 29 TOE Security Functions TSF TSF is a set of all the hardware the software and the firmware of TOE upon which accurate implementation of TSP should depend 30 TSF Data This is the data created by TOE and the data created in relation with TOE that may affect the operation of TOE 31 UART I F This is the name of a wired interface used for communication with the controller UART I F is mainly used for communication with the controller 32 User data This is the data created by users and the data created in relation with the users that do not affect the operation of TSF May 13 2005 7 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 List of Abbreviations ATR CBC CC CPU CRYPTO DES DFA DPA EAL ECB EEPROM IC IF IPL NIST PP RAM RF ROM SOF SPA SRAM ST TSF
74. ssrtrresserreetesess 32 5 1 2 TOE Security Strength of Function Claims ccccessssesseesssssessesssssessessesseesessesssssessssssesseseseenesseenee 39 5 1 3 TOE Security Assurance Requirement 0 0 0 0 cccescessesesseesssseesecncssecssssesseesesaesesssssessuesssusssesssssesssnessanes 39 5 2 Security Requirements for the IT Environment esseessestessessesseeseescesesssesssssssssesssssssssseenseseensase 40 p TOE Sunmimary Speciel nnani e e E dalla puvaecgnas auaseusanesouaboatlowannalatle 41 Gl TOE Sey FUMCtlOns i A E A E N a 41 6 1 1 Security Functions Of IC Chip oo eees cess essesseesesseesesseesesnsssesncssecacssesseesesasesesesessssssussuesnssussnessesneesanes 41 6 1 2 Security Functions Of ROM Prograin eeeeseessesssssessesseesssseesssssessesssesesasesesasesesasssesssesssussssssesnsssssneessaes 43 6 2 Assuiranice Measure i naa A A Aa AAAA A aE A A AE AAE 45 PoP CAMS ve csisiissedegsavsdaaensedobesszsctdeuionsovdsevesesesdeasbtesuseus rA a A aE EAN AE N oE Ea 46 PIV SRP Reference nomia A AO E AA AEREA 46 May 13 2005 2 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 1 2 PP Tailoring seinen iiia aitain asahina e inaasa a asasena ioanen ain 46 TEA A alEO TAA E E A E E E EEE ET O E O ET 46 B A El AE E E E es deat oboe sada E E E E A E 47 8 1 Security Objectives Rationales arein tinnar esitin i das rias E EEE EEE N EEE 47 8 2 Security Requirements Rationale s
75. sssesnsssssscesssnsssesnesseanes 40 Tables Assurance Meastires i te scfstiscdscsvessasesa sav cosvatsocnstastssesadossvessadeusend E i Ea 45 Table 5 Security Protection Rationale eeeseessesssssesseesscstesncssesnsssecscesesasssesaeesesasssssuessesneesesaeessaesnesseenes 47 Table 6 Assumptions Rationale isni a a E a a E 47 Table 7 Threats Rationale ssi3scciecsecsicsstsdsctasias destaved easton iieii ia aiai eaan ei NEn Enia AEAEE aE 47 Table 8 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale ssesseesesssssseestessssrtestsrsssreettersssstereersssreeressss 50 Table 9 Security Objectives Rationale eee nisiongee riirii AREE 50 Table 10 Security Functional Requirements for IT Environment Rationale cece eesesseesesneeseenes 51 Table 11 Security Objectives for IT Environment Rationale 0 0 0 cece eessesessessesseesesaeesesssessssnseseeneeseanes 51 Table 12 Security Objectives for non IT Environment Rationale sssssssssssssesseesesrsssreestsssssstettsrsssreeressss 51 Table 13 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 1 sssssssesssssssssesessssssseesesssssseertsssssnrettsssssnrereersssreeesssss 52 Table 14 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 2 sssssssesssssssssesessssssseettsssssseetesrsssntettsssssnreresrsssreersssss 53 Table 15 emoved ac adanuwiivagens avai untuadentandadanuictawd ded alunite aden dakdanase 54 Table 16 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 4 occ ccseesesseesecsssses
76. ssssesseesesseesessesteseseeneaseseeaees 55 Table 17 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 5 w ccccssessesesseesesssssesssesesssesesasesesaesteesseeeasesesees 56 Table 18 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 7 o ccccssssssesssseesecssssesssesesasesesaeesesstesteseseeeseeseesees 57 Table 19 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 8 sesssssssssssssssessssssssseestsssssseetesssssneettsssssrteresrsssreeesssss 59 Table 20 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 9 sssssssssssssssssessssssssseettsssssseetesssssrrettsssssrrereersssreeesssse 60 Table 21 Adequacy of the security objectives for IT environment and SFR La essesseesestesseeesneeseenes 61 List of Figures Figure 1 Block Diagram of RC S940 IC Chip 2 cece cece cee ee eee cnenee cece eae neaeenea enna eens 12 Figure 2 Block Diagram of TOE muinin aiaei e ce nce e rece e eee e tee a ata i a aie enna 14 Figure 3 Lite Cycle OF TOE miorre tenen ta eaii a iea E ES Ea TTEA N even dendhauies 17 May 13 2005 4 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Definition of Terms 1 Assets Asset means the information or the resource to be protected by countermeasures of TOE 2 Carrier This is an IT product to which TOE is installed In the case of an IC Chip to be embedded to the card the carrier is a case made of plastics In the case of an IC Chip to be installed to a reader wr
77. t of Functionality Class K2 and strength of mechanism medium according to AIS20 6 1 1 Security Functions of IC Chip Detection of illegal operation This function detects illegal temperature voltage and frequency of TOE that outside the normal operating scope of TOE because of trouble accident or intentional act during data processing by TOE When detected any abnormal values the TOE performs a system reset Security functional requirements satisfied FPT_PHP 3 FPT_FLS 1 FPT_RCV 4 Protection to information leakage To convert the information leaked out of hidden channels located within TOE during encryption process and computation process into non beneficial information the SPA DPA resistant CRYPTO Engine is used as the countermeasures against power consumption analysis to provide protection to the confidentiality of data during encryption process and computation process Security functional requirements satisfied FDP_IFC 1 FDP_IFF 1 FDP_ITT 1 FPT_ITT 1 Physical protection A special TOE design and construction Tamper Resistant Layout which uses glue logic layout shield layers etc makes physical analysis reverse engineering or modification tampering of the TOE difficult In addition entry into Test Mode is protected by different protection functions These features protect the integrity of the complete TOE including SRAM ROM and EEPROM It therefore protects all User and TSF Data against disclosure by physical pro
78. ta and content of FMT_MTD 1 operation in IPL mode Modification of IPL authentication key and IPL execution key FMT_MSA 2 The key used for mutual authentication has security attribute EMT _MSA3 Only the personnel who authorized so shall be able to modify the SFR value of key FMT_MSA 1 A Only the personnel who authorized so shall be able to modify a key FMT MSA 1 B Only the personnel who authorized so shall be able to clear IPL Locked state To prevent illegal access to TOE performs IPL authentication IPL FIA_UID 1 ine authentication 1 command on behalf of users FIA UAU2 To prevent illegal access to TOE performs IPL authentication on behalf of users FCS CKM 1 To prevent illegal access to TOE this SFR performs generation of keys when used Triple DES cipher system FCS_COP 1 Controls encryption decryption processes of communication data May 13 2005 57 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Table19 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 7 continued The following security functional requirements meet this objective If the number of successive failures of IPL authentication exceeded FIA_ALF1 the specified number of times IPL Lock is activated to control so that further trials of IPL authentication are impossible To prevent illegal access to TOE this SFR performs destruction of ps the key generated for protection of communicatio
79. that is used in manufacturing process The Test Mode is prohibited after TOE delivery The RC S940 provides a secure platform for running reader writer firmware The firmware must be developed by a trustworthy developer that observes the requirements and hints given in the guidance documentation see assumption A Priv As the firmware is not part of the TOE the operation with firmware loaded in the TOE i e TOE is operating in Normal Mode is out of scope of this evaluation Nevertheless the assumption A Priv is necessary to ensure that no malicious firmware is loaded that might offend or violate the security policy of the TOE in IPL mode Some of the security features provided by the TOE Security functions are also present in Normal Mode these are Detection of illegal operation physical protection and self tests May 13 2005 13 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 2 2 Scope of TOE This section describes which IC chip components are scopes of TOE and which are out of scope based on the 2 1 Product Type Be careful that only a part of the IC Chip components are scope of TOE Product Name RC S940 Product Code CXD9768GG not whole of the IC Chip Components listed below are scope of the TOE CPU ROM SRAM EEPROM Security Logic Peripheral Equipment UART I F General propose ports Data bus whole surface of IC Chip all the external terminal p
80. the TOE with FMT_MSA 1 A and FMT_MSA 1 B Management of security attributes FMT_MSA 2 Secure security attributes FMT_MSA 3Static attribute initialization FMT_SMR 1 Security roles and FMT_MTD 1 Management of TSF data This security policy maintains the confidentiality of data by encrypting the communication data with FCS_COP1 Cryptographic operation This security policy manage cryptographic key with FCS_CKM 1 Cryptographic key generation and FCS_CKM 4 Cryptographic key destruction Unsuccessful authentication is limited by FIA_AFL 1 Authentication failure handling FTP_ITC 1 Inter TSF trusted channel is used for maintaining the integrity of high reliability channel between TSFs This TOE assumes the following threat TOE Threats T Access Attackers may disclose or and manipulate the data in the TOE The following security objectives are used to cope with this threat TOE shall provide protection to the data internal to TOE from illegal TOE Objectives O Data_Acc access The following security functional requirements meet this objective To prevent illegal manipulation of data internal to TOE IPL mode in FMT_SMF 1 which manipulation to data internal to TOE is possible is specified to be the security management function FMT_SMR 1 TOE is maintained so that only the authorized users to operate in IPL mode are allowed to operate TSE Following TSF data are management target da
81. to be delivered IC chip blank chip Process 5 Internal Delivery IC Chip Contents In Process 5 the IC chip blank chip manufactured in Process 4 is delivered to the manufacturing factory Location Responsible Personnel IC developer and manufacturing factory Items to be delivered IPL keys Firmware option Process 6 Internal Delivery Key and firmware Contents IPL keys and firmware option prepared in Process 2 are delivered to the manufacturing factory writing the keys and the firmware to the IC with the secure delivery procedures in Process 6 May 13 2005 20 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Location Manufacturing factory Responsible Personnel manufacturer Process 7 IC Installing Key and Firmware download Contents In Process 7 IPL Keys and the firmware option are written to the IC chip delivered from the IC manufacturing factory in the previous process Location Responsible Personnel Delivery personnel company Items to be delivered IC Chip containing key and firmware Process 8 TOE Delivery IC Chip Contends In Process 8 the IC chip containing key and firmware produced in Process 7 is delivered to the customer Location Responsible Personnel IC developer and customer Items to be delivered IPL keys Process 9 TOE Delivery Key Contents IPL keys prepared in Process 2 are delivered to the customer
82. ts are described The security objectives as the objectives of the security policy are defined as well as the security requirements The requirements are built up of the security functional requirements as a part of the security policy and the security assurance requirements as the steps during the evaluation and certification to show the TOE meets its requirements The functions of the TOE to meet the requirements are described The security enforcing functions are defined here in the security target as property of this specific TOE Here it is shown how this specific TOE fulfils the corresponding requirements 1 3 CC Conformance This security target is conformant to Common Criteria V2 1 ISO15408 part 2 conformant part 3 conformant The assurance level is EALA This Security Target does not claim conformances to any Protection Profile 1 4 References CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1 Introduction and general model Version 2 1 August 1999 CCIMB 99 031 CC Part1 Common Criteria Part1 ISO IEC 15408 Part1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part2 Security functional requirements Version 2 1 August 1999 CCIMB 99 032 CC Part2 Common Criteria Part2 ISO IEC 15408 Part2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3 Security assurance requirements Version 2 1 August 1999 CCIMB 99 033 CC Part3 Common Criteria Part3 ISO IEC 15408 Part3
83. ts for IT Environment Rationale TOE Objectives Addressed by SFR FCS_COP 1 FCS_CKM 1 FCS_CKM 4 FTP_ITC 1 OE CoSec_Com Table 11 Security Objectives for IT Environment Rationale TOE Objectives Addressed by SFR FCS_COP 1 OE CoSec_Com FCS_CKM 1 OE CoSec_Com FCS_CKM 4 OE CoSec_Com FTP_ITC 1 OE CoSec_Com Table 12 Security Objectives for non IT Environment Rationale TOE Environment Non IT Objectives OE Extemal_Manage OE Pers OE Delivery May 13 2005 51 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 Adequacy of Security policy and Security Functions Requirements Table 13 Adequacy of the security objectives and SFR 1 The relationship between the security objectives and the security functional requirements is as shown in the table below O Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions intends implementation of providing protection to a results of TOE s encryption and computation processes from modification and b deactivation of the security functions caused by environmental stresses This security policy detects the environmental stress with FPT_PHP3 Resistance to physical attack and maintains the TOE in secure conditions with FPT_FLS 1 Failure with preservation of secure state And FPT_RCV 4 Function recovery provide for secure operation in case of environmental stress This TOE assumes the following threats
84. y Assets consist of User data and TSF data Assets other than above are defined as Secondary Assets Secondary Assets consist of data managed external to TOE and the related documents 3 1 1 Primary Assets of TOE TOE s assets are the User data and the TSF data The User data includes especially firmware and other data used by firmware TSF data is security relevant data e g cryptographic keys used by TOE Because the User data and or TSF data is transferred through external and internal interface and stored in the TOE external communication data internal communication data and data stored in the TOE shall be protected External communication data is transferred between the Controller and the TOE and internal communication data is transferred through the data bus within the TOE USER data and TSF data are stored to the EEPROM In order to protect integrity of User data and TSF data results of data processing is defined as assets to be protected Data processing by TOE includes encryption decryption generation of random number calculation of check sum and CRC May 13 2005 23 69 FeliCa Business Center Confidential Sony Corporation RC S940 Security Target Public Version Version 2 04 3 2 Assumptions 3 2 1 Physical Assumptions A External_Data External TOE Data It is assumed that the management of external TOE data is performed in a secure manner Significant information regardi
85. yption and decryption with a specified cryptographic algorithm SES and SE6 perform encryption and decryption for mutual authentication and communication data encryption using Triple DES provided by SF4 Therefore SE4 SES and SE6 satisfy this requirement FCS_CKM 1 and FCS_CKM 4 require cryptographic key generation and destruction in secure manner These requirements are satisfied in mutual authentication process of SES Pseudo random number generator of SF4 also satisfies FCS_CKM 1 FPT_TST 1 requires performing self tests SE 7 Self Test obviously satisfies this requirement FTP_ITC 1 requires TOE to provide a secure communication channel between itself and a remote trusted IT product and to permit remote trusted IT product to initiate communication for IPL Authentication SE6 Protection of data passing through the interface provides secure communication channel between TOE and controller a remote trusted IT product The communication is initiated by SES mutual authentication Therefore this requirement is satisfied FIA_UID 1 FIA_UAU 2 require timing of identification and user authentication before any action Mutual authentication of SE5 satisfies these requirements FIA_AFL 1 2 requires authentication failure handling IPL lock function of SE5 satisfies this requirement FDP_ACC 1 FDP_ACF 1 FMT_MSA 1 A FMT_MSA 1 B FMT_MSA 2 FMT_MSA 3 and FMT_MTD 1 require TOE to enforce Access Control Policy for access control and management of security

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